

# [MS-NRPC]: Netlogon Remote Protocol Specification

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## Revision Summary

Date	Revision History	Revision Class	Comments
12/18/2006	0.01		MCPD Milestone 2 Initial Availability
03/02/2007	1.0		MCPD Milestone 2
04/03/2007	1.1		Monthly release
05/11/2007	1.2		Monthly release
06/01/2007	1.2.1	Editorial	Revised and edited the technical content.
07/03/2007	2.0	Major	Technical changes were made to existing sections.
07/20/2007	2.1	Minor	Made technical and editorial changes based on feedback.
08/10/2007	2.2	Minor	Updated content based on feedback.
09/28/2007	2.3	Minor	Made technical and editorial changes based on feedback.
10/23/2007	2.4	Minor	Made technical and editorial changes based on feedback.
11/30/2007	2.5	Minor	Made technical changes based on feedback.
01/25/2008	2.6	Minor	Updated the technical content.
03/14/2008	2.7	Minor	Updated the technical content.
05/16/2008	3.0	Major	Updated and revised the technical content.
06/20/2008	4.0	Major	Updated and revised the technical content.
07/25/2008	5.0	Major	Updated and revised the technical content.
08/29/2008	6.0	Major	Updated and revised the technical content.
10/24/2008	6.1	Minor	Updated the technical content.
12/05/2008	7.0	Major	Updated and revised the technical content.
01/16/2009	7.1	Minor	Updated the technical content.
02/27/2009	8.0	Major	Updated and revised the technical content.
04/10/2009	9.0	Major	Updated and revised the technical content.
05/22/2009	9.1	Minor	Updated the technical content.
07/02/2009	10.0	Major	Updated and revised the technical content.
08/14/2009	11.0	Major	Updated and revised the technical content.

<b>Date</b>	<b>Revision History</b>	<b>Revision Class</b>	<b>Comments</b>
09/25/2009	12.0	Major	Updated and revised the technical content.
11/06/2009	13.0	Major	Updated and revised the technical content.
12/18/2009	14.0	Major	Updated and revised the technical content.
01/29/2010	15.0	Major	Updated and revised the technical content.
03/12/2010	16.0	Major	Updated and revised the technical content.
04/23/2010	17.0	Major	Updated and revised the technical content.
06/04/2010	18.0	Major	Updated and revised the technical content.
07/16/2010	18.1	Minor	Clarified the meaning of the technical content.
08/27/2010	19.0	Major	Significantly changed the technical content.
10/08/2010	20.0	Major	Significantly changed the technical content.
11/19/2010	21.0	Major	Significantly changed the technical content.
01/07/2011	21.1	Minor	Clarified the meaning of the technical content.
02/11/2011	21.2	Minor	Clarified the meaning of the technical content.
03/25/2011	21.3	Minor	Clarified the meaning of the technical content.
05/06/2011	22.0	Major	Significantly changed the technical content.
06/17/2011	23.0	Major	Significantly changed the technical content.

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# 1 Introduction

The Netlogon Remote Protocol is a **remote procedure call (RPC)** interface that is used for user and machine authentication on domain-based networks.

The Netlogon Remote Protocol in Microsoft Windows® is used to maintain domain relationships from the members of a **domain** to the **domain controller (DC)**, among DCs for a domain, and between DCs across domains. This RPC interface is used to discover and manage these relationships.

## 1.1 Glossary

The following terms are defined in [\[MS-GLOS\]](#):

- authentication level**
- authenticator**
- backup domain controller (BDC)**
- binary large object (BLOB)**
- client challenge**
- computer name**
- computer object**
- credential**
- database (1)**
- database serial number**
- directory service (DS)**
- domain**
- domain account**
- domain controller (DC)**
- domain local group**
- domain member (member machine)**
- domain name (3)**
- Domain Name System (DNS)**
- domain tree**
- dynamic endpoint**
- encryption key**
- endpoint**
- forest**
- forest trust information**
- full database synchronization**
- fully qualified domain name (FQDN)**
- global catalog (GC)**
- globally unique identifier (GUID)**
- group**
- Hash-based Message Authentication Code (HMAC)**
- Interface Definition Language (IDL)**
- Local Security Authority (LSA) database**
- mailslot**
- mixed mode**
- naming context (NC)**
- NetBIOS name**
- nonce**
- one-way function (OWF)**
- opnum**
- original equipment manufacturer (OEM) character set**

partial database synchronization  
primary domain  
primary domain controller (PDC)  
principal  
privilege  
remote procedure call (RPC)  
RPC protocol sequence  
RPC transport  
secret key  
secure channel  
security account manager (SAM) built-in database  
security context  
security principal  
security provider  
security support provider (SSP)  
Security Support Provider Interface (SSPI)  
server challenge  
service principal name (SPN)  
session key  
site  
sub-authentication  
sub-authentication package  
ticket-granting ticket (TGT)  
transitive trust  
trust  
trust path  
trusted domain object (TDO)  
Unicode  
universally unique identifier (UUID)  
user principal name (UPN)

The following terms are defined in [\[MS-ADTS\]](#):

**relative identifier (RID)**

The following terms are defined in [\[MS-DTYP\]](#):

**security identifier (SID)**

The following terms are specific to this document:

**alias:** A **group** that is local to a particular machine (as opposed to a **group** that has security permissions and settings for the entire **domain**).

**authoritative response:** An authoritative response is one in which the server has all necessary resources to service the caller's request. If some of the resources are temporarily unavailable, then the server will indicate that its response is not authoritative. When a server does not return an authoritative response, it is reasonable for the caller to retry the request at another server. The reasons why a request is non-authoritative are always implementation-specific and could include any failure of the server to allocate necessary resources.

**checked build:** A special build of a Windows NT-based operating system that contains fewer compiler optimizations and more debugging checks than a production environment build. The purpose of the checked build is to make identifying and diagnosing operating system-level problems easier. For more information, see [\[MSDN-CHKBLD\]](#).

**delta:** One of a set of possible changes that can be made to a **database**.

**direct trust:** A type of authentication functionality in which one **domain** accepts another **domain** as an authoritative source to provide object authentication and other **Active Directory** services for that other **domain**. For example, if a **direct trust** is established from **domain**, DOMAIN-A, to **domain**, DOMAIN-B, DOMAIN-A trusts DOMAIN-B. If a **domain**, DOMAIN-A, must authenticate an object, such as a user account, from a **domain**, DOMAIN-B, DOMAIN-A requests that DOMAIN-B authenticate the user account, and DOMAIN-A will treat the response from DOMAIN-B as reliable.

**enterprise network:** The network of computer systems in an organization, such as a corporation. An enterprise can span geographical locations and often includes a variety of computer types, operating systems, protocols, and network architectures.

**RC4:** A variable key-size stream cipher with byte-oriented operations. The algorithm is based on the use of a random permutation.

**read-only domain controller (RODC):** A **domain controller** that does not accept originating updates. Additionally, an **RODC** does not perform outbound replication.

**security account manager (SAM) account database:** Microsoft-specific terminology for the part of the user account **database** that contains account information (such as account name and passwords) for account and **groups** that are created after **database** installation.

**shared secret:** A piece of data known only to the **security principal** and authenticating authority. It is used to prove the **principal's** identity.

**writable domain controller:** A **domain controller** that performs originating updates and outbound replication.

**MAY, SHOULD, MUST, SHOULD NOT, MUST NOT:** These terms (in all caps) are used as described in [\[RFC2119\]](#). All statements of optional behavior use either MAY, SHOULD, or SHOULD NOT.

## 1.2 References

References to Microsoft Open Specification documents do not include a publishing year because links are to the latest version of the documents, which are updated frequently. References to other documents include a publishing year when one is available.

### 1.2.1 Normative References

We conduct frequent surveys of the normative references to assure their continued availability. If you have any issue with finding a normative reference, please contact [dochelp@microsoft.com](mailto:dochelp@microsoft.com). We will assist you in finding the relevant information. Please check the archive site, <http://msdn2.microsoft.com/en-us/library/E4BD6494-06AD-4aed-9823-445E921C9624>, as an additional source.

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[MS-ADA1] Microsoft Corporation, "[Active Directory Schema Attributes A-L](#)".

[MS-ADA3] Microsoft Corporation, "[Active Directory Schema Attributes N-Z](#)".

[MS-ADSC] Microsoft Corporation, "[Active Directory Schema Classes](#)".

[MS-ADTS] Microsoft Corporation, "[Active Directory Technical Specification](#)".

[MS-APDS] Microsoft Corporation, "[Authentication Protocol Domain Support Specification](#)".

[MS-CIFS] Microsoft Corporation, "[Common Internet File System \(CIFS\) Protocol Specification](#)".

[MS-DISO] Microsoft Corporation, "[Domain Interactions System Overview](#)".

[MS-DTYP] Microsoft Corporation, "[Windows Data Types](#)".

[MS-ERREF] Microsoft Corporation, "[Windows Error Codes](#)".

[MS-GPSB] Microsoft Corporation, "[Group Policy: Security Protocol Extension](#)".

[MS-LSAD] Microsoft Corporation, "[Local Security Authority \(Domain Policy\) Remote Protocol Specification](#)".

[MS-LSAT] Microsoft Corporation, "[Local Security Authority \(Translation Methods\) Remote Protocol Specification](#)".

[MS-MAIL] Microsoft Corporation, "[Remote Mailslot Protocol Specification](#)".

[MS-NLMP] Microsoft Corporation, "[NT LAN Manager \(NTLM\) Authentication Protocol Specification](#)".

[MS-PAC] Microsoft Corporation, "[Privilege Attribute Certificate Data Structure](#)".

[MS-RCMP] Microsoft Corporation, "[Remote Certificate Mapping Protocol Specification](#)".

[MS-RPCE] Microsoft Corporation, "[Remote Procedure Call Protocol Extensions](#)".

[MS-RPRN] Microsoft Corporation, "[Print System Remote Protocol Specification](#)".

[MS-RRP] Microsoft Corporation, "[Windows Remote Registry Protocol Specification](#)".

[MS-SAMR] Microsoft Corporation, "[Security Account Manager \(SAM\) Remote Protocol Specification \(Client-to-Server\)](#)".

[MS-SMB] Microsoft Corporation, "[Server Message Block \(SMB\) Protocol Specification](#)".

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[RFC1321] Rivest, R., "The MD5 Message-Digest Algorithm", RFC 1321, April 1992, <http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc1321.txt>

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### 1.2.2 Informative References

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If you have any trouble finding [LANMAN], please check [here](#).

[LSAPOLICY] Microsoft Corporation, "LSA Policy", <http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms721831.aspx>

[MS-GLOS] Microsoft Corporation, "[Windows Protocols Master Glossary](#)".

[MSDN-CHKBLD] Microsoft Corporation, "Checked Build of Windows", <http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ff543457.aspx>

[NTLM] Microsoft Corporation, "Microsoft NTLM", <http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa378749.aspx>

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[PIPE] Microsoft Corporation, "Named Pipes", <http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa365590.aspx>

[SAMATTRIB] Microsoft Corporation, "All Attributes", <http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms675090.aspx>

[SIDATT] Microsoft Corporation, "TOKEN\_GROUPS", <http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa379624.aspx>

If you have any trouble finding [SIDATT], please check [here](#).

[SPNAMES] Microsoft Corporation, "Name Formats for Unique SPNs", <http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms677601.aspx>

## 1.3 Overview

The Netlogon Remote Protocol is used for secure communication between machines in a domain (both **domain members** and domain controllers) and domain controllers. The communication is secured by using a shared **session key** computed between the client and the DC that is engaged in the secure communication. The session key is computed by using a preconfigured **shared secret** that is known to the client and the DC.

The Netlogon Remote Protocol client and server can only run on domain-joined systems, and are started during boot. When a system is unjoined from the domain, then the client and server are stopped and will not be started during boot.

The following sections describe the scenarios in which the Netlogon Remote Protocol is used. The description is not normative, but it provides an overview about the general purpose of the Netlogon Remote Protocol and the flow of its operations.

### 1.3.1 Pass-Through Authentication


In a scenario where a user does an **interactive logon** to a client machine and connects to a server, the connection must be authenticated. The client and the server engage in an authentication protocol, such as NTLM (as specified in [MS-NLMP]), which validates the user **credentials** and logs the user on to the server upon successful validation. This type of logon is known as **network logon** because it happens over a network connection from the client to the server.

To authenticate the user, the server must pass the user credentials securely to a domain controller in the domain of the user account. (The domain controller is the entity, other than the client machine, that knows the user **secret key**; that is, the user password.) After the logon request is delivered to the DC and the DC successfully validates the credentials, the DC refers back to the server those attributes of the user account that the server can use in authorization decisions (such as granting the user access to a particular file).

It is the responsibility of the Netlogon Remote Protocol to deliver the logon request to the domain controller over a **secure channel** that is established from the server (acting as the secure channel client) to the DC (acting as the secure channel server). The secure channel is achieved by encrypting the communication traffic with a session key computed using a secret key (called a server's machine account password) shared by the server and the domain controller.

Upon successful validation of the user credentials on the DC, the Netlogon Remote Protocol is responsible for delivering the user authorization attributes (referred to as user validation information) back to the server over the secure channel.

This mechanism of delegating the authentication request to a domain controller is called pass-through authentication, a process in which the server passes the logon request through to the domain controller. The following illustration depicts a process of pass-through authentication in which the authentication request is passed over a secure channel from a server in Domain A to a DC in the domain containing the user account, in this case also Domain A.




**Figure 1: Pass-through authentication**

### 1.3.2 Pass-Through Authentication and Domain Trusts

The user account can be in a domain other than the domain of the server. In that case, the DC receiving the logon request from the server must pass the request on to a DC in the domain of the user account. To make such scenarios work, the domain of the server (called the resource domain) and the domain of the user account (called the account domain) engage in a **trust** relationship, in which authentication decisions made in the account domain are trusted in the resource domain. In such trust relationships, the resource domain is called the trusting domain, while the account domain is called the trusted domain. Trust relationships are established by administrators of the two domains.

The result of a trust establishment is a shared secret (called a trust password) that DCs use in the two domains for computing the session key that is used for protecting the secure channel traffic. By using this secure channel, the DC in the resource domain can pass logon requests securely to the DC in the account domain, in the same way that the server passed the logon request to the former DC. The secure channel between DCs in two domains that are connected via a trust relationship is called a trusted domain secure channel. In contrast, the secure channel between the server and the DC in the resource domain is called a workstation secure channel. The following illustration depicts a process of pass-through authentication in which the authentication request is passed over two secure channels: from a server in Domain A to a DC in the same domain, and then from that DC to a DC in Domain B, which contains the user account.





**Figure 2: Pass-through authentication and domain trusts**

In the above scenario, the two domains are connected by means of a **direct trust** relationship. Consider a scenario in which the two domains are connected by means of an "intermediate trust partner"; the resource domain trusts the intermediate domain, which in turn trusts the account domain. There can be multiple domains connected by means of trust relationships along the chain of direct domain trusts between the resource and the account domains. This type of trust relationship, in which the resource domain trusts the account domain through a chain of trust relationships between intermediate domains, is called **transitive trust**. Each link in the transitive trust chain is backed by a shared secret used by DCs in two domains involved in the link for establishing the secure channel. Thus, the resource domain DC can deliver the logon request to the account domain DC over a chain of secure channels.

### 1.3.3 Secure Channel Maintenance

The security of a channel based on a shared secret depends on the secrecy of that shared value. Good cryptographic hygiene requires that such a shared value not be permanent. This protocol includes the facility to choose a new password and communicate that from the client to the DC. This allows client implementations of this protocol to set new passwords on machine accounts (if the request comes over a workstation secure channel) or on the trust accounts (if the request comes over a trusted domain secure channel).

### 1.3.4 Domain Trust Services

In some application scenarios, it may be desirable to obtain the list of domain trusts. For example, an application collecting user credentials may need to present the list of trusted domains from which

users may choose their domains. The Netlogon Remote Protocol provides services to such applications via methods for retrieving domain trust information.

### 1.3.5 Message Protection Services

Some applications may need to authenticate their messages sent to and received from a DC. Windows Time Service is an example of such an application running on a machine that authenticates messages carrying time information received from the DC. The Netlogon Remote Protocol provides services to such applications via methods for computing a cryptographic digest of the message by using the machine account or trust password as the cryptographic key. By using these methods, the application running on the DC obtains the message digest and includes it in its response to the client. The application running on the client receives the message, obtains the message digest, and compares the digest with that received from the DC. If the two digests are the same, the client determines that the message was indeed sent by the DC.

### 1.3.6 Administrative Services

Administrators may need to control or query the behavior related to Netlogon operations. For example, an administrator may want to force a change of the machine account password, or may want to reset the secure channel to a particular DC in the domain. Netlogon provides such administrative services via methods for querying and controlling the server.

#### 1.3.6.1 Netlogon Operational Flow on Domain Members

The first action that a Netlogon client performs on a domain member is finding a DC in its domain with which to set up the secure channel. This process is called the DC discovery. After a DC is discovered, the domain member sets up a secure channel to the DC.

For all subsequent requests from the client to the DC pertaining to authentication, the Netlogon Remote Protocol transmits the request by using the secure channel. The Netlogon Remote Protocol receives the user validation data over the secure channel from the DC and returns the data to the authentication protocol.

Periodically, the operating system can use the Netlogon Remote Protocol to change the machine account password.

### 1.3.7 Netlogon Structures and Methods

The Netlogon Remote Protocol structures and methods that are specified in [section 2.2.1](#) and [section 3.5.5](#) are grouped according to the Netlogon scenarios and operational flows as follows:

- [DC Location Structures \(section 2.2.1.2\)](#) and [DC Location Methods \(section 3.5.5.3\)](#). The Netlogon Remote Protocol uses the structures and methods in this group to locate a domain controller in the specified domain. Methods in this group are also used for obtaining the **site** information that is related to DC discovery, as well as for maintaining **DNS** registration information for domain controllers.
- [Secure Channel Establishment and Maintenance Structures \(section 2.2.1.3\)](#) and [Secure Channel Establishment and Maintenance Methods \(section 3.5.5.4\)](#). Structures and methods in this group are used for setting up and maintaining the secure channel.
- [Pass-Through Authentication Structures \(section 2.2.1.4\)](#) and [Pass-Through Authentication Methods \(section 3.5.5.5\)](#). These structures and methods are used for performing pass-through authentication and obtaining user validation information.

- [Domain Trust Structures \(section 2.2.1.5\)](#) and [Domain Trust Methods \(section 3.5.5.6\)](#). Structures and methods in this group are used for retrieving domain trust information.
- [Message Protection Methods \(section 3.5.5.7\)](#). Methods in this group are used for performing the message protection services.
- [Administrative Services Structures \(section 2.2.1.6\)](#) and [Administrative Services Methods \(section 3.5.5.8\)](#). This group of structures and methods is used for querying and controlling the Netlogon Remote Protocol server.
- [Obsolete Structures \(section 2.2.1.7\)](#) and [Obsolete Methods \(section 3.5.5.9\)](#). The structures and methods in this group are unsupported and obsolete.

### 1.3.7.1 History of Netlogon

The Netlogon Remote Protocol is an older protocol that predates Microsoft Windows NT® operating system and has been through multiple revisions and expansions. As a result, some of the methods are not used in non-LAN Manager environments, and new structures and methods were introduced to support the new functionality required.

#### 1.3.7.1.1 Microsoft LAN Manager

Microsoft's first major entrance into the network operating system field was LAN Manager, a suite of products that worked on MS-DOS, OS/2, Microsoft Windows® 3.0 operating system, and Microsoft Windows NT® 3.1 operating system. While LAN Manager produced many of the underlying paradigms for how services were accessed over the network, the implementation of those paradigms have changed significantly between LAN Manager and Microsoft Windows NT® operating system. In cases where those interfaces were implemented by using RPC [\[MS-RPCE\]](#) the Windows NT line of products may have had support for older clients to make use of those interfaces or methods within those interfaces. However, Windows NT-based products do not use those methods; therefore, those methods are not documented.

#### 1.3.7.1.2 New Methods Derived from Existing Methods

In many cases, a new method would differ from an existing method by the addition of one or a few new parameters. In such cases, one of two naming conventions was used. One convention was that the new method would typically be named identically to the existing method, except for the addition of a suffix such as Ex (to mean Extended, as in the [DsrGetDcNameEx](#) method, which is the extended version of the original [DsrGetDcName](#) method). The other convention was to add a numeral value to reflect the method revision number (as in the [NetrServerAuthenticate2](#) method and [NetrServerAuthenticate3](#) method, which are the new versions of the original [NetrServerAuthenticate](#) method).

#### 1.3.7.1.3 Using Dummy Fields in Structures

The requirements of the Netlogon Remote Protocol have evolved over time. During the original design phase, typed but unused fields were appended to some structures. In later versions of the protocol, if new data needed to be transmitted between the client and the server, these fields could be used without ill effects, so long as the type of the data was preserved. The servers of a previous version of the Netlogon protocol would receive and ignore the fields.

In many cases, an introduction of a new Ex structure necessitated an introduction of a corresponding Ex RPC method for passing the new structure between the client and the server. As an alternative to the growing number of Ex structures and methods, an approach was introduced to avoid the addition of new structures and methods by using dummy fields. New structures would

have a few unused fields, such as **DummyString1**, **DummyString2**, **DummyLong1**, and **DummyLong2**. These dummy fields allow additional information that was not conceived originally to be passed through the interface in a safe fashion. If the structure has not been extended, these fields are set to zero and ignored upon receipt.

For example, a dummy field **DummyString1** of the [NETLOGON\\_ONE\\_DOMAIN\\_INFO \(section 2.2.1.3.10\)](#) structure was used at one point to carry trust extension attributes. As a dummy field got used, it might or might not be renamed. In the case of **NETLOGON\_ONE\_DOMAIN\_INFO**, **DummyString1** was renamed as **TrustExtension** to reflect the new nature of the field. This scheme of dummy field usage worked well: the Netlogon Remote Protocol running on a new client receiving the **NETLOGON\_ONE\_DOMAIN\_INFO** structure would use the **TrustExtension** field as appropriate, while the **NETLOGON\_ONE\_DOMAIN\_INFO** running on an old client would completely ignore the **DummyString1** field.

#### 1.3.7.1.4 Fields and Structures Used by Netlogon Pass-through Methods

During the design of the **NetrLogonSamLogon** method which is used for Netlogon pass-through, three fields were created to pass information opaquely for applications:

- **LogonLevel**
- **LogonInformation**
- **ValidationLevel**

At that time it was thought that there would be four types of logon:

- Interactive
- Network
- Service
- Generic

In Windows, only three were used: Interactive, Network, and Generic. Service type remains an option that can be used by callers, and like all Netlogon pass-through behavior, it must be specified by the receiving protocol.


#### 1.3.7.1.5 Using Negotiated Flags

The client and the server often need to know the capabilities of their partners in their client/server communications. For example, it is sometimes necessary or desirable for a newer version client to avoid calling a method that the older version server does not implement. Similarly, the new server should avoid sending fields that the old client is going to treat as dummies and ignore. To make this possible, the client and the server need to establish a common set of capabilities that both the client and the server support.

For this reason, the [NetrServerAuthenticate3 \(section 3.5.5.4.2\)](#) method, which is called early on during setup of the secure channel between the client and the server, includes the *NegotiateFlags* parameter. The *NegotiateFlags* parameter uses a set of bit flags to carry the client and server capabilities. The client sets its capabilities on input, and the server responds with capabilities that it supports out of those sent by the client. The resulting set of bit flags is the set of capabilities that the client and the server mutually support.

## 1.4 Relationship to Other Protocols

The Netlogon Remote Protocol depends on RPC and on the **mailslot** datagram delivery service, as specified in [\[MS-SMB\]](#), which are its transports.



**Figure 3: Transport relationships**

Other non-RFC standard specifications relevant to the implementation of the Netlogon Remote Protocol are:

- Active Directory Technical Specification [\[MS-ADTS\]](#) defines AD data types, data structures, and their interactions, many of which are relevant to the functioning of the Netlogon Remote Protocol.
- Group Policy: Security Protocol Extension [\[MS-GPSB\]](#) is for managing secure channel signing and encryption settings.
- Local Security Authority (Domain Policy) Remote Protocol Specification [\[MS-LSAD\]](#) is used for accessing certain directory information.
- NT LAN Manager (NTLM) Authentication Protocol Specification [\[MS-NLMP\]](#) uses netlogon for pass-through authentication and specifies how to do one-way functions (OWF) of the computer password.
- Security Account Manager (SAM) Remote Protocol Specification (Client-to-Server) [\[MS-SAMR\]](#) is used for account lookup during session-key negotiation.

Authentication Protocol Domain Support Specification [\[MS-APDS\]](#) is an example of how authentication protocols can use generic pass-through (section [3.2.4.1](#)).

## 1.5 Prerequisites/Preconditions

The Netlogon Remote Protocol is an RPC interface and, as a result, has the prerequisites that [\[MS-RPCE\]](#) specifies as being common to RPC interfaces.

Netlogon replication uses the mailslot datagram delivery mechanism; therefore, it depends on this mailslot delivery mechanism being operational before Netlogon begins operation. For mailslot operational requirements, see [\[MS-MAIL\]](#) section 1.5. For more information about the mailslot delivery mechanism, see [\[MS-CIFS\]](#) section 2.2.4.33.

To use the Netlogon Remote Protocol or to use Netlogon as an **SSP**, a computer requires a shared secret (section [3.1.1](#)) with the domain controller (DC).

The client of the secure channel is required to discover the DC to which it is establishing a secure channel. Thus, a domain member discovers a DC in its domain.

Upon establishing a secure channel, a client can call any of the Netlogon Remote Protocol methods that require a secure channel. This requires both the client and the server to have a working RPC

implementation, including the security extensions ([\[MS-RPCE\]](#) section 2.2.1.1.7). For a complete list of methods that require a secure channel, see section [3.5](#).

All Netlogon Remote Protocol methods are RPC calls from the client to the server that perform the complete operation in a single call. No shared state between the client and server is assumed other than the **security context** that was previously established. There are no restrictions on the number of times that a method can be called or the order in which methods can be called, unless explicitly noted in sections [3.4](#) and [3.5](#).

The Netlogon Remote Protocol client and server can run only on domain-joined systems. The Netlogon Remote Protocol is enabled or disabled during the domain join and unjoin tasks as specified in [\[MS-DISO\]](#).

## 1.6 Applicability Statement

The Netlogon Remote Protocol is used only when the client or server is a member of a Microsoft Windows® domain.

The Netlogon Remote Protocol contains an implementation of a security support provider (SSP), which provides packet encryption and signing services to secure client and server communication at the RPC packet level. These security services are used for establishing a secure channel for RPC-based client-to-server communication.

The Netlogon Remote Protocol can act as a secure transport for NTLM authentication and for other authentication mechanisms between arbitrary servers and the account authority or domain controller for that server. The Netlogon Remote Protocol also provides methods for maintaining the trust password for all versions of Windows. Additional information for the methods in this topic is provided in section [3](#) for cases where the server is not a member of a domain and resolves requests independently.

## 1.7 Versioning and Capability Negotiation

- Supported Transports: The Netlogon Remote Protocol uses the mailslot datagram delivery service, RPC over named pipes and RPC over TCP/IP as its only transports. Also see section [2.1](#).
- Security and Authentication Methods: As specified in section [3.2](#) and [\[MS-RPCE\]](#) section 1.7.
- Protocol Version: This protocol's RPC interface has a single version number of 1.0. Microsoft may extend this protocol by adding RPC methods to the interface with **opnums** lying numerically beyond those defined in this document. A client determines whether such methods are supported by attempting to invoke the method. If the version of the interface does not implement the method being invoked, it is required that the RPC server return an opnum out of range error. RPC versioning and capability negotiation for this situation is specified in [\[C706\]](#) and [\[MS-RPCE\]](#) section 2.1.

For methods with multiple definitions (for example, [NetrServerAuthenticate \(section 3.5.5.4.4\)](#), [NetrServerAuthenticate2 \(section 3.5.5.4.3\)](#), and [NetrServerAuthenticate3 \(section 3.5.5.4.2\)](#)), the Netlogon Remote Protocol first tries the most recent definition of the method for which it has code. If that fails, the Netlogon Remote Protocol tries the next most recent definition, and so on. Using the **NetrServerAuthenticate** example, the Netlogon Remote Protocol tries **NetrServerAuthenticate3** first, **NetrServerAuthenticate2** second, and finally **NetrServerAuthenticate**.

- Capability Negotiation: When a secure channel is established, the *NegotiateFlags* parameter of the **NetrServerAuthenticate2** and **NetrServerAuthenticate3** methods is used to negotiate a

common set of capabilities that each of the participants in the negotiation can support. See section [3.1.4.2](#).

## 1.8 Vendor-Extensible Fields

This protocol uses NTSTATUS values as defined in [\[MS-ERREF\]](#) section 2.3. Vendors are free to choose their own values for this field, as long as the C bit (0x20000000) is set, indicating it is a customer code.

## 1.9 Standards Assignments

Parameter	Value	Reference
RPC interface UUID	12345678-1234-ABCD-EF00-01234567CFFB	Section <a href="#">2.1</a>
Pipe name	\PIPE\NETLOGON	Section <a href="#">2.1</a>
Mailslot name	\MAILSLOT\NET\NETLOGON	Section <a href="#">2.1</a>

## 2 Messages

### 2.1 Transport

The Netlogon Remote Protocol uses the following **RPC protocol sequences** as specified in [\[MS-RPCE\]](#) section 2.1:

- RPC over TCP/IP
- RPC over named pipes

This protocol uses RPC **dynamic endpoints** for RPC over TCP/IP, as specified in [\[C706\] part 4](#).

This protocol uses the following well-known **endpoint**. This endpoint is a named pipe for RPC over **SMB**:

- \PIPE\NETLOGON

This protocol uses the mailslot datagram delivery service ([\[MS-MAIL\]](#) and [\[MS-SMB\]](#)). Mailslot messages (see [\[MS-MAIL\]](#) section 2.2.1) are sent to the following mailslot:

- \MAILSLOT\NET\NETLOGON. This named mailslot is used in the Netlogon replication protocol.

This protocol MUST use the **universally unique identifier (UUID)** 12345678-1234-ABCD-EF00-01234567CFFB. The RPC version number is 1.0.

The Netlogon Remote Protocol uses the Netlogon SSP. The server MUST use the RPC security provider extensions ([\[MS-RPCE\]](#) section 2.2.1.1.7). It MUST register the Netlogon security package as specified in section [3.3](#).

### 2.2 Common Data Types

In addition to the RPC base types and definitions that are specified in [\[C706\]](#) section 4.2.9 and [\[MS-RPCE\]](#) section 2.2, additional data types are defined in the following sections.

#### 2.2.1 Structures and Enumerated Types

This section details structures and enumerated types that are defined and used by the Netlogon RPC methods described in section [3.5](#). Section [2.2.1.1](#) details the basic structures that are elementary to the Netlogon Remote Protocol and which are used by many methods. In the sections that follow [2.2.1.1](#), structures are grouped according to their usage scenarios as outlined in section [1.3](#).

##### 2.2.1.1 Basic Structures

Structures in this group are basic structures that do not fall into any particular category of Netlogon usage scenarios. They are used by multiple Netlogon Remote Protocol methods.

###### 2.2.1.1.1 CYPHER\_BLOCK

The **CYPHER\_BLOCK** structure defines an encrypted eight-character string. The type of encryption used is application-dependent.

```
typedef struct _CYPHER_BLOCK {  
    CHAR data[8];  
};
```



```

} CYPHER_BLOCK,
*PCYPHER_BLOCK;

```

**data:** An encrypted eight-character string.

#### 2.2.1.1.2 STRING

The **STRING** structure contains the length, the maximum length, and a pointer to a buffer containing the string.

```

typedef struct _STRING {
    unsigned short Length;
    unsigned short MaximumLength;
    [size_is(MaximumLength), length_is(Length)]
    char* Buffer;
} STRING,
*PSTRING;

```

**Length:** The length of the data pointed to by **Buffer**, in bytes.

**MaximumLength:** The total allocated length of the data pointed to by **Buffer**, in bytes. [<1>](#)

**Buffer:** A pointer to a buffer containing the character string.

#### 2.2.1.1.3 LM\_OWF\_PASSWORD

The **LM\_OWF\_PASSWORD** structure carries a **one-way function (OWF)** of a LAN Manager password. The **LM\_OWF\_PASSWORD** structure MAY be encrypted, as specified by each method that uses this structure. See the [NetrServerPasswordSet](#) method in section [3.5.5.4.6](#) for encryption information.

```

typedef struct _LM_OWF_PASSWORD {
    CYPHER_BLOCK data[2];
} LM_OWF_PASSWORD,
*PLM_OWF_PASSWORD,
ENCRYPTED_LM_OWF_PASSWORD,
*PENCRYPTED_LM_OWF_PASSWORD;

```

**data:** An array of [CYPHER\\_BLOCK \(section 2.2.1.1.1\)](#) data structures that contains the LMOWFv1 of a password. LMOWFv1 is specified in NTLM v1 Authentication in [\[MS-NLMP\]](#) section 3.3.1.

#### 2.2.1.1.4 NT\_OWF\_PASSWORD

The **NT\_OWF\_PASSWORD** structure defines a one-way function (OWF) of a Windows NT domain password. The **NT\_OWF\_PASSWORD** structure can be encrypted, as specified by each method that uses this structure. When this structure is encrypted, Netlogon methods can use the DES encryption algorithm in ECB mode, as specified in [\[MS-SAMR\]](#) section 2.2.11.1.1 Encrypting an NT Hash or LM Hash Value with a specified key. The session key is the specified 16-byte key used to derive its keys using the 16-byte value process, as specified in [\[MS-SAMR\]](#) section 2.2.11.1.4. For

specific encryption information, see the individual methods, such as [NetrServerGetTrustInfo \(section 3.5.5.6.6\)](#).

```
typedef struct _NT_OWF_PASSWORD {
    CYPHER_BLOCK data[2];
} NT_OWF_PASSWORD,
*PNT_OWF_PASSWORD,
ENCRYPTED_NT_OWF_PASSWORD,
*PENCRYPTED_NT_OWF_PASSWORD;
```

**data:** An array of [CYPHER\\_BLOCK \(section 2.2.1.1.1\)](#) structures that contains the NTOWFv1 of a password. NTOWFv1 is specified in NTLM v1 Authentication in [\[MS-NLMP\]](#) section 3.3.1.

#### 2.2.1.1.5 NETLOGON\_AUTHENTICATOR

The **NETLOGON\_AUTHENTICATOR** structure defines an authentication credential.

```
typedef struct _NETLOGON_AUTHENTICATOR {
    NETLOGON_CREDENTIAL Credential;
    DWORD Timestamp;
} NETLOGON_AUTHENTICATOR,
*PNETLOGON_AUTHENTICATOR;
```

**Credential:** A [NETLOGON\\_CREDENTIAL \(section 2.2.1.3.4\)](#) structure that contains the encrypted portion of the **authenticator**.

**Timestamp:** An integer value that contains the time of day at which the client constructed this authentication credential, represented as the number of elapsed seconds since 00:00:00 of January 1, 1970. The authenticator is constructed just before making a call to a method that requires its usage.

#### 2.2.1.2 DC Location Structures

The structures in this group relate to locating a domain controller as outlined in section [1.3](#).

##### 2.2.1.2.1 DOMAIN\_CONTROLLER\_INFOW

The **DOMAIN\_CONTROLLER\_INFOW** structure defines information returned by the following methods: [DsrGetDcName \(section 3.5.5.3.3\)](#), [DsrGetDcNameEx \(section 3.5.5.3.2\)](#), and [DsrGetDcNameEx2 \(section 3.5.5.3.1\)](#). This structure is used to describe naming and addressing information about a domain controller (DC).<2>

```
typedef struct _DOMAIN_CONTROLLER_INFOW {
    [string, unique] wchar_t* DomainControllerName;
    [string, unique] wchar_t* DomainControllerAddress;
    unsigned long DomainControllerAddressType;
    GUID DomainGuid;
    [string, unique] wchar_t* DomainName;
    [string, unique] wchar_t* DnsForestName;
    unsigned long Flags;
    [string, unique] wchar_t* DcSiteName;
    [string, unique] wchar_t* ClientSiteName;
```

```

} DOMAIN_CONTROLLER_INFO,
*PDOMAIN_CONTROLLER_INFO;

```

**DomainControllerName:** A pointer to a null-terminated UTF-16 string that contains a NetBIOS or **fully qualified domain name (FQDN) (2)** of the DC, prefixed with "\\".

**DomainControllerAddress:** A pointer to a null-terminated **Unicode** string that contains the DC address, prefixed with "\\". The string can be either a textual representation of an IPv4/IPv6 address<3> or the **NetBIOS name** of the DC, determined by the **DomainControllerAddressType** field.

**DomainControllerAddressType:** A 32-bit value indicating the DC address type, which MUST be one, and only one, of the following.

Value	Meaning
0x00000001	The address is a string that contains an IPv4 address in dotted-decimal notation (for example, 192.168.0.1), or an IPv6 address in colon-separated notation.<4>
0x00000002	The address is a NetBIOS name.

**DomainGuid:** A **globally unique identifier (GUID)**, as specified in [\[MS-DTYP\], \(section 2.3.2.1\)](#), structure that contains an identifier for the domain. When there is no domain GUID, this field MUST be set to zero.<5> A GUID can be used across all computers and networks wherever a unique identifier is required.

**DomainName:** A pointer to a Unicode string that contains the NetBIOS or fully qualified domain name (FQDN) (2) of the domain.

**DnsForestName:** A pointer to a null-terminated Unicode string that contains the fully qualified domain name (FQDN) of the **forest**.

**Flags:** A set of bit flags in little-endian format that describe the features and roles of the DC. A flag is TRUE (or set) if its value is equal to 1. The value is constructed from zero or more bit flags from the following table, with the exceptions that bit J cannot be combined with A, B, D, E, or P; bit F cannot be combined with I; and bit K cannot be combined with L.

0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31
O	N	M	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	P	L	K	J	I	H	G	F	E	D	C	B	0	A

Where the bits are defined as:

Value	Description
A	The DC is the domain's <b>primary domain controller (PDC)</b> .
B	The DC contains the <b>global catalog (GC)</b> for the forest <b>Active Directory</b> .
C	The DC supports the Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP).
D	The DC supports a directory service.

Value	Description
E	The DC is a Kerberos Key Distribution Center (KDC).
F	The DC has a network time service available but no clock hardware.
G	The DC is in the closest site to the client.
H	The DC has a writable directory service available.
I	The DC has clock hardware and a network time service available.
J	The DC is an LDAP server servicing an Application NC ( <a href="#">[MS-ADTS] section 3.1.1.1.5</a> ).
K	The DC is a <b>read-only DC</b> . <a href="#">.&lt;6&gt;</a>
L	The server is a <b>writable DC</b> . <a href="#">.&lt;7&gt;</a>
M	The DC's name is a DNS name.
N	The DC's domain name is a DNS name.
O	The DC's forest name is a DNS name.
P	The DC has an Active Directory Web Service available. <a href="#">.&lt;8&gt;</a>

All other bits MUST be set to zero and MUST be ignored on receipt.

**DcSiteName:** Pointer to a null-terminated Unicode string that contains the site name that is associated with the DC. When there is no associated site, this field MUST be NULL.[.<9>](#)

**ClientSiteName:** Pointer to a null-terminated Unicode string that contains the client's site name. When there is no client site name, this field MUST be NULL.

#### 2.2.1.2.2 NL\_SITE\_NAME\_ARRAY

The **NL\_SITE\_NAME\_ARRAY** structure defines an array of site names.

```
typedef struct _NL_SITE_NAME_ARRAY {
    unsigned long EntryCount;
    [size_is(EntryCount)] PRPC_UNICODE_STRING SiteNames;
} NL_SITE_NAME_ARRAY,
*PNL_SITE_NAME_ARRAY;
```

**EntryCount:** The number of entries in **SiteNames**.

**SiteNames:** A pointer to an array of null-terminated [RPC UNICODE STRING](#) strings that contain site names. For more information about sites, see [\[MS-ADTS\] section 7.1.1.2.2.1](#).

#### 2.2.1.2.3 NL\_SITE\_NAME\_EX\_ARRAY

The **NL\_SITE\_NAME\_EX\_ARRAY** structure defines an array of site and subnet names. This structure extends the [NL\\_SITE\\_NAME\\_ARRAY \(section 2.2.1.2.2\)](#) structure by adding an array of subnets that correspond to the sites.

```
typedef struct _NL_SITE_NAME_EX_ARRAY {
    unsigned long EntryCount;
    [size_is(EntryCount)] PRPC_UNICODE_STRING SiteNames;
    [size_is(EntryCount)] PRPC_UNICODE_STRING SubnetNames;
} NL_SITE_NAME_EX_ARRAY,
*PNL_SITE_NAME_EX_ARRAY;
```

**EntryCount:** The number of entries in **SiteNames** and **SubnetNames**.

**SiteNames:** A pointer to an array of null-terminated Unicode strings that contain site names. For information about sites, see [\[MS-ADTS\]](#) section 7.1.1.2.2.1.

**SubnetNames:** A pointer to an array of null-terminated Unicode strings that contain subnet names. For information about subnets, see [\[MS-ADTS\]](#) section 7.1.1.2.2.2.1.

#### 2.2.1.2.4 NL\_SOCKET\_ADDRESS

The **NL\_SOCKET\_ADDRESS** structure contains a socket address.

```
typedef struct _NL_SOCKET_ADDRESS {
    [size_is(iSockaddrLength)] unsigned char* lpSockaddr;
    unsigned long iSockaddrLength;
} NL_SOCKET_ADDRESS,
*PNL_SOCKET_ADDRESS;
```

**lpSockaddr:** A pointer to an octet string. The format of the **lpSockaddr** member when an IPv4 socket address is used is specified in section [2.2.1.2.4.1](#). The format of the **lpSockaddr** member when an IPv6 socket address is used is specified in section [2.2.1.2.4.2](#).

**iSockaddrLength:** The length of the octet string pointed to by **lpSockaddr**, in bytes.

##### 2.2.1.2.4.1 IPv4 Address Structure

The IPv4\_Sockaddr structure specifies the format of an IPv4 socket address. This structure is built as if on a little-endian machine, and is treated as a byte array.

0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31
AddressFamily																Port															
Address																															
Padding																															
...																															

**AddressFamily (2 bytes):** The address family; MUST be 0x0002.

**Port (2 bytes):** An IP port number.

**Address (4 bytes):** An IP address, as specified in [\[RFC791\]](#).

**Padding (8 bytes):** Set to zero. This field is ignored by the server.

2.2.1.2.4.2 IPv6 Address Structure

The IPv6\_Sockaddr structure specifies the format of an IPv6 socket address. This structure is built as if on a little-endian machine, and is treated as a byte array.

0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31
AddressFamily																Port															
FlowInfo																															
Address																															
...																															
...																															
...																															
ScopeID																															

**AddressFamily (2 bytes):** Address family; MUST be 0x0017.

**Port (2 bytes):** An IP port number.

**FlowInfo (4 bytes):** Flow information. This field is not currently used by the protocol. The field MUST be set to zero and MUST be ignored on receipt.

**Address (16 bytes):** An IP address, as specified in [\[RFC3493\]](#).

**ScopeID (4 bytes):** Set of interfaces for a scope, as specified in [\[RFC3493\]](#).

2.2.1.3 Secure Channel Establishment and Maintenance Structures

Structures and enumerated types in this group are used to establish and maintain the secure channel as outlined in section [1.3](#).

2.2.1.3.1 NL\_AUTH\_MESSAGE

The NL\_AUTH\_MESSAGE structure is a token containing information that is part of the first message in establishing a security context between a client and a server. It is used for establishing the secure session when Netlogon functions as a security support provider (SSP). For details about NL\_AUTH\_MESSAGE construction, see section [3.3.4.1](#).

0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31
MessageType																															
Flags																															
Buffer (variable)																															
...																															

**MessageType (4 bytes):** A 32-bit unsigned integer. This value is used to indicate whether the message is a negotiate request message sent from a client to a server, or a negotiate response message sent from the server to the client. **MessageType** MUST be one, and only one, of the following.

Value	Meaning
0x00000000	This is a negotiate request message.
0x00000001	This is a negotiate response message.

**Flags (4 bytes):** A set of bit flags indicating the **principal** names carried in the request. A flag is TRUE (or set) if its value is equal to 1. These flags are set only in negotiate messages. The value is constructed from one or more bit flags from the following table.

0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	20	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	30	1
0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	E	D	C	B	A

Where the bits are defined as:

Value	Description
A	Buffer contains a NetBIOS domain name as an OEM_STRING ( <a href="#">[MS-CIFS]</a> section 2.2.1.1).
B	Buffer contains a NetBIOS <b>computer name</b> as an OEM_STRING ( <a href="#">[MS-CIFS]</a> section 2.2.1.1).
C	Buffer contains a DNS domain name as a compressed UTF-8 string, as specified in <a href="#">[RFC1035]</a> section 4.1.4.
D	Buffer contains a DNS host name as a compressed UTF-8 string, as specified in <a href="#">[RFC1035]</a> section 4.1.4.
E	Buffer contains a NetBIOS computer name as a compressed UTF-8 string, as specified in <a href="#">[RFC1035]</a> section 4.1.4.

All other bits MUST be set to zero and MUST be ignored on receipt.

**Buffer (variable):** Text buffer that contains a concatenation of null-terminated strings for each of the name flags set in the **Flags** field. The order is the same as the order of the **Flags** values (A–E). This buffer is only used in negotiate messages. For negotiate response messages, the buffer contains a NULL character.

### 2.2.1.3.2 NL\_AUTH\_SIGNATURE

The NL\_AUTH\_SIGNATURE structure is a security token that defines the authentication signature used by Netlogon to execute Netlogon methods over a secure channel. It follows the security trailer that a **security provider** MUST associate with a signed or encrypted message. A security trailer or sec\_trailer structure ([\[MS-RPCE\]](#) section 2.2.2.11) has syntax equivalent to the auth\_verifier\_co\_t structure, as specified in "Common Authentication Verifier Encodings" in [\[C706-Ch13Security\]](#) section 13.2.6.1. When Netlogon is functioning as its own SSP for the RPC connection, this structure contains the signature, a sequence number, and if encryption is requested, a confounder. See section [3.3.4.2](#).

0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31
SignatureAlgorithm																SealAlgorithm															
Pad																Flags															
SequenceNumber																															
...																															
Checksum																															
...																															
Confounder																															
...																															

**SignatureAlgorithm (2 bytes):** A 16-bit little-endian integer that identifies the algorithm that is used for signature computation. The only supported signature algorithm is HMAC-MD5, as specified in [\[RFC2104\]](#). The **SignatureAlgorithm** field MUST contain the following value.

Value	Meaning
0x0077	The packet is signed using HMAC-MD5.

**SealAlgorithm (2 bytes):** A 16-bit little-endian integer that identifies the algorithm used for encryption. The only supported encryption algorithm is RSA-**RC4**. The **SealAlgorithm** field MUST contain one of the following values.

Value	Meaning
0xFFFF	The packet is not encrypted.



Value	Meaning
0x007A	The packet is encrypted using RC4.

**Pad (2 bytes):** A 2-byte padding field. Both bytes MUST be set to 0xFF.

**Flags (2 bytes):** Specifies properties of the structure. No flags are currently defined. Both bytes MUST be set to zero and MUST be ignored on receipt.

**SequenceNumber (8 bytes):** A 64-bit little-endian integer containing the sequence number of the RPC message. For more information about how to calculate the sequence number, see section [3.3.4.2.1](#).

**Checksum (8 bytes):** A 64-bit value containing the final checksum of the signature and the RPC message. For more information about how to calculate the checksum, see section [3.3.4.2.1](#).

**Confounder (8 bytes):** A buffer used when the structure is used for encryption in addition to signing. The bytes are filled with random data that is used by the encryption algorithm. If the structure is used only for signing, the confounder is not included. For information about the confounder and encrypting the data, see section [3.3.4.2.1](#).

### 2.2.1.3.3 NL\_AUTH\_SHA2\_SIGNATURE

The NL\_AUTH\_SHA2\_SIGNATURE structure is a security token that defines the SHA2 authentication signature used by Netlogon to execute Netlogon methods over a secure channel. [<10>](#) It follows the security trailer that a security provider MUST associate with a signed or encrypted message. A security trailer or sec\_trailer structure ([\[MS-RPCE\]](#) section 2.2.2.11) has syntax equivalent to the auth\_verifier\_co\_t structure, as specified in [\[C706-Ch13Security\]](#), "Common Authentication Verifier Encodings". When Netlogon is functioning as its own SSP for the RPC connection, this structure contains the signature, a sequence number, and (if encryption is requested) a confounder. See section [3.3.4.2](#).

0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31
SignatureAlgorithm																SealAlgorithm															
Pad																Flags															
SequenceNumber																															
...																															
Checksum																															
...																															
...																															
...																															

...
...
...
...
Confounder
...

**SignatureAlgorithm (2 bytes):** A 16-bit little-endian integer that identifies the algorithm that is used for signature computation. The only supported signature algorithm is HMAC-SHA256 [\[RFC4634\]](#). The **SignatureAlgorithm** field MUST contain the following value.

Value	Meaning
0x0013	The packet is signed using HMAC-SHA256.

**SealAlgorithm (2 bytes):** A 16-bit little-endian integer that identifies the algorithm used for encryption. The only supported encryption algorithm is AES-128 [\[FIPS197\]](#). The **SealAlgorithm** field MUST contain one of the following values.

Value	Meaning
0xFFFF	The packet is not encrypted.
0x001A	The packet is encrypted using AES-128.

**Pad (2 bytes):** A 2-byte padding field. Both bytes MUST be set to 0xFF.

**Flags (2 bytes):** Specifies properties of the structure. No **Flags** are currently defined. Both bytes MUST be set to zero and MUST be ignored on receipt.

**SequenceNumber (8 bytes):** A 64-bit little-endian integer containing the **SequenceNumber** of the RPC message. For more information about how to calculate the **SequenceNumber**, see section [3.3.4.2.1](#).

**Checksum (32 bytes):** A 256-bit value containing the final **Checksum** of the signature and the RPC message. For more information about how to calculate the **Checksum**, see section [3.3.4.2.1](#).

**Confounder (8 bytes):** A buffer that is employed when the structure is used for encryption, in addition to signing. The bytes are filled with random data that is used by the encryption algorithm. If the structure is used only for signing, the **Confounder** is not included. For information about the **Confounder** and encrypting the data, see section [3.3.4.2.1](#).

#### 2.2.1.3.4 NETLOGON\_CREDENTIAL

The **NETLOGON\_CREDENTIAL** structure contains 8 bytes of data that have two distinct uses: for session-key negotiation and for building a Netlogon authenticator.

```
typedef struct _NETLOGON_CREDENTIAL {
    char data[8];
} NETLOGON_CREDENTIAL,
*PNETLOGON_CREDENTIAL;
```

**data:** The meaning of the 8 bytes of data contained in this structure is determined by the following:

- When session-key negotiation is performed, the data field carries an 8-byte challenge. Also see section [3.1.4.1](#).
- When the **NETLOGON\_CREDENTIAL** is used as part of a [NETLOGON\\_AUTHENTICATOR](#) structure, the data field carries 8 bytes of encrypted data, as specified in sections [3.1.4.4](#) and [3.1.4.5](#).

### 2.2.1.3.5 NETLOGON\_LSA\_POLICY\_INFO

The **NETLOGON\_LSA\_POLICY\_INFO** structure defines Local Security Authority (LSA) policy information as an unsigned character buffer. For details, see [\[LSAPOLICY\]](#) and [\[MS-LSAD\]](#).

```
typedef struct _NETLOGON_LSA_POLICY_INFO {
    unsigned long LsaPolicySize;
    [size_is(LsaPolicySize)] unsigned char* LsaPolicy;
} NETLOGON_LSA_POLICY_INFO,
*PNETLOGON_LSA_POLICY_INFO;
```

**LsaPolicySize:** This field is not used, and is set to zero.

**LsaPolicy:** This field is not used, and is initialized to NULL.

### 2.2.1.3.6 NETLOGON\_WORKSTATION\_INFO

The **NETLOGON\_WORKSTATION\_INFO** structure defines information returned by the [NetrLogonGetDomainInfo](#) method, as specified in [3.5.5.4.8](#). It is used to convey information about a member workstation from the client side to the server side. [<11>](#)

```
typedef struct _NETLOGON_WORKSTATION_INFO {
    NETLOGON_LSA_POLICY_INFO LsaPolicy;
    [string] wchar_t* DnsHostName;
    [string] wchar_t* SiteName;
    [string] wchar_t* Dummy1;
    [string] wchar_t* Dummy2;
    [string] wchar_t* Dummy3;
    [string] wchar_t* Dummy4;
    RPC_UNICODE_STRING OsVersion;
    RPC_UNICODE_STRING OsName;
    RPC_UNICODE_STRING DummyString3;
    RPC_UNICODE_STRING DummyString4;
    unsigned long WorkstationFlags;
    unsigned long KerberosSupportedEncryptionTypes;
    unsigned long DummyLong3;
    unsigned long DummyLong4;
} NETLOGON_WORKSTATION_INFO,
```

\*PNETLOGON\_WORKSTATION\_INFO;

**LsaPolicy:** A [NETLOGON LSA POLICY INFO](#) structure, as specified in section [2.2.1.3.5](#), that contains the LSA policy for this domain.

**DnsHostName:** A null-terminated Unicode string that contains the DNS host name of the client.

**SiteName:** A null-terminated Unicode string that contains the name of the site where the workstation resides.

**Dummy1:** MUST be set to NULL and MUST be ignored on receipt. The Netlogon usage of dummy fields is specified in section [1.3.7.1.3](#).

**Dummy2:** MUST be set to NULL and MUST be ignored on receipt. The Netlogon usage of dummy fields is specified in section [1.3.7.1.3](#).

**Dummy3:** MUST be set to NULL and MUST be ignored on receipt. The Netlogon usage of dummy fields is specified in section [1.3.7.1.3](#).

**Dummy4:** MUST be set to NULL and MUST be ignored on receipt. The Netlogon usage of dummy fields is specified in section [1.3.7.1.3](#).

**OsVersion:** An [RPC UNICODE STRING](#) structure in which the **Length** and **MaximumLength** fields are set to the size of an OSVERSIONINFOEX structure and the **Buffer** field points to an OSVERSIONINFOEX ([\[MS-RPRN\]](#) section 2.2.3.10.2) structure. *OsVersion* contains the version number of the operating system installed on the client machine.

**OsName:** A null-terminated Unicode string that contains the name of the operating system installed on the client machine. [<12>](#) The DC that receives this data structure updates the **operatingSystem** attribute of the client's machine account object in Active Directory, as specified in [\[MS-ADA3\]](#), section [2.52](#).

**DummyString3:** MUST contain 0 for the **Length** field, 0 for the **MaximumLength** field, and NULL for the **Buffer** field. It is ignored upon receipt. The Netlogon usage of dummy fields is specified in section [1.3.7.1.3](#).

**DummyString4:** MUST contain 0 for the **Length** field, 0 for the **MaximumLength** field, and NULL for the **Buffer** field. It is ignored upon receipt. The Netlogon usage of dummy fields is specified in section [1.3.7.1.3](#).

**WorkstationFlags:** A set of bit flags specifying workstation behavior. A flag is TRUE (or set) if its value is equal to 1. The value is constructed from zero or more bit flags from the following table.

											1											2															3				
0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	0	1
0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	B	A	

Where the bits are defined as:

Value	Description
A	Client will receive inbound trusts as specified in <a href="#">[MS-LSAD]</a> section 2.2.7.9. The client sets this bit in order to receive the inbound trusts.
B	Client handles the update of the <b>service principal name (SPN)</b> .

All other bits MUST be set to zero and MUST be ignored on receipt.

**KerberosSupportedEncryptionTypes:** The **msDS-SupportedEncryptionTypes** attribute of the client's machine account object in Active Directory, as specified in [\[MS-ADA2\]](#) section 2.324.<13>

**DummyLong3:** MUST be set to zero and MUST be ignored on receipt. The Netlogon usage of dummy fields is specified in section [1.3.7.1.3](#).

**DummyLong4:** MUST be set to zero and MUST be ignored on receipt. The Netlogon usage of dummy fields is specified in section [1.3.7.1.3](#).

### 2.2.1.3.7 NL\_TRUST\_PASSWORD

The **NL\_TRUST\_PASSWORD** structure defines a buffer for carrying a computer account password, or a trust password, to be transmitted over the wire.<14> It is transported as an input parameter to the [NetrServerPasswordSet2](#) method, as specified in section [3.5.5.4.5](#). Domain members use **NetrServerPasswordSet2** to change their computer account password. The primary domain controller uses **NetrServerPasswordSet2** to change trust passwords for all directly trusted domains. The **NL\_TRUST\_PASSWORD** structure is encrypted using the negotiated encryption algorithm before it is sent over the wire.

```
typedef struct _NL_TRUST_PASSWORD {
    WCHAR Buffer[256];
    unsigned long Length;
} NL_TRUST_PASSWORD,
*PNL_TRUST_PASSWORD;
```

**Buffer:** Array of Unicode characters that is treated as a byte buffer containing the password, as follows:

- For a computer account password, the buffer has the following format.



**Figure 4: Computer account password buffer format**

The first (512 – Length) bytes MUST be randomly generated data that serves as an additional source of entropy during encryption. The last Length bytes of the buffer MUST contain the clear text password.

**Length:** The length of the password, in bytes.

#### 2.2.1.3.8 NL\_PASSWORD\_VERSION

The **NL\_PASSWORD\_VERSION** structure defines a password version number that is used to distinguish between different versions of information passed in the **Buffer** field of the [NL\\_TRUST\\_PASSWORD](#) structure. The **NL\_PASSWORD\_VERSION** structure is prepended to the password in the buffer of **NL\_TRUST\_PASSWORD**. This structure is only used for interdomain trust accounts. <15>

```
typedef struct _NL_PASSWORD_VERSION {
    unsigned long ReservedField;
    unsigned long PasswordVersionNumber;
    unsigned long PasswordVersionPresent;
} NL_PASSWORD_VERSION,
*PNL_PASSWORD_VERSION;
```

**ReservedField:** MUST be set to zero when sent and MUST be ignored on receipt.

**PasswordVersionNumber:** Integer value that contains the current password version number. The password version number is incremented by one when a new password is generated; the value for the first password is one.

**PasswordVersionPresent:** MUST be 0x02231968. This member is relevant only for server-to-server communication.

#### 2.2.1.3.9 NETLOGON\_WORKSTATION\_INFORMATION

The **NETLOGON\_WORKSTATION\_INFORMATION** union selects between two parameters of type [NETLOGON\\_WORKSTATION\\_INFO](#) structure, as specified in section [2.2.1.3.6](#), based on the value of the *Level* parameter of the [NetrLogonGetDomainInfo](#) method, as specified in section [3.5.5.4.8](#). <16>

```
typedef
[switch_type(DWORD)]
union _NETLOGON_WORKSTATION_INFORMATION {
    [case(1)]
        PNETLOGON_WORKSTATION_INFO WorkstationInfo;
    [case(2)]
        PNETLOGON_WORKSTATION_INFO LsaPolicyInfo;
} NETLOGON_WORKSTATION_INFORMATION,
*PNETLOGON_WORKSTATION_INFORMATION;
```

**WorkstationInfo:** Field is selected when the switched DWORD ([\[MS-DTYP\]](#) section 2.2.9) constant is 0x00000001.

**LsaPolicyInfo:** Field is selected when the switched DWORD constant is 0x00000002.

#### 2.2.1.3.10 NETLOGON\_ONE\_DOMAIN\_INFO

The **NETLOGON\_ONE\_DOMAIN\_INFO** structure defines information about a single domain. It is in turn contained in the [NETLOGON\\_DOMAIN\\_INFO](#) structure, as specified in section [2.2.1.3.11](#). The **NETLOGON\_DOMAIN\_INFO** structure describes domain relationships and is generated as output from the [NetrLogonGetDomainInfo](#) method, as specified in section [3.5.5.4.8](#). <17>

```
typedef struct _NETLOGON_ONE_DOMAIN_INFO {
    RPC_UNICODE_STRING DomainName;
    RPC_UNICODE_STRING DnsDomainName;
    RPC_UNICODE_STRING DnsForestName;
    GUID DomainGuid;
    PRPC_SID DomainSid;
    RPC_UNICODE_STRING TrustExtension;
    RPC_UNICODE_STRING DummyString2;
    RPC_UNICODE_STRING DummyString3;
    RPC_UNICODE_STRING DummyString4;
    unsigned long DummyLong1;
    unsigned long DummyLong2;
    unsigned long DummyLong3;
    unsigned long DummyLong4;
} NETLOGON_ONE_DOMAIN_INFO;
*PNETLOGON_ONE_DOMAIN_INFO;
```

**DomainName:** A null-terminated Unicode string that contains the NetBIOS name of the domain being described. This field **MUST NOT** be an empty string.

**DnsDomainName:** A null-terminated Unicode string that contains the DNS **domain name** for this domain. This field **MUST NOT** be an empty string.

**DnsForestName:** A null-terminated Unicode string that contains the DNS forest name for this domain.

**DomainGuid:** A globally unique 128-bit identifier for this domain.

**DomainSid:** The **security identifier (SID)**, as specified in [\[MS-DTYP\]](#) section 2.4.2.3 for this domain.

**TrustExtension:** An RPC\_UNICODE\_STRING structure, as specified in [\[MS-DTYP\]](#) section 2.3.8, which does not point to a Unicode string, but in fact points to a buffer of size 16, in bytes, in the following format.

0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31
Flags																															
ParentIndex																															
TrustType																															
TrustAttributes																															

This structure is supplementary domain trust information that contains the following fields of a **DS\_DOMAIN\_TRUSTSW** structure: **Flags**, **ParentIndex**, **TrustType**, and **TrustAttributes**. For more information on usage in **NetrLogonGetDomainInfo**, see section [3.5.5.4.8](#). For more information on the **DS\_DOMAIN\_TRUSTSW** structure, see section [2.2.1.5.2](#).

**DummyString2:** MUST contain 0 for the **Length** field, 0 for the **MaximumLength** field, and NULL for the **Buffer** field. It is ignored upon receipt. The Netlogon usage of dummy fields is described in section [1.3.7.1.3](#).

**DummyString3:** MUST contain 0 for the **Length** field, 0 for the **MaximumLength** field, and NULL for the **Buffer** field. It is ignored upon receipt. The Netlogon usage of dummy fields is described in section [1.3.7.1.3](#).

**DummyString4:** MUST contain 0 for the **Length** field, 0 for the **MaximumLength** field, and NULL for the **Buffer** field. It is ignored upon receipt. The Netlogon usage of dummy fields is described in section [1.3.7.1.3](#).

**DummyLong1:** MUST be set to zero and MUST be ignored on receipt. The Netlogon usage of dummy fields is described in section [1.3.7.1.3](#).

**DummyLong2:** MUST be set to zero and MUST be ignored on receipt. The Netlogon usage of dummy fields is described in section [1.3.7.1.3](#).

**DummyLong3:** MUST be set to zero and MUST be ignored on receipt. The Netlogon usage of dummy fields is described in section [1.3.7.1.3](#).

**DummyLong4:** MUST be set to zero and MUST be ignored on receipt. The Netlogon usage of dummy fields is described in section [1.3.7.1.3](#).

#### 2.2.1.3.11 NETLOGON\_DOMAIN\_INFO

The **NETLOGON\_DOMAIN\_INFO** structure defines information returned as output from the [NetrLogonGetDomainInfo](#) method, as specified in section [3.5.5.4.8](#). It contains information about a domain, including naming information and a list of trusted domains. [<18>](#)

```
typedef struct _NETLOGON_DOMAIN_INFO {
    NETLOGON_ONE_DOMAIN_INFO PrimaryDomain;
    unsigned long TrustedDomainCount;
    [size_is(TrustedDomainCount)] PNETLOGON_ONE_DOMAIN_INFO TrustedDomains;
    NETLOGON_LSA_POLICY_INFO LsaPolicy;
    RPC_UNICODE_STRING DnsHostNameInDs;
    RPC_UNICODE_STRING DummyString2;
    RPC_UNICODE_STRING DummyString3;
    RPC_UNICODE_STRING DummyString4;
    unsigned long WorkstationFlags;
    unsigned long SupportedEncTypes;
    unsigned long DummyLong3;
    unsigned long DummyLong4;
} NETLOGON_DOMAIN_INFO,
*PNETLOGON_DOMAIN_INFO;
```

**PrimaryDomain:** A [NETLOGON\\_ONE\\_DOMAIN\\_INFO](#) structure, as specified in section [2.2.1.3.10](#), that contains information about the domain of which the server is a member.

**TrustedDomainCount:** The number of trusted domains listed in **TrustedDomains**.

**TrustedDomains:** A pointer to an array of **NETLOGON\_ONE\_DOMAIN\_INFO** structures, as specified in section [2.2.1.3.10](#), which contain information about domains with which the current domain has a trust relationship.



**LsaPolicy:** A [NETLOGON\\_LSA\\_POLICY\\_INFO](#) data structure that contains the LSA policy for this domain. This field is not used. The **LsaPolicy.LsaPolicySize** field is set to zero, and the **LsaPolicy.LsaPolicy** field is set to NULL.

**DnsHostNameInDs:** A null-terminated Unicode string that contains the Active Directory DNS host name for the client.

**DummyString2:** MUST contain 0 for the **Length** field, 0 for the **MaximumLength** field, and NULL for the **Buffer** field. It is ignored upon receipt. The Netlogon usage of dummy fields is described in section [1.3.7.1.3](#).

**DummyString3:** MUST contain 0 for the **Length** field, 0 for the **MaximumLength** field, and NULL for the **Buffer** field. It is ignored upon receipt. The Netlogon usage of dummy fields is described in section [1.3.7.1.3](#).

**DummyString4:** MUST contain 0 for the **Length** field, 0 for the **MaximumLength** field, and NULL for the **Buffer** field. It is ignored upon receipt. The Netlogon usage of dummy fields is described in section [1.3.7.1.3](#).

**WorkstationFlags:** A set of bit flags that specify workstation behavior. A flag is TRUE (or set) if its value is equal to 1. The value is constructed from zero or more bit flags from the following table.

0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31
0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	B	A

Where the bits are defined as:

Value	Description
A	Client receives inbound trusts.
B	Client handles the update of the service principal name (SPN). See <a href="#">[SPNNAMES]</a> for details.

All other bits MUST be set to zero and MUST be ignored on receipt.

**SupportedEncTypes:** A set of bit flags that specify the encryption types supported, as specified in [\[MS-LSAD\]](#) section 2.2.7.18. See [\[MS-LSAD\]](#) for a specification of these bit values and their allowed combinations. [<19>](#)

**DummyLong3:** MUST be set to zero and MUST be ignored on receipt. The Netlogon usage of dummy fields is specified in section [1.3.7.1.3](#).

**DummyLong4:** MUST be set to zero and MUST be ignored on receipt. The Netlogon usage of dummy fields is specified in section [1.3.7.1.3](#).

## 2.2.1.3.12 NETLOGON\_DOMAIN\_INFORMATION

The **NETLOGON\_DOMAIN\_INFORMATION** union selects either a [NETLOGON\\_DOMAIN\\_INFO](#), as specified in section [2.2.1.3.11](#), or a [NETLOGON\\_LSA\\_POLICY\\_INFO](#), as specified in section [2.2.1.3.5](#), data type based on the value of the *Level* parameter to the [NetrLogonGetDomainInfo](#) method, as specified in section [3.5.5.4.8](#). [<20>](#)

```
typedef
[switch_type(DWORD)]
union _NETLOGON_DOMAIN_INFORMATION {
    [case(1)]
        PNETLOGON_DOMAIN_INFO DomainInfo;
    [case(2)]
        PNETLOGON_LSA_POLICY_INFO LsaPolicyInfo;
} NETLOGON_DOMAIN_INFORMATION,
*PNETLOGON_DOMAIN_INFORMATION;
```

**DomainInfo:** This field is selected when the switched DWORD ([\[MS-DTYP\]](#) section 2.2.9) value is set to 0x00000001. The union contains a **NETLOGON\_DOMAIN\_INFO** structure, as specified in section [2.2.1.3.11](#).

**LsaPolicyInfo:** This field is selected when the switched DWORD value is set to 0x00000002. The union contains a **NETLOGON\_LSA\_POLICY\_INFO** structure, as specified in section [2.2.1.3.5](#).

### 2.2.1.3.13 NETLOGON\_SECURE\_CHANNEL\_TYPE

The **NETLOGON\_SECURE\_CHANNEL\_TYPE** enumeration specifies the type of secure channel to use in a logon transaction.

```
typedef enum _NETLOGON_SECURE_CHANNEL_TYPE
{
    NullSecureChannel = 0,
    MsvApSecureChannel = 1,
    WorkstationSecureChannel = 2,
    TrustedDnsDomainSecureChannel = 3,
    TrustedDomainSecureChannel = 4,
    UasServerSecureChannel = 5,
    ServerSecureChannel = 6,
    CdcServerSecureChannel = 7
} NETLOGON_SECURE_CHANNEL_TYPE;
```

**NullSecureChannel:** An unauthenticated channel type. This value MUST NOT be used in the Netlogon RPC calls between a client and a remote server. The error code STATUS\_INVALID\_PARAMETER SHOULD be returned.

**MsvApSecureChannel:** A secure channel between the local Windows NT LAN Manager (NTLM) security provider and the Netlogon server. The client and the server are the same machine for this channel type. This value MUST NOT be used in the Netlogon RPC calls between a client and a remote server. The error code STATUS\_INVALID\_PARAMETER SHOULD be returned.

**WorkstationSecureChannel:** A secure channel from a domain member to a domain controller (DC).

**TrustedDnsDomainSecureChannel:** A secure channel between two DCs, connected through a trust relationship created between two Active Directory domains. A **trusted domain object (TDO)** is used in this type of channel.

**TrustedDomainSecureChannel:** A secure channel between two DCs, connected through a trust relationship created between two domains, one or both of which is a Windows NT 4.0 domain.

**UasServerSecureChannel:** Secure channel from a LAN Manager server to a domain controller. This value is no longer supported, and it MUST NOT be used in the Netlogon RPC calls between a client and a remote server. The error code STATUS\_INVALID\_PARAMETER SHOULD be returned.

**ServerSecureChannel:** A secure channel from a **backup domain controller** to a primary domain controller.

**CdcServerSecureChannel:** Secure channel from a read-only domain controller (RODC) [<21>](#) to a domain controller. [<22>](#)

#### 2.2.1.3.14 NETLOGON\_CAPABILITIES

The **NETLOGON\_CAPABILITIES** union carries the supported Netlogon capabilities. [<23>](#)

```
typedef
[switch_type(DWORD)]
union _NETLOGON_CAPABILITIES {
    [case(1)]
        ULONG ServerCapabilities;
} NETLOGON_CAPABILITIES,
*PNETLOGON_CAPABILITIES;
```

**ServerCapabilities:** A 32-bit set of bit flags that identify the server's capabilities (section [<23>](#)).

#### 2.2.1.4 Pass-Through Authentication Structures

Structures and enumerated types in this group are used for generic pass-through and for user logon and logoff, as outlined in section [<23>](#).

##### 2.2.1.4.1 LM\_CHALLENGE

The **LM\_CHALLENGE** structure carries a LAN Manager authentication challenge.

```
typedef struct {
    char data[8];
} LM_CHALLENGE;
```

**data:** A string of eight characters that contains a LAN Manager authentication challenge, which is an unencrypted **nonce**.

For more information, see [\[LANMAN\]](#).

##### 2.2.1.4.2 NETLOGON\_GENERIC\_INFO

The **NETLOGON\_GENERIC\_INFO** structure defines a structure that contains logon information in binary format. Microsoft implementations of authentication protocols make use of this structure for passing generic logon data through the Netlogon secure channel to a DC in the domain that contains the user account to use the domain's **database**. For an example of using the **NETLOGON\_GENERIC\_INFO** structure, see any of the examples documented in [\[MS-APDS\]](#).

```
typedef struct _NETLOGON_GENERIC_INFO {
```

```

NETLOGON_LOGON_IDENTITY_INFO Identity;
RPC_UNICODE_STRING PackageName;
unsigned long DataLength;
[size_is(DataLength)] unsigned char* LogonData;
} NETLOGON_GENERIC_INFO,
*PNETLOGON_GENERIC_INFO;

```

**Identity:** The [NETLOGON\\_LOGON\\_IDENTITY\\_INFO](#) structure, as specified in section [2.2.1.4.15](#), contains information about the logon identity. The **LogonDomainName** field of the **NETLOGON\_LOGON\_IDENTITY\_INFO** structure indicates the target domain that contains the user account.

**PackageName:** Contains the name of the security provider, such as Kerberos, to which the data will be delivered on the domain controller in the target domain that was specified in the **Identity** field. This name **MUST** match the name of an existing security provider; otherwise, the **Security Support Provider Interface (SSPI)** returns a package not found error.

**DataLength:** The length, in bytes, of **LogonData**.

**LogonData:** A pointer to a block of binary data that contains the information to be sent to the security package referenced in **PackageName**. This data is opaque to Netlogon.

#### 2.2.1.4.3 NETLOGON\_INTERACTIVE\_INFO

The **NETLOGON\_INTERACTIVE\_INFO** structure defines information about an interactive logon instance.

```

typedef struct _NETLOGON_INTERACTIVE_INFO {
    NETLOGON_LOGON_IDENTITY_INFO Identity;
    LM_OWF_PASSWORD LmOwfPassword;
    NT_OWF_PASSWORD NtOwfPassword;
} NETLOGON_INTERACTIVE_INFO,
*PNETLOGON_INTERACTIVE_INFO;

```

**Identity:** A [NETLOGON\\_LOGON\\_IDENTITY\\_INFO](#) structure, as specified in section [2.2.1.4.15](#), that contains information about the logon identity.

**LmOwfPassword:** An [LM\\_OWF\\_PASSWORD](#) structure, as specified in section [2.2.1.1.3](#), that contains the LMOWFv1 of a password. LMOWFv1 is specified in NTLM v1 Authentication in [\[MS-NLMP\]](#) section 3.3.1.

**NtOwfPassword:** An [NT\\_OWF\\_PASSWORD](#) structure, as specified in section [2.2.1.1.4](#), that contains the NTOWFv1 of a password. NTOWFv1 is specified in NTLM v1 Authentication in [\[MS-NLMP\]](#) section 3.3.1.

#### 2.2.1.4.4 NETLOGON\_SERVICE\_INFO

The **NETLOGON\_SERVICE\_INFO** structure defines information about a service account logon. Windows services use service accounts as their run-time security identity.

```

typedef struct _NETLOGON_SERVICE_INFO {
    NETLOGON_LOGON_IDENTITY_INFO Identity;

```

```

    LM_OWF_PASSWORD LmOwfPassword;
    NT_OWF_PASSWORD NtOwfPassword;
} NETLOGON_SERVICE_INFO,
*PNETLOGON_SERVICE_INFO;

```

**Identity:** [NETLOGON\\_LOGON\\_IDENTITY\\_INFO](#) structure, as specified in section [2.2.1.4.15](#), that contains information about the logon identity.

**LmOwfPassword:** [LM\\_OWF\\_PASSWORD](#) structure, as specified in section [2.2.1.1.3](#), that contains the LMOWFv1 of a password. LMOWFv1 is specified in NTLM v1 Authentication in [\[MS-NLMP\]](#) section 3.3.1.

**NtOwfPassword:** [NT\\_OWF\\_PASSWORD](#) structure, as specified in section [2.2.1.1.4](#), that contains the NTOWFv1 of a password. NTOWFv1 is specified in NTLM v1 Authentication in [\[MS-NLMP\]](#) section 3.3.1.

#### 2.2.1.4.5 NETLOGON\_NETWORK\_INFO

The **NETLOGON\_NETWORK\_INFO** structure defines information that describes a network account logon.

```

typedef struct _NETLOGON_NETWORK_INFO {
    NETLOGON_LOGON_IDENTITY_INFO Identity;
    LM_CHALLENGE LmChallenge;
    STRING NtChallengeResponse;
    STRING LmChallengeResponse;
} NETLOGON_NETWORK_INFO,
*PNETLOGON_NETWORK_INFO;

```

**Identity:** [NETLOGON\\_LOGON\\_IDENTITY\\_INFO](#) structure, as specified in section [2.2.1.4.15](#), that contains information about the logon identity.

**LmChallenge:** [LM\\_CHALLENGE](#) structure, as specified in section [2.2.1.4.1](#), that contains the network authentication challenge. For details about challenges, see [\[MS-NLMP\]](#).

**NtChallengeResponse:** String that contains the NT response (see [\[MS-NLMP\]](#)) to the network authentication challenge.

**LmChallengeResponse:** String that contains the LAN Manager response (see [\[MS-NLMP\]](#)) to the network authentication challenge.

#### 2.2.1.4.6 NETLOGON\_LEVEL

The **NETLOGON\_LEVEL** union defines a union of all types of logon information.

```

typedef
[switch_type(NETLOGON_LOGON_INFO_CLASS)]
union _NETLOGON_LEVEL {
    [case(NetlogonInteractiveInformation)]
        PNETLOGON_INTERACTIVE_INFO LogonInteractive;
    [case(NetlogonInteractiveTransitiveInformation)]
        PNETLOGON_INTERACTIVE_INFO LogonInteractiveTransitive;
    [case(NetlogonServiceInformation)]

```

```

    PNETLOGON_SERVICE_INFO LogonService;
[case (NetlogonServiceTransitiveInformation)]
    PNETLOGON_SERVICE_INFO LogonServiceTransitive;
[case (NetlogonNetworkInformation)]
    PNETLOGON_NETWORK_INFO LogonNetwork;
[case (NetlogonNetworkTransitiveInformation)]
    PNETLOGON_NETWORK_INFO LogonNetworkTransitive;
[case (NetlogonGenericInformation)]
    PNETLOGON_GENERIC_INFO LogonGeneric;
[default]
    ;
} NETLOGON_LEVEL,
*PNETLOGON_LEVEL;

```

**LogonInteractive:** This field is selected when the logon information type is **NetlogonInteractiveInformation**. The data type is [NETLOGON\\_INTERACTIVE\\_INFO](#), as specified in section [2.2.1.4.3](#).

**LogonInteractiveTransitive:** This field is selected when the logon information type is **NetlogonInteractiveTransitiveInformation**. The data type is **NETLOGON\_INTERACTIVE\_INFO**, as specified in section [2.2.1.4.3](#).

**LogonService:** This field is selected when the logon information type is **NetlogonServiceInformation**. The data type is [NETLOGON\\_SERVICE\\_INFO](#), as specified in section [2.2.1.4.4](#).

**LogonServiceTransitive:** This field is selected when the logon information type is **NetlogonServiceTransitiveInformation**. The data type is **NETLOGON\_SERVICE\_INFO**, as specified in section [2.2.1.4.4](#).

**LogonNetwork:** This field is selected when the logon information type is **NetlogonNetworkInformation**. The data type is [NETLOGON\\_NETWORK\\_INFO](#), as specified in section [2.2.1.4.5](#).

**LogonNetworkTransitive:** This field is selected when the logon information type is **NetlogonNetworkTransitiveInformation**. The data type is **NETLOGON\_NETWORK\_INFO**, as specified in section [2.2.1.4.5](#).

**LogonGeneric:** This field is selected when the logon information type is **NetlogonGenericInformation**. The data type is [NETLOGON\\_GENERIC\\_INFO](#), as specified in section [2.2.1.4.2](#).

#### 2.2.1.4.7 NETLOGON\_SID\_AND\_ATTRIBUTES

The **NETLOGON\_SID\_AND\_ATTRIBUTES** structure contains a security identifier (SID) and its attributes.

```

typedef struct _NETLOGON_SID_AND_ATTRIBUTES {
    PRPC_SID Sid;
    unsigned long Attributes;
} NETLOGON_SID_AND_ATTRIBUTES,
*PNETLOGON_SID_AND_ATTRIBUTES;

```

**Sid:** A pointer to a security identifier (SID).

**Attributes:** A set of bit flags that contains the set of security attributes assigned to this SID. A bit is TRUE (or set) if its value is equal to 1. The value is constructed from one or more bit flags from the following table.

0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31
0	0	D	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	C	B	A

Where the bits are defined as:

Value	Description
A	The SID cannot have the <b>SE_GROUP_ENABLED</b> attribute removed. Corresponds to the SID attribute <b>SE_GROUP_MANDATORY</b> . This attribute prevents the user from disabling the <b>group</b> . Disabling a group causes the group to be ignored by access validation routines. For more information, see <a href="#">[SIDATT]</a> .
B	The SID is enabled by default (as opposed to being enabled by an application). Corresponds to the SID attribute <b>SE_GROUP_ENABLED_BY_DEFAULT</b> . For more information, see <a href="#">[SIDATT]</a> .
C	The SID is enabled for access checks. Corresponds to the SID attribute <b>SE_GROUP_ENABLED</b> . For more information, see <a href="#">[SIDATT]</a> .
D	This group is a <b>domain local group</b> . Corresponds to <b>SE_GROUP_RESOURCE</b> . For more information, see <a href="#">[SIDATT]</a> .

All other bits MUST be set to zero and MUST be ignored on receipt.

These values are opaque to the Netlogon protocol. They are not used or processed directly. All fields of this structure have the same meaning as the identically named fields in the **KERB\_SID\_AND\_ATTRIBUTES** structure as specified in [\[MS-PAC\]](#) section 2.2.1.

#### 2.2.1.4.8 NETLOGON\_VALIDATION\_GENERIC\_INFO2

The **NETLOGON\_VALIDATION\_GENERIC\_INFO2** structure defines a structure that contains account information in binary format. Microsoft implementations of authentication protocols make use of this structure to return generic account information upon successful logon validation. For an example of using the **NETLOGON\_VALIDATION\_GENERIC\_INFO2** structure, see any of the examples in [\[MS-APDS\]](#).

```
typedef struct _NETLOGON_VALIDATION_GENERIC_INFO2 {
    unsigned long DataLength;
    [size_is(DataLength)] unsigned char* ValidationData;
} NETLOGON_VALIDATION_GENERIC_INFO2,
*PNETLOGON_VALIDATION_GENERIC_INFO2;
```

**DataLength:** An integer value that contains the length of the data referenced by **ValidationData**, in bytes.

**ValidationData:** A pointer to a buffer that contains the logon validation information.

#### 2.2.1.4.9 USER\_SESSION\_KEY

The **USER\_SESSION\_KEY** structure defines an encrypted user session key.

```
typedef struct _USER_SESSION_KEY {
    CYPHER_BLOCK data[2];
} USER_SESSION_KEY,
*PUSER_SESSION_KEY;
```

**data:** A two-element [CYPHER\\_BLOCK](#) structure, as specified in section [2.2.1.1.1](#), that contains the 16-byte encrypted user session key.

#### 2.2.1.4.10 GROUP\_MEMBERSHIP

The **GROUP\_MEMBERSHIP** structure identifies the group to which an account belongs.

```
typedef struct _GROUP_MEMBERSHIP {
    unsigned long RelativeId;
    unsigned long Attributes;
} GROUP_MEMBERSHIP,
*PGROUP_MEMBERSHIP;
```

**RelativeId:** The relative identifier (RID) for a particular group.

**Attributes:** A set of values that describe the group membership attributes set for the RID specified in **RelativeId**. The value is constructed from one or more bit flags from the following table.

											1										2														3	
0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	0	1					
0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	C	B	A	

Where the bits are defined as:

Value	Description
A	The SID cannot have the <b>SE_GROUP_ENABLED</b> attribute removed. Corresponds to the SID attribute <b>SE_GROUP_MANDATORY</b> . This attribute prevents the user from disabling the group. Disabling a group causes the group to be ignored by access validation routines. For more information, see <a href="#">[SIDATT]</a> .
B	The SID is enabled by default (as opposed to being enabled by an application). Corresponds to the SID attribute <b>SE_GROUP_ENABLED_BY_DEFAULT</b> . For more information, see <a href="#">[SIDATT]</a> .
C	The SID is enabled for access checks. Corresponds to the SID attribute <b>SE_GROUP_ENABLED</b> . The <b>SE_GROUP_ENABLED</b> attribute enables the group. For more information, see <a href="#">[SIDATT]</a> .

All other bits **MUST** be zero and **MUST** be ignored on receipt.



These values are opaque to the Netlogon protocol. They are not used or processed directly. All fields of this structure have the same meaning as the identically named fields in the **GROUP\_MEMBERSHIP** structure as specified in [\[MS-PAC\]](#) section 2.2.2.

#### 2.2.1.4.11 NETLOGON\_VALIDATION\_SAM\_INFO

The **NETLOGON\_VALIDATION\_SAM\_INFO** structure defines account information retrieved from a database upon a successful user logon validation.

All fields of this structure, except the fields detailed following the structure definition, have the same meaning as the identically named fields in the **KERB\_VALIDATION\_INFO** structure, as specified in [\[MS-PAC\]](#) section 2.5. Additionally, fields of this structure that are defined as **OLD\_LARGE\_INTEGER** are 64-bit timestamps equivalent to the identically named fields in the **KERB\_VALIDATION\_INFO** structure of **FILETIME** type.

```
typedef struct _NETLOGON_VALIDATION_SAM_INFO {
    OLD_LARGE_INTEGER LogonTime;
    OLD_LARGE_INTEGER LogoffTime;
    OLD_LARGE_INTEGER KickOffTime;
    OLD_LARGE_INTEGER PasswordLastSet;
    OLD_LARGE_INTEGER PasswordCanChange;
    OLD_LARGE_INTEGER PasswordMustChange;
    RPC_UNICODE_STRING EffectiveName;
    RPC_UNICODE_STRING FullName;
    RPC_UNICODE_STRING LogonScript;
    RPC_UNICODE_STRING ProfilePath;
    RPC_UNICODE_STRING HomeDirectory;
    RPC_UNICODE_STRING HomeDirectoryDrive;
    unsigned short LogonCount;
    unsigned short BadPasswordCount;
    unsigned long UserId;
    unsigned long PrimaryGroupId;
    unsigned long GroupCount;
    [size_is(GroupCount)] PGROUP_MEMBERSHIP GroupIds;
    unsigned long UserFlags;
    USER_SESSION_KEY UserSessionKey;
    RPC_UNICODE_STRING LogonServer;
    RPC_UNICODE_STRING LogonDomainName;
    PRPC_SID LogonDomainId;
    unsigned long ExpansionRoom[10];
} NETLOGON_VALIDATION_SAM_INFO,
*PNETLOGON_VALIDATION_SAM_INFO;
```

**LogonServer:** An **RPC\_UNICODE\_STRING** structure that contains the NetBIOS name of the server that populates this structure.

**ExpansionRoom:** A ten-element array of unsigned 32-bit integers. This member has a function similar to that of dummy fields, as detailed in section [1.3.7.1.3](#). Each element of the array **MUST** be zero when sent, and **MUST** be ignored on receipt.

#### 2.2.1.4.12 NETLOGON\_VALIDATION\_SAM\_INFO2

The **NETLOGON\_VALIDATION\_SAM\_INFO2** structure is an extension to [NETLOGON\\_VALIDATION\\_SAM\\_INFO](#), as specified in section [2.2.1.4.11](#), with support for storing extra SIDs.

All fields of this structure, except the fields detailed following the structure definition, have the same meaning as the identically named fields in the **KERB\_VALIDATION\_INFO** structure as specified in [\[MS-PAC\]](#) section 2.5. Additionally, fields of this structure that are defined as `OLD_LARGE_INTEGER` are 64-bit timestamps equivalent to the identically named fields in the `KERB_VALIDATION_INFO` structure of `FILETIME` type.

```
typedef struct _NETLOGON_VALIDATION_SAM_INFO2 {
    OLD_LARGE_INTEGER LogonTime;
    OLD_LARGE_INTEGER LogoffTime;
    OLD_LARGE_INTEGER KickOffTime;
    OLD_LARGE_INTEGER PasswordLastSet;
    OLD_LARGE_INTEGER PasswordCanChange;
    OLD_LARGE_INTEGER PasswordMustChange;
    RPC_UNICODE_STRING EffectiveName;
    RPC_UNICODE_STRING FullName;
    RPC_UNICODE_STRING LogonScript;
    RPC_UNICODE_STRING ProfilePath;
    RPC_UNICODE_STRING HomeDirectory;
    RPC_UNICODE_STRING HomeDirectoryDrive;
    unsigned short LogonCount;
    unsigned short BadPasswordCount;
    unsigned long UserId;
    unsigned long PrimaryGroupId;
    unsigned long GroupCount;
    [size_is(GroupCount)] PGROUP_MEMBERSHIP GroupIds;
    unsigned long UserFlags;
    USER_SESSION_KEY UserSessionKey;
    RPC_UNICODE_STRING LogonServer;
    RPC_UNICODE_STRING LogonDomainName;
    PRPC_SID LogonDomainId;
    unsigned long ExpansionRoom[10];
    unsigned long SidCount;
    [size_is(SidCount)] PNETLOGON_SID_AND_ATTRIBUTES ExtraSids;
} NETLOGON_VALIDATION_SAM_INFO2,
*PNETLOGON_VALIDATION_SAM_INFO2;
```

**LogonServer:** An **RPC\_UNICODE\_STRING** structure that contains the NetBIOS name of the server that populates this structure.

**ExpansionRoom:** A ten-element array of unsigned 32-bit integers. This member has a function similar to that of dummy fields, as detailed in section [1.3.7.1.3](#). Each element of the array MUST be zero when sent, and MUST be ignored on receipt.

#### 2.2.1.4.13 NETLOGON\_VALIDATION\_SAM\_INFO4

The **NETLOGON\_VALIDATION\_SAM\_INFO4** structure extends [NETLOGON\\_VALIDATION\\_SAM\\_INFO2](#), as specified in section [2.2.1.4.12](#), by storing the fully qualified domain name (FQDN) of the domain of the user account and the user principal.

All fields of this structure, except the fields detailed following the structure definition, have the same meaning as the identically named fields in the **KERB\_VALIDATION\_INFO** structure, as specified in [\[MS-PAC\]](#) section 2.5. Additionally, fields of this structure that are defined as `OLD_LARGE_INTEGER` are 64-bit timestamps equivalent to the identically named fields in the `KERB_VALIDATION_INFO` structure of `FILETIME` type.

```

typedef struct _NETLOGON_VALIDATION_SAM_INFO4 {
    OLD_LARGE_INTEGER LogonTime;
    OLD_LARGE_INTEGER LogoffTime;
    OLD_LARGE_INTEGER KickOffTime;
    OLD_LARGE_INTEGER PasswordLastSet;
    OLD_LARGE_INTEGER PasswordCanChange;
    OLD_LARGE_INTEGER PasswordMustChange;
    RPC_UNICODE_STRING EffectiveName;
    RPC_UNICODE_STRING FullName;
    RPC_UNICODE_STRING LogonScript;
    RPC_UNICODE_STRING ProfilePath;
    RPC_UNICODE_STRING HomeDirectory;
    RPC_UNICODE_STRING HomeDirectoryDrive;
    unsigned short LogonCount;
    unsigned short BadPasswordCount;
    unsigned long UserId;
    unsigned long PrimaryGroupId;
    unsigned long GroupCount;
    [size_is(GroupCount)] PGROUP_MEMBERSHIP GroupIds;
    unsigned long UserFlags;
    USER_SESSION_KEY UserSessionKey;
    RPC_UNICODE_STRING LogonServer;
    RPC_UNICODE_STRING LogonDomainName;
    PRPC_SID LogonDomainId;
    unsigned CHAR LMKey[8];
    ULONG UserAccountControl;
    ULONG SubAuthStatus;
    OLD_LARGE_INTEGER LastSuccessfulLogon;
    OLD_LARGE_INTEGER LastFailedLogon;
    ULONG FailedLogonCount;
    ULONG Reserved4[1];
    unsigned long SidCount;
    [size_is(SidCount)] PNETLOGON_SID_AND_ATTRIBUTES ExtraSids;
    RPC_UNICODE_STRING DnsLogonDomainName;
    RPC_UNICODE_STRING Upn;
    RPC_UNICODE_STRING ExpansionString1;
    RPC_UNICODE_STRING ExpansionString2;
    RPC_UNICODE_STRING ExpansionString3;
    RPC_UNICODE_STRING ExpansionString4;
    RPC_UNICODE_STRING ExpansionString5;
    RPC_UNICODE_STRING ExpansionString6;
    RPC_UNICODE_STRING ExpansionString7;
    RPC_UNICODE_STRING ExpansionString8;
    RPC_UNICODE_STRING ExpansionString9;
    RPC_UNICODE_STRING ExpansionString10;
} NETLOGON_VALIDATION_SAM_INFO4,
*PNETLOGON_VALIDATION_SAM_INFO4;

```

**LogonServer:** An **RPC\_UNICODE\_STRING** structure that contains the NetBIOS name of the server that populates this structure.

**LMKey:** Contains the first 8 bytes of the LMOWF ([\[MS-NLMP\]](#) section 3.3.1) if NTLMV1 is used, or the first 8 bytes of the KXKEY ([\[MS-NLMP\]](#) section 3.4.5.1) if NTLMV2 is used.

**Reserved4:** An unsigned 32-bit integer. This member is reserved. MUST be zero when sent, and MUST be ignored on receipt.

**DnsLogonDomainName:** Contains the fully qualified domain name (FQDN) of the domain of the user account.

**Upn:** Contains the **user principal name (UPN)**.

**ExpansionString1:** MUST contain 0 for the **Length** field, 0 for the **MaximumLength** field, and NULL for the **Buffer** field. It is ignored upon receipt. Expansion strings have a function similar to that of dummy fields, as detailed in section [1.3.7.1.3](#).

**ExpansionString2:** MUST contain 0 for the **Length** field, 0 for the **MaximumLength** field, and NULL for the **Buffer** field. It is ignored upon receipt. Expansion strings have a function similar to that of dummy fields, as detailed in section [1.3.7.1.3](#).

**ExpansionString3:** MUST contain 0 for the **Length** field, 0 for the **MaximumLength** field, and NULL for the **Buffer** field. It is ignored upon receipt. Expansion strings have a function similar to that of dummy fields, as detailed in section [1.3.7.1.3](#).

**ExpansionString4:** MUST contain 0 for the **Length** field, 0 for the **MaximumLength** field, and NULL for the **Buffer** field. It is ignored upon receipt. Expansion strings have a function similar to that of dummy fields, as detailed in section [1.3.7.1.3](#).

**ExpansionString5:** MUST contain 0 for the **Length** field, 0 for the **MaximumLength** field, and NULL for the **Buffer** field. It is ignored upon receipt. Expansion strings have a function similar to that of dummy fields, as detailed in section [1.3.7.1.3](#).

**ExpansionString6:** MUST contain 0 for the **Length** field, 0 for the **MaximumLength** field, and NULL for the **Buffer** field. It is ignored upon receipt. Expansion strings have a function similar to that of dummy fields, as detailed in section [1.3.7.1.3](#).

**ExpansionString7:** MUST contain 0 for the **Length** field, 0 for the **MaximumLength** field, and NULL for the **Buffer** field. It is ignored upon receipt. Expansion strings have a function similar to that of dummy fields, as detailed in section [1.3.7.1.3](#).

**ExpansionString8:** MUST contain 0 for the **Length** field, 0 for the **MaximumLength** field, and NULL for the **Buffer** field. It is ignored upon receipt. Expansion strings have a function similar to that of dummy fields, as detailed in section [1.3.7.1.3](#).

**ExpansionString9:** MUST contain 0 for the **Length** field, 0 for the **MaximumLength** field, and NULL for the **Buffer** field. It is ignored upon receipt. Expansion strings have a function similar to that of dummy fields, as detailed in section [1.3.7.1.3](#).

**ExpansionString10:** MUST contain 0 for the **Length** field, 0 for the **MaximumLength** field, and NULL for the **Buffer** field. It is ignored upon receipt. Expansion strings have a function similar to that of dummy fields, as detailed in section [1.3.7.1.3](#).

#### 2.2.1.4.14 NETLOGON\_VALIDATION

The **NETLOGON\_VALIDATION** union defines a union of all types of user validation information values.

```
typedef
[switch_type(enum _NETLOGON_VALIDATION_INFO_CLASS)]
union _NETLOGON_VALIDATION {
    [case (NetlogonValidationSamInfo)]
        PNETLOGON_VALIDATION_SAM_INFO ValidationSam;
    [case (NetlogonValidationSamInfo2)]
        PNETLOGON_VALIDATION_SAM_INFO2 ValidationSam2;
```

```

[case (NetlogonValidationGenericInfo2)]
    PNETLOGON_VALIDATION_GENERIC_INFO2 ValidationGeneric2;
[case (NetlogonValidationSamInfo4)]
    PNETLOGON_VALIDATION_SAM_INFO4 ValidationSam4;
[default]
    ;
} NETLOGON_VALIDATION,
*PNETLOGON_VALIDATION;

```

**ValidationSam:** This field is selected when the validation information type is **NetlogonValidationSamInfo**. The selected data type is [NETLOGON\\_VALIDATION\\_SAM\\_INFO](#), as specified in section [2.2.1.4.11](#).

**ValidationSam2:** This field is selected when the validation information type is **NetlogonValidationSamInfo2**. The selected data type is [NETLOGON\\_VALIDATION\\_SAM\\_INFO2](#), as specified in section [2.2.1.4.12](#).

**ValidationGeneric2:** This field is selected when the validation information type is **NetlogonValidationGenericInfo2**. The selected data type is [NETLOGON\\_VALIDATION\\_GENERIC\\_INFO2](#), as specified in section [2.2.1.4.8](#).

**ValidationSam4:** This field is selected when the validation information type is **NetlogonValidationSamInfo4**. The selected data type is [NETLOGON\\_VALIDATION\\_SAM\\_INFO4](#), as specified in section [2.2.1.4.13](#).

#### 2.2.1.4.15 NETLOGON\_LOGON\_IDENTITY\_INFO

The **NETLOGON\_LOGON\_IDENTITY\_INFO** structure defines a logon identity within a domain.

```

typedef struct _NETLOGON_LOGON_IDENTITY_INFO {
    RPC_UNICODE_STRING LogonDomainName;
    unsigned long ParameterControl;
    OLD_LARGE_INTEGER Reserved;
    RPC_UNICODE_STRING UserName;
    RPC_UNICODE_STRING Workstation;
} NETLOGON_LOGON_IDENTITY_INFO,
*PNETLOGON_LOGON_IDENTITY_INFO;

```

**LogonDomainName:** Contains the NetBIOS name of the domain of the account.

**ParameterControl:** A set of bit flags that contain information pertaining to the logon validation processing. A flag is TRUE (or set) if its value is equal to 1. The value is constructed from zero or more bit flags from the following table.

										1									2											3	
0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	0	1
X	W	V	U	T	S	R	Q	0	0	0	P	0	0	0	O	0	N	M	L	K	J	I	H	G	F	E	D	C	B	A	0

Where the bits are defined as:

Value	Description
A	Clear text passwords can be transmitted for this logon identity.
B	Update the logon statistics for this account upon successful logon.
C	Return the user parameter list for this account upon successful logon.
D	Do not attempt to log this account on as a guest upon logon failure.
E	Allow this account to log on with the domain controller account.
F	Return the password expiration date and time upon successful logon.
G	Send a <b>client challenge</b> upon logon request.
H	Attempt logon as a guest for this account only.
I	Return the profile path upon successful logon.
J	Attempt logon to the specified domain only.
K	Allow this account to log on with the computer account.
L	Disable allowing fallback to guest account for this account.
M	Force the logon of this account as a guest if the password is incorrect.
N	This account has supplied a clear text password.
O	Allow NTLMv1 authentication ( <a href="#">[MS-NLMP]</a> ) when only NTLMv2 ( <a href="#">[NTLM]</a> ) is allowed.
P	Use <b>sub-authentication</b> ( <a href="#">[MS-APDS]</a> section 3.1.5.2.1).
Q	Encode the <b>sub-authentication package</b> identifier. Bits Q–X are used to encode the integer value of the sub-authentication package identifier (this is in little-endian order).
R	Encode the sub-authentication package identifier. Bits Q–X are used to encode the integer value of the sub-authentication package identifier (this is in little-endian order).
S	Encode the sub-authentication package identifier. Bits Q–X are used to encode the integer value of the sub-authentication package identifier (this is in little-endian order).
T	Encode the sub-authentication package identifier. Bits Q–X are used to encode the integer value of the sub-authentication package identifier (this is in little-endian order).
U	Encode the sub-authentication package identifier. Bits Q–X are used to encode the integer value of the sub-authentication package identifier (this is in little-endian order).
V	Encode the sub-authentication package identifier. Bits Q–X are used to encode the integer value of the sub-authentication package identifier (this is in little-endian order).
W	Encode the sub-authentication package identifier. Bits Q–X are used to encode the

Value	Description
	integer value of the sub-authentication package identifier (this is in little-endian order).
X	Encode the sub-authentication package identifier. Bits Q–X are used to encode the integer value of the sub-authentication package identifier (this is in little-endian order).

**Reserved:** MUST be set to zero when sent and MUST be ignored on receipt.

**UserName:** Contains the name of the user.

**Workstation:** Contains the NetBIOS name of the workstation from which the user is logging on.

#### 2.2.1.4.16 NETLOGON\_LOGON\_INFO\_CLASS

The **NETLOGON\_LOGON\_INFO\_CLASS** enumeration identifies a particular type of logon information block.

```
typedef enum _NETLOGON_LOGON_INFO_CLASS
{
    NetlogonInteractiveInformation = 1,
    NetlogonNetworkInformation = 2,
    NetlogonServiceInformation = 3,
    NetlogonGenericInformation = 4,
    NetlogonInteractiveTransitiveInformation = 5,
    NetlogonNetworkTransitiveInformation = 6,
    NetlogonServiceTransitiveInformation = 7
} NETLOGON_LOGON_INFO_CLASS;
```

**NetlogonInteractiveInformation:** Logon information provided pertains to an interactive account logon. Interactive account logon requires a user to physically input credentials at the client that are then authenticated by the DC. [<24>](#)

**NetlogonNetworkInformation:** Logon information provided pertains to a network account logon. Network logon is transparent to the user. The user has already input his or her credentials during interactive logon and has been authenticated by the server or DC. These credentials are used again to log the user onto another network resource without prompting the user for his or her credentials. [<25>](#)

**NetlogonServiceInformation:** Logon information provided pertains to a service account logon. A service account acts as a non-privileged user on the local computer and presents anonymous credentials to any remote server. [<26>](#)

**NetlogonGenericInformation:** Logon information provided pertains to a generic account logon. This type of account logon is for generic pass-through authentication, as specified in section [3.2.4.1](#), that enables servers to forward NTLM and Digest authentication credentials to a DC for authorization. [<27>](#)

**NetlogonInteractiveTransitiveInformation:** Logon information provided pertains to a transitive interactive account logon and can be passed through transitive trust links. [<28>](#)

**NetlogonNetworkTransitiveInformation:** Logon information provided pertains to a transitive network account logon and can be passed through transitive trust links. [<29>](#)

**NetlogonServiceTransitiveInformation:** Logon information provided pertains to a transitive service account logon and can be passed through transitive trust links.<30>

#### 2.2.1.4.17 NETLOGON\_VALIDATION\_INFO\_CLASS

The **NETLOGON\_VALIDATION\_INFO\_CLASS** (section 2.2.1.4.17) enumeration selects the type of logon information block being used.

```
typedef enum _NETLOGON_VALIDATION_INFO_CLASS
{
    NetlogonValidationUasInfo = 1,
    NetlogonValidationSamInfo = 2,
    NetlogonValidationSamInfo2 = 3,
    NetlogonValidationGenericInfo = 4,
    NetlogonValidationGenericInfo2 = 5,
    NetlogonValidationSamInfo4 = 6
} NETLOGON_VALIDATION_INFO_CLASS;
```

**NetlogonValidationUasInfo:** Associated structure is [NETLOGON\\_VALIDATION\\_UAS\\_INFO \(section 2.2.1.7.1\)](#).<31>

**NetlogonValidationSamInfo:** Associated structure is [NETLOGON\\_VALIDATION\\_SAM\\_INFO](#) (section 2.2.1.4.11).<32>

**NetlogonValidationSamInfo2:** Associated structure is [NETLOGON\\_VALIDATION\\_SAM\\_INFO2](#) (section 2.2.1.4.12).<33>

**NetlogonValidationGenericInfo:** Associated structure is [NETLOGON\\_VALIDATION\\_GENERIC\\_INFO2](#) (section 2.2.1.4.8).<34>

**NetlogonValidationGenericInfo2:** Associated structure is [NETLOGON\\_VALIDATION\\_GENERIC\\_INFO2](#) (section 2.2.1.4.8).<35>

**NetlogonValidationSamInfo4:** Associated structure is [NETLOGON\\_VALIDATION\\_SAM\\_INFO4](#) (section 2.2.1.4.13).<36>

#### 2.2.1.4.18 NETLOGON Specific Access Masks

**Access Rights:** The access rights defined by this protocol are specified by the bit settings in the following table:

Name	Value	Informative Summary
NETLOGON_UAS_LOGON_ACCESS	0x0001	Obsolete (LAN Manager).
NETLOGON_UAS_LOGOFF_ACCESS	0x0002	Obsolete (LAN Manager).
NETLOGON_CONTROL_ACCESS	0x0004	Granted to <b>security principals</b> that are system operators, account operators, administrators, or components of the operating system.
NETLOGON_QUERY_ACCESS	0x0008	Granted to all security principals.
NETLOGON_SERVICE_ACCESS	0x0010	Granted to all security principals that are administrators or components of the operating system.



Name	Value	Informative Summary
NETLOGON_FTINFO_ACCESS	0x0020	Granted to all security principals that are authenticated users.
NETLOGON_WKSTA_RPC_ACCESS	0x0040	Granted to all security principals that are local users or administrators.

### 2.2.1.5 Domain Trust Structures

Structures in this group are used for retrieving trust information as outlined in section [1.3](#).

#### 2.2.1.5.1 DOMAIN\_NAME\_BUFFER

The **DOMAIN\_NAME\_BUFFER** structure defines information returned by the [NetrEnumerateTrustedDomains](#) method, as specified in section [3.5.5.6.3](#). The structure is used to describe a set of trusted domain names.

```
typedef struct _DOMAIN_NAME_BUFFER {
    unsigned long DomainNameByteCount;
    [unique, size_is(DomainNameByteCount)]
    unsigned char* DomainNames;
} DOMAIN_NAME_BUFFER,
*PDOMAIN_NAME_BUFFER;
```

**DomainNameByteCount:** The size, in bytes, of the buffer pointed to by the **DomainNames** field, including all UTF-16 null characters.

**DomainNames:** The Unicode string buffer that contains the list of trusted domains. The list format is a UTF-16 string composed of one or more substrings. Each substring is separated from adjacent substrings by the UTF-16 null character, 0x0000. After the final substring, the string is terminated by two UTF-16 null characters.

For example, if there are three trusted domains, DOMAIN1, DOMAIN2, and DOMAIN3, the **DomainNames** string buffer would have the following form:

DOMAIN1<null>DOMAIN2<null>DOMAIN3<null><null>

where <null> is the UTF-16 null character, 0x0000.

#### 2.2.1.5.2 DS\_DOMAIN\_TRUSTSW

The **DS\_DOMAIN\_TRUSTSW** structure defines information about a domain trust. It is part of the [NETLOGON\\_TRUSTED\\_DOMAIN\\_ARRAY](#) structure returned by the [DsrEnumerateDomainTrusts](#) method, as specified in section [3.5.5.6.1](#). This structure contains naming information and trust-related information for a specific trusted domain. [<37>](#)

```
typedef struct _DS_DOMAIN_TRUSTSW {
    [string] wchar_t* NetbiosDomainName;
    [string] wchar_t* DnsDomainName;
    unsigned long Flags;
    unsigned long ParentIndex;
    unsigned long TrustType;
    unsigned long TrustAttributes;
```

```

PRPC_SID DomainSid;
GUID DomainGuid;
} DS_DOMAIN_TRUSTSW,
*PDS_DOMAIN_TRUSTSW;

```

**NetbiosDomainName:** A pointer to a null-terminated Unicode string that contains the NetBIOS name of the trusted domain.

**DnsDomainName:** A pointer to a null-terminated Unicode string that contains the fully qualified domain name (FQDN) of the trusted domain.

**Flags:** A set of bit flags that defines the domain trust attributes. A flag is TRUE (or set) if its value is equal to 1. The value is constructed from zero or more bit flags from the following table.

0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31
0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	F	E	D	C	B	A

Where the bits are defined as:

Value	Description
A	Domain is a member of a forest.
B	Domain is directly trusted by the current domain.
C	Domain is the root of a forest.
D	Domain is the primary domain of the queried server.
E	Primary domain is running in native mode.
F	Domain directly trusts the current domain.

All other bits MUST be set to zero and MUST be ignored on receipt.

**ParentIndex:** An integer value that contains the index in the **NETLOGON\_TRUSTED\_DOMAIN\_ARRAY** array (returned by the **DsrEnumerateDomainTrusts** method) that corresponds to the parent domain of the domain represented by this structure. This field is only set if all of the following conditions are met:

- The A flag was specified in the *Flags* parameter of the **DsrEnumerateDomainTrusts** method.
- The **Flags** field of this structure, **DS\_DOMAIN\_TRUSTSW**, does not contain the C flag.

Otherwise, it MUST be set to zero and MUST be ignored.

**TrustType:** A set of bit flags describing the type of domain with which the trust is associated. A flag is TRUE (or set) if its value is equal to 1. **TrustType** MUST be one, and only one, of the following bits.

0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	20	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	30	1	
0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	D	C	B	A

Where the bits are defined as:

Value	Description
A	Trust is with a Windows NT Domain. <a href="#">.&lt;38&gt;</a>
B	Trust is with a Windows Active Directory-based Domain . <a href="#">.&lt;39&gt;</a>
C	Trust is with an MIT Kerberos realm.
D	Trust is with a Distributed Computing Environment (DCE) realm.

All other bits MUST be set to zero and MUST be ignored on receipt.

**TrustAttributes:** A set of bit flags describing trust link attributes. A flag is true (or set) if its value is equal to 1. The value is constructed from zero or more bit flags from the following table, with the exception that bit F cannot be combined with E or D.

0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31
0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	I	H	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	G	F	E	D	C	B	A

Where the bits are defined as:

Value	Description
A	Trust link MUST not allow transitivity.
B	Trust link is valid only for Windows 2000, Windows XP, Windows Server 2003, Windows Vista, and Windows Server 2008 domains.
C	Trust link MUST be set for SID filtering of the client domain. For details about SID filtering, see <a href="#">[MS-PAC]</a> .
D	Trust link can contain forest trust information.
E	Trust link is to either a domain or a forest that is not part of the <b>enterprise network</b> .
F	Trust link is internal to the forest.
G	Trust is to be treated as external for trust boundary purposes.
H	Domain is parent domain.
I	Domain is root of another forest.

All other bits MUST be set to zero and MUST be ignored on receipt.

**DomainSid:** A pointer to an SID structure that identifies the current domain. If the **TrustType** field is set to C or D, the value is 0.

**DomainGuid:** A GUID that identifies the current domain.

### 2.2.1.5.3 NETLOGON\_TRUSTED\_DOMAIN\_ARRAY

The **NETLOGON\_TRUSTED\_DOMAIN\_ARRAY** structure defines information returned by the [NetrEnumerateTrustedDomainsEx](#) method, as specified in section [3.5.5.6.2.<40>](#). It contains an array of **DS\_DOMAIN\_TRUSTSW** structures, as specified in section [2.2.1.5.2](#), that describe domains trusted by the server processing the call.

```
typedef struct _NETLOGON_TRUSTED_DOMAIN_ARRAY {
    DWORD DomainCount;
    [size_is(DomainCount)] PDS_DOMAIN_TRUSTSW Domains;
} NETLOGON_TRUSTED_DOMAIN_ARRAY,
*PNETLOGON_TRUSTED_DOMAIN_ARRAY;
```

**DomainCount:** The number of entries in the **Domains** field.

**Domains:** The data structure that contains an array of **DS\_DOMAIN\_TRUSTSW** structures, as specified in section [2.2.1.5.2](#), that represent trusted domains.

### 2.2.1.5.4 NL\_GENERIC\_RPC\_DATA

The **NL\_GENERIC\_RPC\_DATA** structure defines a format for marshaling arrays of unsigned long values and Unicode strings, by value, over RPC. [<41>](#) The **NL\_GENERIC\_RPC\_DATA** structure can be used to transmit generic data over RPC from the server to a client.

```
typedef struct _NL_GENERIC_RPC_DATA {
    unsigned long UlongEntryCount;
    [size_is(UlongEntryCount)] unsigned long* UlongData;
    unsigned long UnicodeStringEntryCount;
    [size_is(UnicodeStringEntryCount)]
        PRPC_UNICODE_STRING UnicodeStringData;
} NL_GENERIC_RPC_DATA,
*PNL_GENERIC_RPC_DATA;
```

**UlongEntryCount:** The number of entries in **UlongData**.

**UlongData:** A pointer to an array of unsigned 32-bit integer values.

**UnicodeStringEntryCount:** The number of entries in **UnicodeStringData**.

**UnicodeStringData:** A pointer to an array of Unicode string structures.

### 2.2.1.6 Administrative Services Structures

Structures in this group are used to query and control Netlogon behavior, as outlined in section [1.3](#).

### 2.2.1.6.1 NETLOGON\_CONTROL\_DATA\_INFORMATION

The **NETLOGON\_CONTROL\_DATA\_INFORMATION** union is used as input to the [NetrLogonControl2](#) method, as specified in section [3.5.5.8.2](#), and the [NetrLogonControl2Ex](#) method, as specified in section [3.5.5.8.1](#). This union selects a data type, based on the FunctionCode parameter passed to the method. For details about FunctionCode values, see [NetrLogonControl2Ex](#), section [3.5.5.8.1](#).

```
typedef
[switch_type(DWORD)]
union _NETLOGON_CONTROL_DATA_INFORMATION {
    [case(5,6,9,10)]
        [string] wchar_t* TrustedDomainName;
    [case(65534)]
        DWORD DebugFlag;
    [case(8)]
        [string] wchar_t* UserName;
    [default]
        ;
} NETLOGON_CONTROL_DATA_INFORMATION,
*PNETLOGON_CONTROL_DATA_INFORMATION;
```

**TrustedDomainName:** A pointer to a null-terminated Unicode string that contains a trusted domain name. Switched on the DWORD ([\[MS-DTYP\]](#) section 2.2.9) values 0x00000005, 0x00000006, 0x00000009, and 0x0000000A. The DWORD values are equivalent to FunctionCode values. For a complete list of the Netlogon function codes and their associated meanings, see [NetrLogonControl2Ex](#), section [3.5.5.8.1](#).

**DebugFlag:** A DWORD that contains an implementation-specific debug flag. Switched on the value 0x0000FFFE.

**UserName:** A pointer to null-terminated Unicode string that contains a user name. Switched on the DWORD value 0x00000008.

### 2.2.1.6.2 NETLOGON\_INFO\_1

The **NETLOGON\_INFO\_1** structure defines information returned as part of an administrative query, as detailed in the description of the [NetrLogonControl2Ex](#) method in section [3.5.5.8.1](#). This structure is used to convey information about the state and properties of the secure channel to a DC in the primary domain of the queried server. Additionally, for Windows NT 4.0 backup domain controllers, this structure contains information about the state of the database synchronization.

```
typedef struct _NETLOGON_INFO_1 {
    DWORD netlog1_flags;
    NET_API_STATUS netlog1_pdc_connection_status;
} NETLOGON_INFO_1,
*PNETLOGON_INFO_1;
```

**netlog1\_flags:** A set of bit flags that have the following meanings. A flag is TRUE (or set) if its value is equal to 1. The value is constructed from zero or more bit flags from the following table.

0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	0	1
0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	G	F	E	D	C	B	A

The flags are defined in the following table. [.<42>](#)

Value	Description
A	One of the databases is out-of-date, and replication is needed. <a href="#">.&lt;43&gt;</a>
B	At least one of the databases is currently being replicated. <a href="#">.&lt;44&gt;</a>
C	At least one of the databases requires a full synchronization update. <a href="#">.&lt;45&gt;</a>
D	At least one database record requires an update. <a href="#">.&lt;46&gt;</a>
E	The DC used on the secure channel is reachable over TCP/IP. If this flag is not set, then the DC does not have a known IP address. <a href="#">.&lt;47&gt;</a>
F	The DC used on the secure channel runs the Windows Time Service. <a href="#">.&lt;48&gt;</a>
G	The last update of one of the DNS records on the DC failed. <a href="#">.&lt;49&gt;</a>

All other bits MUST be set to zero and MUST be ignored on receipt.

To a client, bit D will appear arbitrarily set to 0 or 1 and the client is not expected to perform any action based on this value. For more information, see the server to server database synchronization topic ([\[MS-NRPC\]](#) section 3.6).

**netlog1\_pdc\_connection\_status:** The integer value that indicates the connection status (section [3.4.5.3.1](#)) of the secure channel to a DC in the primary domain of the queried server. See section [3.4.5.3.1](#) for more information.

### 2.2.1.6.3 NETLOGON\_INFO\_2

The **NETLOGON\_INFO\_2** structure defines information returned as part of an administrative query of the status of the Netlogon server, as detailed in the description of the [NetrLogonControl2Ex](#) method in section [3.5.5.8.1](#). This structure is used to convey information about the status and properties of the secure channel to a DC in the primary or directly trusted domain specified by the caller of the **NetrLogonControl2Ex** method.

```
typedef struct _NETLOGON_INFO_2 {
    DWORD netlog2_flags;
    NET_API_STATUS netlog2_pdc_connection_status;
    [string] wchar_t* netlog2_trusted_dc_name;
    NET_API_STATUS netlog2_tc_connection_status;
} NETLOGON_INFO_2,
*PNETLOGON_INFO_2;
```

**netlog2\_flags:** A set of bit flags describing the following control query responses from the DC. A flag is TRUE (or set) if its value is equal to 1. The value is constructed from zero or more bit flags from the following table.

0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31
0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	C	0	B	A	0	0	0	0

Where the flags are as defined as shown in the following table.<50>

Value	Description
A	The DC used on the secure channel has an IP address (either IPv4 or IPv6).<51>
B	The DC used on the secure channel runs the Windows Time Service.<52>
C	Signifies that the trust verification status was returned in the netlog2_pdc_connection_status field.<53>

All other bits MUST be set to zero and MUST be ignored on receipt.

**netlog2\_pdc\_connection\_status:** Unless the C bit is set in **netlog2\_flags** field, this field indicates the connection status (section 3.4.5.3.1) of the secure channel to a DC in the primary domain of the queried server. If the C bit is set in **netlog2\_flags** field, this field indicates the connection status of verifying the secure channel to the DC in the specified domain (specified by the caller of the **NetrLogonControl2Ex** method; see section 3.5.5.8.1 for more information).

**netlog2\_trusted\_dc\_name:** A pointer to a null-terminated Unicode string that contains the DNS or NetBIOS name of the DC used on the secure channel for the specified domain. The name is the fully qualified domain name (FQDN) if the DC was discovered using the discovery mechanism based on the DNS query and LDAP ping ([MS-ADTS] section 7.3.3). The name is the NetBIOS name if the DC was discovered using the mailslot-based mechanism ([MS-ADTS] section 7.3.5).

**netlog2\_tc\_connection\_status:** An integer value that indicates the connection status (section 3.4.5.3.1) of the secure channel to the DC in the specified domain.

## 2.2.1.6.4 NETLOGON\_INFO\_3

The **NETLOGON\_INFO\_3** structure defines information returned as part of an administrative query of the status of the Netlogon server, as detailed in the description of the **NetrLogonControl2Ex** method in section 3.5.5.8.1. This structure is used to return the number of NTLM logons attempted on the queried server since the last restart.

```
typedef struct _NETLOGON_INFO_3 {
    DWORD netlog3_flags;
    DWORD netlog3_logon_attempts;
    DWORD netlog3_reserved1;
    DWORD netlog3_reserved2;
    DWORD netlog3_reserved3;
    DWORD netlog3_reserved4;
    DWORD netlog3_reserved5;
} NETLOGON_INFO_3,
*PNETLOGON_INFO_3;
```

**netlog3\_flags:** MUST be set to zero and MUST be ignored on receipt.

**netlog3\_logon\_attempts:** The number of NTLM logon attempts made on the server since the last restart.

**netlog3\_reserved1:** MUST be set to zero and MUST be ignored on receipt.

**netlog3\_reserved2:** MUST be set to zero and MUST be ignored on receipt.

**netlog3\_reserved3:** MUST be set to zero and MUST be ignored on receipt.

**netlog3\_reserved4:** MUST be set to zero and MUST be ignored on receipt.

**netlog3\_reserved5:** MUST be set to zero and MUST be ignored on receipt.

#### 2.2.1.6.5 NETLOGON\_INFO\_4

The **NETLOGON\_INFO\_4** structure defines information that is returned as part of an administrative query of the status of the Netlogon server, as detailed in the description of the [NetrLogonControl2Ex](#) method in section [3.5.5.8.1](#). This structure is used to convey information about the status and properties of the secure channel to a DC in the primary or directly trusted domain containing the user account specified by the caller of the **NetrLogonControl2Ex** method.

```
typedef struct _NETLOGON_INFO_4 {  
    [string] wchar_t* netlog4_trusted_dc_name;  
    [string] wchar_t* netlog4_trusted_domain_name;  
} NETLOGON_INFO_4,  
*PNETLOGON_INFO_4;
```

**netlog4\_trusted\_dc\_name:** A pointer to a null-terminated Unicode string that contains the DNS or NetBIOS name of a DC that is used on the secure channel for the primary or directly trusted domain containing the specified user account. The name is the fully qualified domain name (FQDN) if the DC was discovered using the discovery mechanism based on the DNS query and LDAP ping ([\[MS-ADTS\]](#) section 7.3.3). The name is the NetBIOS name if the DC was discovered using the mailslot-based mechanism ([\[MS-ADTS\]](#) section 7.3.5).

**netlog4\_trusted\_domain\_name:** A pointer to a null-terminated Unicode string that contains the NetBIOS name of the primary or directly trusted domain containing the specified user account.

#### 2.2.1.6.6 NETLOGON\_CONTROL\_QUERY\_INFORMATION

The **NETLOGON\_CONTROL\_QUERY\_INFORMATION** union selects an appropriate **NETLOGON\_INFO** data type, based on the value of the *QueryLevel* parameter to the [NetrLogonControl2Ex](#) method described in section [3.5.5.8.1](#).

```
typedef  
[switch_type(DWORD)]  
union _NETLOGON_CONTROL_QUERY_INFORMATION {  
    [case(1)]  
        PNETLOGON_INFO_1 NetlogonInfo1;  
    [case(2)]  
        PNETLOGON_INFO_2 NetlogonInfo2;  
    [case(3)]  
        PNETLOGON_INFO_3 NetlogonInfo3;
```



```

[case(4)]
    PNETLOGON_INFO_4 NetlogonInfo4;
[default]
    ;
} NETLOGON_CONTROL_QUERY_INFORMATION,
*PNETLOGON_CONTROL_QUERY_INFORMATION;

```

**NetlogonInfo1:** This field is selected when the switched DWORD ([\[MS-DTYP\]](#) section 2.2.9) value is 1. For more information about [NETLOGON\\_INFO\\_1](#), see section [2.2.1.6.2](#).

**NetlogonInfo2:** This field is selected when the switched DWORD value is 2. For more information about [NETLOGON\\_INFO\\_2](#), see section [2.2.1.6.3](#).

**NetlogonInfo3:** This field is selected when the switched DWORD value is 3. For more information about [NETLOGON\\_INFO\\_3](#), see section [2.2.1.6.4](#).

**NetlogonInfo4:** This field is selected when the switched DWORD value is 4. For more information about [NETLOGON\\_INFO\\_4](#), see section [2.2.1.6.5](#).

## 2.2.1.7 Obsolete Structures

The structures in this group are unsupported and are out of the scope of this document, but they are types associated with parameters in methods that are also obsolete (see section [3.4.5.7](#) for details), and are thus provided here. The structures were used in versions of Windows not covered by this document.

### 2.2.1.7.1 NETLOGON\_VALIDATION\_UAS\_INFO

The **NETLOGON\_VALIDATION\_UAS\_INFO** structure was for the support of LAN Manager products and is beyond the scope of this document.

```

typedef struct _NETLOGON_VALIDATION_UAS_INFO {
    [string] wchar_t* usrlog1_eff_name;
    DWORD usrlog1_priv;
    DWORD usrlog1_auth_flags;
    DWORD usrlog1_num_logons;
    DWORD usrlog1_bad_pw_count;
    DWORD usrlog1_last_logon;
    DWORD usrlog1_last_logoff;
    DWORD usrlog1_logoff_time;
    DWORD usrlog1_kickoff_time;
    DWORD usrlog1_password_age;
    DWORD usrlog1_pw_can_change;
    DWORD usrlog1_pw_must_change;
    [string] wchar_t* usrlog1_computer;
    [string] wchar_t* usrlog1_domain;
    [string] wchar_t* usrlog1_script_path;
    DWORD usrlog1_reserved1;
} NETLOGON_VALIDATION_UAS_INFO,
*PNETLOGON_VALIDATION_UAS_INFO;

```

### 2.2.1.7.2 NETLOGON\_LOGOFF\_UAS\_INFO

The **NETLOGON\_LOGOFF\_UAS\_INFO** structure was for the support of LAN Manager products and is beyond the scope of this document.

```
typedef struct _NETLOGON_LOGOFF_UAS_INFO {
    DWORD Duration;
    unsigned short LogonCount;
} NETLOGON_LOGOFF_UAS_INFORMATION,
*PNETLOGON_LOGOFF_UAS_INFO;
```

### 2.2.1.7.3 UAS\_INFO\_0

The **UAS\_INFO\_0** structure was for the support of LAN Manager products and is beyond the scope of this document.

```
typedef struct _UAS_INFO_0 {
    char ComputerName[16];
    unsigned long TimeCreated;
    unsigned long SerialNumber;
} UAS_INFO_0,
*PUAS_INFO_0;
```

### 2.2.1.7.4 NETLOGON\_DUMMY1

The **NETLOGON\_DUMMY1** union serves as a placeholder. [<54>](#)

```
typedef
[switch_type(DWORD)]
union {
    [case(1)]
    unsigned long Dummy;
} NETLOGON_DUMMY1,
*PNETLOGON_DUMMY1;
```

**Dummy:** The field is selected when the switched DWORD ([\[MS-DTYP\]](#) section 2.2.9) value is 1.

## 2.3 Directory Service Schema Elements Used by the Netlogon Remote Protocol

The Netlogon Remote Protocol accesses the **directory service** schema classes and attributes listed in the following table.

For the syntactic specifications of the following <Class> or <Class><Attribute> pairs, refer to Active Directory Domain Services (AD DS) ([\[MS-ADA1\]](#), [\[MS-ADA3\]](#) and [\[MS-ADSC\]](#)).

Class	Attribute
nTDSDSA	objectGUID
trustedDomain	trustAuthIncoming trustAuthOutgoing
computer	ImPwdHistory operatingSystem securityIdentifier

Class	Attribute
	operatingSystemVersion servicePrincipalName unicodePwd dnsHostName

### 3 Protocol Details

The Netlogon Remote Protocol remote procedure call (RPC) interface is used primarily by Microsoft Windows® to maintain the relationship between a machine and its domain. As such, there are several distinct responsibilities that the RPC interface fulfills while acting in this maintenance capacity. These responsibilities are as follows:

- The Netlogon Remote Protocol RPC interface is used to establish and maintain the secure channel that is used by members of a domain to communicate with the domain controller (DC).
- The Netlogon Remote Protocol RPC interface is used to transport authentication requests from domain members to the DC. This functionality is most commonly implemented by authentications using the NTLM Authentication Protocol ([\[MS-NLMP\]](#)), but it is also used by other protocols such as Kerberos and Digest ([\[MS-APDS\]](#) section 1.4).
- The Netlogon Remote Protocol RPC interface is used to transmit certain account changes, such as password changes or account lockout information.
- The Netlogon Remote Protocol serves as its own security provider for its RPC connection; that is, the authentication protocol is used both within the RPC exchanges for specific methods, and also as a general authentication protocol for the entire Netlogon Remote Protocol RPC interface.

This section presents the details of the Netlogon Protocol:

- Section [3.1](#) specifies the authentication aspects that are common to all Netlogon Remote Protocol roles, including establishing the secure channel. Before any method that utilizes the secure channel can be invoked, the authentication process that is described in this section MUST be completed.
- Section [3.2](#) specifies the use of the Netlogon Remote Protocol for pass-through authentication.
- Section [3.3](#) specifies the use of the Netlogon Remote Protocol authentication method as a generic security authentication mechanism.
- Sections [3.4](#) and [3.5](#) detail client and server operations, respectively.

All the Netlogon Remote Protocol methods return 0x00000000 (NERR\_Success) to indicate success; otherwise, they return a 32-bit nonzero error code. There are two types of error codes returned, NET\_API\_STATUS ([\[MS-ERREF\]](#) section 2.2) and NTSTATUS ([\[MS-ERREF\]](#) section 2.3). For more information about NTSTATUS values, see [\[NTSTATUSERR\]](#).

#### Common Error Processing Rules

Several Netlogon Remote Protocol methods apply the processing rules listed in the following section to determine which error codes are returned. The applicable processing rules from those mentioned in this section are referred to in each of the method descriptions. Error codes prepended with the prefix STATUS are of type NTSTATUS; the remaining error codes are of type NET\_API\_STATUS.

Common Error Processing Rule	Description
<b>A</b>	If a server does not support a specific Netlogon RPC method, it MUST return ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED or STATUS_NOT_SUPPORTED, based on the return type. This

Common Error Processing Rule	Description
	includes the case when the server is not a domain controller.
<b>B</b>	If the input parameter to a Netlogon RPC request is a computer name or server name, the server SHOULD look up this name in the domain the server hosts. If the name is not found<55>, the server MUST return ERROR_INVALID_COMPUTERNAME or STATUS_INVALID_COMPUTER_NAME.
<b>C</b>	If a server needs to locate a domain controller (DC) to service a Netlogon RPC request, it follows the method specified in <a href="#">[MS-ADTS]</a> section 7.3.6. If the DC cannot be located by following this method, the server MUST return ERROR_NO_LOGON_SERVERS or STATUS_NO_LOGON_SERVERS, depending on the return type.
<b>D</b>	If the Directory Service is paused and the Netlogon RPC method cannot be processed further, the server SHOULD return STATUS_DS_BUSY.
<b>E</b>	The server MUST return ERROR_NO_SUCH_DOMAIN if the DC could not be located for the specified domain, or if the specified domain is not primary or directly trusted.

The default pointer type for the Netlogon Remote Protocol RPC interface is pointer\_default(unique). Method calls are received at a dynamically assigned endpoint ([\[MS-RPCE\]](#) section 3.3.3.3.1.4). The endpoints for the Netlogon Remote Protocol service are negotiated by the RPC endpoint mapper ([\[MS-RPCE\]](#) section 3.3.3.3.1.4).

### Out of Memory Errors

Netlogon Remote Protocol methods require allocation of memory in order to execute their processing rules. If a client or server is unable to allocate the memory required, it MUST return STATUS\_NO\_MEMORY.

## 3.1 Netlogon Common Authentication Details

The Netlogon RPC interface is used to establish and maintain the secure channel. The client MUST attempt to establish this secure channel with a domain controller within the client's domain. (Common Error Processing Rule C MUST be applied whenever a secure connection to a DC is required by a method.) Establishing the secure channel is accomplished by first negotiating a session key (as specified in section [3.1.4.1](#)) over nonprotected RPC (nonprotected RPC is an RPC connection without any underlying security support), resulting in both the client and server mutually verifying each other's credentials. Verifying Netlogon credentials on both the client and server establishes that both ends shared the same password information for the requesting client. Therefore, both Netlogon credentials are valid. The client and server both store a copy of the Netlogon credential computed by using the client challenge. This stored client Netlogon credential serves as a seed for authenticating further client-to-server operations.

Upon successful mutual verification, both client and server have the information necessary to compute a session key. The session key is used to secure further RPC communication between the two machines.

The following sections specify the common steps in the authentication portion of the Netlogon RPC interface, including Netlogon credential computation and the derivation and use of the session key.

### 3.1.1 Abstract Data Model

This section describes a conceptual model of possible data organization that an implementation maintains to participate in this protocol. The described organization is provided to facilitate the explanation of how the protocol behaves. This document does not mandate that implementations adhere to this model as long as their external behavior is consistent with that described in this document.

The Netlogon interface is used to create a secure connection between a client and a server, where the server is a domain controller (DC). The client of the Netlogon interface can be a member of the domain, another DC in the same domain, or a DC in a different but trusting domain. This secure connection is often referred to as the secure channel.

The connection is secured by the use of cryptographic algorithms. The key used for these algorithms, the session key, is computed on both the client and the server and is based on a shared secret that has been previously shared between the client and the server. After the session key is computed on both sides, it is used to encrypt the communication between the two parties. There are two methods of deriving the key. The method used is version-dependent, as specified in section [3.1.4.3](#).

Abstract variables of the session key operations are as follows:

**ClientStoredCredential:** A [NETLOGON\\_CREDENTIAL \(section 2.2.1.3.4\)](#) structure containing the credential that is created by the client and received by the server and that is used during computation and verification of the Netlogon authenticator (section [3.1.4.5](#)).

**ClientChallenge:** A pointer to a **NETLOGON\_CREDENTIAL** structure that contains the client challenge.

**NegotiateFlags:** A 32-bit set of bit flags that identify the negotiated capabilities between the client and the server.

**ServerStoredCredential:** A **NETLOGON\_CREDENTIAL** structure containing the credential that is created by the server and received by the client and that is used during computation and verification of the Netlogon authenticator.

**ServerChallenge:** A pointer to a **NETLOGON\_CREDENTIAL** structure that contains the **server challenge** response.

**SharedSecret:** An even-numbered sequence of bytes, with no embedded zero values, that is a plain-text secret (password) shared between the client and the server. Implementers can choose to store the **unicodePwd** ([\[MS-ADA3\]](#) section 2.331) instead of a clear text version of the shared secret. [<56><57><58>](#) For more information, refer to the ADM element Password in ([\[MS-DISO\]](#) section 4.3.1.1); initialization of this shared ADM is covered in the domain join sections of [\[MS-DISO\]](#) (sections 6, 7, and 8).

**TrustPasswordVersion:** An unsigned 32-bit integer which indicates the number of times that a trust password has changed. [<59>](#)

**SealSecureChannel:** A Boolean setting that indicates whether the RPC message has to be encrypted or just integrity-protected ([\[C706\]](#), section 13.2.5). When TRUE, the message will be encrypted; otherwise, it will be integrity-protected.

**StrongKeySupport:** A Boolean setting that indicates whether a strong method of creating the session key will be used. A strong method, in the context of Netlogon, is one that uses the MD5 message-digest algorithm [\[RFC1321\]](#). The behavior of this setting is specified in section [3.1.4.3](#).

The Netlogon client and server variables are as follows:

**LocatedDCsCache:** A cache SHOULD be implemented containing a set of previously located DCs. The fields of the cache are implementation-specific but are required to contain enough information to be able to respond correctly to a DC locator request. Any cache implementation MUST be able to return the set of cache results given a domain name. The results SHOULD be equivalent to the DOMAIN\_CONTROLLER\_INFO structure. Also, each entry SHOULD maintain, and return with any cache lookup, two timestamps. The first timestamp indicates when the entry was created so that age checks can be performed in order to invalidate stale cache entries. The second timestamp indicates the last communication with the indicated machine in order to facilitate periodic liveliness tests with the cached DC (see section [3.5.5.3.1](#) for more information).

**SealSecureChannel:** A Boolean setting that indicates whether the RPC message has to be encrypted or just integrity-protected ([\[C706\]](#), section 13.2.5). When TRUE, the message will be encrypted; otherwise, it will be integrity-protected.

Implementations that use the Windows registry [\[MS-GPSB\]](#) section 2.2.5 to persistently store and retrieve the SealSecureChannel variable SHOULD use the following:

- RegistryValueName:  
HKEY\_LOCAL\_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Netlogon\Parameters
- RegistryValueType: 4
- RegistryValue: SealSecureChannel

The implementation SHOULD also expose the key and value at the specified registry path using the Windows Remote Registry Protocol [\[MS-RRP\]](#). For each abstract data model element that is loaded from the registry, there is one instance that is shared between [\[MS-RRP\]](#) and the protocol(s) that uses the abstract data model element. Any changes made to the registry keys will be reflected in the abstract data model elements when a PolicyChange event is received ([\[MS-GPSO\]](#) section 6.5).

### 3.1.2 Timers

None.

### 3.1.3 Initialization

See section [3.4.3](#) for client initialization, and see section [3.5.3](#) for server initialization.


### 3.1.4 Message Processing Events and Sequencing Rules

Netlogon communication between a client and a server occurs through RPC calls. A subset of the methods defined by Netlogon's RPC interface requires a session key to be established between the client and the server before these methods are called. Section [3.1.4.6](#) lists all Netlogon methods that require a session key. This section also specifies the sequence of steps that a client MUST follow when calling any method in the list. Section [3.1.4.7](#) specifies the required sequence of steps that a client MUST follow when calling methods that do not require a session key. Section [3.1.4.3](#) specifies how the session key is computed. Section [3.1.4.10](#) specifies how a client attempts to locate a domain controller in a domain.

### 3.1.4.1 Session-Key Negotiation

Session-key negotiation between a client and a server is performed over an unprotected RPC channel.

The following diagram illustrates the negotiation flow.



**Figure 5: Session-key negotiation**

Session-key negotiation works as follows.

1. The client binds to the remote Netlogon RPC endpoint on the server. The client then generates a nonce, called the client challenge, and sends the client challenge to the server as an input argument to the [NetrServerReqChallenge](#) method call.
2. The server receives the client's **NetrServerReqChallenge** call. The server generates its own nonce, called the server challenge (SC). In its response to the client's **NetrServerReqChallenge** method call, the server sends the SC back to the client as an output argument to **NetrServerReqChallenge**. After the client has received the server's response, both computers have one another's challenge nonce (client challenge and server challenge, respectively).



3. The client computes a session key, as specified in section [3.1.4.3](#), Session-Key Computation. The client specifies an initial set of capabilities by providing an initial set of values in the NegotiateFlags.
4. The client computes its client Netlogon credential by using client challenge as input to the credential computation algorithm, as specified in section [3.1.4.4](#).
5. The client exchanges its client Netlogon credential with the server by passing it in the [NetrServerAuthenticate](#), [NetrServerAuthenticate2](#), or [NetrServerAuthenticate3](#) call as the ClientCredential input argument. The selection of the particular method called by the client is specified in section [3.4.5.2.2](#).
6. The server receives the **NetrServerAuthenticate**, **NetrServerAuthenticate2**, or **NetrServerAuthenticate3** call and verifies the client Netlogon credential. It does this by computing a session key, as specified in section [3.1.4.3](#), duplicating the client Netlogon credential computation, using its stored copy of client challenge, and comparing the result of this recomputation with the client Netlogon credential that was just received from the client. If the comparison fails, the server MUST fail session-key negotiation without further processing of the following steps.
7. The server computes its server Netlogon credential by using the server challenge as input to the credential computation algorithm, as specified in section [3.1.4.4](#). The server returns the server Netlogon credential as the ServerCredential output parameter of the **NetrServerAuthenticate**, **NetrServerAuthenticate2**, or **NetrServerAuthenticate3** call.
8. The client verifies the server Netlogon credential. It does this by recomputing the server Netlogon credential, using its stored copy of server challenge, and comparing the result of this recomputation with the server Netlogon credential passed back from the server. If the comparison fails, the client MUST fail session-key negotiation.
9. Upon mutual verification, the client and server agree to use the computed session key for encrypting and/or signing further communications.
10. The client calls the NetrLogonGetCapabilities method. [<60>](#)
11. The server returns the negotiated flags for the current exchange. [<61>](#)
12. The client compares the received ServerCapabilities (section [3.5.5.4.9](#)) with the negotiated NegotiateFlags (section [3.5.5.4.2](#)), and if there is a difference, the session key negotiation is aborted. [<62>](#)
13. The client sets the ServerSessionInfo.LastAuthenticationTry (indexed by server name) to the current time. This prevents authentication retries from occurring for 45 seconds, unless a new transport notification is received.

In the first phase of session-key negotiation (**NetrServerReqChallenge**), the client and server exchange nonces. This allows both the client and the server to compute a session key by using the algorithm described in section [3.1.4.3](#). To provide mutual authentication, both the client and the server calculate a Netlogon credential based on their own nonce, using the computed session key, and exchange them in the second phase of session-key negotiation (**NetrServerAuthenticate** or **NetrServerAuthenticate2** or **NetrServerAuthenticate3**). Because nonces are exchanged in the first phase, this allows each side to calculate the other party's Netlogon credential locally, and then compare it with the received one. If the locally computed credential matches the one supplied by the other party, this proves to the client and to the server that the respective party has access to the shared secret.

#### .1.4.2 Netlogon Negotiable Options

If **NT4Emulator** is set to TRUE and bit U has not been set in *NegotiateFlags* as input, then the server MUST return 0 for bits J, K, L, M, N, O, P, Q, R, S, T, U, V, W, X, and Y in the output of the *NegotiateFlags* parameter.

[illegible]

Option	Meaning
A	Not used. MUST be ignored on receipt.
B	Not used. MUST be ignored on receipt.
C	Supports RC4 encryption.
D	Not used. MUST be ignored on receipt.
E	Not used. MUST be ignored on receipt.
F	Not used. MUST be ignored on receipt.
G	Does not require ValidationLevel 2 for nongeneric passthrough.
I	Supports RefusePasswordChange.
J	Supports the <a href="#">NetrLogonSendToSam (Opnum 32)</a> functionality. <a href="#">&lt;63&gt;</a>
K	Supports generic pass-through authentication. <a href="#">&lt;64&gt;</a>
L	Supports concurrent RPC calls. <a href="#">&lt;65&gt;</a>

Option	Meaning
M	Not used. MUST be ignored on receipt.
N	Not used. MUST be ignored on receipt.
O	Supports strong keys.<66>
P	Supports transitive trusts.<67>
Q	Not used. MUST be ignored on receipt.
R	Supports the <a href="#">NetrServerPasswordSet2</a> functionality.<68>
S	Supports the <a href="#">NetrLogonGetDomainInfo</a> functionality.<69>
T	Supports cross-forest trusts.<70>
U	Supports neutralizing Microsoft Windows NT® 4.0 operating system emulation. Note that when this flag is negotiated between a client and a server, it indicates that the server SHOULD ignore the <b>NT4Emulator</b> ADM element.<71>
V	Supports RODC pass-through to different domains.<72>
W	Supports AES encryption (128 bit in 8-bit CFB mode) and SHA2 hashing as specified in sections <a href="#">2.2.1.3.3</a> , <a href="#">3.1.4.3</a> , <a href="#">3.1.4.4</a> , and <a href="#">3.3</a> .<73>
X	Not used. MUST be ignored on receipt.
Y	Supports Secure RPC.<74>

All other bits MUST be set as specified in the *NegotiateFlags* description and MUST be ignored on receipt.

### 3.1.4.3 Session-Key Computation

Although ClientChallenge and ServerChallenge are treated normally as byte arrays, ClientChallenge and ServerChallenge are treated as 64-bit integers in little-endian format to set the sum in the following pseudocode. The carry of the most-significant bit is ignored in the sum of the ClientChallenge and ServerChallenge.

#### 3.1.4.3.1 AES Session-Key

If AES support is negotiated between the client and the server, the strong-key support flag is ignored and the session key is computed with the HMAC-SHA256 algorithm [\[RFC4634\]](#), as specified in the steps of pseudocode that follow. SHA256Reset, SHA256Input, SHA256FinalBits, and SHA256Result are predicates or functions specified in [\[RFC4634\]](#). MD4 is specified in [\[RFC1320\]](#).

```

ComputeSessionKey(SharedSecret, ClientChallenge,
                  ServerChallenge)
    M4SS := MD4(UNICODE(SharedSecret))

    CALL SHA256Reset(HashContext, M4SS, sizeof(M4SS));
    CALL SHA256Input(HashContext, ClientChallenge, sizeof(ClientChallenge));
    CALL SHA256FinalBits(HashContext, ServerChallenge, sizeof(ServerChallenge));
    CALL SHA256Result(HashContext, SessionKey);
    SET SessionKey to lower 16 bytes of the SessionKey;

```

The key produced with AES support negotiated is 128 bits (16 bytes).

#### 3.1.4.3.2 Strong-key Session-Key

If AES is not negotiated and strong-key support is one of the flags in the NegotiateFlags between the client and the server, the session key is computed with the MD5 message-digest algorithm [\[RFC1321\]](#), as specified in the steps of pseudocode that follow. MD5Init, MD5Update, and MD5Final are predicates or functions specified in [\[RFC1321\]](#). HMAC\_MD5 is a function specified in [\[RFC2104\]](#). The md5Context variable is of type MD5\_CTX, as specified in [\[RFC1321\]](#).

```
SET zeroes to 4 bytes of 0

ComputeSessionKey(SharedSecret, ClientChallenge,
                  ServerChallenge)

M4SS := MD4(UNICODE(SharedSecret))

CALL MD5Init(md5context)
CALL MD5Update(md5context, zeroes, [4 bytes])
CALL MD5Update(md5context, ClientChallenge, [8 bytes])
CALL MD5Update(md5context, ServerChallenge, [8 bytes])
CALL MD5Final(md5context)
CALL HMAC_MD5(md5context.digest, md5context.digest length,
              M4SS, length of M4SS, output)
SET Session-Key to output
```

The key produced with strong-key support negotiated is 128 bits (16 bytes).

#### 3.1.4.3.3 DES Session-Key

If neither AES nor strong-key support is negotiated between the client and the server, the session key is computed by using the DES encryption algorithm in ECB mode, as specified in [\[FIPS81\]](#), as follows.

```
ComputeSessionKey(SharedSecret, ClientChallenge,
                  ServerChallenge)

M4SS := MD4(UNICODE(SharedSecret))

SET sum to ClientChallenge + ServerChallenge
SET k1 to lower 7 bytes of the M4SS
SET k2 to upper 7 bytes of the M4SS
CALL DES_ECB(sum, k1, &output1)
CALL DES_ECB(output1, k2, &output2)
SET Session-Key to output2
```

The key produced without AES and strong-key support negotiated is 64 bits and is padded to 128 bits with zeros in the most-significant bits.

#### 3.1.4.4 Netlogon Credential Computation

When establishing a secure channel, the input is the client challenge when the Netlogon credential for the client is being computed, and the server challenge when the Netlogon credential for the server is being computed. For subsequent calls using authenticators, the input is the previously computed credential.

Output contains the computed 64-bit Netlogon credential.

#### 3.1.4.4.1 AES Credential

If AES support is negotiated between the client and the server, the Netlogon credentials are computed using the AES-128 encryption algorithm in 8-bit CFB mode with a zero initialization vector.

```
ComputeNetlogonCredential(Input, Sk,
                          Output)

    SET IV = 0
    CALL AesEncrypt(Input, Sk, IV, Output)
```

AesEncrypt is the AES-128 encryption algorithm in 8-bit CFB mode with a zero initialization vector [\[FIPS197\]](#).

#### 3.1.4.4.2 DES Credential

The session key is computed as follows.

```
InitLMKey(KeyIn, KeyOut)
    KeyOut[0] = KeyIn[0] >> 0x01;
    KeyOut[1] = ((KeyIn[0]&0x01)<<6) | (KeyIn[1]>>2);
    KeyOut[2] = ((KeyIn[1]&0x03)<<5) | (KeyIn[2]>>3);
    KeyOut[3] = ((KeyIn[2]&0x07)<<4) | (KeyIn[3]>>4);
    KeyOut[4] = ((KeyIn[3]&0x0F)<<3) | (KeyIn[4]>>5);
    KeyOut[5] = ((KeyIn[4]&0x1F)<<2) | (KeyIn[5]>>6);
    KeyOut[6] = ((KeyIn[5]&0x3F)<<1) | (KeyIn[6]>>7);
    KeyOut[7] = KeyIn[6] & 0x7F;

for( int i=0; i<8; i++ ){
    KeyOut[i] = (KeyOut[i] << 1) & 0xfe;
}
```

Assume bytes(s, e, l) returns bytes from s to e of the byte array l. After a session key is computed, a Netlogon credential is computed. If AES support is not negotiated between the client and the server, the Netlogon credentials are computed using DES:

```
ComputeNetlogonCredential(Input, Sk,
                          Output)

    SET k1 to bytes(0, 6, Sk)
    CALL InitLMKey(k1, k3)
    SET k2 to bytes(7, 13, Sk)
    CALL InitLMKey(k2, k4)
    CALL DES_ECB(Input, k3, &output1)
    CALL DES_ECB(output1, k4, &output2)
    SET Output to output2
```

DES\_ECB is the DES encryption algorithm in ECB mode ([\[FIPS81\]](#) and [\[FIPS46-2\]](#)).

### 3.1.4.5 Netlogon Authenticator Computation and Verification

All methods that require a secure channel, except [NetrLogonSamLogonEx](#), will use Netlogon authenticators. If the Netlogon RPC call is using Netlogon authenticators, the following steps are used to calculate the authenticator:

1. Each time a client sends a new request, it records the current time stamp (expressed as the number of seconds since 00:00:00 on January 1, 1970 (UTC)) in the **TimeStamp** field of the **NETLOGON\_AUTHENTICATOR** structure, as specified in section [2.2.1.1.5](#). The client also adds the value of this time stamp to the stored Netlogon client credential and encrypts the result with the session key, using the Netlogon credential computation algorithm described in section [3.1.4.4](#). The result of this computation is stored in the **Credential** field of the **NETLOGON\_AUTHENTICATOR** structure and is then sent to the server.

```
SET TimeNow = current time;
SET ClientAuthenticator.Timestamp = TimeNow;
SET ClientStoredCredential = ClientStoredCredential + TimeNow;
CALL ComputeNetlogonCredential(ClientStoredCredential,
    Session-Key, ClientAuthenticator.Credential);
```

2. When the server receives a request, the server confirms the validity of the Netlogon authenticator that it received with the request. Validation is achieved by adding the time stamp transmitted in the received Netlogon authenticator to the server's stored copy of the Netlogon credential, and by encrypting the result with the session key, using the algorithm specified in section [3.1.4.4](#). The server then compares the Netlogon credential that it just calculated with the Netlogon credential transmitted in the received Netlogon authenticator. If the Netlogon credentials do not match, the operation fails, and an error indicating that access is denied is returned to the client.

If the Netlogon credentials match, the server increments the Netlogon credential in the Netlogon authenticator by one, performs the computation described in section [3.1.4.4](#), Netlogon Credential Computation, and stores the new Netlogon credential. The server returns a Netlogon authenticator that contains the new Netlogon credential to the client.

```
SET ServerStoredCredential = ServerStoredCredential +
    ClientAuthenticator.Timestamp;
CALL ComputeNetlogonCredential(ServerStoredCredential,
    Session-Key, TempCredential);
IF TempCredential != ClientAuthenticator.Credential
    THEN return access denied error

SET ServerStoredCredential = ServerStoredCredential + 1;
CALL ComputeNetlogonCredential(ServerStoredCredential,
    Session-Key, ServerAuthenticator.Credential);
```

3. The client validates the returned Netlogon authenticator by incrementing its stored Netlogon credential by one, encrypting the result with the session key using the algorithm described in section [3.1.4.4](#), and comparing the results. If this is successful, the client stores the Netlogon credential part of the Netlogon authenticator as the new Netlogon credential. If the validation failed, the client SHOULD re-establish its secure channel with the domain controller.

```
SET ClientStoredCredential = ClientStoredCredential + 1;
```

```

CALL ComputeNetlogonCredential(ClientStoredCredential,
                               Session-Key, TempCredential);
IF TempCredential != ServerAuthenticator.Credential
THEN return abort

```

In each of the addition operations previously performed, the least-significant 4 bytes of the credential are added with the 4-byte time stamp value (or the constant 1), and overflow is ignored. This leaves the most-significant 4 bytes of the credential unmodified.

### 3.1.4.6 Calling Methods Requiring Session-Key Establishment

To call the methods in the following set, the client and the server MUST have performed session-key negotiation. If negotiation has not been completed prior to the time of a call, negotiation MUST be initiated and completed before making the call. Each method that requires a secure channel is described in section [3.5](#), with the errors specified. For descriptions of the following methods, see section [3.5](#).

- NetrGetForestTrustInformation
- NetrLogonGetCapabilities
- NetrLogonSamLogon
- NetrLogonSamLogonEx
- NetrLogonSamLogonWithFlags
- NetrLogonSamLogoff
- NetrLogonSendToSam
- NetrServerPasswordSet
- NetrServerPasswordSet2
- NetrServerGetTrustInfo
- NetrServerTrustPasswordsGet
- NetrLogonGetDomainInfo
- NetrLogonDummyRoutine1

The client follows this sequence of steps.

1. The client binds to the RPC server. [<75>](#)

The client and server SHOULD utilize a secure bind. [<76>](#) If a secure bind is used, the client instructs the RPC runtime to use the Netlogon SSP ([\[MS-RPCE\]](#) section 2.2.1.1.7) for privacy/integrity of the RPC messages. If the SealSecureChannel setting is TRUE, the client requests the Privacy **authentication level** from the RPC runtime. If the SealSecureChannel setting is FALSE, then the authentication level requested is Integrity.

2. If the call to be made uses Netlogon authenticators, the client MUST compute the Netlogon authenticator to be passed as a parameter to the RPC method, as specified in section [3.1.4.5](#).

3. The client calls the method on the server. If the RPC server denies access, the client SHOULD attempt to re-establish the session key with the target server if the difference between the current time and value of `ServerSessionInfo.LastAuthenticationTry` (indexed by the name of the target server) is greater than 45 seconds.
4. The server MUST verify the authenticator, if used, and compute the return authenticator, as specified in section [3.1.4.5](#).
5. The client MUST validate the returned authenticator, if used.
6. The client MAY unbind from the server, or it MAY [<77>](#) reuse the binding for multiple RPC calls.

#### 3.1.4.7 Calling Methods Not Requiring Session-Key Establishment

The client follows this sequence of steps:

1. The client SHOULD bind to the RPC server using the named pipe "`\PIPE\NETLOGON`", or MAY bind to the RPC server over TCP/IP.

**Note** The TCP/IP channel cannot support impersonation for access control, and is therefore unusable. The server will ignore any calls made via this channel.

2. The client MUST call the method on the server.
3. The client SHOULD unbind from the server, or it MAY reuse the binding for multiple RPC calls.

#### 3.1.4.8 Determining If the Implementation Is Running on a Domain Controller

The implementation determines whether it is running on a domain controller by querying the current server configuration by calling the abstract interface **ServerGetInfo** specified in [\[MS-DTYP\]](#) section 2.6, specifying a level of 101. The resulting `bufptr` contains a **SERVER\_INFO\_101** structure, as specified in [\[MS-DTYP\]](#) section 2.3.10. The determination is TRUE if **sv101\_version\_type** contains `SV_TYPE_DOMAIN_CTRL` or `SV_TYPE_DOMAIN_BAKCTRL`. If **sv101\_version\_type** does not contain either of these values, the determination is FALSE.

#### 3.1.4.9 Determining if a Request is for the Current Domain

If the server is running on a domain controller (DC), then the server determines if a request is for its domain or not by comparing the domain the request was intended for and the domain-name ADM element.

#### 3.1.4.10 Client Domain Controller Location

The client MUST attempt to locate a domain controller (DC) of a given domain. A client locally invokes processing rules specified in [DsrGetDCName](#) (section [3.5.5.3.3](#)) with the method parameters set as follows:

- Set the *ComputerName* parameter to NULL.
- Set the *DomainName* parameter to the domain name.
- Set the *DomainGuid* parameter to NULL.
- Set the *SiteGuid* parameter to NULL.
- Set the *Flags* parameter to a bitwise OR of the bits L and R that are specified in [DsrGetDcNameEx2](#) (section [3.5.5.3.1](#)).



If **DsrGetDCName** returns with no errors, the **DomainControllerName** field of the returned **DomainControllerInfo** structure will contain the DC name.

### 3.1.5 Timer Events

No protocol timer events are required on the client beyond the timers required in the underlying **RPC transport**.

### 3.1.6 Other Local Events

No additional local events are used on the client beyond the events maintained in the underlying RPC transport and GP notification.

The Netlogon client and server register a local change notification callback with the Group Policy: Security Protocol Extension Client [\[MS-GPSB\]](#). The client SHOULD send Netlogon a PolicyChange event when the policy is changed.

When Netlogon receives a PolicyChange event, those NRPC implementations that use the Windows registry to persistently store and retrieve the SealSecureChannel variable SHOULD load the new value from the HKEY\_LOCAL\_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\Netlogon\Parameters registry path and SealSecureChannel key.

## 3.2 Pass-Through Authentication Details

Netlogon has various roles, one of which is to securely transport data for authentication packages between the client and the server.

### 3.2.1 Abstract Data Model

None.

### 3.2.2 Timers

None.

### 3.2.3 Initialization

Using Netlogon for pass-through authentication requires a session key to have already been negotiated, as specified in section [3.1.4.1](#).

### 3.2.4 Message Processing Events and Sequencing Rules

Netlogon is used to securely transport data for authentication packages between the client and the server. This is accomplished by packages calling the [NetrLogonSamLogon](#) or [NetrLogonSamLogonEx](#) methods. Netlogon takes the data specified in the input parameters by the authentication package on the client and sends it unexamined over the secure channel to the server. The server delivers the data to the target authentication package.

#### 3.2.4.1 Generic Pass-Through

When using the [NetrLogonSamLogon](#) method, as specified in section [3.5.5.5.3](#), or the [NetrLogonSamLogonEx](#) method, as specified in section [3.5.5.5.1](#), for generic pass-through, the following requirements MUST be met:

- The *LogonLevel* parameter is 4 ([NetlogonGenericInformation](#)).

- The *ValidationLevel* parameter is 5 ([NetlogonValidationGenericInfo2](#)).
- The *LogonInformation* parameter is [NETLOGON\\_GENERIC\\_INFO](#).
- **NETLOGON\_GENERIC\_INFO.PackageName** is "Kerberos" ([\[MS-APDS\]](#) section 3.2.5.1) or "WDigest" ([\[MS-APDS\]](#) section 3.3.5.1).

Protocols that use Netlogon for generic pass-through will also include opaque **Binary Large Objects (BLOBs)** that comprise their respective message data. These BLOBs are passed in the **LogonData** field of the **NETLOGON\_GENERIC\_INFO** structure, with the size of the data specified in the **DataLength** field. The BLOB is passed from one system's Netlogon component to the other system's component over the wire. Netlogon will then pass the opaque BLOB to the security package specified in the **PackageName** field.

The [NETLOGON\\_LOGON\\_IDENTITY\\_INFO](#) structure (as specified in section [2.2.1.4.15](#)) inside the **NETLOGON\_GENERIC\_INFO** structure (as specified in section [2.2.1.4.2](#)) MUST:

- Contain the *LogonDomainName*.
- Ensure that the rest of the **NETLOGON\_LOGON\_IDENTITY\_INFO** fields are zeroed out.

The response is sent by the domain controller via the *ValidationInformation* parameter, which points to a pointer to the [NETLOGON\\_VALIDATION\\_GENERIC\\_INFO2](#) structure.

See [\[MS-APDS\]](#) for a specification of how NTLM, Kerberos, and Digest authentication packages use the Netlogon secure channel.

### 3.2.5 Timer Events

No protocol timer events are required on the client beyond the timers required in the underlying RPC transport.

### 3.2.6 Other Local Events

No additional local events are used on the client beyond the events maintained in the underlying RPC transport.

## 3.3 Netlogon as a Security Support Provider

In addition to other functionality, Netlogon also serves as a limited private SSP [<78>](#) for use by Netlogon and RPC ([\[MS-RPCE\]](#) section 2.2.1.1.7) when encrypting and signing data during communication. [<79>](#) Central to this capability is the use of the session key, as specified in section [3.1](#). This section specifies the behavior of the security provider role for both client and server.

Netlogon implements a service that allows the RPC runtime to perform a security context negotiation between the client and the server and to use per-message calls to protect the data being passed over the network. For Netlogon to be able to perform this functionality, a session key MUST have been established between the client and the server as described in section [3.1](#). Netlogon registers with the RPC runtime as a security provider with the *auth\_type* value (as specified in [\[MS-RPCE\]](#) section 2.2.2.11) of 0x44.

When serving as its own generic SSP, Netlogon always provides the following service features:

- Integrity: Signed messages are constructed so that they cannot be tampered with while in transit. The generation and receipt of the [Netlogon Signature](#) token will always provide integrity protection for the messages.

- **Sequence Detect:** Signed messages are constructed such that out-of-order sequences can be detected. The generation and receipt of the Netlogon Signature token will always detect out-of-sequence messages.

### 3.3.1 Abstract Data Model

This section describes a conceptual model of possible data organization that an implementation maintains to participate in this protocol. The described organization is provided to facilitate the explanation of how the protocol behaves. This document does not mandate that implementations adhere to this model as long as their external behavior is consistent with that described in this document.

Netlogon serves as a security provider for its own RPC connections. As such, it provides the following service: Confidentiality.

For protocol features, once a session key has been established through the session-key negotiation, Netlogon relies upon the RPC runtime to invoke the per-message functions. The following define the services provided by the Netlogon security support provider (SSP).

**Note** The following defined variables are logical, abstract parameters that an implementation is required to maintain and expose to provide the proper level of service. How these variables are maintained and exposed is determined by the implementation.

**Confidentiality:** A Boolean setting that indicates that the caller is requiring encryption of messages so that they cannot be read while in transit. Requesting this service results in Netlogon encrypting the message. For more information, see sections [3.1.4.2](#) and [3.1.4.3](#).

As per [\[MS-RPCE\]](#) section 2.2.2.11, the **auth\_level** field of the **sec\_trailer** structure determines the authentication level used. Netlogon only supports `RPC_C_AUTHN_LEVEL_PKT_INTEGRITY` and `RPC_C_AUTHN_LEVEL_PKT_PRIVACY`. A value of `RPC_C_AUTHN_LEVEL_PKT_INTEGRITY` implies that Integrity is provided by the Netlogon SSP, and a value of `RPC_C_AUTHN_LEVEL_PKT_PRIVACY` implies that Confidentiality is provided by the Netlogon SSP. Sequence detection is always provided.

The Netlogon SSP maintains the following set of data for each session:

**ClientSequenceNumber:** A 64-bit integer value used for detecting out-of-order messages on the client side.

**ServerSequenceNumber:** A 64-bit integer value used for detecting out-of-order messages on the server side.

**Session-Key:** See section [3.1.4.3](#) for **Session-Key** computation details.

**NegotiateFlags:** See section [3.1.1](#) for **NegotiateFlags** details.

**MessageBlockSize:** An integer that indicates the minimum size of messages for encryption. This value MUST be 1.

### 3.3.2 Timers

None.

### 3.3.3 Initialization

Establishing a Netlogon security context requires a session key to have already been negotiated, as described in section [3.1.4.1](#).

### 3.3.4 Message Processing Events and Sequencing Rules

Netlogon uses two types of tokens when functioning as an SSP: [NL\\_AUTH\\_MESSAGE](#) and [NL\\_AUTH\\_SIGNATURE](#).

#### 3.3.4.1 The NL\_AUTH\_MESSAGE Token

The NL\_AUTH\_MESSAGE token contains information that is part of the first message in an authenticated transaction between a client and a server. It contains a message type, flags, and naming information. For the exact format, see section [2.2.1.3.1](#).

The NL\_AUTH\_MESSAGE token is part of the RPC PDU AUTH trailer structure as specified in [\[MS-RPCE\]](#) section 2.2.2.11.

The client generates an initial token and sends it to the server. The server receives the token, processes it, and passes back a return token to the client.

The exchange of this message requires a session key to have been negotiated as described in section [3.1](#). Upon successful exchange of tokens, the application can start using per-message calls to protect the data being passed over the network.

##### 3.3.4.1.1 Generating an Initial NL\_AUTH\_MESSAGE Token

The client generates a [NL\\_AUTH\\_MESSAGE token](#) to initiate authentication to a server. The **MessageType** field of this token MUST be set to zero to indicate that this is a Negotiate message type.

The client MUST provide at least one domain name and one computer name in the token by providing the **Flags** bit and the corresponding text buffer. The **Flags** field is a bitwise OR of the values described under the **Flags** field of the NL\_AUTH\_MESSAGE token in section [2.2.1.3.1](#). This value represents the names available in the token. The **Buffer** field is then composed by concatenating the strings of the names indicated by the **Flags** value. The compressed UTF-8 strings are generated, as specified in [\[RFC1035\]](#) section 4.1.4.

The following is an example token on the wire.

00 00 00 00 17 00 00 00 4E 54 44 45 56 00 4E 41	.....NTDEV.NA
53 4B 4F 00 05 6E 74 64 65 76 04 63 6F 72 70 09	SKO..ntdev.corp.
6D 69 63 72 6F 73 6F 66 74 03 63 6F 6D 00 05 4E	microsoft.com..N
41 53 4B 4F 00	ASKO.

##### 3.3.4.1.2 Receiving an Initial NL\_AUTH\_MESSAGE Token

When the server receives the initial NL\_AUTH\_MESSAGE token, the server will check the token type and extract the client names using the Flags values and corresponding text buffer passed. The server MUST return SEC\_E\_INVALID\_TOKEN (0x80090308), indicating that an invalid token has been received, when any of the following are true:

- The MessageType is not set to 0x00000000.

- A flag for a particular name type is present and the corresponding text buffer cannot be extracted from the Buffer.
- The token does not contain at least one domain name and one computer name.

The server initializes **ServerSequenceNumber** to 0. This sequence number is used to detect out-of-order messages.

#### 3.3.4.1.3 Generating a Return NL\_AUTH\_MESSAGE Token

Upon successful verification and extraction of data from the initial token, the server verifies that a successful session-key negotiation has occurred by the presence of the **Session-Key** data item for the client. If no negotiation has occurred, the server MUST return SEC\_E\_INVALID\_TOKEN (0x80090308) indicating that an invalid token has been received.

The server generates a return NL\_AUTH\_MESSAGE (section [2.2.1.3.1](#)) token. The **MessageType** MUST be set to 1 to indicate that this is a Negotiate response message type, the **Flags** field SHOULD be set to zero, the **Buffer** field SHOULD contain a NULL character, and the NL\_AUTH\_MESSAGE token MUST be padded to 12 bytes in length.

The return NL\_AUTH\_MESSAGE token is then sent back to the client along with any additional application-specific data.

#### 3.3.4.1.4 Receiving a Return NL\_AUTH\_MESSAGE Token

When the client receives the return token, it verifies that:

- the NL\_AUTH\_MESSAGE token is at least 12 bytes in length, and
- the MessageType is set to 1.

If either of these conditions are not true, the client MUST return SEC\_E\_INVALID\_TOKEN (0x80090308) indicating that an invalid token has been received.

Otherwise, the client initializes ClientSequenceNumber to 0, which is used to detect out-of-order messages.

#### 3.3.4.2 The Netlogon Signature Token

The Netlogon Signature token contains information that MUST be part of each protected message. It contains a signature algorithm identifier, encryption algorithm identifier, confounder, flags, sequence number, and checksum (see section [2.2.1.3.2](#) for the exact format). When data is protected/signed, a Netlogon Signature token is generated that describes the algorithms used and contains the checksum of the data to be sent. When data is received and is unprotected/verified, the Netlogon Signature token is used.

##### 3.3.4.2.1 Generating an Initial Netlogon Signature Token

If AES is negotiated, a client generates an [NL\\_AUTH\\_SHA2\\_SIGNATURE](#) token that contains an **HMAC**-SHA256 checksum [\[RFC4634\]](#), a sequence number, and a **Confounder** (if confidentiality has been requested) to send data protected on the wire. The data is encrypted using the AES algorithm. If AES is not negotiated, a client generates a [Netlogon Signature token](#) that contains an HMAC-MD5 checksum ([\[RFC2104\]](#)), a sequence number, and a **Confounder** (if confidentiality has been requested) to send data protected on the wire. The data is encrypted using the negotiated encryption algorithm. Note that in the algorithm that follows, the term Confidentiality is used as

defined in section [3.3.1](#). The following steps are performed to generate these Netlogon Signature tokens and to encrypt the data if requested.

1. If AES is negotiated:

- The **SignatureAlgorithm** first byte MUST be set to 0x13, and the second byte MUST be set to 0x00.
- If the Confidentiality option (section [3.3.1](#)) is requested from the application, then the **SealAlgorithm** first byte MUST be set to 0x1A, the second byte MUST be set to 0x00, and the **Confounder** MUST be filled with cryptographically random data.
- If the Confidentiality option (section [3.3.1](#)) is not requested, then the **SealAlgorithm** MUST be filled with two bytes of 0xff and the **Confounder** is not included in the token.

2. If AES is not negotiated:

- The **SignatureAlgorithm** first byte MUST be set to 0x77, and the second byte MUST be set to 0x00.
- If the Confidentiality option (section [3.3.1](#)) is requested from the application, then the **SealAlgorithm** first byte MUST be set to 0x7A, the second byte MUST be set to 0x00, and the **Confounder** MUST be filled with cryptographically random data.
- If the Confidentiality option is not requested, then the **SealAlgorithm** MUST be filled with two bytes of value 0xff and the **Confounder** is not included in the token.

3. The **Pad** MUST be filled with 0xff bytes.

4. The **Flags** MUST be filled with 0x00 bytes.

5. The **SequenceNumber** MUST be computed using the following algorithm.

```
Assume byte(n, l) returns byte n of the 32-bit number l.  
The n parameter is limited to 0..3. The least significant  
byte is 0, the most significant byte is 3.
```

```
SET CopySeqNumber[0] to byte(3, ClientSequenceNumber.LowPart)  
SET CopySeqNumber[1] to byte(2, ClientSequenceNumber.LowPart)  
SET CopySeqNumber[2] to byte(1, ClientSequenceNumber.LowPart)  
SET CopySeqNumber[3] to byte(0, ClientSequenceNumber.LowPart)
```

```
SET CopySeqNumber[4] to byte(3, ClientSequenceNumber.HighPart)  
SET CopySeqNumber[5] to byte(2, ClientSequenceNumber.HighPart)  
SET CopySeqNumber[6] to byte(1, ClientSequenceNumber.HighPart)  
SET CopySeqNumber[7] to byte(0, ClientSequenceNumber.HighPart)  
Set CopySeqNumber[4] to CopySeqNumber[4] OR 0x80
```

6. The **ClientSequenceNumber** MUST be incremented by 1.

7. If AES is negotiated, then a signature MUST be computed using the following algorithm:

```
CALL SHA256Reset(&HashContext, Sk, sizeof(Sk));  
CALL SHA256Input(HashContext, NL_AUTH_SHA2_SIGNATURE, [8 bytes]);  
IF Confidentiality requested  
CALL SHA256Input(HashContext, Confounder, [8 bytes]);
```

```
CALL SHA256FinalBits(HashContext, Message, size of Message;
CALL SHA256Result(HashContext, output);
SET Signature to output
```

Note: In the first call to SHA256Input, only the first 8-bytes of the NL\_AUTH\_SHA2\_SIGNATURE structure are used.

Else, a signature MUST be computed using the following algorithm:

```
SET zeroes to 4 bytes of 0

CALL MD5Init(md5context)
CALL MD5Update(md5context, zeroes, [4 bytes])
CALL MD5Update(md5context, NL_AUTH_SIGNATURE, [8 bytes])
IF Confidentiality requested
    CALL MD5Update(md5context, Confounder, [8 bytes])
CALL MD5Update(md5context, Message, size of Message)
CALL MD5Final(md5context)
CALL HMAC_MD5(md5context.digest, md5context.digest length,
              Session-Key, size of Session Key, output)
SET Signature to output
```

Note: In the second call to MD5Update, only the first 8-bytes of the NL\_AUTH\_SIGNATURE structure are used.

After the signature is computed, the signature MUST be truncated, with only the first 8 bytes being copied into the **Checksum** field of [NL AUTH SIGNATURE](#).

8. If the Confidentiality option is requested, the **Confounder** field and the data MUST be encrypted, in that order, using the same encryption algorithm.
  - If AES is negotiated, then the server MUST use AES-128 for encryption. The server MUST derive the AES key using the following algorithm:

```
FOR (I=0; I < Key Length; I++)
    EncryptionKey[I] = SessionKey[I] XOR 0xf0
```

The server MUST encrypt the **Confounder** field using the initialization vector constructed by concatenating the sequence number with itself twice (thus getting 16 bytes of data). For encrypting the data, the initialization vector MUST be constructed using the last block of the encrypted **Confounder** field.

- Else, the server MUST use RC4 for encryption. The server MUST derive the RC4 key using the following algorithm:

```
SET zeroes to 4 bytes of 0

FOR (I=0; I < Key Length; I++)
    XorKey [I] = SessionKey[I] XOR 0xf0
CALL hmac_md5(zeroes, [4 bytes], XorKey, size of XorKey, TempData)
CALL hmac_md5(CopySeqNumber, size of CopySeqNumber, TempData,
              size of TempData, EncryptionKey)
```

The `hmac_md5` function is defined in the Appendix of [\[RFC2104\]](#). The server MUST use this key to initialize RC4 and encrypt the **Confounder** field and then the data. The server MUST initialize RC4 only once, before encrypting the **Confounder** field.

9. The **SequenceNumber** MUST be encrypted. If AES is negotiated, then the AES-128 algorithm MUST be used, using the SessionKey with an initialization vector constructed by concatenating the first 8 bytes of the checksum with itself twice (thus getting 16 bytes of data), otherwise the RC4 algorithm MUST be used.

The RC4 key MUST be derived as follows:

```
SET zeroes to 4 bytes of 0

CALL hmac_md5(zeroes, [4 bytes], SessionKey, size of SessionKey, TmpData)
CALL hmac_md5(Checksum, size of Checksum, TmpData, size of TmpData,
               EncryptionKey)
```

The NetLogon Signature token MUST then be sent to the server along with the data.

### 3.3.4.2.2 Receiving an Initial Netlogon Signature Token

When a server receives encrypted data, it verifies the [Netlogon Signature](#) token. If AES is negotiated, a server receives an [NL\\_AUTH\\_SHA2\\_SIGNATURE](#) structure, otherwise it receives a [NL\\_AUTH\\_SIGNATURE](#) structure. The following steps are performed to verify the data and to decrypt with AES if negotiated, otherwise RC4 if required:

1. The **SignatureAlgorithm** bytes MUST be verified to ensure:

- If AES is negotiated, the first byte is set to 0x13; otherwise the first byte is set to 0x77.
- The second byte is set to 0x00.

If either of these two is incorrect, an SEC\_E\_MESSAGE\_ALTERED (0x8009030F) MUST be returned.

2. If the Confidentiality option is requested from the application, then the **SealAlgorithm** MUST be verified to ensure that if AES is negotiated, the first byte is set to 0x1A; otherwise the first byte is set to 0x7A. The second byte is set to 0x00.

If the Confidentiality option is not requested, then the **SealAlgorithm** MUST be verified to contain all 0xff bytes.

If either of these two is incorrect, an SEC\_E\_MESSAGE\_ALTERED (0x8009030F) MUST be returned.

3. The **Pad** MUST be verified to contain all 0xff bytes and SEC\_E\_MESSAGE\_ALTERED (0x8009030F) MUST be returned otherwise.
4. The **Flags** data MAY be [<80>](#) disregarded.
5. The **SequenceNumber** MUST be decrypted. If AES is negotiated, then the AES 128 algorithm MUST be used with Session Key and an initialization vector constructed by concatenating the checksum with itself (thus getting 16 bytes of data). Otherwise, the RC4 algorithm MUST be used. The RC4 key MUST be derived as follows:

```
SET zeroes to 4 bytes of 0
```



```
CALL hmac_md5(zeroes, [4 bytes], SessionKey, size of SessionKey, TempData)
CALL hmac_md5(Checksum, size of Checksum, TempData, size of TempData,
    DecryptionKey)
```

6. A local copy of **SequenceNumber** MUST be computed using the following algorithm.

Assume byte(n, l) returns byte n of the 32-bit number l. The n parameter is limited to 0..3. The least significant byte is 0, the most significant byte is 3.

```
SET CopySeqNumber[0] to byte(3, ServerSequenceNumber.LowPart)
SET CopySeqNumber[1] to byte(2, ServerSequenceNumber.LowPart)
SET CopySeqNumber[2] to byte(1, ServerSequenceNumber.LowPart)
SET CopySeqNumber[3] to byte(0, ServerSequenceNumber.LowPart)

SET CopySeqNumber[4] to byte(3, ServerSequenceNumber.HighPart)
SET CopySeqNumber[5] to byte(2, ServerSequenceNumber.HighPart)
SET CopySeqNumber[6] to byte(1, ServerSequenceNumber.HighPart)
SET CopySeqNumber[7] to byte(0, ServerSequenceNumber.HighPart)
Set CopySeqNumber[4] to CopySeqNumber[4] OR 0x80
```

7. The **SequenceNumber** MUST be compared to **CopySeqNumber**. If these two do not match, SEC\_E\_OUT\_OF\_SEQUENCE MUST be returned.

8. **ServerSequenceNumber** MUST be incremented.

If the Confidentiality option is requested, the **Confounder** and the data MUST be decrypted using RC4.

9. If the Confidentiality option is requested, the **Confounder** and the data MUST be decrypted.

- The AES key used MUST be derived using the following algorithm:

```
FOR (I=0; I < Key Length; I++)
    EncryptionKey [I] = SessionKey[I] XOR 0xf0
```

If AES is negotiated, decrypt using an initialization vector constructed by concatenating twice the sequence number (thus getting 16 bytes of data).

- The RC4 key used MUST be derived using the following algorithm:

```
SET zeroes to 4 bytes of 0

FOR (I=0; I < Key Length; I++)
    XorKey [I] = SessionKey[I] XOR 0xf0
CALL hmac_md5(zeroes, [4 bytes], XorKey, size of XorKey, TempData)
CALL hmac_md5(CopySeqNumber, size of CopySeqNumber, TempData,
    size of TempData, EncryptionKey)
```

The hmac\_md5 function is specified in [\[RFC2104\]](#)

10.If AES is negotiated, then a signature MUST be computed using the following algorithm:

```
CALL SHA256Reset(&HashContext, Sk, sizeof(Sk));
CALL SHA256Input(HashContext, NL_AUTH_SHA2_SIGNATURE, [8 bytes]);
IF Confidentiality requested
CALL SHA256Input(HashContext, Confounder, [8 bytes]);
CALL SHA256FinalBits(HashContext, Message, size of Message);
CALL SHA256Result(HashContext, output);
SET Signature to output
```

Note: In the first call to SHA256Input only the first 8-bytes of the NL\_AUTH\_SHA2\_SIGNATURE structure are used.

Else a signature MUST be computed using the following algorithm:

```
SET zeroes to 4 bytes of 0

CALL MD5Init(md5context)
CALL MD5Update(md5context, zeroes, [4 bytes])
CALL MD5Update(md5context, NL_AUTH_SIGNATURE, [8 bytes])
IF Confidentiality requested
CALL MD5Update(md5context, Confounder, [8 bytes])
CALL MD5Update(md5context, Message, size of Message)
CALL MD5Final(md5context)
CALL HMAC_MD5(md5context.digest, md5context.digest length,
              Session Key, size of Session Key, output)
SET Signature to output
```

Note: In the second call to MD5Update only the first 8-bytes of the NL\_AUTH\_SIGNATURE structure are used.

11.The first 8 bytes of the computed signature MUST be compared to the checksum. If these two do not match, the SEC\_E\_MESSAGE\_ALTERED (0x8009030F) MUST be returned, indicating that the message was altered.

### 3.3.4.2.3 Generating a Return Netlogon Signature Token

If AES is negotiated, a server generates an [NL\\_AUTH\\_SHA2\\_SIGNATURE](#) token that contains an HMAC-SHA256 checksum [\[RFC4634\]](#), a sequence number, and a **Confounder** (if confidentiality has been requested) to send data protected on the wire. The data is encrypted using the AES algorithm. If AES is not negotiated, a client generates a [Netlogon Signature](#) token that contains an HMAC-MD5 checksum ([\[RFC2104\]](#)), a sequence number, and a **Confounder** (if confidentiality has been requested) to send data protected on the wire. The data is encrypted using the negotiated encryption algorithm. Note that in the algorithm that follows, the term Confidentiality is used as defined in section [3.3.1](#). Except for steps 5 and 6, the same steps as described in section [3.3.4.2.1](#) are performed to generate these Netlogon Signature tokens and to encrypt the data if requested. Steps 5 and 6 are as follows:

5. The **SequenceNumber** MUST be computed using the following algorithm:

```
Assume byte(n, l) returns byte n of the 32-bit number l.
The n parameter is limited to 0..3. The least significant
byte is 0, the most significant byte is 3.
```

```

SET CopySeqNumber[0] to byte(3, ServerSequenceNumber.LowPart)
SET CopySeqNumber[1] to byte(2, ServerSequenceNumber.LowPart)
SET CopySeqNumber[2] to byte(1, ServerSequenceNumber.LowPart)
SET CopySeqNumber[3] to byte(0, ServerSequenceNumber.LowPart)

SET CopySeqNumber[4] to byte(3, ServerSequenceNumber.HighPart)
SET CopySeqNumber[5] to byte(2, ServerSequenceNumber.HighPart)
SET CopySeqNumber[6] to byte(1, ServerSequenceNumber.HighPart)
SET CopySeqNumber[7] to byte(0, ServerSequenceNumber.HighPart)

```

6. The **ServerSequenceNumber** MUST be incremented by one. The Netlogon Signature token MUST then be sent to the client along with the data.

#### 3.3.4.2.4 Receiving a Return Netlogon Signature Token

When a client receives encrypted data, it verifies the [Netlogon Signature](#) token. If AES is negotiated, a client receives an [NL AUTH SHA2 SIGNATURE](#) structure, otherwise it receives an [NL AUTH SIGNATURE](#) structure. Except for steps 6 and 8, the same steps as in section [3.3.4.2.2](#) are performed to verify the data and to decrypt with AES if negotiated, otherwise RC4 MUST be used if required. Steps 6 and 8 are as follows:

6. A local copy of **SequenceNumber** MUST be computed using the following algorithm.

Assume byte(n, l) returns byte n of the 32-bit number l. The n parameter is limited to 0..3. The least significant byte is 0, the most significant byte is 3.

```

SET CopySeqNumber[0] to byte(3, ClientSequenceNumber.LowPart)
SET CopySeqNumber[1] to byte(2, ClientSequenceNumber.LowPart)
SET CopySeqNumber[2] to byte(1, ClientSequenceNumber.LowPart)
SET CopySeqNumber[3] to byte(0, ClientSequenceNumber.LowPart)

SET CopySeqNumber[4] to byte(3, ClientSequenceNumber.HighPart)
SET CopySeqNumber[5] to byte(2, ClientSequenceNumber.HighPart)
SET CopySeqNumber[6] to byte(1, ClientSequenceNumber.HighPart)
SET CopySeqNumber[7] to byte(0, ClientSequenceNumber.HighPart)
Set CopySeqNumber[4] to CopySeqNumber[4] OR 0x80

```

.

.

.

8. **ClientSequenceNumber** MUST be incremented.

#### 3.3.5 Timer Events

None.

### 3.3.6 Other Local Events

None.

## 3.4 Netlogon Client Details

The following sections specify data and state maintained by the Netlogon RPC client. They include details of calling Netlogon RPC methods on the client side of the client/server communication. A client in this context can be a domain member (member machine), a member server, or a DC. The provided data is to facilitate the explanation of how the protocol behaves. This section does not mandate that implementations adhere to this model as long as their external behavior is consistent with that described in this document. [<81>](#)

### 3.4.1 Abstract Data Model

This section describes a conceptual model of possible data organization that an implementation maintains to participate in this protocol. The described organization is provided to facilitate the explanation of how the protocol behaves. This document does not mandate that implementations adhere to this model as long as their external behavior is consistent with that described in this document.

The Netlogon Protocol client maintains the following variables in addition to the ones described in section [3.1](#), Netlogon Common Details, which are part of the abstract state.

**ClientCapabilities:** A 32-bit set of bit flags (section [3.1.4.2](#)) that identify the client's supported options.

**domain-name (Public):** For client machines, the NetBIOS name of the domain to which the machine has been joined. This Abstract Data Model element is shared with DomainName.NetBIOS ([\[MS-DISO\]](#) section 4.3.1.1).

The Netlogon client variables which are registry keys are as follows:

**RejectMD5Servers:** A Boolean variable that indicates whether the client MUST reject servers that are using MD5 encryption. [<82>](#) Implementations that use the Windows registry to persistently store and retrieve the RejectMD5Servers variable SHOULD use the HKEY\_LOCAL\_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Netlogon\Parameters registry path and RejectMD5Servers key.

**RequireSignOrSeal:** Indicates whether the client SHOULD continue session-key negotiation when the server did not specify support for Secure RPC as described in the negotiable option Y of section [3.1.4.2](#). Implementations that use the Windows registry [\[MS-GPSB\]](#) Section 2.2.5 to persistently store and retrieve the RequireSignOrSeal variable SHOULD use the following:

- RegistryValueName:  
HKEY\_LOCAL\_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Netlogon\Parameters
- RegistryValueType: 4
- RegistryValue: RequireSignOrSeal

**RequireStrongKey:** A Boolean variable that indicates whether the client MUST negotiate the use of a strong key during secure channel creation as described by the negotiable option O of section [3.1.4.2](#). [<83>](#) Implementations that use the Windows registry [\[MS-GPSB\]](#) section 2.2.5 to persistently store and retrieve the RequireStrongKey variable SHOULD use the following:

- **RegistryValueName:**  
HKEY\_LOCAL\_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Netlogon\Parameters
- **RegistryValueType:** 4
- **RegistryValue:** RequireStrongKey

These registry keys and values MUST be exposed at a specified registry path via the Windows Remote Registry Protocol [MS-RRP]. For each abstract data model element that is loaded from the registry, there is one instance that is shared RRP and the protocol(s) that uses the abstract data model element. Any changes made to the RejectMD5Servers registry key will not be reflected in the abstract data model elements until the Netlogon server is stopped and restarted. Any changes made to the RequireStrongKey and RequireSignOrSeal registry keys will be reflected in the abstract data model elements when [MS-GPSB] a PolicyChange event is received (section 3.1.6).

When a secure channel is established, the client maintains:

**ServerSessionInfo:** A table indexed by *PrimaryName* with the following members:

- **PrimaryName:** The *PrimaryName* (section 3.5.5.4.1) used by the client during session-key negotiations (section 3.1.4.1).
- **ClientSequenceNumber:** See section 3.3.1 for *ClientSequenceNumber* details.
- **ServerSequenceNumber:** See section 3.3.1 for *ServerSequenceNumber* details.
- **Session-Key:** See section 3.1.4.3 for *Session-Key* computation details.
- **NegotiateFlags:** See section 3.1.1 for *NegotiateFlags* details.
- **ClientStoredCredential:** See section 3.1.1 for *ClientStoredCredential* details.
- **DomainName:** See section 3.1.1 for *ClientStoredCredential* details.
- **ConnectionStatus:** See section 3.1.1 for *ClientStoredCredential* details.
- **LastAuthenticationTry:** A **FILETIME** ([MS-DTYP] section 2.3.1) indicating the time when the last authentication attempt was made. The time stamp is used to determine if at least 45 seconds have passed since the last authentication attempt.

### 3.4.2 Timers

If the client is running on a domain controller, the client MUST create a *domainControllerCacheTimer* with an expiry of 15 minutes. The operation of this timer is specified in section 3.4.6.1.

### 3.4.3 Initialization

If the client is running on a member workstation, the client MUST initialize the **LocatedDCsCache** with one entry, as follows:

- The client MUST attempt to locate a domain controller (DC) from the client's domain by performing the steps described in section 3.1.4.10 for the domain specified by the domain-name ADM element. If a DC is successfully located, the **LocatedDCsCache** is populated based on the resulting *DomainControllerInfo* structure.
- If the client fails to locate a DC, the client ignores errors and MUST continue initialization.

If the client is running on a DC, the client MUST initialize the **LocatedDCsCache** for each domain trusted by the client DC, as follows:

- The client MUST get a trusted domain list by performing the external behavior consistent with locally invoking `LsarEnumerateTrustedDomains` ([MS-LSAD] section 3.1.4.7.8).
  - The *EnumerationContext* parameter MUST be set to 0.
  - The *PreferredMaximumLength* SHOULD be set to 4096. <84>
  - A policy handle is not needed locally.
- The client MUST attempt to locate a DC (section 3.1.4.10) for each of the domain entries of the returned trusted domain list.
  - If the client fails when attempting to locate a DC for a domain entry in the trusted domain list, the client MUST ignore errors and continue to attempt to locate DCs for the remaining domain entries in the trusted domain list.
  - For each successfully located DC, the client must add an entry to the `ServerSessionInfo` table with the new entry's **PrimaryName** set to **DOMAIN\_CONTROLLER\_INFOW.DomainControllerName** and the new entry's **DomainName** set to **DOMAIN\_CONTROLLER\_INFOW.DomainName**.
- For each located DC, the client MUST attempt to establish a session key with the located DC (section 3.1.4.10)

**ServerSessionInfo** MUST be empty.

**ClientCapabilities** SHOULD be initialized in an implementation-specific way to reflect the capabilities offered by that client implementation. The client SHOULD set the value according to the bit field, defined as shown in Netlogon Negotiable Options (section 3.1.4.2). Bits C, G, I, J, K, L, O, P, R, S, T, V, W, and Y SHOULD be set to 1 when a corresponding capability is supported by a given implementation. <85> Bit U should be set if the client is determined to be running on a domain controller (section 3.1.4.8). Other bits are not used and MAY be set to zero, but will be ignored upon receipt.

**RejectMD5Servers** MUST be initialized to FALSE.

**RequireSignOrSeal** SHOULD be initialized to TRUE. <86>

**RequireStrongKey** SHOULD be initialized to TRUE. <87>

**domain-name** is a shared Abstract Data Model element with `DomainName.NetBIOS` in ([MS-DISO] section 4.3.1.1).

**TrustPasswordVersion** MUST be initialized to 0.

### 3.4.4 Higher-Layer Triggered Events

Netlogon responds to a few higher-layer triggered events.

- Transport being added or removed. Whenever a new transport becomes available or unavailable, Netlogon MUST incorporate the transport event and use the DC Locator components ([MS-ADTS] section 7.3.6) to make sure that it has a valid domain controller to connect to.
- If an application calls a Netlogon method and a secure channel is not currently set up, a secure channel MUST be established before the RPC call to the server is made.

### 3.4.5 Message Processing Events and Sequencing Rules

For all of the method calls, the client **MUST** bind to the server before making the RPC call. If an application calls a Netlogon method and a secure channel is not currently set up, a secure channel **MUST** be established before the RPC call to the server is made. For details, see sections [3.1.4.6](#) and [3.1.4.7](#).

If the *NegotiateFlags* bit L is not set, clients calling the **NetrLogonSamLogon/NetrLogonSamLogonEx/NetrLogonSamLogonWithFlags** methods **MUST** have only one outstanding RPC call at a time. If the *NegotiateFlags* bit L is set, clients can have more than one concurrent RPC call.

Whenever a new transport becomes available or unavailable, Netlogon receives a notification, and it uses the DC Locator component ([\[MS-ADTS\]](#) section 7.3.6) to make sure that it has a valid domain controller with which to connect.

#### 3.4.5.1 DC Location Methods

##### 3.4.5.1.1 Calling DsrGetDcNameEx2

No client-specific events or rules are required.

##### 3.4.5.1.2 Calling DsrGetDcNameEx

No client-specific events or rules are required.

##### 3.4.5.1.3 Calling DsrGetDcName

No client-specific events or rules are required. [<88>](#)

##### 3.4.5.1.4 Calling NetrGetDCName

No client-specific events or rules are required.

##### 3.4.5.1.5 Calling NetrGetAnyDCName

No client-specific events or rules are required.

##### 3.4.5.1.6 Calling DsrGetSiteName

No client-specific events or rules are required.

##### 3.4.5.1.7 Calling DsrGetDcSiteCoverageW

No client-specific events or rules are required.

##### 3.4.5.1.8 Calling DsrAddressToSiteNamesW

No client-specific events or rules are required.

##### 3.4.5.1.9 Calling DsrAddressToSiteNamesExW

No client-specific events or rules are required.

#### 3.4.5.1.10 Calling DsrDeregisterDnsHostRecords

The client SHOULD be prepared to handle ERROR\_ACCESS\_DENIED, if the server determines that the client does not have appropriate privileges.

#### 3.4.5.2 Secure Channel Establishment and Maintenance Methods

##### 3.4.5.2.1 Calling NetrServerReqChallenge

The client MUST do the following:

- Pass a valid domain controller name as the *PrimaryName* parameter.
- Generate 64 bits of random data to pass as the *ClientChallenge* parameter.

##### 3.4.5.2.2 Calling NetrServerAuthenticate3

To call NetrServerAuthenticate3, the client MUST have called [NetrServerReqChallenge](#) and have a local copy of the server challenge (SC).

The client MUST set **ClientStoredCredential** to 0.

The client MUST set **ServerStoredCredential** to 0.

The client MUST compute a Netlogon credential using the algorithm described in section [3.1.4.4](#). The result MUST be computed using the client challenge used in the call to **NetrServerReqChallenge**. The computed credential is passed as the *ClientCredential* parameter.

If the server returns STATUS\_ACCESS\_DENIED and the client used AES:

- If RejectMD5Servers is set to FALSE and the *NegotiateFlags* parameter bit flag W is not set, the client SHOULD retry establishing the session with the MD5/DES algorithm.
- If RejectMD5Servers is set to TRUE, the client MUST fail session-key negotiation.

If RequireStrongKey is set to TRUE, and the server did not specify bit O in the *NegotiateFlags* output parameter as described in section [3.1.4.2](#), the client MUST fail session-key negotiation.

If RequireSignOrSeal is set to TRUE, and the server did not specify bit Y in the *NegotiateFlags* output parameter as described in section [3.1.4.2](#), the client MUST fail session-key negotiation.

After the call to NetrServerAuthenticate3 completes successfully, the client MUST compute the server Netlogon credential (as specified in section [3.1.4.4](#)) and compare it with the one passed from the server for verification. The result MUST be computed using the server challenge. If the comparison fails, the client MUST fail session-key negotiation.

If the return value indicates that the method is not available on the server, the client MUST retry with a call to [NetrServerAuthenticate2](#). If that call also fails with the method not available on the server, the client MUST retry with a call to [NetrServerAuthenticate](#).

The client MUST compute a session key to use for encrypting further communications, as specified in section [3.1.4.3](#).

The client SHOULD set **ConnectionStatus** (section [3.4.5.3.1](#)) if changed.



### 3.4.5.2.3 Calling NetrServerAuthenticate2

Message processing is identical to [NetrServerAuthenticate3](#),[<89>](#) as specified in section [3.4.5.2.2](#), except for the following:

The *AccountRid* parameter is not present in [NetrServerAuthenticate2](#).

### 3.4.5.2.4 Calling NetrServerAuthenticate

Message processing is identical to [NetrServerAuthenticate3](#),[<90>](#) as specified in section [3.4.5.2.2](#), except for the following:

- The *NegotiateFlags* parameter is not present in [NetrServerAuthenticate](#).
- The *AccountRid* parameter is not present in **NetrServerAuthenticate**.

### 3.4.5.2.5 Calling NetrServerPasswordSet2

The client MUST do the following:

- Have a secure channel that is established with a domain controller in the domain that is identified by domain-name, and pass its name as the *PrimaryName* parameter.
- Encrypt the *ClearNewPassword* parameter using the negotiated encryption algorithm (determined by bits C, O, or W, respectively, in the **NegotiateFlags** member of the **ServerSessionInfo** table entry for *PrimaryName*) and the session key established as the **encryption key**.
- Pass a valid client Netlogon authenticator as the *Authenticator* parameter.

The *ClearNewPassword* parameter is constructed as follows, assuming a WCHAR-represented password of length X bytes.

If the password is for an interdomain account:

- The password is copied into the **Buffer** field of *ClearNewPassword*, which is treated as an array of bytes, starting at byte offset (512 - X).
- An **NL\_PASSWORD\_VERSION** structure, as specified in section [2.2.1.3.8](#), is prepared. The **PasswordVersionNumber** field of the structure is set to the value of the [TrustPasswordVersion](#) variable corresponding to the password being set. The first trust password generated has **TrustPasswordVersion** equal to one. Each time a new trust password is generated, its **TrustPasswordVersion** is computed by adding one to the value of **TrustPasswordVersion** of the previous password. The **NL\_PASSWORD\_VERSION** structure is copied into *ClearNewPassword.Buffer* starting at byte offset (512 - X - size of (**NL\_PASSWORD\_VERSION**)). For more information on the **NL\_PASSWORD\_VERSION** structure, see section [2.2.1.3.8](#).
- The first (512 - X) - size of (**NL\_PASSWORD\_VERSION**) bytes of *ClearNewPassword.Buffer* are filled with randomly generated data.
- *ClearNewPassword.Length* is set to X.

For any other type of account:

- The password is copied into the **Buffer** field of *ClearNewPassword*, which is treated as an array of bytes, starting at byte offset (512 - X).

- The first (512 - X) bytes are filled with randomly generated data.
- `ClearNewPassword.Length` is set to X.

After the method returns, the client MUST verify the `ReturnAuthenticator` as defined in section [3.1.4.5](#).

On receiving `STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED`, the client SHOULD [<91>](#) re-establish the secure channel with the domain controller.

#### 3.4.5.2.6 Calling `NetrServerPasswordSet`

The client MUST do the following:

- Have a secure channel established with a DC in the domain identified by domain-name, and pass its name as the *PrimaryName* parameter.
- Pass the encrypted new password:
  1. Compute the NTOWFv1 ([\[MS-NLMP\]](#) section 3.3.1) of the new password.
  2. Encrypt ([\[MS-SAMR\]](#) section 2.2.11.1.1) the result of step 1 using the Session-Key for the secure channel as the specified key.
  3. Pass the result of step 2 as the *UasNewPassword* parameter.
- Pass a valid client Netlogon authenticator as the *Authenticator* parameter.

After the method returns, the client MUST verify the `ReturnAuthenticator` as described in section [3.1.4.5](#).

On receiving `STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED`, the client SHOULD [<92>](#) re-establish the secure channel with the domain controller.

#### 3.4.5.2.7 Calling `NetrServerTrustPasswordsGet`

The process for calling `NetrServerTrustPasswordsGet` is the same as that used for [NetrServerGetTrustInfo](#), except the *TrustInfo* parameter is not specified.

See section [3.4.5.4.6](#), **Calling `NetrServerGetTrustInfo`**.

#### 3.4.5.2.8 Calling `NetrLogonGetDomainInfo`

The client MUST do the following:

- Have a secure channel established with a domain controller in the domain identified by domain-name, and pass its name as the *ServerName* parameter.
- Pass a valid client Netlogon authenticator as the *Authenticator* parameter.
- Pass the *Level* parameter set to 1 or 2.

After the method returns, the client MUST verify the *ReturnAuthenticator* as defined in section [3.1.4.5](#).

On receiving `STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED`, the client SHOULD [<93>](#) re-establish the secure channel with the domain controller.

### 3.4.5.2.9 Calling NetrLogonGetCapabilities

The client MUST do the following: [<94>](#94)

- Have a secure channel established with a domain controller in the domain identified by domain-name, and pass its name as the *ServerName* parameter.
- Pass a valid client Netlogon authenticator as the *Authenticator* parameter.

After the method returns, the client MUST verify the *ReturnAuthenticator* (section [3.1.4.5](#3.1.4.5)) and compare the received **Capabilities** with the negotiated flags of the current secure channel. If the negotiated flags do not match, then the client SHOULD re-establish the secure channel with the DC. [<95>](#95)

Upon receiving STATUS\_NOT\_IMPLEMENTED, the client MUST treat this as successful confirmation that the DC does not support AES [\[FIPS197\]](#FIPS197). [<96>](#96)

On receiving STATUS\_ACCESS\_DENIED, the client SHOULD re-establish the secure channel with the DC. [<97>](#97)

### 3.4.5.3 Pass-Through Authentication Methods

All clients SHOULD set **ConnectionStatus** (section [3.4.5.3.1](#3.4.5.3.1)) if changed.

#### 3.4.5.3.1 Setting ConnectionStatus

When one of the following return values is received, the client SHOULD set **ConnectionStatus** to that value:

- NERR\_Success
- STATUS\_NO\_LOGON\_SERVERS
- STATUS\_ACCESS\_DENIED
- STATUS\_NO\_TRUST\_LSA\_SECRET
- STATUS\_NO\_TRUST\_SAM\_ACCOUNT
- STATUS\_INVALID\_SERVER\_STATE
- STATUS\_NO\_MEMORY
- STATUS\_INSUFFICIENT\_RESOURCES
- STATUS\_DISK\_FULL

#### 3.4.5.3.2 Calling NetrLogonSamLogonEx

The client MUST do the following:

- Have a secure channel established with a domain controller in the domain identified by domain-name and pass its name as the *LogonServer* parameter.
- Pass the client name as the *ComputerName* parameter.

- If the *LogonLevel* is [NetlogonInteractiveInformation](#) or **NetlogonInteractiveTransitiveInformation**, then encrypt<98> the **LmOwfPassword** and **NtOwfPassword** members in the [NETLOGON\\_INTERACTIVE\\_INFO](#) structure.
- If the *LogonLevel* is **NetlogonServiceInformation** or **NetlogonServiceTransitiveInformation**, then encrypt<99> the **LmOwfPassword** and **NtOwfPassword** members in the [NETLOGON\\_SERVICE\\_INFO](#) structure.
- If the *LogonLevel* is **NetlogonGenericInformation**, then encrypt<100> the **LogonData** member in the [NETLOGON\\_GENERIC\\_INFO](#) structure.
- Call the method using Secure RPC, as specified in [\[MS-RPCE\]](#) section 3.3.1.5.2.1.

If the *NegotiateFlags* bit V is not set, then the **read-only domain controller (RODC)** SHOULD NOT set *ExtraFlags* C or D.

If the *NegotiateFlags* bit P is set, then the client SHOULD convert:

- NetlogonInteractiveInformation to NetlogonInteractiveTransitiveInformation
- NetlogonNetworkInformation to NetlogonNetworkTransitiveInformation
- NetlogonServiceInformation to NetlogonServiceTransitiveInformation

If the *NegotiateFlags* bit G is not set and *LogonLevel* is not **NetlogonGenericInformation**, then the *ValidationLevel* parameter MUST be set to 2 ([NETLOGON\\_VALIDATION\\_SAM\\_INFO \(section 2.2.1.4.11\)](#)).

The *LogonLevel*, *LogonInformation*, *ValidationLevel*, and *ValidationInformation* parameters are specified in [\[MS-APDS\]](#) for NTLM, Kerberos, and Digest, and in [\[MS-RCMP\]](#) for TLS/SSL.

To call for Generic-Passthrough to authentication packages, the *LogonLevel* parameter MUST be set to 4 (**NetlogonGenericInformation**), and the *ValidationLevel* parameter MUST be set to 5 ([NetlogonValidationGenericInfo2](#)). The *LogonInformation* parameter MUST be a **NETLOGON\_GENERIC\_INFO** structure, as specified in section [2.2.1.4.2](#).

After the method returns, the client MUST:

- If the *LogonLevel* is **NetlogonNetworkInformation** or **NetlogonNetworkTransitiveInformation**, the client MUST decrypt the *UserSessionKey* and the first two elements of the **ExpansionRoom** array in the **NETLOGON\_VALIDATION\_SAM\_INFO** (section 2.2.1.4.11) or in the [NETLOGON\\_VALIDATION\\_SAM\\_INFO2 \(section 2.2.1.4.12\)](#) structure.
- Verify that it received an authoritative response by checking the *Authoritative* parameter. If the *Authoritative* parameter is TRUE, the client MUST treat the result as final. If the *Authoritative* parameter is FALSE, the client SHOULD retry the call at a later time or at a different domain controller.

On receiving STATUS\_ACCESS\_DENIED, the client SHOULD re-establish the secure channel with the DC. [<101>](#)

### 3.4.5.3.3 Calling NetrLogonSamLogonWithFlags

Message processing for NetrLogonSamLogonWithFlags is identical to [NetrLogonSamLogon](#), except for the following:

- NetrLogonSamLogonWithFlags has the additional parameter *ExtraFlags*.

See section [3.4.5.3.4](#).

### 3.4.5.3.4 Calling NetrLogonSamLogon

The client MUST do the following:

- Have a secure channel established with a domain controller in the domain identified by domain-name, and pass its name as the *LogonServer* parameter.
- Pass the client name as the *ComputerName* parameter.
- If the *LogonLevel* is [NetlogonInteractiveInformation](#) or **NetlogonInteractiveTransitiveInformation**, then encrypt<sup><102></sup> the **LmOwfPassword** and **NtOwfPassword** members in the [NETLOGON\\_INTERACTIVE\\_INFO](#) structure.
- If the *LogonLevel* is **NetlogonServiceInformation** or **NetlogonServiceTransitiveInformation**, then encrypt<sup><103></sup> the **LmOwfPassword** and **NtOwfPassword** members in the [NETLOGON\\_SERVICE\\_INFO](#) structure.
- If the *LogonLevel* is **NetlogonGenericInformation**, then encrypt<sup><104></sup> the **LogonData** member in the [NETLOGON\\_GENERIC\\_INFO](#) structure.
- If the *LogonLevel* is **NetlogonNetworkInformation** or **NetlogonNetworkTransitiveInformation**, then encrypt the *UserSessionKey* and the first two elements of the **ExpansionRoom** array in the [NETLOGON\\_VALIDATION\\_SAM\\_INFO \(section 2.2.1.4.11\)](#) or in the [NETLOGON\\_VALIDATION\\_SAM\\_INFO2 \(section 2.2.1.4.12\)](#) structure.
- Pass a valid client Netlogon authenticator as the *Authenticator* parameter.

If the *NegotiateFlags* bit P is set, then the client SHOULD convert:

- NetlogonInteractiveInformation to NetlogonInteractiveTransitiveInformation
- NetlogonNetworkInformation to NetlogonNetworkTransitiveInformation
- NetlogonServiceInformation to NetlogonServiceTransitiveInformation

If the *NegotiateFlags* bit G is not set and *LogonLevel* is not **NetlogonGenericInformation**, then the *ValidationLevel* parameter MUST be set to 2 (**NETLOGON\_VALIDATION\_SAM\_INFO** (section 2.2.1.4.11)).

The *LogonLevel*, *LogonInformation*, *ValidationLevel*, and *ValidationInformation* parameters are specified in [\[MS-APDS\]](#) for NTLM, Kerberos, and Digest, and in [\[MS-RCMP\]](#) for TLS/SSL.

To call for Generic-Passthrough to authentication packages, the *LogonLevel* parameter MUST be set to 4 (**NetlogonGenericInformation**), and the *ValidationLevel* parameter MUST be set to 5 ([NetlogonValidationGenericInfo2](#)). The *LogonInformation* parameter MUST be a **NETLOGON\_GENERIC\_INFO** structure, as specified in section [2.2.1.4.2](#).

After the method returns, the client MUST:

- Verify the *ReturnAuthenticator*, as specified in section [3.1.4.5](#).
- Verify that it received an authoritative response by checking the *Authoritative* parameter. If the *Authoritative* parameter is TRUE, the client MUST treat the result as final. If the *Authoritative*

parameter is FALSE, the client SHOULD retry the call at a later time or at a different domain controller.

On receiving STATUS\_ACCESS\_DENIED, the client SHOULD reestablish the secure channel with the DC. [<105>](#)

### 3.4.5.3.5 Calling NetrLogonSamLogoff

The client MUST do the following:

- Have a secure channel established with a domain controller in the domain identified by domain-name, and pass its name as the *LogonServer* parameter.
- Pass the client name as the *ComputerName* parameter.
- Pass a valid client Netlogon authenticator as the *Authenticator* parameter.

After the method returns, the client MUST verify the *ReturnAuthenticator* as described in section [3.1.4.5](#).

On receiving STATUS\_ACCESS\_DENIED, the client SHOULD reestablish the secure channel with the DC. [<106>](#)

### 3.4.5.4 Domain Trusts Methods

#### 3.4.5.4.1 Calling DsrEnumerateDomainTrusts

No client-specific events or rules are required.

#### 3.4.5.4.2 Calling NetrEnumerateTrustedDomainsEx

No client-specific events or rules are required.

#### 3.4.5.4.3 Calling NetrEnumerateTrustedDomains

No client-specific events or rules are required.

#### 3.4.5.4.4 Calling NetrGetForestTrustInformation

The client calling this method MUST be a DC in a different domain. If the NegotiateFlags bit T is not set, then the client SHOULD NOT call this method.

The client MUST do the following:

- Have a secure channel established with a domain controller in the domain identified by domain-name and pass its name as the *ServerName* parameter.
- Pass a valid client Netlogon authenticator as the *Authenticator* parameter.

After the method returns, the client MUST verify the *ReturnAuthenticator* as described in section [3.1.4.5](#).

On receiving STATUS\_ACCESS\_DENIED, the client SHOULD [<107>](#) reestablish the secure channel with the domain controller.

#### 3.4.5.4.5 Calling DsrGetForestTrustInformation

The client SHOULD be prepared to handle ERROR\_ACCESS\_DENIED, if the server determines that the client does not have appropriate **privileges**.

#### 3.4.5.4.6 Calling NetrServerGetTrustInfo

The client MUST do the following:

- Have a secure channel established with a domain controller in the domain identified by domain-name, and pass its name as the *TrustedDcName* parameter.

After the method returns, the client MUST verify the *ReturnAuthenticator* as described in section [3.1.4.5](#).

On receiving STATUS\_ACCESS\_DENIED, the client SHOULD [<108>](#) reestablish the secure channel with the domain controller.

### 3.4.5.5 Message Protection Methods

#### 3.4.5.5.1 Calling NetrLogonGetTrustRid

If the client requires the RID for the computer account of the calling machine, the caller MUST specify this by passing NULL for both the *ServerName* and *DomainName* parameters. Otherwise, a valid *ServerName* MUST be passed. The client SHOULD be prepared to handle ERROR\_ACCESS\_DENIED, if the server determines that the client does not have appropriate privileges.

#### 3.4.5.5.2 Calling NetrLogonComputeServerDigest

The client SHOULD be prepared to handle ERROR\_ACCESS\_DENIED, if the server determines that the client does not have appropriate privileges.

#### 3.4.5.5.3 Calling NetrLogonComputeClientDigest

When comparing digests, the client SHOULD compare the new password digest first. If this comparison fails, the client SHOULD compare the old password digest. If that comparison also fails, the digests do not match. The client SHOULD be prepared to handle ERROR\_ACCESS\_DENIED, if the server determines that the client does not have appropriate privileges.

#### 3.4.5.5.4 Calling NetrLogonSendToSam

The client calling this method MUST be a BDC or RODC. The client MUST do the following:

- Have a secure channel established with a domain controller in the domain identified by domain-name and pass its name as the *PrimaryName* parameter.
- Encrypt the *OpaqueBuffer* parameter using the negotiated encryption algorithm (determined by bits C, O, or W, respectively, in the **NegotiateFlags** member of the **ServerSessionInfo** table entry for *PrimaryName*) and the session key established as the encryption key.
- Pass a valid client Netlogon authenticator as the *Authenticator* parameter.

After the method returns, the client MUST verify the *ReturnAuthenticator* as described in section [3.1.4.5.<109>](#)

#### 3.4.5.5.5 Calling NetrLogonSetServiceBits

The client SHOULD be prepared to handle ERROR\_ACCESS\_DENIED, if the server determines that the client does not have appropriate privileges.

#### 3.4.5.5.6 Calling NetrLogonGetTimeServiceParentDomain

The client SHOULD be prepared to handle ERROR\_ACCESS\_DENIED, if the server determines that the client does not have appropriate privileges.

### 3.4.5.6 Administrative Services Methods

#### 3.4.5.6.1 Calling NetrLogonControl2Ex

The client MUST do the following:

- Supply the *Data* parameter if the client is calling with one of the following *FunctionCode* values:  
0x00000005(NETLOGON\_CONTROL\_REDISCOVER),  
0x00000006(NETLOGON\_CONTROL\_TC\_QUERY),  
0x00000008(NETLOGON\_CONTROL\_FIND\_USER),  
0x00000009(NETLOGON\_CONTROL\_CHANGE\_PASSWORD),  
0x0000000A(NETLOGON\_CONTROL\_TC\_VERIFY). For details about the *FunctionCode* values, see section [3.5.5.8.1](#).

The client SHOULD be prepared to handle ERROR\_ACCESS\_DENIED, if the server determines that the client does not have appropriate privileges.

#### 3.4.5.6.2 Calling NetrLogonControl2

The client MUST not use this method for calls requiring *QueryLevel* set to 4. All other client requirements are identical to NetrLogonControl2Ex (section [3.4.5.6.1](#)).

#### 3.4.5.6.3 Calling NetrLogonControl

No client-specific events or rules are required.

### 3.4.5.7 Obsolete Methods

#### 3.4.5.7.1 Calling NetrLogonUasLogon

This method was used only by LAN Manager clients and is not currently used.

#### 3.4.5.7.2 Calling NetrLogonUasLogoff

This method was used only by LAN Manager clients and is not currently used.

### 3.4.6 Timer Events

#### 3.4.6.1 Timer Expiry on domainControllerCacheTimer

This event occurs whenever the domainControllerCacheTimer expires.



If the client is a domain controller (DC), the client MUST get a trusted domain list by performing the external behavior consistent with locally invoking LsarEnumerateTrustedDomains ([MS-LSAD] section 3.1.4.7.8).

- The *EnumerationContext* parameter MUST be set to 0.
- The *PreferredMaximumLength* SHOULD [<110>](#) be set to 4096.
- A policy handle is not needed locally.

The client MUST attempt to locate a DC (section [3.1.4.10](#)) for each of the domain entries of the returned trusted domain list.

- If the client fails when attempting to locate a DC for a domain entry in the trusted domain list, the client MUST ignore errors and continue to attempt to locate DCs for the remaining domain entries in the trusted domain list.
- For each successfully located DC: If the *DomainControllerInfo.Flags* has bit G set, and the *ServerSessionInfo* table's entry **PrimaryName** field whose **DomainName** field matches the **DomainControllerInfoW.DomainName** field does not match the **DomainControllerInfoW.DomainControllerName** field, the client must update the name in **PrimaryName** so that it matches **DomainControllerInfoW.DomainControllerName**. The client also MUST attempt to establish a session key with the located DC (section [3.1.4.10](#)).

### 3.4.7 Other Local Events

No additional local events are used on the client beyond the events maintained in the underlying RPC transport and GP notification.

When Netlogon receives a PolicyChange event ([MS-GPSO] section 6.5), NRPC implementations which use the Microsoft Windows® registry to persistently store and retrieve the RequireStrongKey and RequireSignOrSeal variables SHOULD load the new value from the HKEY\_LOCAL\_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Netlogon\Parameters registry path and the RequireStrongKey and RequireSignOrSeal keys.

## 3.5 Netlogon Server Details

### 3.5.1 Abstract Data Model

This section describes a conceptual model of possible data organization that an implementation maintains to participate in this protocol. The described organization is provided to facilitate the explanation of how the protocol behaves. This document does not mandate that implementations adhere to this model as long as their external behavior is consistent with that described in this document.

A Netlogon Remote Protocol server maintains the following abstract variables, in addition to the ones defined in section [3.1](#):

**NetlogonSecurityDescriptor:** A security descriptor that is used for verifying access security during processing of some methods. This security descriptor MUST NOT be changed.

**ServerCapabilities:** A 32-bit set of bit flags (section [3.1.4.2](#)) that identify the server's supported options.

**DNSDomainName:** The FQDN (2) domain name for the domain to which the server belongs. This Abstract Data Model element is shared with DomainName.FQDN ([\[MS-DISO\]](#) section 4.3.1.1).

**NetbiosDomainName:** The NetBIOS domain name for the domain to which the server belongs. This Abstract Data Model element is shared with DomainName.NetBIOS ([\[MS-DISO\]](#) section 4.3.1.1).

**DomainGuid:** The GUID for the domain. This Abstract Data Model element is shared with DomainGuid ([\[MS-DISO\]](#) section 4.3.1.1).

**DomainSid:** The security identifier for the domain. This Abstract Data Model element is shared with DomainSid ([\[MS-DISO\]](#) section 4.3.1.1).

**AllowSingleLabelDNSDomain:** A Boolean that specifies whether location via single label DNS names is enabled.

**SiteName:** The site name of the computer.

**NextClosestSiteName:** The name of the site that is closest to the site of the computer.

**DynamicSiteName:** Dynamically determined site name of the computer.

**DynamicSiteNameTimeout:** An implementation-specific time span that determines whether or not it is time to rediscover the site name. [<111>](#)

**DynamicSiteNameSetTime:** An implementation-specific timestamp indicating the time at which DynamicSiteName was determined.

**ChallengeTable:** A table indexed by **ComputerName** with the following members:

**ComputerName:** The **ComputerName** (section [3.5.5.4.1](#)) used by the DC during [session-key negotiations \(section 3.1.4.1\)](#).

**ClientChallenge:** A pointer to a [NETLOGON\\_CREDENTIAL \(section 2.2.1.3.4\)](#) structure that contains the client challenge.

**ServerChallenge:** A pointer to a **NETLOGON\_CREDENTIAL** (section 2.2.1.3.4) structure that contains the server challenge response.

**SecureChannelType:** A [NETLOGON\\_SECURE\\_CHANNEL\\_TYPE \(section 2.2.1.3.13\)](#) enumerated value, as specified in section [2.2.1.3.13](#), that indicates the type of the secure channel being established.

**FailedDiscoveryCache:** The server SHOULD implement a cache containing a set of failed DC discovery attempts. The fields of the cache are implementation-specific but any cache implementation MUST be able to return the time when the last DC discovery attempt failed for a given domain name (see section [3.5.5.3.1](#) for more information).

**FailedDiscoveryCachePeriod:** The length of time, in seconds, for which an entry in the **FailedDiscoveryCache** is valid.

**CacheEntryValidityPeriod:** The length of time, in hours, for which an entry in the **LocatedDCsCache** is valid.

**CacheEntryPingValidityPeriod:** The length of time, in minutes, for which an entry in the **LocatedDCsCache** is considered valid without having to ping the DC represented by that cached entry.

The Netlogon server variables which are registry keys are as follows:

**RejectMD5Clients:** A Boolean variable that indicates whether the server MUST reject incoming clients that are using MD5 encryption. [<112>](#)

**SignSecureChannel:** A Boolean variable that determines whether a domain member attempts to negotiate signing for all secure channel traffic that it initiates.

**TrustedDomains:** A list of domain trusts (of type [DS\\_DOMAIN\\_TRUSTW](#), section [2.2.1.5.2](#)) obtained by calling [DsrEnumerateDomainTrusts](#) (section [3.5.5.6.1](#)).

When the server is a DC, it also maintains the following abstract variables:

**RejectDES:** A Boolean variable that indicates whether the server MUST reject incoming clients using DES encryption in ECB mode.

**DnsForestName:** The FQDN (2) forest name for the forest to which the domain belongs. This Abstract Data Model element is shared with DomainName.FQDN ([\[MS-DISO\]](#), section [4.3.1.1](#)). [<113>](#)

**LogonAttempts:** A 32-bit unsigned integer shared from LogonAttempts ([\[MS-APDS\]](#) section 3.1.1).

**NT4Emulator:** A Boolean variable that indicates whether the server offers only the server capabilities of a Microsoft Windows NT® 4.0 operating system unless the client specifically requests otherwise. [<114>](#)

**RefusePasswordChange:** A setting that indicates whether the server refuses client password changes. This domain-wide setting can be used to indicate to the client machines that they SHOULD avoid password changes. When TRUE, the *NegotiateFlags* bit I is sent.

**DCRPCPort:** The domain controller Netlogon port that is registered with the RPC endpoint mapper instead of the standard dynamic port. [<115>](#) It is read only once, at initialization.

**SiteCoverage:** The names of all the sites that a domain controller covers.

**TrustedDomainObjectsCollection:** A collection of trusted domain objects as defined and initialized in [\[MS-LSAD\]](#) (section [3.1.1.5](#)).

When a secure channel is established, the server maintains:

**ClientSessionInfo:** A table indexed by *ComputerName* with the following members:

- **ComputerName:** The *ComputerName* (section [3.5.5.4.1](#)) used by the DC during session-key negotiations (section [3.1.4.1](#)).
- **ClientSequenceNumber:** See section [3.3.1](#) for *ClientSequenceNumber* details.
- **AccountRid:** The RID of this client's machine account.
- **ServerSequenceNumber:** See section [3.3.1](#) for *ServerSequenceNumber* details.
- **Session-Key:** See section [3.1.4.3](#) for *Session-Key* computation details.
- **NegotiateFlags:** See section [3.1.1](#) for *NegotiateFlags* details.
- **ServerStoredCredential:** See section [3.1.1](#) for *ServerStoredCredential* details.

- **SecureChannelType:** A **NETLOGON\_SECURE\_CHANNEL\_TYPE** enumerated value, as specified in section [2.2.1.3.13](#), which indicates the type of secure channel being established with this client.

In addition, NetLogon stores service state information.

**ServerServiceBits:** A set of bit flags used to store the state of running services. If the bit is set to 0, the corresponding service is not running; otherwise, the bit is set to 1 and the corresponding service is running. The value of the bit flags is constructed from zero or more bit flags in the following table.

											1										2											3	
0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	0	1		
0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	C	0	0	0	B	0	0	A	0	0	0	0	0	0		

The meanings of the flags are described in the following table.

Value	Description
A	The time service is running.
B	The time service with clock hardware is running.
C	The Active Directory Web service is running.

### 3.5.2 Timers

No server protocol timers are introduced by this protocol.

### 3.5.3 Initialization

The server side registers an endpoint with RPC over named pipes transport, using the NETLOGON named pipe [<116>](#) and an endpoint with RPC over TCP/IP. When DCRPCPort is present and is not NULL, and the **server** is a domain controller, then the DC MUST also register the port listed in DCRPCPort ([\[MS-RPCE\]](#) section 3.3.3.1.4). The server side MUST register the Netlogon security support provider authentication\_type constant [0x44] as the security provider ([\[MS-RPCE\]](#) section 3.3.3.1.3) used by the RPC interface.

**NetlogonSecurityDescriptor:** Initialized to the following value, expressed in Security Descriptor Description Language (SDDL) ([\[MS-DTYP\]](#) section 2.5.1):  
D:(A;;CCLCSWRPWPDTLOCRRC;;;SY)(A;;CCDCLCSWRPWPDTLOCRSDRCWDWO;;;BA)(A;;CCLCSWLOCRRC;;;IU)(A;;CCLCSWLOCRRC;;;SU) S:(AU;FA;CCDCLCSWRPWPDTLOCRSDRCWDWO;;;WD)

**ChallengeTable** MUST be empty.

**ClientSessionInfo** MUST be empty.

**RefusePasswordChange** SHOULD be FALSE.

The **ServerCapabilities** field SHOULD be initialized to reflect the capabilities offered by that server implementation.

**RejectMD5Clients** SHOULD be initialized in an implementation specific way and SHOULD be FALSE. Implementations that use the Windows registry to persistently store and retrieve the

RejectMD5Clients variable SHOULD use the HKEY\_LOCAL\_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Netlogon\Parameters registry path and RejectMD5Clients key.

**SealSecureChannel** SHOULD be TRUE.

**SignSecureChannel** SHOULD be initialized in an implementation specific way and SHOULD be TRUE. Implementations that use the Windows registry ([\[MS-GPSB\]](#) section 2.2.5) to persistently store and retrieve the SignSecureChannel variable SHOULD use the following:

- RegistryValueName: HKEY\_LOCAL\_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Netlogon\Parameters
- RegistryValueType: 4
- RegistryValue: SignSecureChannel

These registry keys and values MUST be exposed at a specified registry path via the Windows Remote Registry Protocol [\[MS-RRP\]](#). For each abstract data model element that is loaded from the registry, there is one instance that is shared RRP and the protocol(s) that uses the abstract data model element. Any changes made to the RejectMD5Clients registry key will not be reflected in the abstract data model elements until the **Netlogon** server is stopped and restarted. Any changes made to the SignSecureChannel registry keys will be reflected in the abstract data model elements when [\[MS-GPSB\]](#) a PolicyChange event is received (section [3.1.6](#)).

**StrongKeySupport** SHOULD be TRUE.[<117>](#)

**NetbiosDomainName** is a shared abstract data model element with DomainName.NetBIOS ([\[MS-DISO\]](#) section 4.3.1.1).

**DomainGuid**: Prior to the initialization of the Netlogon Remote Protocol, DomainGuid has already been initialized, as described in [\[MS-DISO\]](#) section 4.3.1.1, since Netlogon Remote Protocol is running on a system already joined to a domain.

**DomainSid**: Prior to the initialization of the Netlogon Remote Protocol, DomainSid has already been initialized, as described in [\[MS-DISO\]](#) section 4.3.1.1, since Netlogon Remote Protocol is running on a system already joined to a domain.

**AllowSingleLabelDNSDomain** SHOULD be set to a locally configured value.[<118>](#)

**SiteName** SHOULD be initialized from msDS-SiteName ([\[MS-ADTS\]](#) section 3.1.1.4.5.29) of the **computer object** if the server is a DC. If the server is not a **DC**, this abstract data model element SHOULD be set to a locally configured value.[<119>](#)

**NextClosestSiteName** SHOULD be initialized as follows: if the server is a DC, the server SHOULD invoke [IDL DRSQuerySitesByCost](#) ([\[MS-DRDM\]](#) section 4.1.9), setting **NextClosestSiteName** to the site that is closest to **SiteName** but not equal to **SiteName**. If the server is not a DC, this abstract data model element SHOULD be initialized to NULL.

**DynamicSiteNameSetTime** MUST be set to a value such that **DynamicSiteNameSetTime** plus **DynamicSiteNameTimeout** is less than the current time.

**FailedDiscoveryCachePeriod** SHOULD be set to a locally configured value.[<120>](#)

**CacheEntryValidityPeriod** SHOULD be set to a locally configured value.[<121>](#)

**CacheEntryPingValidityPeriod** SHOULD be set to a locally configured value.[<122>](#)

If the NRPC server is a DC, then the following abstract data model variables are initialized:

- **DCRPCPort** SHOULD be initialized in an implementation specific way and MUST default to NULL. Implementations that use the Windows registry to persistently store and retrieve the **DCRPCPort** variable SHOULD use the HKEY\_LOCAL\_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Netlogon\Parameters registry path and **DCRPCPort** key.
- **DnsForestName**: SHOULD be initialized from the fully qualified domain name (FQDN) (2) of **rootDomainNamingContext** [MS-ADTS] (section [3.1.1.3.2.16](#)).
- **TrustedDomainObjectsCollection** are initialized in [\[MS-LSAD\]](#) (section [3.1.1.5](#)).
- The **NT4Emulator** field SHOULD be FALSE.
- **RejectDES** SHOULD be TRUE. [<123>](#)
- **ServerServiceBits** SHOULD be initialized to zero.
- **SiteCoverage** SHOULD be initialized in an implementation specific way and MUST default to NULL. Implementations that use the Windows registry to persistently store and retrieve the **SiteCoverage** variable SHOULD use the HKEY\_LOCAL\_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Netlogon\Parameters registry path and **SiteCoverage** key.

### 3.5.4 Higher-Layer Triggered Events

None.

### 3.5.5 Message Processing Events and Sequencing Rules

The following section specifies data and state maintained by the Netlogon RPC server. It includes details about receiving Netlogon RPC methods on the server side of the client/server communication. The provided data is to facilitate the explanation of how the protocol behaves. This section does not mandate that implementations adhere to this model as long as their external behavior is consistent with that described in this document.

This protocol MUST instruct the RPC runtime, via the **strict\_context\_handle** attribute, to reject use of context handles created by a method of a different RPC interface than this one, as described in [\[MS-RPCE\]](#) section 3.

This protocol MUST indicate to the RPC runtime that it is to perform a strict NDR data consistency check at target level 6.0, as specified in [\[MS-RPCE\]](#) section 3.

Methods in RPC Opnum Order

Method	Description
<a href="#">NetrLogonUasLogon</a>	This method was for support of LAN Manager products, and it is no longer used. This method was introduced in LAN Manager. Opnum: 0
<a href="#">NetrLogonUasLogoff</a>	This method was for support of LAN Manager products, and it is no longer used. This method was introduced in LAN Manager. Opnum: 1

Method	Description
<a href="#">NetrLogonSamLogon</a>	The <b>NetrLogonSamLogon</b> method updates the user's <b>lastLogon</b> attribute for the Security Account Manager (SAM). <a href="#">.&lt;124&gt;</a> Opnum: 2
<a href="#">NetrLogonSamLogoff</a>	The <b>NetrLogonSamLogoff</b> method handles logoff requests for the SAM. <a href="#">.&lt;125&gt;</a> Opnum: 3
<a href="#">NetrServerReqChallenge</a>	The <b>NetrServerReqChallenge</b> method receives a client challenge and returns a server challenge. <a href="#">.&lt;126&gt;</a> Opnum: 4
<a href="#">NetrServerAuthenticate</a>	The <b>NetrServerAuthenticate</b> method authenticates an account by verifying that the computed client credentials are the same as those provided in the previous challenge. <a href="#">.&lt;127&gt;</a> Opnum: 5
<a href="#">NetrServerPasswordSet</a>	The <b>NetrServerPasswordSet</b> method sets a new password for an account in the User Account Subsystem (UAS). <a href="#">.&lt;128&gt;</a> Opnum: 6
OpnumUnused7	Opnum: 7
OpnumUnused8	Opnum: 8
OpnumUnused9	Opnum: 9
OpnumUnused10	Opnum: 10
<a href="#">NetrGetDCName</a>	The <b>NetrGetDCName</b> method retrieves the NetBIOS name of the PDC for a specified domain. <a href="#">.&lt;129&gt;</a> Opnum: 11
<a href="#">NetrLogonControl</a>	The <b>NetrLogonControl</b> method executes a specific Netlogon control operation. <a href="#">.&lt;130&gt;</a> Opnum: 12
<a href="#">NetrGetAnyDCName</a>	The <b>NetrGetAnyDCName</b> method retrieves the name of a domain controller in a specified domain. <a href="#">.&lt;131&gt;</a> Opnum: 13
<a href="#">NetrLogonControl2</a>	The <b>NetrLogonControl2</b> method executes a specific Netlogon control operation. This method extends <b>NetrLogonControl</b> by allowing an input buffer that contains data for a particular query. <a href="#">.&lt;132&gt;</a> Opnum: 14
<a href="#">NetrServerAuthenticate2</a>	The <b>NetrServerAuthenticate2</b> method handles logoff requests for the security account manager (SAM). <a href="#">.&lt;133&gt;</a> Opnum: 15

Method	Description
OpnumUnused16	Opnum: 16
OpnumUnused17	Opnum: 17
<a href="#">NetrLogonControl2Ex</a>	The <b>NetrLogonControl2Ex</b> method executes a specific Netlogon control operation. The introduction of this method added support for query level (4) to both <b>NetrLogonControl2Ex</b> and <b>NetrLogonControl2</b> for retrieving user account information. <a href="#">.&lt;134&gt;</a> Opnum: 18
<a href="#">NetrEnumerateTrustedDomains</a>	The <b>NetrEnumerateTrustedDomains</b> method returns an enumeration of trusted domain names. <a href="#">.&lt;135&gt;</a> Opnum: 19
<a href="#">DsrGetDcName</a>	The <b>DsrGetDcName</b> method returns the current domain controller for a specified domain. <a href="#">.&lt;136&gt;</a> Opnum: 20
OpnumUnused21	Opnum: 21
<a href="#">NetrLogonSetServiceBits</a>	The <b>NetrLogonSetServiceBits</b> method indicates to Netlogon whether a domain controller is running a specified service. This is done by setting service bits. <a href="#">.&lt;137&gt;</a> Opnum: 22
<a href="#">NetrLogonGetTrustRid</a>	The <b>NetrLogonGetTrustRid</b> method is used to obtain the RID of the account that is used by the specified server in its secure channel, to determine the <b>DomainName</b> for the specified domain. <a href="#">.&lt;138&gt;</a> Opnum: 23
<a href="#">NetrLogonComputeServerDigest</a>	The <b>NetrLogonComputeServerDigest</b> method computes a cryptographic digest of a message. <a href="#">.&lt;139&gt;</a> Opnum: 24
<a href="#">NetrLogonComputeClientDigest</a>	The <b>NetrLogonComputeClientDigest</b> method is used by a client to compute a cryptographic digest of a message. <a href="#">.&lt;140&gt;</a> Opnum: 25
<a href="#">NetrServerAuthenticate3</a>	The <b>NetrServerAuthenticate3</b> method extends <b>NetrServerAuthenticate2</b> , returning an account RID after authentication. <a href="#">.&lt;141&gt;</a> Opnum: 26
<a href="#">DsrGetDcNameEx</a>	The <b>DsrGetDcNameEx</b> method returns the current domain controller for a specified domain and site. <a href="#">.&lt;142&gt;</a> Opnum: 27
<a href="#">DsrGetSiteName</a>	The <b>DsrGetSiteName</b> method returns the site name for a specified computer. <a href="#">.&lt;143&gt;</a> Opnum: 28



Method	Description
<a href="#">NetrLogonGetDomainInfo</a>	The <b>NetrLogonGetDomainInfo</b> method returns information that describes the current domain to which a specified client belongs. <a href="#">.&lt;144&gt;</a> Opnum: 29
<a href="#">NetrServerPasswordSet2</a>	The <b>NetrServerPasswordSet2</b> method allows an account to set a new clear text password. This method extends <b>NetrServerPasswordSet</b> , which specifies an encrypted one-way function (OWF) of a password. <a href="#">.&lt;145&gt;</a> Opnum: 30
OpnumUnused31	Opnum: 31
<a href="#">NetrLogonSendToSam</a>	The <b>NetrLogonSendToSam</b> method allows a BDC or RODC to forward user account password changes to the PDC. <a href="#">.&lt;146&gt;</a> Opnum: 32
<a href="#">DsrAddressToSiteNamesW</a>	The <b>DsrAddressToSiteNamesW</b> method resolves a list of socket addresses as their corresponding site names. <a href="#">.&lt;147&gt;</a> Opnum: 33
<a href="#">DsrGetDcNameEx2</a>	The <b>DsrGetDcNameEx2</b> method returns the current DC for a specified domain and site. <a href="#">.&lt;148&gt;</a> Opnum: 34
<a href="#">NetrLogonGetTimeServiceParentDomain</a>	The <b>NetrLogonGetTimeServiceParentDomain</b> method returns the name of the parent domain of the current domain. <a href="#">.&lt;149&gt;</a> Opnum: 35
<a href="#">NetrEnumerateTrustedDomainsEx</a>	The <b>NetrEnumerateTrustedDomainsEx</b> method returns a list of trusted domains from a specified server. <a href="#">.&lt;150&gt;</a> Opnum: 36
<a href="#">DsrAddressToSiteNamesExW</a>	The <b>DsrAddressToSiteNamesExW</b> method translates a list of socket addresses into their corresponding site names and subnet names. <a href="#">.&lt;151&gt;</a> Opnum: 37
<a href="#">DsrGetDcSiteCoverageW</a>	The <b>DsrGetDcSiteCoverageW</b> method returns a list of sites covered by a DC. <a href="#">.&lt;152&gt;</a> Opnum: 38
<a href="#">NetrLogonSamLogonEx</a>	The <b>NetrLogonSamLogonEx</b> method provides an extension to <b>NetrLogonSamLogon</b> that allows for Windows NT LAN Manager (NTLM) pass-through authentication. <a href="#">.&lt;153&gt;</a> Opnum: 39
<a href="#">DsrEnumerateDomainTrusts</a>	The <b>DsrEnumerateDomainTrusts</b> method returns an enumerated list of domain trusts, filtered by a set of flags, from a specified server. <a href="#">.&lt;154&gt;</a>

Method	Description
	Opnum: 40
<a href="#">DsrDeregisterDnsHostRecords</a>	The <b>DsrDeregisterDnsHostRecords</b> method deletes DNS entries, except for type A records registered by a DC. <a href="#">&lt;155&gt;</a> Opnum: 41
<a href="#">NetrServerTrustPasswordsGet</a>	The <b>NetrServerTrustPasswordsGet</b> method returns encrypted passwords for an account on a server. <a href="#">&lt;156&gt;</a> Opnum: 42
<a href="#">DsrGetForestTrustInformation</a>	The <b>DsrGetForestTrustInformation</b> method retrieves the trust information for the forest of the specified domain controller, or for a forest trusted by the forest of the specified DC. <a href="#">&lt;157&gt;</a> Opnum: 43
<a href="#">NetrGetForestTrustInformation</a>	The <b>NetrGetForestTrustInformation</b> method retrieves the trust information for the forest of which the member's domain is itself a member. <a href="#">&lt;158&gt;</a> Opnum: 44
<a href="#">NetrLogonSamLogonWithFlags</a>	The <b>NetrLogonSamLogonWithFlags</b> method handles logon requests for the SAM according to specific property flags. <a href="#">&lt;159&gt;</a> Opnum: 45
<a href="#">NetrServerGetTrustInfo</a>	The <b>NetrServerGetTrustInfo</b> method returns an information block from a specified server. The information includes encrypted passwords for a particular account and trust data. <a href="#">&lt;160&gt;</a> Opnum: 46
OpnumUnused47	Opnum: 47
OpnumUnused48	Opnum: 48
OpnumUnused49	Opnum: 49

Note that gaps in the opnum numbering sequence represent opnums that MUST NOT [<161>](#) be used over the wire.

All methods MUST NOT throw an exception.

The following is a complete list of the Netlogon methods that require a secure channel to be established before they are called by a client. See section [3.1.4.1](#) for information about how to establish a secure channel between the client and the server:

- NetrGetForestTrustInformation
- NetrLogonSamLogon
- NetrLogonSamLogonEx
- NetrLogonSamLogonWithFlags

- NetrLogonSamLogoff
- NetrLogonSendToSam
- NetrServerPasswordSet
- NetrServerPasswordSet2
- NetrServerGetTrustInfo
- NetrServerTrustPasswordsGet
- NetrLogonGetDomainInfo
- NetrLogonDummyRoutine1

### 3.5.5.1 RPC Binding Handles for Netlogon Methods

RPC binding is the process of creating a logical connection between a client and a server. The information that composes the binding between client and server is represented by a structure called a binding handle.

All Netlogon RPC methods accept an RPC binding handle as the first parameter. With the exception of the [NetrLogonSamLogonEx \(section 3.5.5.5.1\)](#) method, which uses an RPC primitive binding handle (see [\[MS-RPCE\]](#) section 3.3.2.3.1), all Netlogon RPC methods use a custom binding handle.

This type is declared as follows:

```
typedef [handle] wchar_t* LOGONSRV_HANDLE;
```

This custom binding handle is a null-terminated Unicode string of the name of the server that receives the call. The server name can be in either the NetBIOS format or the DNS format. It may or may not be prefixed with two backslashes. There is no prescriptive requirement regarding backslashes. It MAY [<162>](#) be NULL, in which case the server is the same as the client (that is, the local machine).

### 3.5.5.2 Determining client privileges

To determine access rights, the client access token is retrieved from the RPC transport, as described for `RpcImpersonationAccessToken` in [\[MS-RPCE\]](#) section 3.3.3.4.3.

Method Access Control Algorithm: During processing of methods that implement access checks, the server implementing this protocol SHOULD perform access security verification on the client's identity, using the algorithm specified by the Access Check Algorithm Pseudo code ([\[MS-DTYP\]](#) section 2.5.3.2). For this protocol, the input parameters of that algorithm are mapped as follows:

- *SecurityDescriptor*: This MUST be the `NetlogonSecurityDescriptor` ADM element.
- *Token / Authorization Context*: This MUST be the identity of the client from the ADM element `RpcImpersonationAccessToken`, retrieved as specified in [\[MS-RPCE\]](#) section 3.3.3.4.3.
- *Access Request mask*: This is specified by each method's processing logic and MUST be one or more of the Access Rights specified previously in section [2.2.1.4.18](#).

- *Object Tree*: This parameter MUST be NULL.
- *PrincipalSelfSubst SID*: This parameter MUST be NULL.

### 3.5.5.3 DC Location Methods

Methods in this group are used to locate a domain controller as outlined in section [1.3](#).

#### 3.5.5.3.1 DsrGetDcNameEx2 (Opnum 34)

The **DsrGetDcNameEx2** method returns information about a domain controller in the specified domain and site.[<163>](#) If the *AccountName* parameter is not NULL, and a DC matching the requested capabilities (as defined in the *Flags* parameter) responds during this method call, then that DC will have verified that the DC account database contains an account for the *AccountName* specified. The server that receives this call is not required to be a DC.

```
NET_API_STATUS DsrGetDcNameEx2(
    [in, unique, string] LOGONSRV_HANDLE ComputerName,
    [in, unique, string] wchar_t* AccountName,
    [in] unsigned long AllowableAccountControlBits,
    [in, unique, string] wchar_t* DomainName,
    [in, unique] GUID* DomainGuid,
    [in, unique, string] wchar_t* SiteName,
    [in] unsigned long Flags,
    [out] PDOMAIN_CONTROLLER_INFO* DomainControllerInfo
);
```

**ComputerName:** The custom RPC binding handle (section [3.5.5.1](#)).

**AccountName:** A null-terminated Unicode string that contains the name of the account that MUST exist and be enabled on the DC.

**AllowableAccountControlBits:** A set of bit flags that list properties of the *AccountName* account. A flag is TRUE (or set) if its value is equal to 1. If the flag is set, then the account MUST have that property; otherwise, the property is ignored. The value is constructed from zero or more bit flags from the following table.

											1										2											3	
0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	0	1		
0	0	0	0	0	0	F	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	E	D	C	0	B	A	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	

Where the bits are defined as:

Value	Description
A	Account for users whose primary account is in another domain. This account provides user access to the domain, but not to any domain that trusts the domain.
B	Normal domain user account.
C	Interdomain trust account.
D	Computer account for a domain member.

Value	Description
E	Computer account for a BDC.
F	Computer account for an RODC. <a href="#">&lt;164&gt;</a>

All other bits MUST be set to zero and MUST be ignored on receipt.

**DomainName:** A null-terminated Unicode string that contains the domain name (3). If the string is NULL or empty (that is, the first character in the string is the null-terminator character), then the primary domain name (3) is assumed.

**DomainGuid:** A pointer to a GUID structure that specifies the GUID of the domain queried. If *DomainGuid* is not NULL and the domain specified by *DomainName* cannot be found, the DC locator attempts to locate a DC in the domain that has the GUID specified by *DomainGuid*. This allows renamed domains to be found by their GUID.

**SiteName:** A null-terminated string that contains the name of the site in which the DC MUST be located.

**Flags:** A set of bit flags that provide additional data that is used to process the request. A flag is TRUE (or set) if its value is equal to 1. The value is constructed from zero or more bit flags from the following table.

0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31
S	R	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	T	Q	P	O	N	M	L	K	J	I	H	G	F	E	D	C	B	O	O	O	A

Where the bits are defined as:

Value	Description
A	The server ignores any cached DC data.
B	The server returns a DC that supports directory service functions.
C	The server first attempts to find a DC that supports directory service functions.
D	The server returns a DC that is a global catalog server for the forest.
E	The server returns a DC that is the PDC for the domain.
F	The server uses cached DC data if available, even if the cached data is expired.
G	The server returns a DC that has an IP (either IPv4 or IPv6) address.
H	The server returns a DC that is currently running the Kerberos Key Distribution Center service.
I	The server returns a DC that is currently running the Windows Time Service.
J	The server returns a DC that is writable.
K	The server first attempts to find a DC that is a reliable time server. If a reliable time server is unavailable, the server returns a DC that is currently running the Windows Time

Value	Description
	Service.
L	The server returns a different DC in the domain, if one exists.
M	The server returns a server that is an LDAP server. The server MAY return a DC.
N	Specifies that the <i>DomainName</i> parameter is a NetBIOS name.
O	Specifies that the <i>DomainName</i> parameter is a DNS name.
P	The server attempts to find a DC in the next closest site, if a DC in the closest site is not available. If a DC in the next closest site is also not available, the server returns any available DC. <a href="#">&lt;165&gt;</a>
Q	The server returns a DC that has a DC functional level of DS_BEHAVIOR_WIN2008 or greater, as specified in <a href="#">[MS-ADTS]</a> section 7.1.4.2.
R	Specifies that the names returned in the <b>DomainControllerName</b> and <b>DomainName</b> fields of <i>DomainControllerInfo</i> are DNS names.
S	Specifies that the names returned in the <b>DomainControllerName</b> and <b>DomainName</b> fields of <i>DomainControllerInfo</i> are NetBIOS names.
T	The server returns a DC that is currently running the Active Directory Web Service.

All other bits MUST be set to zero. The server MUST return ERROR\_INVALID\_FLAGS if any of the unspecified bits are not zero.

**DomainControllerInfo:** A pointer to a [DOMAIN\\_CONTROLLER\\_INFOW](#) structure (section [2.2.1.2.1](#)) containing data about the DC.

**Return Values:** The method returns 0x00000000 on success; otherwise, it returns a nonzero error code.

On receiving this call, the server MUST perform the following *Flags* parameter validations:

- Flags D, E, and H MUST NOT be combined with each other.
- Flag N MUST NOT be combined with the O flag.
- Flag R MUST NOT be combined with the S flag.
- Flag Q MUST NOT be combined with the B flag.
- Flag K MUST NOT be combined with any of the flags: B, C, D, E, or H.
- Flag P MUST NOT be set when the SiteName parameter is provided.

The server MUST return ERROR\_INVALID\_FLAGS for any of the previously mentioned conflicting combinations.

Additionally, the server MUST perform the following parameter validations:

- If the flag D is set and *DomainName* parameter is neither NULL nor empty, the *DomainName* is a valid NetBIOS name format or a fully qualified domain name (FQDN) (2) format, and the *DomainName* is not FQDN(2) or NetBIOS name of a trusted forest, then the server MUST return

ERROR\_NO\_SUCH\_DOMAIN. To determine the list of trusted forests, and their FQDN(2) and NetBIOS names, the server MUST use the **TrustedDomains** ADM. The domains from this collection that have the C bit set in the *Flags* field represent the trusted forests.

- If the flag N is set and *DomainName* parameter is neither NULL nor empty and the *DomainName* is NOT a valid NetBIOS name format, then the server MUST return ERROR\_INVALID\_DOMAINNAME.
- If the flag O is set and *DomainName* parameter is neither NULL nor empty and the *DomainName* is NOT a valid fully qualified domain name (FQDN) (2) format, then the server MUST return ERROR\_INVALID\_DOMAINNAME.
- If neither the N flag nor the O flag are specified and *DomainName* parameter is neither NULL nor empty, then the server MUST return ERROR\_INVALID\_DOMAINNAME if the *DomainName* is neither a valid NetBIOS name format nor a valid fully qualified domain name (FQDN) (2) format.

If the A bit in *Flags* is not set, then the server SHOULD attempt to use the **LocatedDCsCache** and **FailedDiscoveryCache** if it has them, even if the F bit in *Flags* is not set. The process for this is as follows:

- If there is no entry for the requested domain in **LocatedDCsCache**, then check if it exists in **FailedDiscoveryCache**. If an entry is found in **FailedDiscoveryCache**, then find the delta between the current time and the last failure time for that cache entry. If this delta is less than **FailedDiscoveryCachePeriod**, the server SHOULD return an error.
- If there is an entry for the requested domain in **LocatedDCsCache**, but its capabilities do not include the requested capabilities, then invalidate the cached entry and attempt to locate a DC as described below.
- If the delta between the current time and the creation time for the entry in **LocatedDCsCache** is greater than the **CacheEntryValidityPeriod** and the F bit in the *Flags* is not set, then invalidate the cached entry and attempt to locate a DC as described below.
- If the difference between the current time and the refresh time for the entry in **LocatedDCsCache** is greater than **CacheEntryPingValidityPeriod**, then the server MUST send a ping message to the DC prior to returning the value. The ping mechanism to be used, whether LDAP Ping ([MS-ADTS] section 7.3.3) or Mailslot Ping ([MS-ADTS] section 7.3.5), is determined based on the N and O bit settings in the *Flags*, as described below. If a ping of the DC fails, then it MUST invalidate the cache entry and attempt to locate a DC as described below. Otherwise update the refresh time and return the cached result.

The server MUST attempt to locate a domain controller for the domain specified by the client. The server MAY<166> implement alternate means of locating a DC: for example, a static list in a file, or the two methods detailed in "Locating a Domain Controller" in [MS-ADTS] section 7.3.6.

If the *ComputerName* parameter is not NULL, then it is compared against the server's <Computer Name> ([MS-WSQ] section 5.1). If the server is not a DC (section 3.1.4.8) and the *ComputerName* parameter does not match the server's <Computer Name>, the server MUST return STATUS\_INVALID\_COMPUTER\_NAME. If the *ComputerName* parameter matches the server's <Computer Name>, the *ComputerName* parameter is NULL, or the server is a DC, then processing proceeds.

The server can use the DC location protocol ([MS-ADTS] section 7.3.6) to locate a DC (the located DC is known as the responding DC). There are two methods of locating a DC that the DC location protocol supports. One of the methods involves the DNS-based discovery mechanism and the LDAP ping message, and the other method involves the mailslot datagram message.

If the N bit is set in the *Flags* parameter, the mailslot message MUST be sent.

If the O bit is set in the *Flags* parameter, the DNS-based discovery MUST be performed and the LDAP message MUST be sent.

If neither the N bit nor the O bit are specified, then:

- If the *DomainName* parameter is a fully qualified domain name (FQDN) (2) with more than one label (as specified in [\[RFC1034\]](#)), or if the **AllowSingleLabelDNSDomain** field is TRUE and the *DomainName* parameter is a fully qualified domain name (FQDN) (2) with a single label, then a DNS-based discovery SHOULD be attempted and an LDAP message SHOULD be sent.
- If the *DomainName* parameter is a syntactically valid NetBIOS name (as specified in [\[MS-NBTE\]](#)), then the mailslot message MUST be sent.

If the DNS-based discovery is performed, the server identifies the candidate DCs by performing DNS SRV queries as follows:

1. Based on the value of the B, D, E, H, and M bits in the *Flags* parameter, the appropriate query is selected from those listed in [\[MS-ADTS\]](#) section 7.3.6. Other bits specified in the *Flags* parameter do not contribute to the selection of this query but are used to validate against the capabilities published in the ping response. The table below shows the specific query that is used for the different valid combinations of these bits:

Bits specified	Non site-specific query	Site-specific query
B=0/1, D=0, E=1, H=0, M=0/1	_ldap._tcp.pdc._msdcs.<domainname>	N/A
B=0/1, D=0, E=0, H=1, M=0/1	_kerberos._tcp.dc._msdcs.<domainname>	_kerberos._tcp.<sitename>._sites.dc._msdcs.<domainname>
B=0/1, D=1, E=0, H=0, M=1	_gc._tcp.<forestname>	_gc._tcp.<sitename>._sites.<forestname>
B=0/1, D=0, E=0, H=0, M=1	_ldap._tcp.<domainname>	_ldap._tcp.<sitename>._sites.<domainname>
B=0/1, D=1, E=0, H=0, M=0	_gc._tcp.dc._msdcs.<forestname>	_gc._tcp.<sitename>._sites.dc._msdcs.<forestname>
B=0/1,	_ldap._tcp.dc._msdcs.<domainname>	_ldap._tcp.<sitename>._sites.dc._msdcs.<domainname>



Bits specified	Non site-specific query	Site-specific query
D=0, E=0, H=0, M=0	>	me>

2. If the *SiteName* parameter is not NULL, the server MUST attempt a site-specific query. For example, if the request is to locate a **Key Distribution Center (KDC)**, the following query is used: `_kerberos._tcp.<SiteName>._sites.dc._msdcs.<DomainName>`.
3. If the *SiteName* parameter is NULL, the server MUST attempt to first use a site-specific query for the **SiteName** (ADM element) site where applicable. For example, if the request is to locate a KDC, the following query is used: `_kerberos._tcp.<SiteName>._sites.dc._msdcs.<DomainName>`. If the site-specific query does not result in any candidate domain controllers, or if the candidate domain controllers are not reachable via LDAP ping (described below), and if the P bit in the *Flags* parameter is set, and if **NextClosestSiteName** (ADM element) is not NULL, then the server MUST attempt to locate a DC in the next closest site by performing a site-specific query for **NextClosestSiteName**. If a DC in the next closest site is not available, or if the P bit in the *Flags* parameter was not set, or if **NextClosestSiteName** was NULL, the server MUST return any available DC, using a non-site-specific query to determine the candidate domain controllers. Using the same KDC example as before, the following non-site-specific query is used: `_kerberos._tcp.dc._mcdcs.<DomainName>`.

In either mechanism (described in [\[MS-ADTS\]](#) section 7.3.6), multiple candidate DCs can be discovered. The candidate DCs are pinged to determine availability and ability to satisfy the specified requirements.

The LDAP/maillslot ping messages are constructed as follows:

When using the LDAP ping method ([\[MS-ADTS\]](#) section 7.3.3), the server MUST set the parameters of the LDAP message as follows:

- The **DnsDomain** field of the message is set to the *DomainName* parameter of the **DsrGetDcNameEx2** call. If *DomainName* is NULL, the **DnsDomain** field of the message is set to **DnsDomainName** (section [3.5.1](#)).
- The **Host** field of the message is set to the *ComputerName* that is sending the message.
- The **User** field of the message is not set.
- The **AAC** field of the message is not set.
- The **DomainSid** field of the message is not set.
- If the **DomainGuid** parameter of the **DsrGetDcNameEx2** is not NULL, the **DomainGuid** field of the message is set to the *DomainGuid* parameter, else the **DomainGuid** field of the message is not set.

When using the maillslot ping method ([\[MS-ADTS\]](#) section 7.3.5), the server MUST set the parameters of the maillslot message as follows:

- The **UnicodeComputerName** field of the message is set to the *ComputerName* that is sending the message.

- The **UnicodeUserName** field of the message is not set.
- The **AllowableAccountControlBits** field of the message is not set.
- The **DomainSidSize** field of the message is set to 0x00000000.
- The **DomainSid** field of the message is not set.
- The **DomainGuid** field of the message is not set.

If the *AccountName* parameter is specified, the server MUST perform the following additional processing that is described in detail in [MS-ADTS]:

- The LDAP and mailslot query message fields are set as specified in [MS-ADTS] sections [7.3.3](#) and [7.3.5](#), except for the following:
  - LDAP ping message:
    - The **User** field of the message is set to the value of the *AccountName* parameter.
    - The **AAC** field of the message is mapped from the *AllowableAccountControlBits* parameter, according to the table in [MS-SAMR] section 3.1.5.14.2, where the "ProtocolUserAccountControl" column defines the **AAC** field while the "DatabaseUserAccountControl" column defines the *AllowableAccountControlBits*.
  - Mailslot message:
    - The **UnicodeUserName** field of the message is set to the value of the *AccountName* parameter.
    - The **AllowableAccountControlBits** field of the message is mapped from the *AllowableAccountControlBits* parameter, according to the table in [MS-SAMR] section 3.1.5.14.2, where the "ProtocolUserAccountControl" column defines the **AAC** field while the "DatabaseUserAccountControl" column defines the *AllowableAccountControlBits*.

LDAP/Mailslot ping responses from the candidate DCs are processed (in the order in which they are received) along with the flags to determine if the server queried meets all of the requirements, until a server that meets the requirements is found or an implementation-specific timeout is reached.

If the B bit in the *Flags* is set, then the server MUST return a DC that supports directory service functions. [<167>](#) To determine if a domain controller meets this requirement, the server must check the value of the **NETLOGON\_SAM\_LOGON\_RESPONSE.NtVersion** field in the message and ensure that NETLOGON\_NT\_VERSION\_5 or greater is specified. If a server that meets this requirement cannot be located, the server MUST return ERROR\_NO\_SUCH\_DOMAIN.

If the C bit in the *Flags* is set, then the service MUST first attempt to find a DC that supports directory service functions. [<168>](#) To determine if a domain controller meets this requirement, the server must check the value of the **NETLOGON\_SAM\_LOGON\_RESPONSE.NtVersion** field in the message and ensure that NETLOGON\_NT\_VERSION\_5 or greater is specified. If a DC that supports the directory service functions is not available, the server MUST return the name of a non-directory service DC.

If the D bit in the *Flags* is set, then the server MUST return a DC that is a global catalog server for the forest of domains. To determine if a domain controller is a global catalog server, the server MUST check the value of the FG bit in the *Flags* field of the message as defined in [\[MS-ADTS\]](#) section 7.3.1.2.

If the E bit in the *Flags* is set, then the server MUST return a DC that is the PDC for the domain. To determine if a domain controller is a primary domain controller the server MUST check the value of the FP bit in the *Flags* field of the message as defined in [\[MS-ADTS\]](#) section 7.3.1.2. If a server that meets this requirement cannot be located, the server MUST return ERROR\_NO\_SUCH\_DOMAIN.

If the G bit in the *Flags* is set, then the server MUST return a DC that has an IP (either IPv4 or IPv6) address. The IP address can be verified by examining the **DcIpAddress** field of the NETLOGON\_SAM\_LOGON\_RESPONSE message or the **DcSockAddr** field of the NETLOGON\_SAM\_LOGON\_RESPONSE\_EX message. If a server that meets this requirement cannot be located, the server MUST return ERROR\_NO\_SUCH\_DOMAIN.

If the H bit in the *Flags* is set, then the server MUST return a DC that is currently running the Kerberos Key Distribution Center service. To determine if a domain controller is currently running the Kerberos Key Distribution Center service, the server MUST check the value of the FK bit in the **Flags** field of the message as defined in [\[MS-ADTS\]](#) section 7.3.1.2. If a server that meets this requirement cannot be located, the server MUST return ERROR\_NO\_SUCH\_DOMAIN.

If the I bit in the *Flags* is set, then the server MUST return a DC that is currently running the Windows Time Service. To determine if a domain controller is currently running an [MS-SNTP](#) implementation, the server MUST check the value of the FT bit in the *Flags* field of the message as defined in [\[MS-ADTS\]](#) section 7.3.1.2. If a server that meets this requirement cannot be located, the server MUST return ERROR\_NO\_SUCH\_DOMAIN.

If the J bit in the *Flags* is set, then the server MUST return a DC that is writable. [<169>](#) To determine if a domain controller is writable, the server MUST check the value of the FW bit in the *Flags* field of the message as defined in [\[MS-ADTS\]](#) section 7.3.1.2. If a server that meets this requirement cannot be located, the server MUST return ERROR\_NO\_SUCH\_DOMAIN.

If the K bit in the *Flags* is set, then the server returns a DC that is a reliable time server. If a reliable time server is unavailable, the server returns a DC that is a time server. To determine whether a domain controller is a reliable time server, the server MUST check the value of the FGT bit in the **Flags** field of the message as defined in [\[MS-ADTS\]](#) section 7.3.1.2. To determine whether a domain controller is a time server, the server MUST check the value of the FT bit in the **Flags** field of the message as defined in [\[MS-ADTS\]](#) section 7.3.1.2. If a domain controller that meets either of these requirements cannot be located, the server MUST return ERROR\_NO\_SUCH\_DOMAIN.

If the L bit in the **Flags** is set, then the server MUST return a DC in the domain other than the server, if one exists. This flag is ignored if the recipient is not running as a DC.

If the M bit in the *Flags* is set, then the server MUST return an LDAP server. To determine if a domain controller is an LDAP server, the server MUST check the value of the FL bit in the **Flags** field of the message as defined in [\[MS-ADTS\]](#) section 7.3.1.2. The server MAY return a DC. No other services are required to be present on the server returned. The server MAY return a server that has a writable config container or a writable schema container. If the D bit in the **Flags** is set, the server returned MUST be an LDAP server and a global catalog server, and may be a DC. No other services are implied to be present at the server. If this flag is specified, the B, C, E, H, I, J, and T bits in the **Flags** are ignored along with their respective processing requirements.

If the Q bit in **Flags** is set, then the server MUST return a DC that has a functional level of DS\_BEHAVIOR\_WIN2008 or greater. To determine the functional level of a DC, the server must locate the DC's nTDSDSA object in the directory and verify the **msDS-Behavior-Version** attribute as specified in [\[MS-ADTS\]](#) section 7.1.4.2.

If the T bit in the *Flags* is set, then the server MUST return a DC that is currently running the Active Directory Web Service. [<170>](#) To determine if a domain controller is currently running the Active Directory Web Service, the server MUST check the value of the FWS bit in the *Flags* field of the

message as defined in [\[MS-ADTS\]](#) section 7.3.1.2. If a server that meets this requirement cannot be located, the server MUST return ERROR\_NO\_SUCH\_DOMAIN.

NETLOGON\_SAM\_LOGON\_RESPONSE\_EX ([\[MS-ADTS\]](#) section 7.3.1.9) and NETLOGON\_SAM\_LOGON\_RESPONSE ([\[MS-ADTS\]](#) section 7.3.1.8) messages are received from a DC in response to the LDAP and the mailslot messages, respectively. Using these response messages, the **DsrGetDcNameEx2** populates the returned DOMAIN\_CONTROLLER\_INFO structure (section [2.2.1.2.1](#)) as follows:

- The **DnsHostName**, **DnsDomainName**, **NetbiosComputerName**, and **NetbiosDomainName** fields are compressed and MUST be decompressed as described in [\[MS-ADTS\]](#) section 7.3.7.
- If the R flag is set in the *Flags* parameter:
  - The **DomainControllerInfo.DomainControllerName** field MUST be set to the value of the **DnsHostName** message field. If the **DnsHostName** field is not set in the message, the error ERROR\_NO\_SUCH\_DOMAIN MUST be returned.
  - The **DomainControllerInfo.DomainName** field MUST be set to the value of the **DnsDomainName** message field. If the **DnsDomainName** field is not set in the message, the error ERROR\_NO\_SUCH\_DOMAIN MUST be returned.
- If the S flag is set in the *Flags* parameter:
  - The **DomainControllerInfo.DomainControllerName** field MUST be set to the value of the **NetbiosComputerName** message field.
  - The **DomainControllerInfo.DomainName** field MUST be set to the value of the **NetbiosDomainName** message field.
- If neither the R nor S flags are set in the *Flags* parameter: [<171>](#)
  - The **DomainControllerInfo.DomainControllerName** field MUST be set to either the value of the **DnsHostName** message field, or to the value of the **NetbiosComputerName** message field. [<172>](#)
  - The **DomainControllerInfo.DomainName** field MUST be set to either the value of the **DnsDomainName** message field, or to the value of the **NetbiosDomainName** message field. [<173>](#)
- If the IP address of the DC to which the message was sent is known from the underlying transport protocol, the **DomainControllerInfo.DomainControllerAddress** field MUST be set to that address. Otherwise, the field SHOULD be set from the value of the **NETLOGON\_SAM\_LOGON\_RESPONSE\_EX.DcSockAddr** message field if the **NETLOGON\_SAM\_LOGON\_RESPONSE\_EX.DcSockAddrSize** message field is not zero.
- If the IP address of the DC is not available because the aforementioned conditions are not met, the **DomainControllerInfo.DomainControllerAddress** field MUST be set to the **NETLOGON\_SAM\_LOGON\_RESPONSE\_EX.NetbiosComputerName** field.
- The **DomainControllerInfo.DomainControllerAddressType** field MUST be set to 0x00000001 if the **DomainControllerAddress** field is set to the IP address of the DC. Otherwise, the **DomainControllerInfo.DomainControllerAddressType** field MUST be set to 0x00000002 for a NETBIOS name.

- The **DomainControllerInfo.DomainGuid** field MUST be set to the **NETLOGON\_SAM\_LOGON\_RESPONSE.DomainGuid** or the **NETLOGON\_SAM\_LOGON\_RESPONSE\_EX.DomainGuid** field.
- The **DomainControllerInfo.DnsForestName** field MUST be set to the value of the **NETLOGON\_SAM\_LOGON\_RESPONSE.DnsForestName** or the **NETLOGON\_SAM\_LOGON\_RESPONSE\_EX.DnsForestName** fields if they are present, or to NULL if the **NETLOGON\_SAM\_LOGON\_RESPONSE.DnsForestName** and the **NETLOGON\_SAM\_LOGON\_RESPONSE\_EX.DnsForestName** fields are not present.
- The **DomainControllerInfo.Flags** field MUST be set to the value of the **NETLOGON\_SAM\_LOGON\_RESPONSE.Flags** or the **NETLOGON\_SAM\_LOGON\_RESPONSE\_EX.Flags** field. Additionally, the following flags are set in the **DomainControllerInfo.Flags** field:
  - The flag M MUST be set if the **DomainControllerInfo.DomainControllerName** field is set to the fully qualified domain name (FQDN) (1) of the DC.
  - The flag N MUST be set if the **DomainControllerInfo.DomainName** field is set to the fully qualified domain name (FQDN) (2) of the domain.
  - The flag O MUST be set if the **DomainControllerInfo.DnsForestName** field is set.
- The **DomainControllerInfo.DcSiteName** field MUST be set to the value of the **NETLOGON\_SAM\_LOGON\_RESPONSE\_EX.DcSiteName** field if it is present, or to NULL if the **NETLOGON\_SAM\_LOGON\_RESPONSE\_EX.DcSiteName** field is not present.
- The **DomainControllerInfo.ClientSiteName** field MUST be set to the value of the **NETLOGON\_SAM\_LOGON\_RESPONSE\_EX.ClientSiteName** field if it is present, or to NULL if the **NETLOGON\_SAM\_LOGON\_RESPONSE\_EX.ClientSiteName** field is not present.
  - If the **NETLOGON\_SAM\_LOGON\_RESPONSE\_EX.NextClosestSiteName** field is present, the value MUST be saved in the **NextClosestSiteName** ADM element.

If a satisfactory **NETLOGON\_SAM\_LOGON\_RESPONSE\_NT40** ([\[MS-ADTS\]](#) section 7.3.1.7) response message is received from a Windows NT 4.0 DC in response to the mailslot messages, the **DsrGetDcNameEx2** call populates the returned **DOMAIN\_CONTROLLER\_INFOW** structure (section [2.2.1.2.1](#)) as follows:

- The **DomainControllerInfo.DomainControllerName** field MUST be set to the **NETLOGON\_SAM\_LOGON\_RESPONSE\_NT40.UnicodeLogonServer** field.
- The **DomainControllerInfo.DomainControllerAddress** field MUST be set to the **NETLOGON\_SAM\_LOGON\_RESPONSE\_NT40.UnicodeLogonServer** field.
- The **DomainControllerInfo.DomainControllerAddressType** field MUST be set to 0x00000002.
- The **DomainControllerInfo.DomainGuid** field MUST be set to NULL.
- The **DomainControllerInfo.DomainName** field MUST be set to the **NETLOGON\_SAM\_LOGON\_RESPONSE\_NT40.UnicodeLogonServer** field.
- The **DomainControllerInfo.DnsForestName** field MUST be set to NULL.
- The **DomainControllerInfo.Flags** field MUST have the A and H flags set if the response is to a PDC query; otherwise it MUST be set to 0x00000000.

- The **DomainControllerInfo.DcSiteName** field MUST be set to NULL.
- The **DomainControllerInfo.ClientSiteName** field MUST be set to NULL.

If the *AccountName* parameter is not NULL, the response message validation adds the following check: if the DC response is received indicating the lack of an account, as specified in [MS-ADTS] sections [7.3.3](#) and [7.3.5](#), the server MUST return ERROR\_NO\_SUCH\_USER.

If the server successfully locates a DC for the requested capabilities, then it SHOULD save the result in the **LocatedDCsCache**. If a DC for the domain cannot be located, then the server SHOULD save the result in the **FailedDiscoveryCache**.

### 3.5.5.3.2 DsrGetDcNameEx (Opnum 27)

The **DsrGetDcNameEx** method [<174>](#) is a predecessor to the [DsrGetDcNameEx2 \(section 3.5.5.3.1\)](#) method. The method returns information about a domain controller in the specified domain and site. All parameters of this method have the same meanings as the identically named parameters of the **DsrGetDcNameEx2** method.

```
NET_API_STATUS DsrGetDcNameEx (
    [in, unique, string] LOGONSRV_HANDLE ComputerName,
    [in, unique, string] wchar_t* DomainName,
    [in, unique] GUID* DomainGuid,
    [in, unique, string] wchar_t* SiteName,
    [in] unsigned long Flags,
    [out] PDOMAIN_CONTROLLER_INFO* DomainControllerInfo
);
```

On receiving this call, the server MUST perform all of the processing done on receiving the **DsrGetDcNameEx2** call, except that any processing specific to the *AccountName* and *AllowableAccountControlBits* parameters is ignored. This function MUST be processed as if the *AccountName* and *AllowableControlBits* parameters were not specified.

### 3.5.5.3.3 DsrGetDcName (Opnum 20)

The **DsrGetDcName** method [<175>](#) is a predecessor to the [DsrGetDcNameEx2](#) method (section [3.5.5.3.1](#)). The method returns information about a domain controller in the specified domain. All parameters of this method have the same meanings as the identically named parameters of the **DsrGetDcNameEx2** method, except for the *SiteGuid* parameter, detailed as follows.

```
NET_API_STATUS DsrGetDcName (
    [in, unique, string] LOGONSRV_HANDLE ComputerName,
    [in, unique, string] wchar_t* DomainName,
    [in, unique] GUID* DomainGuid,
    [in, unique] GUID* SiteGuid,
    [in] unsigned long Flags,
    [out] PDOMAIN_CONTROLLER_INFO* DomainControllerInfo
);
```

**SiteGuid:** This parameter MUST be NULL and ignored upon receipt.

The **DsrGetDcName** call accepts the *SiteGuid* parameter instead of the *SiteName* parameter of the **DsrGetDcNameEx** call. On receiving this call, the server MUST perform all of the processing done on receiving the **DsrGetDcNameEx** call.

### 3.5.5.3.4 NetrGetDCName (Opnum 11)

The **NetrGetDCName** method [<176>](#) retrieves the NetBIOS name of the PDC for the specified domain.

```
NET_API_STATUS NetrGetDCName(  
    [in, string] LOGONSRV_HANDLE ServerName,  
    [in, unique, string] wchar_t* DomainName,  
    [out, string] wchar_t** Buffer  
);
```

**ServerName:** The custom RPC binding handle, as specified in section [3.5.5.1](#), that represents the connection to a domain controller.

**DomainName:** A null-terminated Unicode string that specifies the NetBIOS name of the domain.

**Buffer:** A pointer to a null-terminated Unicode string that contains the NetBIOS name of the PDC for the specified domain. The server name returned by this method is prefixed by two backslashes (\\).

**Return Values:** The method returns 0x00000000 on success; otherwise, it returns a nonzero error code. [<177>](#)

If the *DomainName* parameter is not NULL and is not a valid NetBIOS name format, the server MUST return NERR\_DCNotFound.

The server MUST attempt to locate a PDC for the domain specified by the client. The server MUST return NERR\_DCNotFound if the PDC could not be located for the specified domain. The server MAY [<178>](#) implement alternate means of locating DCs: for example, a static list in a file, or two methods detailed in [\[MS-ADTS\]](#) section 7.3.6.

**NetrGetDcName** returns the name of the discovered PDC.

### 3.5.5.3.5 NetrGetAnyDCName (Opnum 13)

The **NetrGetAnyDCName** method [<179>](#) retrieves the name of a domain controller in the specified primary or directly trusted domain. Only DCs can return the name of a DC in a specified directly trusted domain.

```
NET_API_STATUS NetrGetAnyDCName(  
    [in, unique, string] LOGONSRV_HANDLE ServerName,  
    [in, unique, string] wchar_t* DomainName,  
    [out, string] wchar_t** Buffer  
);
```

**ServerName:** The custom RPC binding handle, as specified in section [3.5.5.1](#).

**DomainName:** A null-terminated Unicode string that contains the name of the primary or directly trusted domain. If the string is NULL or empty (that is, the first character in the string is the null-terminator character), the primary domain name (3) is assumed.

**Buffer:** A pointer to an allocated buffer that contains the null-terminated Unicode string containing the NetBIOS name of a DC in the specified domain. The DC name is prefixed by two backslashes (\\).



**Return Values:** The method returns 0x00000000 on success; otherwise, it returns a nonzero error code. [<180>](#)

The server MUST attempt to locate a DC for the domain specified by the client. The server MAY [<181>](#) implement alternate means to locate domain controllers: for example, a static list in a file, or the two methods detailed in [\[MS-ADTS\]](#) section 7.3.6. If the server that receives this call is the PDC for the domain specified in *DomainName*, the server MUST return `ERROR_NO_SUCH_DOMAIN`.

If the *ServerName* parameter is not a valid binding handle (as described in section [3.5.5.1](#)), the server MUST return `ERROR_INVALID_COMPUTERNAME`.

This method also returns errors based on Common Error Processing Rule E, specified in section [3](#).

**NetrGetAnyDcName** returns the name of the discovered DC.

### 3.5.5.3.6 DsrGetSiteName (Opnum 28)

The **DsrGetSiteName** method [<182>](#) returns the site name for the specified computer that receives this call.

```
NET_API_STATUS DsrGetSiteName(  
    [in, unique, string] LOGONSRV_HANDLE ComputerName,  
    [out, string] wchar_t** SiteName  
);
```

**ComputerName:** The custom RPC binding handle (section [3.5.5.1](#)).

**SiteName:** A null-terminated Unicode string that contains the name of the site in which the computer that receives this call resides.

**Return Values:** The method returns 0x00000000 on success; otherwise, it returns a nonzero error code. [<183>](#)

If the computer has been configured with a *SiteName*, it MUST return the *SiteName* immediately.

If the *DynamicSiteNameSetTime* plus the *DynamicSiteNameTimeout* is less than the current time (meaning that the *DynamicSiteNameSetTime* is older than allowed by *DynamicSiteNameTimeout*), then:

- The server MUST locate a domain controller in the domain. The server MAY [<184>](#) implement alternate means to locate DCs: for example, a static list in a file, or the two methods detailed in [\[MS-ADTS\]](#) section 7.3.6. If the server cannot locate a DC for the domain, then the server MUST return `ERROR_NO_SUCH_DOMAIN`.
- The server then populates the *SiteName* parameter with the `NETLOGON_SAM_LOGON_RESPONSE_EX` message ([\[MS-ADTS\]](#) section 7.3.1.9) by setting the *SiteName* parameter to `NETLOGON_SAM_LOGON_RESPONSE_EX.ClientSiteName`. The server stores the discovered site name in **DynamicSiteName**.
- The server sets the *DynamicSiteNameSetTime* to the current time.

Otherwise, **DynamicSiteName** MUST be returned immediately as the *SiteName* parameter.

If it is determined that the server that receives this call has no site name, the server MUST return `ERROR_NO_SITENAME`.



This method also returns errors based on Common Error Processing Rules B and C, specified in section [3](#).

### 3.5.5.3.7 DsrGetDcSiteCoverageW (Opnum 38)

The **DsrGetDcSiteCoverageW** method [<185>](#) returns a list of sites covered by a domain controller. Site coverage is detailed in [\[MS-ADTS\]](#) section 7.1.1.2.2.

```
NET_API_STATUS DsrGetDcSiteCoverageW(  
    [in, unique, string] LOGONSRV_HANDLE ServerName,  
    [out] PNL_SITE_NAME_ARRAY* SiteNames  
);
```

**ServerName:** The custom RPC binding handle (section [3.5.5.1](#)) that represents the connection to a DC.

**SiteNames:** A pointer to an [NL\\_SITE\\_NAME\\_ARRAY](#) structure (section [2.2.1.2.2](#)) that contains an array of site name strings.

**Return Values:** The method returns 0x00000000 on success; otherwise, it returns a nonzero error code.

This method returns errors based on Common Error Processing Rules A and B, specified in section [3](#).

The server MUST return all the sites for which the DC publishes site-specific DNS SRV records ([\[MS-ADTS\]](#) section 7.3.2.3).

### 3.5.5.3.8 DsrAddressToSiteNamesW (Opnum 33)

The **DsrAddressToSiteNamesW** method [<186>](#) translates a list of socket addresses into their corresponding site names. For information about the mapping from socket address to subnet/site name, see [\[MS-ADTS\]](#) sections [7.1.1.2.2.1](#) and [7.1.1.2.2.2](#).

```
NET_API_STATUS DsrAddressToSiteNamesW(  
    [in, unique, string] LOGONSRV_HANDLE ComputerName,  
    [in, range(0, 32000)] DWORD EntryCount,  
    [in, size_is(EntryCount)] PNL_SOCKET_ADDRESS SocketAddresses,  
    [out] PNL_SITE_NAME_ARRAY* SiteNames  
);
```

**ComputerName:** The custom RPC binding handle (section [3.5.5.1](#)) that represents the connection to a domain controller.

**EntryCount:** The number of socket addresses specified in *SocketAddresses*. The maximum value for *EntryCount* is 32000. The limit was chosen to prevent clients from being able to force large memory allocations on servers.

**SocketAddresses:** An array of [NL\\_SOCKET\\_ADDRESS](#) structures (section [2.2.1.2.4](#)) that contains socket addresses to translate. The number of addresses specified MUST be equal to *EntryCount*.

**SiteNames:** A pointer to an [NL\\_SITE\\_NAME\\_ARRAY](#) structure (section [2.2.1.2.2](#)) that contains a corresponding array of site names. The number of entries returned is equal to *EntryCount*. An entry is returned as NULL if the corresponding socket address does not map to

any site, or if the address family of the socket address is not IPV4 or IPV6. The mapping of IP addresses to sites is specified in [\[MS-ADTS\]](#) section 7.1.1.2.2.1.

**Return Values:** The method returns 0x00000000 on success; otherwise, it returns a nonzero error code. [<187>](#)

This method returns errors based on Common Error Processing Rule A, specified in section [3](#).

The server MUST return the site names that correspond to the *SocketAddresses* parameter by using the method specified for IP address and site/subnet mapping ([\[MS-ADTS\]](#) section 7.1.1.2.2.2.1).

### 3.5.5.3.9 DsrAddressToSiteNamesExW (Opnum 37)

The **DsrAddressToSiteNamesExW** method [<188>](#) translates a list of socket addresses into their corresponding site names and subnet names. For information about the mapping from socket address to subnet/site name, see [\[MS-ADTS\]](#) sections [7.1.1.2.2.1](#) and [7.1.1.2.2.2](#).

```
NET_API_STATUS DsrAddressToSiteNamesExW(  
    [in, unique, string] LOGONSRV_HANDLE ComputerName,  
    [in, range(0, 32000)] DWORD EntryCount,  
    [in, size_is(EntryCount)] PNL_SOCKET_ADDRESS SocketAddresses,  
    [out] PNL_SITE_NAME_EX_ARRAY* SiteNames  
);
```

**ComputerName:** The custom RPC binding handle (section [3.5.5.1](#)) that represents the connection to a domain controller.

**EntryCount:** The number of socket addresses specified in *SocketAddresses*. The maximum value for *EntryCount* is 32000. [<189>](#)

**SocketAddresses:** An array of [NL\\_SOCKET\\_ADDRESS](#) structures (section [2.2.1.2.4](#)) that contains socket addresses to translate. The number of addresses specified MUST be equal to *EntryCount*.

**SiteNames:** A pointer to an [NL\\_SITE\\_NAME\\_EX\\_ARRAY](#) structure (section [2.2.1.2.3](#)) that contains an array of site names and an array of subnet names that correspond to socket addresses in *SocketAddresses*. The number of entries returned is equal to *EntryCount*. An entry is returned as NULL if the corresponding socket address does not map to any site, or if the address family of the socket address is not IPV4 or IPV6. The mapping of IP addresses to sites is specified in [\[MS-ADTS\]](#) section 7.1.1.2.2.1.

**Return Values:** The method returns 0x00000000 on success; otherwise, it returns a nonzero error code. [<190>](#)

This method returns errors based on Common Error Processing Rule A, specified in section [3](#).

The server MUST return the site and subnet names that correspond to the *SocketAddresses* by using the method specified for IP address and site/subnet mapping ([\[MS-ADTS\]](#) section 7.1.1.2.2.2.1).

### 3.5.5.3.10 DsrDeregisterDnsHostRecords (Opnum 41)

The **DsrDeregisterDnsHostRecords** method [<191>](#) deletes all of the DNS SRV records registered by a specified domain controller. For the list of SRV records that a domain registers, see [\[MS-ADTS\]](#) section 7.3.2.3, "SRV Records Registered by DC".

```

NET_API_STATUS DsrDeregisterDnsHostRecords(
    [in, unique, string] LOGONSRV_HANDLE ServerName,
    [in, unique, string] wchar_t* DnsDomainName,
    [in, unique] GUID* DomainGuid,
    [in, unique] GUID* DsaGuid,
    [in, string] wchar_t* DnsHostName
);

```

**ServerName:** The custom RPC binding handle, as specified in section [3.5.5.1](#), that represents the connection to the DC.

**DnsDomainName:** A null-terminated Unicode string that specifies the fully qualified domain name (FQDN) (2).

**DomainGuid:** A pointer to the domain GUID. If the value is not NULL, the DNS SRV record of type \_ldap.\_tcp.DomainGuid.domains.\_msdcs.DnsDomainName is also deregistered.

**DsaGuid:** A pointer to the objectGUID of the DC's NTDSDSA object. For information about the NTDSDSA object, see [\[MS-ADTS\]](#) section 7.1.1.2.2.1.2.1.1. If the value is not NULL, the CNAME [\[RFC1035\]](#) record of the domain in the form of DsaGuid.\_msdcs.DnsDomainName is also deregistered.

**DnsHostName:** A null-terminated Unicode string that specifies the fully qualified domain name (FQDN) (1) of the DC whose records are being deregistered.

**Return Values:** The method returns 0x00000000 on success; otherwise, it returns a nonzero error code. [<192>](#)

The server SHOULD determine if the client has sufficient privileges (as described in section [3.5.5.2](#)) with the Access Request mask set to the NETLOGON\_CONTROL\_ACCESS mask.

If the client does not have sufficient privilege, the server MUST return ERROR\_ACCESS\_DENIED.

If the *DnsHostName* parameter is not null, the server MUST attempt to delete the DNS SRV records registered for the DC *DnsHostName*, as specified in [\[MS-ADTS\]](#) section 7.3.2.3.

If the *DomainGuid* parameter is not null, then the server MUST attempt to delete the domain-GUID-based SRV record.

If the *DsaGuid* parameter is not null, then the server MUST attempt to delete the domain CNAME record.

The deletion of site-specific records MUST be attempted for every site in the enterprise of the DC on which the method is executed.

Unless stated otherwise, if the attempt to delete any records documented above fails for any reason, then the server MUST ignore the error and continue message processing.

It is possible that this method call will create a time-consuming run that can generate significant network traffic for enterprises with many sites.

### 3.5.5.4 Secure Channel Establishment and Maintenance Methods

Methods in this group are used to establish the secure channel, as outlined in section [1.3](#).

#### 3.5.5.4.1 NetrServerReqChallenge (Opnum 4)

The **NetrServerReqChallenge** method receives a client challenge and returns a server challenge.

```
NTSTATUS NetrServerReqChallenge(  
    [in, unique, string] LOGONSRV_HANDLE PrimaryName,  
    [in, string] wchar_t* ComputerName,  
    [in] PNETLOGON_CREDENTIAL ClientChallenge,  
    [out] PNETLOGON_CREDENTIAL ServerChallenge  
);
```

**PrimaryName:** The custom RPC binding handle, as specified in section [3.5.5.1](#).

**ComputerName:** A Unicode string that contains the NetBIOS name of the client computer calling this method.

**ClientChallenge:** A pointer to a [NETLOGON\\_CREDENTIAL](#) structure, as specified in section [2.2.1.3.4](#), that contains the client challenge.

**ServerChallenge:** A pointer to a **NETLOGON\_CREDENTIAL** structure, as specified in section [2.2.1.3.4](#), that contains the server challenge response.

**Return Values:** The method returns 0x00000000 on success; otherwise, it returns a nonzero error code.

On receiving this call, the server MUST perform the following validation steps:

- Apply Common Error Processing Rule A, specified in section [3](#).
- Apply Common Error Processing Rule B, specified in section [3](#), to the *PrimaryName* parameter.

The server MUST generate 64 bits of random data as the server challenge to be returned in the *ServerChallenge* parameter. The *ServerChallenge* is saved in the **ChallengeTable**, along with the client name passed in the *ComputerName* parameter and the client challenge passed in the *ClientChallenge* parameter.

#### 3.5.5.4.2 NetrServerAuthenticate3 (Opnum 26)

The **NetrServerAuthenticate3** method mutually authenticates the client and the server and establishes the session key to be used for the secure channel message protection between the client and the server. [<193>](#) It is called after the [NetrServerReqChallenge](#) method, as specified in section [3.5.5.4.1](#).

```
NTSTATUS NetrServerAuthenticate3(  
    [in, unique, string] LOGONSRV_HANDLE PrimaryName,  
    [in, string] wchar_t* AccountName,  
    [in] NETLOGON_SECURE_CHANNEL_TYPE SecureChannelType,  
    [in, string] wchar_t* ComputerName,  
    [in] PNETLOGON_CREDENTIAL ClientCredential,  
    [out] PNETLOGON_CREDENTIAL ServerCredential,  
    [in, out] unsigned long* NegotiateFlags,  
    [out] unsigned long* AccountRid  
);
```

**PrimaryName:** The custom RPC binding handle, as specified in section [3.5.5.1](#).

**AccountName:** A null-terminated Unicode string that identifies the name of the account that contains the secret key (password) that is shared between the client and the server, as specified in section [1.5.<194>](#)

**SecureChannelType:** A [NETLOGON\\_SECURE\\_CHANNEL\\_TYPE](#) enumerated value, as specified in section [2.2.1.3.13](#), that indicates the type of the secure channel being established by this call.

**ComputerName:** A null-terminated Unicode string that contains the NetBIOS name of the client computer calling this method.

**ClientCredential:** A pointer to a [NETLOGON\\_CREDENTIAL](#) structure, as specified in section [2.2.1.3.4](#), that contains the supplied client credentials, as specified in section [3.1.4.4](#).

**ServerCredential:** A pointer to a [NETLOGON\\_CREDENTIAL](#) structure, as specified in section [2.2.1.3.4](#), that contains the returned server credentials.

**NegotiateFlags:** A pointer to a 32-bit set of bit flags in little-endian format that indicate features supported. As input, the set of flags are those requested by the client and SHOULD be the same as [ClientCapabilities](#). As output, they are the bit-wise AND of the client's requested capabilities and the server's [ServerCapabilities](#). For more details, see section [3.1.4.2](#).

**AccountRid:** A pointer that receives the RID of the account specified by the *AccountName* parameter. (Section [3.1.1.5.2.4](#) of [\[MS-ADTS\]](#) describes how this RID is assigned at account creation time.) This value is stored in the **AccountRid** ADM element within the ClientSessionInfo table.

**Return Values:** The method returns 0x00000000 on success; otherwise, it returns a nonzero error code.

On receiving this call, the server MUST perform the following validation steps:

- Apply Common Error Processing Rule A, specified in section [3](#).
- Apply Common Error Processing Rule B, specified in section [3](#), to the *PrimaryName* parameter.

If the *AccountName* parameter is the name of a domain trust object, and there is a period at the end of the parameter name, the period is ignored during processing.

The server SHOULD [<195>](#) check the *SecureChannelType* parameter.

The server MUST compute the mask of supported Netlogon Options.

If **RejectDES** is set to TRUE and neither flag O nor flag W is specified by the client, the server MUST fail the session-key negotiation and return STATUS\_DOWNGRADE\_DETECTED.

If **RejectMD5Clients** is set to TRUE and flag W is not specified by the client, the server MUST fail the session-key negotiation and return STATUS\_DOWNGRADE\_DETECTED. [<196>](#)

The server MUST set **ClientStoredCredential** to 0.

The server MUST set **ServerStoredCredential** to the value of the *ClientCredential* parameter.

The server MUST compute or retrieve the NTOWFv1 (as specified in NTLM v1 Authentication in [\[MS-NLMP\]](#) section 3.3.1) of the client computer password and use it to compute a session key, as described in section [3.1.4.3](#). If the server cannot compute or retrieve the NTOWFv1 of the client computer password, it MUST return STATUS\_NO\_TRUST\_SAM\_ACCOUNT.

The server MUST compute the client Netlogon credential as described in section [3.1.4.4](#), and compare the result with the client Netlogon credential passed from the client for verification. The computation is performed using the *ClientChallenge* from the **ChallengeTable**. If the comparison fails, session-key negotiation fails, and the server MUST return STATUS\_ACCESS\_DENIED.

The server MUST compute the server Netlogon credential to be returned to the client.

The server MUST obtain the RID to be returned in the *AccountRid* parameter by performing external behavior consistent with locally invoking **SamrLookupNamesInDomain** ([\[MS-SAMR\]](#) section 3.1.5.11.2), using the following parameters:

- *DomainHandle* is set to the value received by performing external behavior consistent with locally invoking **SamrOpenDomain** ([\[MS-SAMR\]](#) section 3.1.5.1.5).
- *Count* is set to the value of 1.
- *Names* is set to an array with a length of 1, and is the only array element set to the value of <AccountName>.

If the call returns any error code other than STATUS\_SUCCESS, the server MUST return that error code.

The server MUST obtain the value of the *DomainHandle* parameter used when invoking **SamrLookupNamesInDomain** by performing external behavior consistent with locally invoking **SamrOpenDomain** ([\[MS-SAMR\]](#) section 3.1.5.1.5), using the following parameters:

- *ServerHandle* is set to the value returned by performing external behavior consistent with locally invoking **SamrConnect** ([\[MS-SAMR\]](#) section 3.1.5.1.4).
- *DesiredAccess* is set to the value DOMAIN\_LOOKUP.
- *DomainId* is set to the value of DomainSid (section [3.5.1](#)).

If the call returns any error code other than STATUS\_SUCCESS, the server MUST return that error code.

The server MUST obtain the value of the *ServerHandle* parameter used when invoking **SamrOpenDomain** by performing external behavior consistent with locally invoking **SamrConnect** ([\[MS-SAMR\]](#) section 3.1.5.1.4), using the following parameters:

- *ServerName* is set to the value of the NetBIOS form of the server computer name.
- *DesiredAccess* is set to the value SAM\_SERVER\_LOOKUP\_DOMAIN.

If the call returns any error code other than STATUS\_SUCCESS, the server MUST return that error code.

### 3.5.5.4.3 NetrServerAuthenticate2 (Opnum 15)

The **NetrServerAuthenticate2** method [<197>](#) is a predecessor to the **NetrServerAuthenticate3** method, as specified in section [3.5.5.4.2](#). All parameters of this method have the same meanings as the identically named parameters of the **NetrServerAuthenticate3** method.

```
NTSTATUS NetrServerAuthenticate2(  
    [in, unique, string] LOGONSRV_HANDLE PrimaryName,  
    [in, string] wchar_t* AccountName,  
    [in] NETLOGON_SECURE_CHANNEL_TYPE SecureChannelType,
```

```

[in, string] wchar_t* ComputerName,
[in] PNETLOGON_CREDENTIAL ClientCredential,
[out] PNETLOGON_CREDENTIAL ServerCredential,
[in, out] unsigned long* NegotiateFlags
);

```

Message processing is identical to **NetrServerAuthenticate3**, as specified in section [3.5.5.4.2](#), except for the following:

The *AccountRid* parameter is not present in **NetrServerAuthenticate2**.

#### 3.5.5.4.4 NetrServerAuthenticate (Opnum 5)

The **NetrServerAuthenticate** method [<198>](#) is a predecessor to the **NetrServerAuthenticate3** method (section [3.5.5.4.2](#)). All parameters of this method have the same meanings as the identically named parameters of the **NetrServerAuthenticate3** method.

```

NTSTATUS NetrServerAuthenticate(
[in, unique, string] LOGONSRV_HANDLE PrimaryName,
[in, string] wchar_t* AccountName,
[in] NETLOGON_SECURE_CHANNEL_TYPE SecureChannelType,
[in, string] wchar_t* ComputerName,
[in] PNETLOGON_CREDENTIAL ClientCredential,
[out] PNETLOGON_CREDENTIAL ServerCredential
);

```

Message processing is identical to **NetrServerAuthenticate3**, as specified in section [3.5.5.4.2](#), except for the following:

- The *NegotiateFlags* parameter is not present in **NetrServerAuthenticate**. Message processing would be identical to an invocation of **NetrServerAuthenticate3** with the *NegotiateFlags* parameter set to 0.
- The *AccountRid* parameter is not present in **NetrServerAuthenticate**.

#### 3.5.5.4.5 NetrServerPasswordSet2 (Opnum 30)

The **NetrServerPasswordSet2** method [<199>](#) allows the client to set a new clear text password for an account used by the domain controller (as specified in section [1.5](#)) for setting up the secure channel from the client. [<200>](#)

```

NTSTATUS NetrServerPasswordSet2(
[in, unique, string] LOGONSRV_HANDLE PrimaryName,
[in, string] wchar_t* AccountName,
[in] NETLOGON_SECURE_CHANNEL_TYPE SecureChannelType,
[in, string] wchar_t* ComputerName,
[in] PNETLOGON_AUTHENTICATOR Authenticator,
[out] PNETLOGON_AUTHENTICATOR ReturnAuthenticator,
[in] PNL_TRUST_PASSWORD ClearNewPassword
);

```

**PrimaryName:** The custom RPC binding handle, as specified in section [3.5.5.1](#).

**AccountName:** The null-terminated Unicode string that contains the name of the account whose password is being changed. [<201>](#)

**SecureChannelType:** An enumerated value that describes the secure channel to be used for authentication, as specified in section [2.2.1.3.13](#).

**ComputerName:** The null-terminated Unicode string that contains the NetBIOS name of the computer making the request.

**Authenticator:** A pointer to a [NETLOGON\\_AUTHENTICATOR](#) structure, as specified in section [2.2.1.1.5](#), that contains the encrypted logon credential and a time stamp.

**ReturnAuthenticator:** A pointer to a [NETLOGON\\_AUTHENTICATOR](#) structure, as specified in section [2.2.1.1.5](#), that contains the server return authenticator.

**ClearNewPassword:** A pointer to an [NL\\_TRUST\\_PASSWORD](#) structure, as specified in section [2.2.1.3.7](#), that contains the new password encrypted as specified in [Calling NetrServerPasswordSet2 \(section 3.4.5.2.5\)](#).

**Return Values:** The method returns 0x00000000 on success; otherwise, it returns a nonzero error code.

On receiving this call, the server MUST perform the following validation steps:

- Apply Common Error Processing Rule A, specified in section [3](#).
- Using the *ComputerName* for the secure channel to find the corresponding record in the ClientSessionInfo table, verify the *Authenticator* parameter (section [3.1.4.5](#)). If the *Authenticator* parameter is valid, compute the *ReturnAuthenticator* parameter returned (section [3.1.4.5](#)). Otherwise, the server MUST return STATUS\_ACCESS\_DENIED.
- Apply Common Error Processing Rule B, specified in section [3](#), to the *PrimaryName* parameter.

If the server *RefusePasswordChange* variable (section [3.5.1](#)) is set and the *SecureChannelType* is WorkstationSecureChannel, the server MUST return STATUS\_WRONG\_PASSWORD.

The server MUST decrypt the new password supplied in the *ClearNewPassword* parameter, by using the negotiated encryption algorithm (determined by bits C, O, or W, respectively, in the **NegotiateFlags** member of the **ClientSessionInfo** table entry for *ComputerName*) and the session key established as the decryption key. The NTOWFv1 (as specified in NTLM v1 Authentication in [\[MS-NLMP\]](#) section 3.3.1) of the cleartext password MUST be computed.

The server MUST compute or retrieve (see unicodePwd, [\[MS-ADA3\]](#) section 2.331) the NTOWFv1 of the current client machine password, which is stored as the result of the OWF on the clear text password for the AccountName. If the current password matches the new password, success is returned to the client, but no actual password change is performed.

The server MUST change the SharedSecret abstract value to the new password supplied in the *ClearNewPassword* parameter. If the value of the **PasswordVersionPresent** field of the ClearNewPassword.Buffer parameter is equal to 0x02231968, the server MUST change the **TrustPasswordVersion** abstract value to the value of the **PasswordVersionNumber** field of the ClearNewPassword.Buffer parameter. See section [2.2.1.3.8](#) for more details about the type of the *ClearNewPassword* parameter.

This method can only be called by a machine that has established a secure channel with the server.

This method also returns errors based on Common Error Processing Rule D, specified in section [3](#).



#### 3.5.5.4.6 NetrServerPasswordSet (Opnum 6)

The **NetrServerPasswordSet** method sets a new one-way function (OWF) of a password for an account used by the domain controller (as detailed in section [1.5](#)) for setting up the secure channel from the client.

```
NTSTATUS NetrServerPasswordSet(
    [in, unique, string] LOGONSRV_HANDLE PrimaryName,
    [in, string] wchar_t* AccountName,
    [in] NETLOGON_SECURE_CHANNEL_TYPE SecureChannelType,
    [in, string] wchar_t* ComputerName,
    [in] PNETLOGON_AUTHENTICATOR Authenticator,
    [out] PNETLOGON_AUTHENTICATOR ReturnAuthenticator,
    [in] PENCIPHERED_NT_OWF_PASSWORD UasNewPassword
);
```

**PrimaryName:** The custom RPC binding handle, as specified in section [3.5.5.1](#).

**AccountName:** The null-terminated Unicode string that contains the name of the account whose password is being changed. [<202>](#)

**SecureChannelType:** An enumerated value (specified in section [2.2.1.3.13](#)) that indicates the type of secure channel used by the client.

**ComputerName:** A null-terminated Unicode string that contains the NetBIOS name of the client computer calling this method.

**Authenticator:** A pointer to a [NETLOGON\\_AUTHENTICATOR](#) structure, as specified in section [2.2.1.1.5](#), that contains the client authenticator.

**ReturnAuthenticator:** A pointer to a **NETLOGON\_AUTHENTICATOR** structure, as specified in section [2.2.1.1.5](#), that contains the server return authenticator.

**UasNewPassword:** A pointer to an ENCRYPTED\_NT\_OWF\_PASSWORD structure, as specified in section [2.2.1.1.4](#) and encrypted by the algorithm specified in section [3.4.5.2.6](#).

**Return Values:** The method returns 0x00000000 on success; otherwise, it returns a nonzero error code.

On receiving this call, the server MUST perform the following validation steps:

- Apply Common Error Processing Rule A, specified in section [3](#).
- Using the *ComputerName* for the secure channel to find the corresponding record in the ClientSessionInfo table, verify the *Authenticator* parameter (section [3.1.4.5](#)). If the *Authenticator* parameter is valid, compute the *ReturnAuthenticator* parameter returned (section [3.1.4.5](#)). Otherwise, the server MUST return STATUS\_ACCESS\_DENIED.

If the *RefusePasswordChange* variable (section [3.5.1](#)) is set and the *SecureChannelType* is WorkstationSecureChannel, the server MUST return STATUS\_WRONG\_PASSWORD.

The server MUST decrypt the new password that is supplied in the *UasNewPassword* parameter by using the inverse to the encryption algorithm that is specified in [\[MS-SAMR\]](#) section 2.2.11.1.1, Encrypt an NT Hash or LM Hash Value with a specified key. The session key is the specified key input, and the decryption keys are derived using the 16-byte value process, as specified in [\[MS-SAMR\]](#) section 2.2.11.1.4.

The server MUST compute or retrieve the NTOWFv1 (as specified in NTLM v1 Authentication in [\[MS-NLMP\]](#) section 3.3.1) of the current client machine password, which is stored as an OWF of the clear-text password for the account.

The server MUST compute or retrieve the NTOWFv1 of the old client machine password and compare it to the NTOWFv1 of the new password supplied in the *UasNewPassword* parameter; if they match, the server MUST return STATUS\_ACCESS\_DENIED.

This method can only be called by a machine that has established a secure channel with the server.

This method also returns errors based on Common Error Processing Rule D, specified in section [3](#).

#### 3.5.5.4.7 NetrServerTrustPasswordsGet (Opnum 42)

The **NetrServerTrustPasswordsGet** method [<203>](#) returns the encrypted current and previous passwords for an account in the domain. This method is called by a client to retrieve the current and previous account passwords from a domain controller. The account name requested MUST be the name used when the secure channel was created, unless the method is called on a PDC by a DC, in which case it can be any valid account name.

```
NTSTATUS NetrServerTrustPasswordsGet(  
    [in, unique, string] LOGONSRV_HANDLE TrustedDcName,  
    [in, string] wchar_t* AccountName,  
    [in] NETLOGON_SECURE_CHANNEL_TYPE SecureChannelType,  
    [in, string] wchar_t* ComputerName,  
    [in] PNETLOGON_AUTHENTICATOR Authenticator,  
    [out] PNETLOGON_AUTHENTICATOR ReturnAuthenticator,  
    [out] PENCRIPTED_NT_OWF_PASSWORD EncryptedNewOwfPassword,  
    [out] PENCRIPTED_NT_OWF_PASSWORD EncryptedOldOwfPassword  
);
```

**TrustedDcName:** The custom RPC binding handle, as specified in section [3.5.5.1](#).

**AccountName:** The null-terminated Unicode string that contains the name of the client account in the domain for which the trust password MUST be returned. [<204>](#)

**SecureChannelType:** A [NETLOGON\\_SECURE\\_CHANNEL\\_TYPE](#) enumerated value, as specified in section [2.2.1.3.13](#), that indicates the type of the secure channel being established by this call.

**ComputerName:** The null-terminated Unicode string that contains the NetBIOS name of the client computer.

**Authenticator:** A pointer to a [NETLOGON\\_AUTHENTICATOR](#) structure, as specified in section [2.2.1.1.5](#), that contains the client authenticator.

**ReturnAuthenticator:** A pointer to a [NETLOGON\\_AUTHENTICATOR](#) structure, as specified in section [2.2.1.1.5](#), that contains the server return authenticator.

**EncryptedNewOwfPassword:** A pointer to an [ENCRIPTED\\_NT\\_OWF\\_PASSWORD](#) structure, as specified in section [2.2.1.1.4](#), that contains the NTOWFv1 (as specified in NTLM v1 Authentication in [\[MS-NLMP\]](#) section 3.3.1) of the current password, encrypted as specified in [\[MS-SAMR\]](#) section 2.2.11.1.1, Encrypting an NT Hash or LM Hash Value with a specified key. The session key is the specified 16-byte key that is used to derive the password's keys. The specified 16-byte key uses the 16-byte value process, as specified in [\[MS-SAMR\]](#) section 2.2.11.1.4.

**EncryptedOldOwfPassword:** A pointer to an **ENCRYPTED\_NT\_OWF\_PASSWORD** structure, as specified in section [2.2.1.1.4](#), that contains the NTOWFv1 (as specified in NTLM v1 Authentication in [\[MS-NLMP\]](#) section 3.3.1) of the previous password, encrypted as specified in [\[MS-SAMR\]](#) section 2.2.11.1.1, Encrypting an NT Hash or LM Hash Value with a specified key. The session key is the specified 16-byte key that is used to derive the password's keys. The specified 16-byte key uses the 16-byte value process, as specified in [\[MS-SAMR\]](#) section 2.2.11.1.4.

**Return Values:** The method returns 0x00000000 on success; otherwise, it returns a nonzero error code.

Message processing is identical to [NetrServerGetTrustInfo](#), as specified in section [3.5.5.6.6](#), except for the following:

- The *TrustInfo* parameter is not present in **NetrServerTrustPasswordsGet**.

### 3.5.5.4.8 NetrLogonGetDomainInfo (Opnum 29)

The **NetrLogonGetDomainInfo** method [<205>](#) returns information that describes the current domain to which the specified client belongs.

```
NTSTATUS NetrLogonGetDomainInfo(  
    [in, string] LOGONSRV_HANDLE ServerName,  
    [in, string, unique] wchar_t* ComputerName,  
    [in] PNETLOGON_AUTHENTICATOR Authenticator,  
    [in, out] PNETLOGON_AUTHENTICATOR ReturnAuthenticator,  
    [in] DWORD Level,  
    [in, switch_is(Level)] PNETLOGON_WORKSTATION_INFORMATION WkstaBuffer,  
    [out, switch_is(Level)] PNETLOGON_DOMAIN_INFORMATION DomBuffer  
);
```

**ServerName:** The custom RPC binding handle, as specified in section [3.5.5.1](#).

**ComputerName:** The null-terminated Unicode string that contains the name of the client computer issuing the request.

**Authenticator:** A pointer to a [NETLOGON\\_AUTHENTICATOR](#) structure, as specified in section [2.2.1.1.5](#), that contains the client authenticator.

**ReturnAuthenticator:** A pointer to a **NETLOGON\_AUTHENTICATOR** structure, as specified in section [2.2.1.1.5](#), that contains the server return authenticator.

**Level:** The information level requested by the client. The *DomBuffer* parameter contains one of the following structures, based on the value of this field.

Value	Meaning
0x00000001	The <i>DomBuffer</i> contains a <a href="#">NETLOGON_DOMAIN_INFO</a> structure.
0x00000002	The <i>DomBuffer</i> contains a <a href="#">NETLOGON_LSA_POLICY_INFO</a> structure.

**WkstaBuffer:** A pointer to a [NETLOGON\\_WORKSTATION\\_INFORMATION](#) structure, as specified in section [2.2.1.3.9](#), that contains information about the client workstation.

**DomBuffer:** A pointer to a [NETLOGON\\_DOMAIN\\_INFORMATION](#) structure, as specified in section [2.2.1.3.12](#), that contains information about the domain or policy information.

**Return Values:** The method returns 0x00000000 on success; otherwise, it returns a nonzero error code.

On receiving this call, the server MUST perform the following validation steps:

- Apply Common Error Processing Rule A, specified in section [3](#).
- Verify that the *WkstaBuffer* parameter is not NULL. If it is, the server SHOULD return STATUS\_INVALID\_PARAMETER. [<206>](#)
- Verify that the *Level* parameter is set to 1 or 2. All other values are invalid, and STATUS\_INVALID\_LEVEL MUST be returned.
- Using the *ComputerName* for the secure channel to find the corresponding record in the ClientSessionInfo table, verify the *Authenticator* parameter (section [3.1.4.5](#)). If the *Authenticator* parameter is valid, compute the *ReturnAuthenticator* parameter returned (section [3.1.4.5](#)). Otherwise, the server MUST return STATUS\_ACCESS\_DENIED.

If the *Level* parameter is set to 1, the return structure pointed to by *DomBuffer* MUST be generated as follows:

- NETLOGON\_DOMAIN\_INFO.PrimaryDomain.DomainName MUST be set to **NetbiosDomainName**.
- NETLOGON\_DOMAIN\_INFO.PrimaryDomain.DnsDomainName MUST be set to **DnsDomainName**.
- NETLOGON\_DOMAIN\_INFO.PrimaryDomain.DnsForestName MUST be set to **DnsForestName**.
- NETLOGON\_DOMAIN\_INFO.PrimaryDomain.DomainGuid MUST be set to **DomainGuid**.
- NETLOGON\_DOMAIN\_INFO.PrimaryDomain.DomainSid MUST be set to **DomainSid**.
- NETLOGON\_DOMAIN\_INFO.WorkstationFlags MUST be set with the bitwise AND of NETLOGON\_WORKSTATION\_INFORMATION.WorkstationInfo.WorkstationFlags and 0x3.
- NETLOGON\_DOMAIN\_INFO.TrustedDomainCount MUST be set to the number of elements of the trusted domain list returned by performing the external behavior consistent with locally invoking LsarEnumerateTrustedDomainsEx ([\[MS-LSAD\]](#) section 3.1.4.7.7). The *EnumerationContext* parameter MUST be set to 0 and *PreferedMaximumLength* SHOULD be set to 4096. [<207>](#) A policy handle is not needed locally.
- NETLOGON\_DOMAIN\_INFO.TrustedDomains MUST be set to a TrustedDomainCount-sized array of NETLOGON\_ONE\_DOMAIN\_INFO structures. Each structure MUST be generated as follows:
  - NETLOGON\_ONE\_DOMAIN\_INFO.DomainName MUST be set to the NetBIOS domain name of the trusted domain.
  - NETLOGON\_ONE\_DOMAIN\_INFO.DnsDomainName MUST be set to the DNS domain name of the trusted domain.
  - NETLOGON\_ONE\_DOMAIN\_INFO.DnsForestName MUST be set to NULL string.
  - NETLOGON\_ONE\_DOMAIN\_INFO.DomainGuid MUST be set to the domain GUID of the trusted domain.
  - NETLOGON\_ONE\_DOMAIN\_INFO.DomainSid MUST be set to the domain SID of the trusted domain. [<208>](#)

- NETLOGON\_DOMAIN\_INFO.SupportedEncTypes MUST be set to the value of the msDS-SupportedEncryptionTypes attribute ([\[MS-ADA2\]](#) section 2.324) of the *ComputerName* account. If the msDS-SupportedEncryptionTypes attribute does not exist, then set NETLOGON\_DOMAIN\_INFO.SupportedEncTypes to 0xFFFFFFFF.

Structure	Reference
NETLOGON_DOMAIN_INFO	For details, see section <a href="#">2.2.1.3.11</a> .
NETLOGON_WORKSTATION_INFO	For details, see section <a href="#">2.2.1.3.6</a> .
DS_DOMAIN_TRUSTSW	For details, see section <a href="#">2.2.1.5.2</a> .
NETLOGON_ONE_DOMAIN_INFO	For details, see section <a href="#">2.2.1.3.10</a> .

If the Level parameter is set to 2:

- NETLOGON\_DOMAIN\_INFO.LsaPolicy.LsaPolicySize MUST be set to 0.
- NETLOGON\_DOMAIN\_INFO.LsaPolicy.LsaPolicy MUST be set to NULL.

If the WkstaBuffer.WorkstationInfo pointer is NULL, no further processing occurs and NERR\_Success MUST be returned.

If WkstaBuffer.WorkstationInfo.WorkstationFlags has the 0x2 bit set, NETLOGON\_DOMAIN\_INFO.DnsHostNameInDs is set to the dNSHostName ([\[MS-ADA1\]](#) section 2.185) of the client account. If there was a change in domain naming, this value holds the previous DNS host name since the AD query is done prior to changing the value. If WkstaBuffer.WorkstationInfo.WorkstationFlags does not have the 0x2 bit set, the server adds the following SPNs to the **ServicePrincipalName** attribute of the clients account:

- HOST/<Netbios name>
- HOST/<FQDN name>

WkstaBuffer.WorkstationInfo.OsName and WkstaBuffer.WorkstationInfo.OsVersion SHOULD be processed as specified in section [2.2.1.3.6](#). If WkstaBuffer.WorkstationInfo.OsName and WkstaBuffer.WorkstationInfo.OsVersion are not specified, then a generic string SHOULD be used to update the operatingSystem attribute ("Windows unknown version"). If WkstaBuffer.WorkstationInfo.OsVersion is specified but WkstaBuffer.WorkstationInfo.OsName is not, then a different generic string SHOULD be used to update the **operatingSystem** attribute, depending on the value of WkstaBuffer.WorkstationInfo.OsVersion.wProductType. If the wProductType is VER\_NT\_WORKSTATION, then the string that SHOULD be used is "Windows Workstation", otherwise the string SHOULD be "Windows Server".[<209>](#)

This method can only be called by a machine that has established a secure channel with the server.

#### 3.5.5.4.9 NetrLogonGetCapabilities (Opnum 21)

The **NetrLogonGetCapabilities** method is used by clients to confirm the server capabilities after a secure channel has been established. [<210>](#)

```
NTSTATUS NetrLogonGetCapabilities(
    [in, string] LOGONSRV_HANDLE ServerName,
    [in, string, unique] wchar_t* ComputerName,
    [in] PNETLOGON_AUTHENTICATOR Authenticator,
```

```
[in, out] PNETLOGON_AUTHENTICATOR ReturnAuthenticator,
[in] DWORD QueryLevel,
[out, switch_is(QueryLevel)] PNETLOGON_CAPABILITIES ServerCapabilities
);
```

**ServerName:** A [LOGONSRV\\_HANDLE](#) Unicode string handle of the server that is handling the request.

**ComputerName:** A string that contains the name of the computer.

**Authenticator:** A pointer to a [NETLOGON\\_AUTHENTICATOR](#) structure that contains the client authenticator.

**ReturnAuthenticator:** A pointer to a [NETLOGON\\_AUTHENTICATOR](#) structure that contains the server return authenticator.

**QueryLevel:** Specifies the level of information to return from the domain controller being queried. A value of 0x00000001 causes return of a [NETLOGON\\_CAPABILITIES](#) structure that contains server capabilities.

**ServerCapabilities:** A pointer to a 32-bit set of bit flags that identify the server's capabilities. [<211>](#)

**Return Values:** The method returns 0x00000000 on success; otherwise, it returns a nonzero error code.

Upon receiving this call, the server MUST perform the following validation steps: [<212>](#)

- Apply Common Error Processing Rule A, specified in section [3](#).
- Verify that the *QueryLevel* parameter is set to 1. All other values are invalid, and STATUS\_INVALID\_LEVEL MUST be returned.
- Using the ComputerName for the secure channel to find the corresponding record in the ClientSessionInfo table, verify the *Authenticator* parameter (section [3.1.4.5](#)). If the *Authenticator* parameter is valid, compute the *ReturnAuthenticator* parameter returned (section [3.1.4.5](#)). Otherwise, the server MUST return STATUS\_ACCESS\_DENIED.

If *ServerCapabilities* bit W is true, then *ServerCapabilities* MUST be set to the ServerSessionInfo.NegotiateFlags being used by the secure channel of the calling client. Otherwise, the server MUST return STATUS\_NOT\_IMPLEMENTED.

### 3.5.5.5 Pass-Through Authentication Methods

Methods in this group are used for generic pass-through, user logon, and user logoff as outlined in section [1.3](#).

#### 3.5.5.5.1 NetrLogonSamLogonEx (Opnum 39)

The **NetrLogonSamLogonEx** method [<213>](#) provides an extension to [NetrLogonSamLogon](#) that accepts an extra flags parameter and uses Secure RPC ([\[MS-RPCE\]](#) section 3.3.1.5.2) instead of Netlogon authenticators. This method handles logon requests for the **SAM** accounts and allows for generic pass-through authentication, as specified in section [3.2.4.1](#). For more information about fields and structures used by Netlogon pass-through methods, see section [1.3.7.1.4](#).

```

NTSTATUS NetrLogonSamLogonEx(
    [in] handle_t ContextHandle,
    [in, unique, string] wchar_t* LogonServer,
    [in, unique, string] wchar_t* ComputerName,
    [in] NETLOGON_LOGON_INFO_CLASS LogonLevel,
    [in, switch_is(LogonLevel)] PNETLOGON_LEVEL LogonInformation,
    [in] NETLOGON_VALIDATION_INFO_CLASS ValidationLevel,
    [out, switch_is(ValidationLevel)]
        PNETLOGON_VALIDATION ValidationInformation,
    [out] unsigned char* Authoritative,
    [in, out] unsigned long* ExtraFlags
);

```

**ContextHandle:** A primitive RPC handle that identifies a particular client/server binding, as specified in section [3.5.5.1](#).

**LogonServer:** The null-terminated Unicode string that contains the NetBIOS name of the server that will handle the logon request.

**ComputerName:** The null-terminated Unicode string that contains the NetBIOS name of the client computer sending the logon request.

**LogonLevel:** A [NETLOGON\\_LOGON\\_INFO\\_CLASS](#) enumerated type, as specified in section [2.2.1.4.16](#), that specifies the type of the logon information passed in the *LogonInformation* parameter.

**LogonInformation:** A pointer to a [NETLOGON\\_LEVEL](#) structure, as specified in section [2.2.1.4.6](#), that describes the logon request information.

**ValidationLevel:** A [NETLOGON\\_VALIDATION\\_INFO\\_CLASS](#) enumerated type, as specified in section [2.2.1.4.17](#), that contains the validation level requested by the client.

**ValidationInformation:** A pointer to a [NETLOGON\\_VALIDATION](#) structure, as specified in section [2.2.1.4.14](#), that describes the user validation information returned to the client. The type of the **NETLOGON\_VALIDATION** used is determined by the value of the *ValidationLevel* parameter.

**Authoritative:** A pointer to a char value that represents a Boolean condition. FALSE is indicated by the value 0x00, and TRUE SHOULD [<214>](#) be indicated by the value 0x01 and **MAY** also be indicated by any nonzero value.

This Boolean value indicates whether the validation information is final. This field is necessary because the request might be forwarded through multiple servers. The value TRUE indicates that the validation information is an authoritative response and MUST remain unchanged. The value FALSE SHOULD indicate that the validation information is not an authoritative response and that the client can resend the request to another server.

**ExtraFlags:** A pointer to a set of bit flags that specify delivery settings. A flag is TRUE (or set) if its value is equal to 1. Output flags MUST be the same as input. The value is constructed from zero or more bit flags from the following table.

										1										2										3									
0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	0	1								
0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	D	C	B	A							



Where the bits are defined as:

Value	Description
A	Request MUST be passed to the domain controller at the root of the forest.
B	Request MUST be passed to the DC at the end of the first hop over a cross-forest trust.
C	Request was passed by an RODC to a DC in a different domain. <215>
D	Request is an NTLM authentication package request passed by an RODC. <216>

All other bits MUST be set to zero and MUST be ignored on receipt. Flags A, B, C, and D can be combined and the server SHOULD honor the flags. Flags A and B require the server to take action to deliver the request, while flags C and D are informational and implementation-specific.

**Return Values:** The method returns 0x00000000 on success; otherwise, it returns a nonzero error code.

On receiving this call, the server MUST perform the following validation steps:

- Apply Common Error Processing Rule A, specified in section 3.
- The pointer contained in the *LogonInformation* parameter MUST NOT be NULL; otherwise, the server MUST return STATUS\_INVALID\_PARAMETER.
- Verify that the caller is using Secure RPC ([MS-RPCE] section 3.3.1.5.2); otherwise, the server MUST return STATUS\_ACCESS\_DENIED.
- Verify that if bit B in *ExtraFlags* is enabled, then the domain's TAFT bit in the **trustAttributes** structure (MS-ADTS section 7.1.6.7.9) is also enabled; otherwise, the server MUST return STATUS\_NO\_SUCH\_USER.
- Apply Common Error Processing Rule B, specified in section 3, to the *LogonServer* parameter.
- If the *LogonServer* parameter is not NULL, then it is compared against the server's <Computer Name> ([MS-WSO] section 5.1).

The server uses the server name passed in the *LogonServer* parameter to look up the domain that the server hosts. If the name is not found, the server MUST return STATUS\_INVALID\_COMPUTER\_NAME.

The server MUST decrypt data protected in transport:

- If the *LogonLevel* is **NetlogonInteractiveInformation** or **NetlogonInteractiveTransitiveInformation**, decrypt<217> the **LmOwfPassword** and **NtOwfPassword** members in the **NETLOGON\_INTERACTIVE\_INFO (section 2.2.1.4.3)** structure.
- If the *LogonLevel* is **NetlogonServiceInformation** or **NetlogonServiceTransitiveInformation**, decrypt<218> the **LmOwfPassword** and **NtOwfPassword** members in the **NETLOGON\_SERVICE\_INFO (section 2.2.1.4.4)** structure.
- If the *LogonLevel* is **NetlogonGenericInformation**, decrypt<219> the **LogonData** member in the **NETLOGON\_GENERIC\_INFO (section 2.2.1.4.2)** structure.



When the *LogonLevel* parameter is set to 4 (**NetlogonGenericInformation**), the call is for generic pass-through to authentication packages and the *ValidationLevel* parameter MUST be 5 (**NetlogonValidationGenericInfo2**) or 4 (**NetlogonValidationGenericInfo**). If this is not true, the server MUST return STATUS\_INVALID\_INFO\_CLASS. <220>

If *LogonLevel* is not set to 4 (**NetlogonGenericInformation**), the *ValidationLevel* parameter MUST be 6 (**NetlogonValidationSamInfo4**) or 3 (**NetlogonValidationSamInfo2**) or 2 (**NetlogonValidationSamInfo**). If this is not true, the server MUST return STATUS\_INVALID\_INFO\_CLASS. <221> The data is opaque to Netlogon, and the parameters MUST be passed to NTLM ([MS-APDS] section 3.1).

If the request is not for the domain of which the server is a member and the server is a DC, then the server MUST perform external behavior consistent with locally invoking **LsarQueryTrustedDomainInfoByName** (MS-LSAD section 3.1.4.7.5), using the following parameters (policy handle is not needed locally):

- *Domain* is set to the value of the *TrustedDomainName* parameter.
- *InformationClass* is set to the value of *TrustedDomainInformationEx*.

The server MUST also verify that:

- The **securityIdentifier** (Sid) field ([MS-ADTS] section 7.1.6.7.8) is not NULL,
- The **trustType** field ([MS-ADTS] section 7.1.6.7.15) is 1 or 2, and
- The **trustAttributes** field ([MS-ADTS] section 7.1.6.7.9) does not contain TRUST\_ATTRIBUTE\_UPLEVEL\_ONLY

If **LsarQueryTrustedDomainInfoByName** succeeds and returns the domain information in *TrustedDomainInformation*, the server MUST check if it has established a secure channel with the domain. If there is not an established secure channel then the server MUST return the error code STATUS\_NO\_SUCH\_USER. If there is an established secure channel then the server MUST call NetrLogonSamLogonEx using **LogonLevel**, **LogonInformation**, **ValidationLevel**, **ValidationInformation**, and **ExtraFlags** (**ExtraFlags** can be updated by the server before passing it to NetrLogonSamLogonEx on the DC) to the DC with which it has an established secure channel.

If an error is returned from an authentication package (in the case of generic pass-through) or from NTLM (in the case of logon), the error code MUST be propagated to the caller of this method.

If the *LogonLevel* is **NetlogonNetworkInformation** or **NetlogonNetworkTransitiveInformation**, the server MUST encrypt the *UserSessionKey* and the first two elements of the **ExpansionRoom** array in the **NETLOGON\_VALIDATION\_SAM\_INFO** (section 2.2.1.4.11) or in the **NETLOGON\_VALIDATION\_SAM\_INFO2** (section 2.2.1.4.12) structure.

This method can be called only by a machine that has established a secure channel with the server.

This is the only NetrLogonSamLogon family method that uses secure channel and does not use Netlogon authenticator parameters.

### 3.5.5.5.2 NetrLogonSamLogonWithFlags (Opnum 45)

The **NetrLogonSamLogonWithFlags** method <222> handles logon requests for the SAM accounts.

```
NTSTATUS NetrLogonSamLogonWithFlags(  
    [in, unique, string] LOGONSRV_HANDLE LogonServer,
```

```

[in, unique, string] wchar_t* ComputerName,
[in, unique] PNETLOGON_AUTHENTICATOR Authenticator,
[in, out, unique] PNETLOGON_AUTHENTICATOR ReturnAuthenticator,
[in] NETLOGON_LOGON_INFO_CLASS LogonLevel,
[in, switch_is(LogonLevel)] PNETLOGON_LEVEL LogonInformation,
[in] NETLOGON_VALIDATION_INFO_CLASS ValidationLevel,
[out, switch_is(ValidationLevel)]
    PNETLOGON_VALIDATION ValidationInformation,
[out] unsigned char* Authoritative,
[in, out] unsigned long* ExtraFlags
);

```

**LogonServer:** The custom RPC binding handle, as specified in section [3.5.5.1](#).

**ComputerName:** The Unicode string that contains the NetBIOS name of the client computer calling this method.

**Authenticator:** A pointer to a [NETLOGON\\_AUTHENTICATOR](#) structure, as specified in section [2.2.1.1.5](#), that contains the client authenticator.

**ReturnAuthenticator:** A pointer to a **NETLOGON\_AUTHENTICATOR** structure, as specified in section [2.2.1.1.5](#), that contains the server return authenticator.

**LogonLevel:** A [NETLOGON\\_LOGON\\_INFO\\_CLASS](#) structure, as specified in section [2.2.1.4.16](#), that specifies the type of logon information passed in the *LogonInformation* parameter.

**LogonInformation:** A pointer to a [NETLOGON\\_LEVEL](#) structure, as specified in section [2.2.1.4.6](#), that describes the logon request information.

**ValidationLevel:** A [NETLOGON\\_VALIDATION\\_INFO\\_CLASS](#) enumerated type, as specified in section [2.2.1.4.17](#), that contains the validation level requested by the client.

**ValidationInformation:** A pointer to a [NETLOGON\\_VALIDATION](#) structure, as specified in section [2.2.1.4.14](#), that describes the user validation information returned to the client. The type of the **NETLOGON\_VALIDATION** used is determined by the value of the *ValidationLevel* parameter.

**Authoritative:** A pointer to a char value representing a Boolean condition. FALSE is indicated by the value 0x00; TRUE SHOULD be indicated by the value 0x01 and MAY also be indicated by any nonzero value. [<223>](#)

This Boolean value indicates whether the validation information is an authoritative response. This field is necessary because the request might be forwarded through multiple servers. A value of TRUE indicates that the validation information is final and MUST remain unchanged. The value FALSE SHOULD indicate that the validation information is not an authoritative response and that the client can resend the request to another server.

**ExtraFlags:** A pointer to a set of bit flags that specify delivery settings. A flag is TRUE (or set) if its value is equal to 1. The value is constructed from zero or more bit flags from the following table.

0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	20	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	30	1	
0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	D	C	B	A

Where the bits are defined as:

Value	Description
A	Request is passed to the domain controller at the root of the forest.
B	Request is passed to the DC at the end of the first hop over a cross-forest trust.
C	Request is passed by an RODC to a DC in a different domain. <a href="#">&lt;224&gt;</a>
D	Request is an NTLM authentication package request passed by an RODC. <a href="#">&lt;225&gt;</a>

All other bits MUST be set to zero and MUST be ignored on receipt.

**Return Values:** The method returns 0x00000000 on success; otherwise, it returns a nonzero error code.

Message processing is identical to [NetrLogonSamLogon](#), as specified in section [3.5.5.5.3](#), except for the following:

- **NetrLogonSamLogonWithFlags** contains an additional parameter named *ExtraFlags*.

### 3.5.5.5.3 NetrLogonSamLogon (Opnum 2)

The **NetrLogonSamLogon** method [<226>](#) is a predecessor to the [NetrLogonSamLogonWithFlags](#) method (section [3.5.5.5.2](#)). All parameters of this method have the same meanings as the identically named parameters of the **NetrLogonSamLogonWithFlags** method.

```
NTSTATUS NetrLogonSamLogon(
    [in, unique, string] LOGONSRV_HANDLE LogonServer,
    [in, unique, string] wchar_t* ComputerName,
    [in, unique] PNETLOGON_AUTHENTICATOR Authenticator,
    [in, out, unique] PNETLOGON_AUTHENTICATOR ReturnAuthenticator,
    [in] NETLOGON_LOGON_INFO_CLASS LogonLevel,
    [in, switch_is(LogonLevel)] PNETLOGON_LEVEL LogonInformation,
    [in] NETLOGON_VALIDATION_INFO_CLASS ValidationLevel,
    [out, switch_is(ValidationLevel)]
        PNETLOGON_VALIDATION ValidationInformation,
    [out] unsigned char* Authoritative
);
```

Message processing is identical to [NetrLogonSamLogonEx](#), as specified in section [3.5.5.5.1](#), except for the following:

- The method uses Netlogon authenticators, so instead of checking for Secure RPC, the server MUST confirm the validity of the *Authenticator* (section [3.1.4.5](#)) that it received using the *ComputerName* for the secure channel to find the corresponding record in the *ClientSessionInfo* table. If the *Authenticator* parameter is valid, the server MUST compute the *ReturnAuthenticator*

parameter returned (section [3.1.4.5](#)). Otherwise, the server MUST return STATUS\_ACCESS\_DENIED.

- The ExtraFlags parameter is not processed.

This method can only be called by a machine that has established a secure channel with the server.

On receiving this call, the server MUST perform the following validation step:

- Apply Common Error Processing Rule A, specified in section [3](#).

#### 3.5.5.5.4 NetrLogonSamLogoff (Opnum 3)

The **NetrLogonSamLogoff** updates the user **lastLogoff** attribute for the SAM accounts.

```
NTSTATUS NetrLogonSamLogoff(  
    [in, unique, string] LOGONSRV_HANDLE LogonServer,  
    [in, unique, string] wchar_t* ComputerName,  
    [in, unique] PNETLOGON_AUTHENTICATOR Authenticator,  
    [in, out, unique] PNETLOGON_AUTHENTICATOR ReturnAuthenticator,  
    [in] NETLOGON_LOGON_INFO_CLASS LogonLevel,  
    [in, switch_is(LogonLevel)] PNETLOGON_LEVEL LogonInformation  
);
```

**LogonServer:** The custom RPC binding handle, as specified in section [3.5.5.1](#).

**ComputerName:** The Unicode string that contains the NetBIOS name of the client computer calling this method.

**Authenticator:** A pointer to a [NETLOGON\\_AUTHENTICATOR](#) structure, as specified in section [2.2.1.1.5](#), that contains the client authenticator.

**ReturnAuthenticator:** A pointer to a **NETLOGON\_AUTHENTICATOR** structure, as specified in section [2.2.1.1.5](#), that contains the server return authenticator.

**LogonLevel:** A **NETLOGON\_LOGON\_INFO\_CLASS** structure, as specified in section [2.2.1.4.16](#), that identifies the type of logon information in the *LogonInformation* union.

**LogonInformation:** A pointer to a [NETLOGON\\_LEVEL](#) structure, as specified in section [2.2.1.4.6](#), that describes the logon information.

**Return Values:** The method returns 0x00000000 on success; otherwise, it returns a nonzero error code.

On receiving this call, the server MUST perform the following validation steps:

- The pointer contained in the *LogonInformation* parameter MUST not be NULL; otherwise, the server MUST return STATUS\_INVALID\_PARAMETER.
- Apply Common Error Processing Rule A, specified in section [3](#).
- Using the *ComputerName* for the secure channel to find the corresponding record in the ClientSessionInfo table, verify the *Authenticator* parameter (section [3.1.4.5](#)). If the *Authenticator* parameter is valid, compute the *ReturnAuthenticator* parameter returned (section [3.1.4.5](#)). Otherwise, the server MUST return STATUS\_ACCESS\_DENIED.

The server MUST check the following parameters, and if any of them are NULL, it MUST return STATUS\_INVALID\_PARAMETER:

- *LogonServer*
- *ComputerName*
- *Authenticator*
- *ReturnAuthenticator*

The server MUST check the *LogonLevel* parameter, and the server MUST return STATUS\_INVALID\_INFO\_CLASS if it is not set to 1 (**NetlogonInteractiveInformation**).

If the request is not for the domain of which the server is a member and the server is a DC, then the server MUST perform external behavior consistent with locally invoking **LsarQueryTrustedDomainInfoByName** ([MS-LSAD] section 3.1.4.7.5), using the following parameters (policy handle is not needed locally):

- **TrustedDomainName** is set to the value of the *LogonInformation.LogonInteractive.Identity.LogonDomainName* parameter
- **InformationClass** is set to the value of **TrustedDomainInformationEx**.

If the call returns STATUS\_OBJECT\_NAME\_NOT\_FOUND (0xC0000034) the server MUST return STATUS\_NO\_SUCH\_DOMAIN. If the call returns any other error code other than STATUS\_SUCCESS the server MUST return that error code.

Additionally, the server MUST also verify that:

- The **securityIdentifier** (Sid) field ([MS-ADTS] section 7.1.6.7.8) is not NULL,
- The **trustType** field ([MS-ADTS] section 7.1.6.7.15) is 1 or 2
- The **trustAttributes** field ([MS-ADTS] section 7.1.6.7.9) does not contain TRUST\_ATTRIBUTE\_UPLEVEL\_ONLY.

If **LsarQueryTrustedDomainInfoByName** succeeds and returns the domain information in *TrustedDomainInformation*, the server MUST check if it has established a secure channel with the domain. If there is not an established secure channel then the server MUST return the error code STATUS\_NO\_SUCH\_DOMAIN. If there is an established secure channel then the server MUST call NetrLogonSamLogoff using **LogonLevel** and **LogonInformation** to the DC with which it has established a secure channel.

Otherwise, if the server's account database is for the domain specified by **LogonInformation.LogonInteractive.Identity.LogonDomainName**, then it MAY update the **lastLogoff** attribute ([MS-ADA1] section 2.350) on the account object specified by the **LogonInformation.LogonInteractive.Identity.UserName** field. <227>

This method can only be called by a machine that has established a secure channel with the server.

### 3.5.5.6 Domain Trust Methods

Methods in this group are used to retrieve trust data, as outlined in section [1.3](#).

### 3.5.5.6.1 DsrEnumerateDomainTrusts (Opnum 40)

The **DsrEnumerateDomainTrusts** method [<228>](#) returns an enumerated list of domain trusts, filtered by a set of flags, from the specified server.

```
NET_API_STATUS DsrEnumerateDomainTrusts(  
    [in, unique, string] LOGONSRV_HANDLE ServerName,  
    [in] unsigned long Flags,  
    [out] PNETLOGON_TRUSTED_DOMAIN_ARRAY Domains  
);
```

**ServerName:** The custom RPC binding handle, as specified in section [<228>](#).

**Flags:** A set of bit flags that specify properties that MUST be true for a domain trust to be part of the returned domain name list. A flag is TRUE (or set) if its value is equal to 1. Flags MUST contain one or more of the following bits.

											1											2										3	
0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	0	1		
0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	F	E	D	C	B	A		

Where the bits are defined as:

Value	Description
A	Domain is a member of the forest.
B	Domain is directly trusted by this domain.
C	Domain is the root of a tree in the forest.
D	Domain is the primary domain of the queried server.
E	Primary domain is running in native mode.
F	Domain directly trusts this domain.

All other bits MUST be set to zero.

**Domains:** A pointer to a [<228>](#) structure, as specified in section [<228>](#), that contains a list of trusted domains.

**Return Values:** The method returns 0x00000000 on success; otherwise, it returns a nonzero error code. [<229>](#)

On receiving this call, the server MUST perform the following validation step:

- The *Flags* parameter MUST be checked to verify that at least one of the above valid bits is set. All other bits (0-24) MUST be zero. The server MUST return ERROR\_INVALID\_FLAGS if there are invalid bits present.

If the *ServerName* parameter is not NULL then it is compared against the server's Computer Name ([<228>](#) section 5.1). If the *ServerName* parameter does not match the server's computer name, the server MUST return STATUS\_INVALID\_COMPUTER\_NAME. If the *ServerName* parameter

matches the server's computer name or the *ServerName* parameter is NULL, then processing proceeds.

If the server is not a DC (section 3.1.4.8), the server SHOULD call **NetrLogonGetDomainInfo** to a DC in its domain, with the following parameters:

- The *NetlogonWorkstationInfo* parameter with the following elements:
  - *NetlogonWorkstationInfo.LsaPolicy.LsaPolicySize* is set to 0.
  - *NetlogonWorkstationInfo.LsaPolicy.LsaPolicy* is set to NULL.
  - *NetlogonWorkstationInfo.WorkStationFlags* has the A flag set.
  - *NetlogonWorkstationInfo.DnsHostName* set to the DNS Computer Name ([MS-WSO] section 5.1).
- Level MUST be set to 0x1.

If the server is a domain controller (section 3.1.4.8), it must perform behavior equivalent to locally invoking **NetrLogonGetDomainInfo** with the previously described parameters.

If the call returns any other error code other than STATUS\_SUCCESS, then the server MUST return that error code and no further processing occurs.

If the call returns STATUS\_SUCCESS, the server MUST use the returned domains in the *DomBuffer.TrustedDomains* parameter to build and return an array of **DS\_DOMAIN\_TRUSTSW** structures from the **NETLOGON\_ONE\_DOMAIN\_INFO** structures as follows:

- If the **primary domain** is determined to not be running in **mixed mode** ([MS-ADTS] section 7.1.4.1), and the E bit is set in the *Flags* parameter, the server MUST include the primary domain (*DomBuffer.PrimaryDomain*) in the returned array.
- For each element of *DomBuffer.TrustedDomains*, if the bitwise AND of the *Flags* parameter and the *DomBuffer.TrustedDomains.TrustExtension.Flags (Flags & DomBuffer.TrustedDomains.TrustExtension[0-3])* is true, the server must include the domain in the returned array.
- For each element to be included in the returned array, each field in the **NETLOGON\_ONE\_DOMAIN\_INFO** structure listed in the first column of the following table is copied to the field of the **DS\_DOMAIN\_TRUSTSW** structure listed on the same line in the second column:

NETLOGON_ONE_DOMAIN_INFO element	DS_DOMAIN_TRUSTSW element
DomainName	NetBiosDomainName
DnsDomainName	DnsDomainName
DomainGuid	DomainGuid
DomainSid	DomainSid
Bytes 0 – 3 of TrustExtension	Flags
Bytes 4 – 7 of TrustExtension	ParentIndex
Bytes 8 – 11 of TrustExtension	TrustType

NETLOGON_ONE_DOMAIN_INFO element	DS_DOMAIN_TRUSTSW element
Bytes 12 – 15 of Trust Extension	TrustAttributes

### 3.5.5.6.2 NetrEnumerateTrustedDomainsEx (Opnum 36)

The **NetrEnumerateTrustedDomainsEx** method [<230>](#) returns a list of trusted domains from a specified server. This method extends **NetrEnumerateTrustedDomains** by returning an array of domains in a more flexible **DS\_DOMAIN\_TRUSTSW** structure, as specified in section [2.2.1.5.2](#), rather than the array of strings in **DOMAIN\_NAME\_BUFFER** structure, as specified in section [2.2.1.5.1](#). The array is returned as part of the **NETLOGON\_TRUSTED\_DOMAIN\_ARRAY** structure, as specified in section [2.2.1.5.3](#).

```
NET_API_STATUS NetrEnumerateTrustedDomainsEx (
    [in, unique, string] LOGONSRV_HANDLE ServerName,
    [out] PNETLOGON_TRUSTED_DOMAIN_ARRAY Domains
);
```

**ServerName:** The custom RPC binding handle, as specified in section [3.5.5.1](#).

**Domains:** A pointer to a **NETLOGON\_TRUSTED\_DOMAIN\_ARRAY** structure, as specified in section [2.2.1.5.3](#), that contains an array of **DS\_DOMAIN\_TRUSTSW** structures, as specified in section [2.2.1.5.2](#), one for each trusted domain.

**Return Values:** The method returns 0x00000000 on success; otherwise, it returns a nonzero error code. [<231>](#)

This method is a wrapper for [DsrEnumerateDomainTrusts](#), which strips off the F flag from the returned data for backward compatibility. For details, see section [3.5.5.6.1](#).

### 3.5.5.6.3 NetrEnumerateTrustedDomains (Opnum 19)

The **NetrEnumerateTrustedDomains** method returns a set of NetBIOS names of trusted domains.

```
NTSTATUS NetrEnumerateTrustedDomains (
    [in, unique, string] LOGONSRV_HANDLE ServerName,
    [out] PDOMAIN_NAME_BUFFER DomainNameBuffer
);
```

**ServerName:** The custom RPC binding handle, as specified in section [3.5.5.1](#).

**DomainNameBuffer:** A pointer to a **DOMAIN\_NAME\_BUFFER** structure, as specified in section [2.2.1.5.1](#), that contains a list of trusted domain names. The format of domain names contained in the buffer is specified in section [2.2.1.5.1](#).

**Return Values:** The method returns 0x00000000 on success; otherwise, it returns a nonzero error code. [<232>](#)

The server initializes the *DomainNames* field of the **DOMAIN\_NAME** buffer to the empty string. The server calls the [NetrEnumerateTrustedDomainsEx](#) method and for each **PDS\_DOMAIN\_TRUSTSW** element of the **NETLOGON\_TRUSTED\_DOMAIN\_ARRAY**, appends the *NetbiosDomainName* field to the *DomainNames* field of the **DOMAIN\_NAME\_BUFFER** (section [2.2.1.5.1](#)). Then the server terminates the *DomainNames* field with two null bytes.



For details, see section [3.5.5.6.2](#), Receiving NetrEnumerateTrustedDomainsEx.

#### 3.5.5.6.4 NetrGetForestTrustInformation (Opnum 44)

The **NetrGetForestTrustInformation** [<233>](#) method retrieves the trust information for the forest of which the member's domain is itself a member.

```
NTSTATUS NetrGetForestTrustInformation(  
    [in, unique, string] LOGONSRV_HANDLE ServerName,  
    [in, string] wchar_t* ComputerName,  
    [in] PNETLOGON_AUTHENTICATOR Authenticator,  
    [out] PNETLOGON_AUTHENTICATOR ReturnAuthenticator,  
    [in] DWORD Flags,  
    [out] PLSA_FOREST_TRUST_INFORMATION* ForestTrustInfo  
);
```

**ServerName:** The custom RPC binding handle, as specified in section [3.5.5.1](#).

**ComputerName:** The null-terminated Unicode string that contains the client computer NetBIOS name.

**Authenticator:** A pointer to a [NETLOGON\\_AUTHENTICATOR](#) structure, as specified in section [2.2.1.1.5](#), that contains the client authenticator.

**ReturnAuthenticator:** A pointer to a **NETLOGON\_AUTHENTICATOR** structure, as specified in section [2.2.1.1.5](#), that contains the server return authenticator.

**Flags:** MUST be set to zero and MUST be ignored on receipt.

**ForestTrustInfo:** A pointer to an [LSA FOREST TRUST INFORMATION](#) structure, as specified in [\[MS-LSAD\]](#) section 2.2.7.25, that contains data for each forest trust.

**Return Values:** The method returns 0x00000000 on success; otherwise, it returns a nonzero error code.

On receiving this call, the server MUST perform the following validation steps:

- Apply Common Error Processing Rule A, specified in section [3](#).
- Using the *ComputerName* for the secure channel to find the corresponding record in the ClientSessionInfo table, verify the *Authenticator* parameter (section [3.1.4.5](#)). If the *Authenticator* parameter is valid, compute the *ReturnAuthenticator* parameter returned (section [3.1.4.5](#)). Otherwise, the server MUST return STATUS\_ACCESS\_DENIED.
- Ensure that the caller is a DC in a different domain by checking that the *SecureChannelType* from ChallengeTable is TrustedDnsDomainSecureChannel or TrustedDomainSecureChannel. For all other types, this call MUST return STATUS\_NOT\_IMPLEMENTED.
- Apply Common Error Processing Rule B, specified in section [3](#), to the *ServerName* parameter.

The forest trust information for the domain hosted by *ServerName* MUST be returned.

This method can only be called by a machine that has established a secure channel with the server.

### 3.5.5.6.5 DsrGetForestTrustInformation (Opnum 43)

The DsrGetForestTrustInformation method<234> retrieves the trust information for the forest of the specified domain controller, or for a forest trusted by the forest of the specified DC.

```
NET_API_STATUS DsrGetForestTrustInformation(  
    [in, unique, string] LOGONSRV_HANDLE ServerName,  
    [in, unique, string] wchar_t* TrustedDomainName,  
    [in] DWORD Flags,  
    [out] PLSA_FOREST_TRUST_INFORMATION* ForestTrustInfo  
);
```

**ServerName:** The custom RPC binding handle, as specified in section [3.5.5.1](#).

**TrustedDomainName:** The optional null-terminated Unicode string that contains the DNS or NetBIOS name of the trusted domain for which the forest trust information is to be gathered.

**Flags:** A set of bit flags that specify additional applications for the foresttrust information. A flag is TRUE (or set) if its value is equal to 1.

0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31
0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	A

Where the bits are defined as:

Value	Description
A	Update a trusted domain object (TDO) with the information returned in ForestTrustInfo.

All other bits MUST be set to zero.

**ForestTrustInfo:** A pointer to an [LSA\\_FOREST\\_TRUST\\_INFORMATION](#) structure, as specified in [\[MS-LSAD\]](#) section 2.2.7.25, that contains data for each foresttrust.

**Return Values:** The method returns 0x00000000 on success; otherwise, it returns a nonzero error code.<235>

On receiving this call, the server MUST perform the following validation steps:

- Apply Common Error Processing Rule A, specified in section [3](#).
- Apply Common Error Processing Rule B, specified in section [3](#).
- Verify that the client has sufficient privileges. The server SHOULD determine if the client has sufficient privileges (as specified in section [3.5.5.1](#)) with the Access Request mask set to match the NETLOGON\_FTINFO\_ACCESS mask; otherwise, the server MUST return ERROR\_ACCESS\_DENIED.
- Verify that if the *Flags* parameter has bit A enabled, then the server is a PDC; otherwise, the server MUST return NERR\_NotPrimary.
- The *Flags* parameter MUST be checked for invalid bit flags. The server MUST return ERROR\_INVALID\_FLAGS if any bit other than A is set.

Additionally, if the *TrustedDomainName* is not NULL, the server MUST perform the additional following validation steps:

- Verify that the server has established a secure channel with the domain specified in the *TrustedDomainName* parameter, and apply Common Error Processing Rule E, specified in section [3](#). If the server has not established a secure channel with the domain specified in the *TrustedDomainName* parameter, then the server MUST return the error code ERROR\_NO\_SUCH\_DOMAIN.
- Apply Common Error Processing Rule C, specified in section [3](#).
- The **forest trust information** for the domain specified by the *TrustedDomainName* parameter MUST be returned.
- The server MUST verify that the *TrustedDomainName* refers to a cross-forest trust by performing external behavior consistent with locally invoking LsarQueryTrustedDomainInfoByName ([\[MS-LSAD\]](#) section 3.1.4.7.5), using the following parameters (a policy handle is not needed locally):
  - *Domain* is set to the value of the *TrustedDomainName* parameter
  - *InformationClass* is set to the value of TrustedDomainInformationEx.

If the call returns STATUS\_OBJECT\_NAME\_NOT\_FOUND the server MUST return ERROR\_NO\_SUCH\_DOMAIN. Additionally, the server MUST verify that:

- The **securityIdentifier** (Sid) field ([\[MS-ADTS\]](#) section 7.1.6.7.8) is not NULL
- The **trustType** field ([\[MS-ADTS\]](#) section 7.1.6.7.15) is 1 or 2
- The **trustAttributes** field ([\[MS-ADTS\]](#) section 7.1.6.7.9) does not contain TRUST\_ATTRIBUTE\_UPLEVEL\_ONLY
- The **trustAttributes** field ([\[MS-ADTS\]](#) section 7.1.6.7.9) contains TRUST\_ATTRIBUTE\_FOREST\_TRANSITIVE.

If the server fails to verify any of the preceding conditions, the server MUST return ERROR\_NO\_SUCH\_DOMAIN.

Otherwise, if the *TrustedDomainName* is NULL, the server MUST check to see if Flags bit A is set. If Flags bit A is set, the server MUST return ERROR\_INVALID, and no further processing occurs.

The server MUST retrieve the forest trust information for the domain specified by the *TrustedDomainName* parameter:

- If the *TrustedDomainName* is NULL the server SHOULD perform external behavior equivalent to locally invoking NetrGetForestTrustInformation with the parameters specified in the previous paragraph, return the forest trust information, and stop further processing.
- Otherwise, the server SHOULD call NetrGetForestTrustInformation with the following parameters (in addition to those specified in section [3.4.5.4.4](#)) to a **PDC**, in the domain specified by the *TrustedDomainName* Parameter, in order to retrieve the Trusted Forest's version of the LSA\_FOREST\_TRUST\_INFORMATION, referred to in the rest of this section as NewTrustInfo:
  - **ServerName** is set to NULL, indicating the current server's domain
  - **ComputerName** is set to the NetBIOS Computer Name ([\[MS-WSO\]](#) section 5.1) of the server
  - **Flags** is set to 0.

Otherwise, if the *TrustedDomainName* is not NULL and Flags bit A is set, the server SHOULD update the server's forest information for the domain specified by the *TrustedDomainName* parameter as follows:

- The server MUST retrieve its version of the forest trust information, referred to in the rest of this section as *OldTrustInfo*, by performing external behavior equivalent to locally invoking *LsarQueryForestTrustInformation* with the following parameters (a policy handle is not required locally):
  - **TrustedDomainName** is set to the *TrustedDomainName* parameter that was passed by the caller of *DsrGetForestTrustInformation*
  - **HighestRecordType** is set to *ForestTrustRecordTypeLast*.
- If the call returns *STATUS\_NOT\_FOUND*, the server SHOULD ignore this error and continue processing. If any other error is returned, the server SHOULD pass the error through and stop processing.
- The server SHOULD merge the *OldTrustInfo* *LSA\_FOREST\_TRUST\_INFORMATION* with the Trusted Forest's version of the *NewTrustInfo* *LSA\_FOREST\_TRUST\_INFORMATION*. The server SHOULD create an *LSA\_FOREST\_TRUST\_INFORMATION* structure. After the merge the new version of the *LSA\_FOREST\_TRUST\_INFORMATION* will result in the merged result, referred to in this section as *MergedTrustInfo*. The server SHOULD perform the merge using the following rules:
  - The server SHOULD iterate through the *LSA\_FOREST\_TRUST\_RECORD* ([MS-LSAD] section 2.2.7.21) entries in the *NewTrustInfo* version of the *LSA\_FOREST\_TRUST\_INFORMATION* according to the following rules. The index for the current entry in *NewTrustInfo.Entries* is denoted as "i":
    - If the *NewTrustInfo.Entries[i].ForestTrustType* is not *ForestTrustTopLevelName*, then ignore further rules for *NewTrustInfo.Entries[i]*, and continue iterating through *NewTrustInfo.Entries*.
    - If the *NewTrustInfo.Entries[i].ForestTrustData.TopLevelName* is equal to the DNS domain name (2) of the TDO, copy *NewTrustInfo.Entries[i]* into *MergedTrustInfo.Entries*, ignore further rules for *NewTrustInfo.Entries[i]*, and continue iterating through *NewTrustInfo.Entries*.
    - Iterate through the *LSA\_FOREST\_TRUST\_RECORD* entries in the *MergedTrustInfo* version of the *LSA\_FOREST\_TRUST\_INFORMATION* according to the following rules. The index for the current entry in *MergedTrustInfo.Entries* is denoted as "m":
      - If the *NewTrustInfo.Entries[i].ForestTrustData.TopLevelName* is subordinate to the *MergedTrustInfo.Entries[m].ForestTrustData.TopLevelName*, stop iterating through *MergedTrustInfo.Entries*, ignore further rules for *NewTrustInfo.Entries[i]*, and continue iterating through *NewTrustInfo.Entries*.
    - Copy the *NewTrustInfo.Entries[i]* to *MergedTrustInfo.Entries*. The new entry in *MergedTrustInfo.Entries* is referred to as *MergedEntry*.
    - Iterate through the *LSA\_FOREST\_TRUST\_RECORD* entries in the *OldTrustInfo* version of the *LSA\_FOREST\_TRUST\_INFORMATION* according to the following rules. The index for the current entry in *OldTrustInfo.Entries* is denoted as "k":
      - If the *OldTrustInfo.Entries[k].ForestTrustType* is equal to *ForestTrustTopLevelName*, and the *NewTrustInfo.Entries[i].ForestTrustData.TopLevelName* is equal to

OldTrustInfo.Entries[k].ForestTrustData.TopLevelName, copy  
OldTrustInfo.Entries[k].Flags to MergedEntry.Flags and copy  
OldTrustInfo.Entries[k].Time to MergedEntry.Time.

- Otherwise, MergedEntry.Flags is set to LSA\_TLN\_DISABLED\_NEW and MergedEntry.Time is set to 0.
- The server SHOULD iterate through the LSA\_FOREST\_TRUST\_RECORD ([MS-LSAD] section 2.2.7.21) entries in the NewTrustInfo version of the LSA\_FOREST\_TRUST\_INFORMATION according to the following rules. The index for the current entry in NewTrustInfo.Entries is denoted as "i":
  - If the NewTrustInfo.Entries[i].ForestTrustType is a ForestTrustDomainInfo, create a new LSA\_FOREST\_TRUST\_RECORD, referred to in this section as TempEntry, and copy NewTrustInfo.Entries[i] into TempEntry. TempEntry.Flags is set to 0 and TempEntry.Time is set to 0.
  - Iterate through the LSA\_FOREST\_TRUST\_RECORD entries in the MergedTrustInfo version of the LSA\_FOREST\_TRUST\_INFORMATION according to the following rules. The index for the current entry in MergedTrustInfo.Entries is denoted as "m":
    - If MergedTrustInfo.Entries[m].ForestTrustType is a ForestTrustDomainInfo and TempEntry.ForestTrustData.DomainInfo.Sid is equal to MergedTrustInfo.Entries[m].ForestTrustData.DomainInfo.Sid, delete TempEntry, stop iterating through MergedTrustInfo.Entries, ignore further rules for NewTrustInfo.Entries[i], and continue iterating through NewTrustInfo.Entries.
    - Iterate through the LSA\_FOREST\_TRUST\_RECORD Entries in the OldTrustInfo version of the LSA\_FOREST\_TRUST\_INFORMATION according to the following rules. The index for the current entry in OldTrustInfo.Entries is denoted as "n":
      - If OldTrustInfo.Entries[n].ForestTrustType is a ForestTrustDomainInfo and TempEntry.ForestTrustData.DomainInfo.NetbiosName is equal to OldTrustInfo.Entries[n].ForestTrustData.DomainInfo.NetbiosName, copy OldTrustInfo.Entries[n].Flags into TempEntry.Flags and also copy OldTrustInfo.Entries[n].Time into TempEntry.Time.
  - Copy TempEntry into MergedTrustedInfo.Entries.
- The server SHOULD iterate through the LSA\_FOREST\_TRUST\_RECORD ([MS-LSAD] section 2.2.7.21) entries in the OldTrustInfo version of the LSA\_FOREST\_TRUST\_INFORMATION according to the following rules. The index for the current entry in OldTrustInfo.Entries is denoted as "i":
  - If OldTrustInfo.Entries[i].ForestTrustType is not ForestTrustDomainInfo, then ignore further rules for OldTrustInfo.Entries[i] and continue iterating through OldTrustInfo.Entries.
  - Iterate through the LSA\_FOREST\_TRUST\_RECORD entries in the MergedTrustInfo version of the LSA\_FOREST\_TRUST\_INFORMATION according to the following rules. The index for the current entry in MergedTrustInfo.Entries is denoted as "m":
    - If MergedTrustInfo.Entries[m].ForestTrustType is a ForestTrustDomainInfo and OldTrustInfo.Entries[i].ForestTrustData.DomainInfo.NetbiosName equals MergedTrustInfo.Entries[m].ForestTrustData.DomainInfo.NetbiosName, stop iterating through the MergedTrustInfo.Entries, ignore further rules for OldTrustInfo.Entries[i] and continue iterating through OldTrustInfo.Entries.

- If OldTrustInfo.Entries[i].Flags has either the LSA\_SID\_DISABLED\_ADMIN flag set or the LSA\_NB\_DISABLED\_ADMIN flag set, copy OldTrustInfo.Entries[i] into MergedTrustInfo.Entries.
- The server SHOULD iterate through the LSA\_FOREST\_TRUST\_RECORD ([MS-LSAD] section 2.2.7.21) entries in the OldTrustInfo version of the LSA\_FOREST\_TRUST\_INFORMATION according to the following rules. The index for the current entry in OldTrustInfo.Entries is denoted as "i":
  - If OldTrustInfo.Entries[i].ForestTrustType is not equal to ForestTrustTopLevelNameEx, then ignore further rules for OldTrustInfo.Entries[i] and continue iterating through OldTrustInfo.Entries.
  - Iterate through the LSA\_FOREST\_TRUST\_RECORD entries in the MergedTrustInfo version of the LSA\_FOREST\_TRUST\_INFORMATION according to the following rules. The index for the current entry in MergedTrustInfo.Entries is denoted as "m":
    - If MergedTrustInfo.Entries[m].ForestTrustType is a ForestTrustTopLevelName and OldTrustInfo.Entries[i].ForestTrustData.TopLevelName is equal to or subordinate to MergedTrustInfo.Entries[m].ForestTrustData.TopLevelName, copy OldTrustInfo.Entries[i] into MergedTrustInfo.Entries. Stop iterating through MergedTrustInfo.Entries, but continue iterating through OldTrustInfo.Entries.

The server MUST update its version of the forest trust information for the domain specified by the TrustedDomainName parameter by performing external behavior equivalent to locally invoking LsarSetForestTrustInformation, with the following parameters (a policy handle is not needed locally):

- **TrustedDomainName** is set to the TrustedDomainName parameter that was passed by the caller of DsrGetForestTrustInformation
- **HighestRecordType** is set to ForestTrustRecordTypeLast
- **ForestTrustInfo** is set to the merged forest trust information from above, MergedTrustInfo.

If the *TrustedDomainName* is NULL:

- The forest trust information for the domain hosted by *ServerName* MUST be returned if *Flags* bit A is not set.
- The server MUST return ERROR\_INVALID\_FLAGS if *Flags* bit A is set.

### 3.5.5.6.6 NetrServerGetTrustInfo (Opnum 46)

The **NetrServerGetTrustInfo** method <236> returns an information block from a specified server. The information includes encrypted current and previous passwords for a particular account and additional trust data. The account name requested MUST be the name used when the secure channel was created, unless the method is called on a PDC by a domain controller, in which case it can be any valid account name.

```
NTSTATUS NetrServerGetTrustInfo(
    [in, unique, string] LOGONSRV_HANDLE TrustedDcName,
    [in, string] wchar_t* AccountName,
    [in] NETLOGON_SECURE_CHANNEL_TYPE SecureChannelType,
    [in, string] wchar_t* ComputerName,
    [in] PNETLOGON_AUTHENTICATOR Authenticator,
    [out] PNETLOGON_AUTHENTICATOR ReturnAuthenticator,
```

```

[out] PENCRIPTED_NT_OWF_PASSWORD EncryptedNewOwfPassword,
[out] PENCRIPTED_NT_OWF_PASSWORD EncryptedOldOwfPassword,
[out] PNL_GENERIC_RPC_DATA* TrustInfo
);

```

**TrustedDcName:** The custom RPC binding handle, as specified in section [3.5.5.1](#).

**AccountName:** The null-terminated Unicode string that contains the name of the client account in the domain.

**SecureChannelType:** A [NETLOGON\\_SECURE\\_CHANNEL\\_TYPE](#) enumerated value, as specified in section [2.2.1.3.13](#), that indicates the type of the secure channel being established by this call.

**ComputerName:** The null-terminated Unicode string that contains the NetBIOS name of the client computer, for which the trust information **MUST** be returned.

**Authenticator:** A pointer to a [NETLOGON\\_AUTHENTICATOR](#) structure, as specified in section [2.2.1.1.5](#), that contains the client authenticator.

**ReturnAuthenticator:** A pointer to a [NETLOGON\\_AUTHENTICATOR](#) structure, as specified in section [2.2.1.1.5](#), that contains the server return authenticator.

**EncryptedNewOwfPassword:** A pointer to an [ENCRYPTED\\_NT\\_OWF\\_PASSWORD](#) structure, as specified in section [2.2.1.1.4](#), that contains the NTOWFv1 (as specified in NTLM v1 Authentication in [\[MS-NLMP\]](#) section 3.3.1) of the current password, encrypted as specified in [\[MS-SAMR\]](#) section 2.2.11.1.1, Encrypting an NT Hash or LM Hash Value with a specified key. The session key is the specified 16-byte key that is used to derive its keys via the 16-byte value process, as specified in [\[MS-SAMR\]](#) section 2.2.11.1.4.

**EncryptedOldOwfPassword:** A pointer to an [ENCRYPTED\\_NT\\_OWF\\_PASSWORD](#) structure, as specified in section [2.2.1.1.4](#), that contains the NTOWFv1 (as specified in NTLM v1 Authentication in [\[MS-NLMP\]](#) section 3.3.1) of the old password, encrypted as specified in [\[MS-SAMR\]](#) section 2.2.11.1.1, Encrypting an NT Hash or LM Hash Value with a specified key. The session key is the specified 16-byte key that is used to derive its keys via the 16-byte value process, as specified in [\[MS-SAMR\]](#) section 2.2.11.1.4.

**TrustInfo:** A pointer to an [NL\\_GENERIC\\_RPC\\_DATA](#) structure, as specified in section [2.2.1.5.4](#), that contains a block of generic RPC data with trust information for the specified server.

**Return Values:** The method returns 0x00000000 to indicate success; otherwise, it returns a nonzero error code.

On receiving this call, the server **MUST** perform the following validation steps:

- Apply Common Error Processing Rule A, specified in section [3](#).
- Using the *ComputerName* for the secure channel to find the corresponding record in the ClientSessionInfo table, verify the *Authenticator* parameter (section [3.1.4.5](#)). If the *Authenticator* parameter is valid, compute the *ReturnAuthenticator* parameter returned (section [3.1.4.5](#)). Otherwise, the server **MUST** return STATUS\_ACCESS\_DENIED.

If the *TrustedDcName* parameter is not NULL, then it is compared against the server's <Computer Name> ([\[MS-WSO\]](#) section 5.1). If the *TrustedDcName* parameter does not match the server's <Computer Name>, or is NULL, then the server **MUST** return STATUS\_INVALID\_COMPUTER\_NAME.



If the *TrustedDcName* parameter matches the server's <Computer Name>, then processing proceeds.

The server MUST retrieve the OWF of the current password for the account identified by the *AccountName* and *SecureChannelType* parameters. If the *SecureChannelType* is **TrustedDnsDomainSecureChannel** or **TrustedDomainSecureChannel**, then the SharedSecret of the trust will be used and the OWF of the previous password MUST also be retrieved. All other types of *SecureChannelType* require that the SharedSecret of the computer account be used, and that an empty string MUST be used when calculating the OWF of the previous password.

The NTOWFv1 of the current and previous passwords MUST be encrypted as specified in [\[MS-SAMR\]](#) section 2.2.11.1.1, Encrypting an NT Hash or LM Hash Value with a specified key. The session key is the specified 16-byte key used to derive its keys via the 16-byte value process, as specified in [\[MS-SAMR\]](#) section 2.2.11.1.4. The encrypted versions of the NTOWFv1 for the current password and previous password MUST be returned in the parameters *EncryptedNewOwfPassword* and *EncryptedOldOwfPassword*, respectively.

If the *TrustInfo* parameter is not NULL, the structure is generated by setting NL\_GENERIC\_RPC\_DATA.UlongEntryCount to 1 and setting NL\_GENERIC\_RPC\_DATA.UlongData to a 32-bit value that contains the trust attributes. The trust attributes themselves are defined in [\[MS-LSAD\]](#) section 2.2.7.9 as the TrustAttributes member, as part of the LSAPR\_TRUSTED\_DOMAIN\_INFORMATION\_EX structure.

This method can only be called by a machine that has established a secure channel with the server.

### 3.5.5.7 Message Protection Methods

Methods in this group are used by components outside Netlogon to accomplish certain tasks, as outlined in section [1.3](#).

#### 3.5.5.7.1 NetrLogonGetTrustRid (Opnum 23)

The **NetrLogonGetTrustRid** method [<237>](#) is used to obtain the RID of the account whose password is used by domain controllers in the specified domain for establishing the secure channel from the server receiving this call.

```
NET_API_STATUS NetrLogonGetTrustRid(  
    [in, unique, string] LOGONSRV_HANDLE ServerName,  
    [in, string, unique] wchar_t* DomainName,  
    [out] unsigned long* Rid  
);
```

**ServerName:** The custom RPC binding handle, as specified in section [3.5.5.1](#).

**DomainName:** The null-terminated Unicode string that contains the DNS or NetBIOS name of the primary or trusted domain. If this parameter is NULL, this method uses the name of the primary domain of the server.

**Rid:** A pointer to an unsigned long that receives the RID of the account.

**Return Values:** The method returns 0x00000000 on success; otherwise, it returns a nonzero error code.



If *ServerName* equals NULL and *DomainName* equals NULL, then the server SHOULD determine if the client has sufficient privilege (as described in section [3.5.5.2](#)) with the Access Request mask set to NETLOGON\_FTINFO\_ACCESS.

Otherwise, the server SHOULD determine if the client has sufficient privilege (as described in section [3.5.5.2](#)) with the Access Request mask set to NETLOGON\_SERVICE\_ACCESS.

If the client does not have sufficient privilege, the server MUST return ERROR\_ACCESS\_DENIED.

If *ServerName* equals NULL, then the call MUST be made to the local machine. If the *DomainName* is the same as the domain that the machine is joined to, the call MUST succeed, and the server MUST return the **AccountRid** of the machine in the domain. If the *DomainName* is a different domain, the server MUST return ERROR\_NO\_SUCH\_DOMAIN.

If both *ServerName* and *DomainName* are NULL, the server MUST return the RID for the computer account of the caller. Otherwise, the RID for the account identified by *ServerName* and *DomainName* MUST be returned.

The server uses the server name passed in the *ServerName* parameter to look up the domain for the request. If the name is not found, the server MUST return ERROR\_INVALID\_COMPUTERNAME.

If the RID cannot be determined, the server SHOULD return ERROR\_TRUSTED\_RELATIONSHIP\_FAILURE.

### 3.5.5.7.2 NetrLogonComputeServerDigest (Opnum 24)

The **NetrLogonComputeServerDigest** method [<238>](#) computes a cryptographic digest of a message by using the MD5 message-digest algorithm, as specified in [\[RFC1321\]](#). This method is called by a client computer against a server and is used to compute a message digest, as specified in this section. The client MAY then call the **NetrLogonComputeClientDigest** method (as specified in section [3.4.5.5.3](#)) and compare the digests to ensure that the server that it communicates with knows the shared secret between the client machine and the domain.

```
NET_API_STATUS NetrLogonComputeServerDigest(  
    [in, unique, string] LOGONSRV_HANDLE ServerName,  
    [in] unsigned long Rid,  
    [in, size_is(MessageSize)] unsigned char* Message,  
    [in] unsigned long MessageSize,  
    [out] char NewMessageDigest[16],  
    [out] char OldMessageDigest[16]  
);
```

**ServerName:** The custom RPC binding handle, as specified in section [3.5.5.1](#).

**Rid:** The RID of the machine account for which the digest is to be computed. The **NetrLogonGetTrustRid method**, as specified in section [3.5.5.7.1](#), is used to obtain the RID.

**Message:** A pointer to buffer that contains the message to compute the digest.

**MessageSize:** The length of the data referenced by the *Message* parameter, in bytes.

**NewMessageDigest:** A 128-bit MD5 digest of the current machine account password and the message in the *Message* buffer. The machine account is identified by the *Rid* parameter.

**OldMessageDigest:** A 128-bit MD5 digest of the previous machine account password, if present, and the message in the *Message* buffer. If no previous machine account password exists, then the current password is used. The machine account is identified by the *Rid* parameter.

**Return Values:** The method returns 0x00000000 on success; otherwise, it returns a nonzero error code.

The server uses the server name passed in the *ServerName* parameter to look up the domain for the request. If the name is not found, the server MUST return ERROR\_INVALID\_COMPUTERNAME.

If the client does not have sufficient privilege, the server MUST return ERROR\_ACCESS\_DENIED.

The server MUST construct the machine account SID using the *Rid* parameter and the current domain with the format S-1-5-current domain-*Rid* parameter.

The server MUST compute or retrieve the NTOWFv1 of the current password, retrieve **ImpPwdHistory** ([MS-ADA1] section 2.363), and the NTOWFv1 of the previous password (if it exists) for the machine account whose security identifier ([MS-ADA3] section 2.236) corresponds to the generated SID. If the machine account cannot be found, or the machine account does not correspond to a machine, or the machine account is disabled, the server MUST return ERROR\_NO\_SUCH\_USER.

The digest of the *Message* parameter MUST be calculated with the following algorithm, using this one-way function (OWF) of the password.

```
CALL MD5Init(md5context)
IF OWF of password is present
    CALL MD5Update(md5context, OWF of password, length of OWF of
        password)
CALL MD5Update(md5context, Message, MessageSize)
CALL MD5Final(md5context)
SET digest to md5context.digest
```

The *NewMessageDigest* parameter MUST be computed by using the current password. The *OldMessageDigest* parameter MUST be computed by using the previous password, if it exists. If the previous password is not present, the new password MUST be used to compute the *OldMessageDigest*.

Creating a message digest for the previous password allows the possibility of password replication latency to be accounted for. If the machine account password was recently changed, but the change has not propagated to the server processing this method, the server keeps the old password.

### 3.5.5.7.3 NetrLogonComputeClientDigest (Opnum 25)

The **NetrLogonComputeClientDigest** method <239> is used by a client to compute a cryptographic digest of a message by using the MD5 message-digest algorithm, as specified in [RFC1321]. This method is called by a client to compute a message digest, as specified in this section. The client SHOULD use this digest to compare against one that is returned by a call to **NetrLogonComputeServerDigest**. This comparison allows the client to ensure that the server that it communicates with knows the shared secret between the client machine and the domain.

```
NET_API_STATUS NetrLogonComputeClientDigest(
    [in, unique, string] LOGONSRV_HANDLE ServerName,
    [in, unique, string] wchar_t* DomainName,
    [in, size_is(MessageSize)] unsigned char* Message,
```

```

[in] unsigned long MessageSize,
[out] char NewMessageDigest[16],
[out] char OldMessageDigest[16]
);

```

**ServerName:** The custom RPC binding handle, as specified in section [3.5.5.1](#).

**DomainName:** A pointer to a null-terminated Unicode string that contains the DNS or NetBIOS name of the trusted domain. If this parameter is NULL, the domain of which the client computer is a member is used.

**Message:** A pointer to a buffer that contains the message for which the digest is to be computed.

**MessageSize:** The length, in bytes, of the *Message* parameter.

**NewMessageDigest:** A 128-bit MD5 digest of the current computer account password and the message in the *Message* buffer.

**OldMessageDigest:** A 128-bit MD5 digest of the previous machine account password and the message in the *Message* buffer. If no previous computer account password exists, the current password is used.

**Return Values:** The method returns 0x00000000 on success; otherwise, it returns a nonzero error code.

If the client does not have sufficient privilege, the server MUST return ERROR\_ACCESS\_DENIED.

The server MUST compute or retrieve the NTOWFv1 of the current machine password and the NTOWFv1 of the previous machine password, if it exists. If the password cannot be found, the server MUST return ERROR\_NO\_TRUST\_LSA\_SECRET.

The server MUST compute the NTOWFv1 (as specified in [\[MS-NLMP\]](#) section 3.3.1) of each password, if present. The digest of the *Message* parameter MUST be calculated using this OWF of the password, as follows.

```

CALL MD5Init(md5context)
IF OWF of password is present
    CALL MD5Update(md5context, OWF of password, length of OWF of
        password)
CALL MD5Update(md5context, Message, MessageSize)
CALL MD5Final(md5context)
SET digest to md5context.digest

```

The *NewMessageDigest* parameter MUST be computed by using the current password. The *OldMessageDigest* parameter MUST be computed by using the previous password, if it exists. If the previous password is not present, the new password MUST be used to compute the *OldMessageDigest*.

Creating a message digest for the previous password allows the possibility of password replication latency to be accounted for. If the client computer password was recently changed, but the change has not propagated to the server processing this method, the client and the server will have two different passwords.

#### 3.5.5.7.4 NetrLogonSendToSam (Opnum 32)

The **NetrLogonSendToSam** <240> method allows a BDC or RODC to forward user account password changes to the PDC. It is used by the client to deliver an opaque buffer to the **SAM database** ([MS-SAMR] (section 3.1.1)) on the server side.

```
NTSTATUS NetrLogonSendToSam(
    [in, unique, string] LOGONSRV_HANDLE PrimaryName,
    [in, string] wchar_t* ComputerName,
    [in] PNETLOGON_AUTHENTICATOR Authenticator,
    [out] PNETLOGON_AUTHENTICATOR ReturnAuthenticator,
    [in, size_is(OpaqueBufferSize)]
        unsigned char* OpaqueBuffer,
    [in] unsigned long OpaqueBufferSize
);
```

**PrimaryName:** The custom RPC binding handle, as specified in [3.5.5.1](#).

**ComputerName:** A null-terminated Unicode string that contains the NetBIOS name of the client computer making the call.

**Authenticator:** A pointer to a **NETLOGON\_AUTHENTICATOR** structure, as specified in section [2.2.1.1.5](#), that contains the client authenticator.

**ReturnAuthenticator:** A pointer to a **NETLOGON\_AUTHENTICATOR** structure, as specified in section [2.2.1.1.5](#), that contains the server return authenticator.

**OpaqueBuffer:** A buffer to be passed to the Security Account Manager (SAM) service on the PDC. The buffer is encrypted on the wire.

**OpaqueBufferSize:** The size, in bytes, of the *OpaqueBuffer* parameter.

**Return Values:** The method returns 0x00000000 on success; otherwise, it returns a nonzero error code.

On receiving this call, the server MUST perform the following validation steps:

- Apply Common Error Processing Rule A, specified in section [3](#).
- Using the *ComputerName* for the secure channel to find the corresponding record in the ClientSessionInfo table, verify the *Authenticator* parameter (section [3.1.4.5](#)). If the *Authenticator* parameter is valid, compute the *ReturnAuthenticator* parameter returned (section [3.1.4.5](#)). Otherwise, the server MUST return STATUS\_ACCESS\_DENIED.

If the *PrimaryName* parameter is not NULL, then it is compared against the server's Computer Name ([MS-WSQ] section 5.1). If the *PrimaryName* parameter does not match the server's Computer Name, the server MUST return STATUS\_INVALID\_COMPUTER\_NAME. If the *PrimaryName* parameter matches the server's Computer Name, or the *PrimaryName* parameter is NULL, then processing proceeds.

The server MUST check whether the caller is a BDC or RODC; otherwise, it MUST return STATUS\_ACCESS\_DENIED. The server determines whether the caller is BDC or RODC by examining the value of *SecureChannelType* parameter in the ClientSessionInfo table. The caller is a BDC if *SecureChannelType* is ServerSecureChannel. The caller is an RODC if the *SecureChannelType* is CdcServerSecureChannel.

The server MUST decrypt the message passed in the *OpaqueBuffer* parameter using the negotiated encryption algorithm (determined by bits C, O, or W, respectively, in the **NegotiateFlags** member of the **ClientSessionInfo** table entry for *ComputerName*) and the established session key as the **decryption** key. The server SHOULD pass the decrypted data to the local SAM for processing. The buffer specified by *OpaqueBuffer* is completely opaque to the Netlogon Protocol.

This method can be called only by a machine that has established a secure channel with the server.

**3.5.5.7.5 NetrLogonSetServiceBits (Opnum 22)**

The **NetrLogonSetServiceBits**<241> method is used to notify Netlogon whether a domain controller is running specified services, as detailed in the following section.

```
NTSTATUS NetrLogonSetServiceBits(
    [in, unique, string] LOGONSRV_HANDLE ServerName,
    [in] DWORD ServiceBitsOfInterest,
    [in] DWORD ServiceBits
);
```

**ServerName:** The custom RPC binding handle, as specified in section 3.5.5.1, representing the connection to a DC.

**ServiceBitsOfInterest:** A set of bit flags used as a mask to indicate which service's state (running or not running) is being set by this call. The value is constructed from zero or more bit flags from the following table.

										1										2										3	
0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	0	1
0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	C	0	0	0	B	0	0	A	0	0	0	0	0	0

The flags are defined as follows.

Value	Description
A	The state of the time service is being set.
B	The state of the time service with clock hardware is being set.
C	The state of the Active Directory Web service is being set.<242>

All other bits MUST be set to zero; otherwise, the error STATUS\_ACCESS\_DENIED is returned.

**ServiceBits:** A set of bit flags used as a mask to indicate whether the service indicated by *ServiceBitsOfInterest* is running or not. If the flag is set to 0, the corresponding service indicated by *ServiceBitsOfInterest* is not running. Otherwise, if the flag is set to 1, the corresponding service indicated by *ServiceBitsOfInterest* is running. The value is constructed from zero or more bit flags from the following table.

0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31
0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	C	0	0	0	B	0	0	A	0	0	0	0	0	0

The flags are defined as follows.

Value	Description
A	Time service is running.
B	Time service with clock hardware is running.
C	Active Directory Web service is running. <a href="#">&lt;243&gt;</a>

All other bits MUST be set to zero; otherwise, the error STATUS\_INVALID\_PARAMETER is returned.

If a flag is set to 1 and the same flag is set to 0 in the *ServiceBitsOfInterest* parameter, the error STATUS\_INVALID\_PARAMETER is returned.

**Return Values:** The method returns 0x00000000 on success; otherwise, it returns a nonzero error code.

If the client does not have sufficient privilege, the server MUST return ERROR\_ACCESS\_DENIED.

The server MUST return STATUS\_ACCESS\_DENIED if bits other than those previously specified are passed in.

For every service state being set by this call, as indicated by *ServiceBitsOfInterest*, the state of the corresponding service ([\[MS-ADTS\]](#) section 7.3.1.2), as indicated by *ServiceBits*, is updated in the **ServerServiceBits** abstract data model element.

### 3.5.5.7.6 NetrLogonGetTimeServiceParentDomain (Opnum 35)

The **NetrLogonGetTimeServiceParentDomain** method [<244>](#) returns the name of the parent domain of the current domain. The domain name returned by this method is suitable for passing into the [NetrLogonGetTrustRid](#) method and [NetrLogonComputeClientDigest](#) method.

```
NET_API_STATUS NetrLogonGetTimeServiceParentDomain(
    [in, unique, string] LOGONSRV_HANDLE ServerName,
    [out, string] wchar_t** DomainName,
    [out] int* PdcSameSite
);
```

**ServerName:** The custom RPC binding handle, as specified in section [3.5.5.1](#).

**DomainName:** A pointer to the buffer that receives the null-terminated Unicode string that contains the name of the parent domain. If the DNS domain name is available, it is returned through this parameter; otherwise, the NetBIOS domain name is returned.

**PdcSameSite:** A pointer to the integer that receives the value that indicates whether the PDC for the domain *DomainName* is in the same site as the server specified by *ServerName*. This value SHOULD [<245>](#) be ignored if *ServerName* is not a domain controller.

Value	Meaning
False 0	The PDC is not in the same site as the server specified by <i>ServerName</i> .
True 1	The PDC is in the same site as the server specified by <i>ServerName</i> .

**Return Values:** The method returns 0x00000000 on success; otherwise, it returns a nonzero error code.

If the client does not have sufficient privilege, the server MUST return ERROR\_ACCESS\_DENIED.

The domain name returned MUST be determined according to the following rules:

- On a non-DC machine, the returned domain name is the name of the domain of which the *ServerName* is a member. If *ServerName* is not valid, then the server MUST return ERROR\_INVALID\_COMPUTERNAME.
- On a DC that is at the root of the forest, **rootDomainNamingContext** ([MS-ADTS] section 3.1.1.3.2.16) is equal to **defaultNamingContext** ([MS-ADTS] section 3.1.1.3.2.3). In this case, ERROR\_NO\_SUCH\_DOMAIN is returned.
- On a DC that is at the root of a tree in the forest, the name of a trusted domain that is also at the root of a tree in the forest is returned.

On any other DC, the name of the domain that is directly the parent domain is returned.

The domain's information MUST be retrieved from an implementation-specific directory. Based on this retrieved information, if the domain has a DNS domain name, it MUST be returned; otherwise, the NetBIOS domain name MUST be returned. This behavior is functionally equivalent to locally invoking LsarQueryTrustedDomainInfo ([MS-LSAD] section 3.1.4.7.2) for the domain, where TrustedDomainSid is the domain SID corresponding to the appropriate domain name retrieved from a cached list, and InformationClass is TrustedDomainInformationEx (policy handle is not needed locally), to return the TrustedDomainInformationEx.Name string (DNS name) if it is present or TrustedDomainInformationEx.Flat Name string (NetBIOS name) otherwise.

The *PdcSameSite* returned MUST be determined according to the following rules:

- On a non-DC machine, the value of *PdcSameSite* is set to TRUE.
- On a DC machine, the server SHOULD determine the PDC as specified in [MS-ADTS] section 3.1.1.1.11. Then the server SHOULD determine the sites of both the server and PDC as described in [MS-ADTS] section 3.1.1.4.5.29. The server MUST compare the PDC site with its own site and if the two match, the *PdcSameSite* output parameter MUST be set to TRUE; otherwise, it MUST be set to FALSE.

### 3.5.5.8 Administrative Services Methods

Methods in this group are used for querying and controlling Netlogon behavior, as outlined in section [1.3](#).

### 3.5.5.8.1 NetrLogonControl2Ex (Opnum 18)

The **NetrLogonControl2Ex** method executes Windows-specific administrative actions that pertain to the Netlogon server operation. It is used to query the status and control the actions of the Netlogon server.

```
NET_API_STATUS NetrLogonControl2Ex(  
    [in, unique, string] LOGONSRV_HANDLE ServerName,  
    [in] DWORD FunctionCode,  
    [in] DWORD QueryLevel,  
    [in, switch_is(FunctionCode)] PNETLOGON_CONTROL_DATA_INFORMATION Data,  
    [out, switch_is(QueryLevel)] PNETLOGON_CONTROL_QUERY_INFORMATION Buffer  
);
```

**ServerName:** The custom RPC binding handle, as specified in section [3.5.5.1](#).

**FunctionCode:** The control operation to be performed; MUST be one of the following values. [<246>](#)

Value	Meaning
NETLOGON_CONTROL_QUERY 0x00000001	No operation; only the requested information is returned.
NETLOGON_CONTROL_REPLICATE 0x00000002	Forces a BDC to perform an immediate partial synchronization of all databases. <a href="#">&lt;247&gt;</a>
NETLOGON_CONTROL_SYNCHRONIZE 0x00000003	Forces a BDC to perform an immediate full synchronization of all databases. <a href="#">&lt;248&gt;</a>
NETLOGON_CONTROL_PDC_REPLICATE 0x00000004	Forces a PDC to immediately send announcement messages to ask each BDC to replicate the database. <a href="#">&lt;249&gt;</a>
NETLOGON_CONTROL_REDISCOVER 0x00000005	Forces the server to rediscover a domain controller in the specified domain and to set up a secure channel to the discovered DC.
NETLOGON_CONTROL_TC_QUERY 0x00000006	Queries the status of the last usage of the secure channel to the DC.
NETLOGON_CONTROL_TRANSPORT_NOTIFY 0x00000007	Notifies the Netlogon server that a new network connection has been added, and causes the server to flush any DC cache.
NETLOGON_CONTROL_FIND_USER 0x00000008	Queries the name of a trusted domain that contains an account for a user.
NETLOGON_CONTROL_CHANGE_PASSWORD 0x00000009	Causes the server to generate a new shared secret and to set it on the account used by the DC for setting up the secure channel from the server.
NETLOGON_CONTROL_TC_VERIFY 0x0000000A	Verifies the current status of the server's secure channel to a DC in the specified domain.
NETLOGON_CONTROL_FORCE_DNS_REG 0x0000000B	Triggers the non-timer event, Force Register DNS Records, described in <a href="#">[MS-ADTS]</a> section



Value	Meaning
	7.3.2.2.1.<250>
NETLOGON_CONTROL_QUERY_DNS_REG 0x0000000C	Queries the status of DNS updates performed by the Netlogon server, as described in <a href="#">[MS-ADTS]</a> section 7.3.2.<251>
NETLOGON_CONTROL_BACKUP_CHANGE_LOG 0x0000FFFC	This value is used for debugging purposes and does not affect the Netlogon protocol behavior.<252>
NETLOGON_CONTROL_TRUNCATE_LOG 0x0000FFFD	This value is used for debugging purposes and does not affect the Netlogon protocol behavior.<253>
NETLOGON_CONTROL_SET_DBFLAG 0x0000FFFE	This value is used for debugging purposes and does not affect the Netlogon protocol behavior.<254>
NETLOGON_CONTROL_BREAKPOINT 0x0000FFFF	This value is used for debugging purposes and MUST be used only with <b>checked builds</b> .<255> Calling <b>NetrLogonControl2Ex</b> with this function code does not affect the Netlogon protocol behavior.<256>

**QueryLevel:** Information query level requested by the client. The buffer returned in the *Buffer* parameter contains one of the following structures, based on the value of this field.

Value	Buffer Contents
0x00000001	A <a href="#">NETLOGON_INFO_1</a> structure is returned.
0x00000002	A <a href="#">NETLOGON_INFO_2</a> structure is returned.
0x00000003	A <a href="#">NETLOGON_INFO_3</a> structure is returned.
0x00000004	A <a href="#">NETLOGON_INFO_4</a> structure is returned.<257>

**Data:** [NETLOGON\\_CONTROL\\_DATA\\_INFORMATION](#) structure, as specified in section [2.2.1.6.1](#), that contains specific data required by the query.

**Buffer:** [NETLOGON\\_CONTROL\\_QUERY\\_INFORMATION](#) structure, as specified in section [2.2.1.6.6](#), that contains the specific query results, with a level of verbosity as specified in *QueryLevel*.

**Return Values:** The method returns 0x00000000 on success; otherwise, it returns a nonzero error code.

On receiving this call, the server MUST perform the following validation steps:

- The *QueryLevel* parameter MUST contain a value between 1 and 4; otherwise, the server MUST return ERROR\_INVALID\_LEVEL.
- When the *QueryLevel* parameter is set to 0x00000004, the *FunctionCode* parameter MUST be set to NETLOGON\_CONTROL\_FIND\_USER (0x00000008); otherwise, the server MUST return ERROR\_INVALID\_PARAMETER.

- When the *QueryLevel* parameter is set to 0x00000002, the *FunctionCode* parameter MUST be set to NETLOGON\_CONTROL\_REDISCOVER (0x00000005), NETLOGON\_CONTROL\_TC\_QUERY (0x00000006), or NETLOGON\_CONTROL\_TC\_VERIFY (0x0000000A); otherwise, the server MUST return ERROR\_INVALID\_PARAMETER.
- When the *FunctionCode* parameter is set to NETLOGON\_CONTROL\_FIND\_USER (0x00000008), the *QueryLevel* parameter MUST be set to 0x00000004; otherwise, the server MUST return ERROR\_INVALID\_PARAMETER.
- When the *FunctionCode* parameter is set to NETLOGON\_CONTROL\_TC\_QUERY (0x00000006), the *QueryLevel* parameter MUST be set to 0x00000002; otherwise, the server MUST return ERROR\_INVALID\_PARAMETER.
- When the *FunctionCode* parameter is set to NETLOGON\_CONTROL\_QUERY\_DNS\_REG (0x0000000C), the *QueryLevel* parameter MUST be set to 0x00000001; otherwise, the server MUST return ERROR\_INVALID\_LEVEL.
- The server MUST verify the *Data* parameter for the NETLOGON\_CONTROL\_REDISCOVER (0x00000005), NETLOGON\_CONTROL\_TC\_QUERY (0x00000006), NETLOGON\_CONTROL\_FIND\_USER (0x00000008), NETLOGON\_CONTROL\_CHANGE\_PASSWORD (0x00000009), and NETLOGON\_CONTROL\_TC\_VERIFY (0x0000000A) function codes:
  - If the parameter is NULL, the server MUST return ERROR\_INVALID\_PARAMETER.
  - For the NETLOGON\_CONTROL\_REDISCOVER (0x00000005), NETLOGON\_CONTROL\_TC\_QUERY (0x00000006), NETLOGON\_CONTROL\_CHANGE\_PASSWORD (0x00000009), and NETLOGON\_CONTROL\_TC\_VERIFY (0x0000000A) function codes, if the parameter does not contain a valid domain name in the trust list, the server MUST return ERROR\_NO\_SUCH\_DOMAIN.
  - For the NETLOGON\_CONTROL\_FIND\_USER (0x00000008) function code, if the parameter does not contain a valid user name, the server MUST return NERR\_UserNotFound.
  - If the parameter is not in the previous list, the *Data* parameter is ignored.

The server uses the server name passed in the *ServerName* parameter to look up the domain for the request. If the name is not found, the server MUST return ERROR\_INVALID\_COMPUTERNAME.

If the client does not have sufficient privilege, the server MUST return ERROR\_ACCESS\_DENIED.

If more than one of the validation steps fail, the server MAY choose one of the appropriate applicable error messages to return.

Based on the *FunctionCode* parameter provided by the client, the server MUST complete the following before populating the return structure:

- NETLOGON\_CONTROL\_QUERY: Nothing.
- NETLOGON\_CONTROL\_REPLICATE: Return ERROR\_NOT\_SUPPORTED. [.<258>](#)
- NETLOGON\_CONTROL\_SYNCHRONIZE: Return ERROR\_NOT\_SUPPORTED. [.<259>](#)
- NETLOGON\_CONTROL\_PDC\_REPLICATE: Return ERROR\_NOT\_SUPPORTED. [.<260>](#)
- NETLOGON\_CONTROL\_REDISCOVER: Force the server to rediscover DCs in the domain name provided in the **TrustedDomainName** field of the *Data* parameter and to set up a secure channel (section [3.1](#)) to the discovered DC. DC rediscovery is the same as initial DC discovery

(section [3.1.4.10](#)). If a DC discovery and establishment of a secure channel to the DC fails, the error ERROR\_NO\_LOGON\_SERVERS is returned.

- NETLOGON\_CONTROL\_TC\_QUERY: Provide return data based on the DC in the domain name provided in the **TrustedDomainName** field of the *Data* parameter.
- NETLOGON\_CONTROL\_TRANSPORT\_NOTIFY: In order to allow the server to immediately retry establishing a secure session over the new network connection that became available, the server SHOULD set the **LastAuthenticationTry** member of every entry in the ServerSession table maintained by the Netlogon client on the server's machine to zero, enumerating across every entry in the table. Also, if the server has a DC cache, the server SHOULD flush the **LocatedDCsCache** and **FailedDiscoveryCache**.
- NETLOGON\_CONTROL\_FIND\_USER: Query the name of a trusted domain that contains an account for a user with the user name provided in the **UserName** field of the *Data* parameter. The server MUST be a DC; otherwise, return ERROR\_NOT\_SUPPORTED.
- NETLOGON\_CONTROL\_CHANGE\_PASSWORD: Generate a new shared secret for the domain name provided in the **TrustedDomainName** field of the *Data* parameter. The server MUST update the **SharedSecret** (section [3.1.1](#)). If the **TrustedDomainName** field of the *Data* parameter is a trust name and the server is not a PDC ([\[MS-ADTS\]](#) section 7.1.5.3), the server MUST return ERROR\_INVALID\_DOMAIN\_ROLE.
- NETLOGON\_CONTROL\_TC\_VERIFY: Call any Netlogon method that requires a secure channel (section [3.1.4.6](#)) to the DCC in the domain name provided in the **TrustedDomainName** field of the *Data* parameter.
- NETLOGON\_CONTROL\_FORCE\_DNS\_REG: The DC SHOULD re-register all of its DNS records ([\[MS-ADTS\]](#) section 7.3.2).<261>
- NETLOGON\_CONTROL\_QUERY\_DNS\_REG: Query the status of DNS updates performed by the Netlogon server.<262>
- NETLOGON\_CONTROL\_BACKUP\_CHANGE\_LOG: Nothing.
- NETLOGON\_CONTROL\_TRUNCATE\_LOG: Nothing.
- NETLOGON\_CONTROL\_SET\_DBFLAG: Nothing.
- NETLOGON\_CONTROL\_BREAKPOINT: Nothing.

The following describes the output generated in the *Buffer* parameter based on the *FunctionCode* and *QueryLevel* requested.

For *QueryLevel* 1, the return structure MUST be generated as follows:

- **NETLOGON\_CONTROL\_QUERY\_INFORMATION.NetlogonInfo1.netlog1\_flags** MUST be set to the **netlog1\_flags** values that are applicable to the server. See **NETLOGON\_INFO\_1** (section 2.2.1.6.2) for a description of the netlog1\_flags field.
- If the *FunctionCode* parameter has the value NETLOGON\_CONTROL\_QUERY\_DNS\_REG (0x0000000C), and any DNS registration or deregistration ([\[MS-ADTS\]](#) section [7.3.2](#)) errors occurred on the last completed update, then the NETLOGON\_CONTROL\_QUERY\_INFORMATION.NetlogonInfo1.netlog1\_flags G bit MUST be set. Otherwise, the NETLOGON\_CONTROL\_QUERY\_INFORMATION.NetlogonInfo1.netlog1\_flags G bit MUST NOT be set.

- If this is a non-PDC computer, **NETLOGON\_CONTROL\_QUERY\_INFORMATION.NetlogonInfo1.netlog1\_pdc\_connection\_status** MUST be set to the current connection status of the PDC, which is stored in the **ConnectionStatus** field of the **ServerSessionInfo** table. This field MUST be set to zero if this server is the PDC.
- If *FunctionCode* NETLOGON\_CONTROL\_PDC\_REPLICATE (0x00000004) is supported [<263>](#263) and **ntMixedDomain** is set to zero, the server MUST return ERROR\_NOT\_SUPPORTED. Otherwise, the server SHOULD return STATUS\_SUCCESS.

For *QueryLevel* 2, the return structure MUST be generated as follows:

- **NETLOGON\_CONTROL\_QUERY\_INFORMATION.NetlogonInfo2.netlog2\_flags** MUST be set to the **netlog2\_flags** values that are applicable to the server. For a description of the **netlog2\_flags** member, see [2.2.1.6.3](#2.2.1.6.3).
- If this is a non-PDC computer, **NETLOGON\_CONTROL\_QUERY\_INFORMATION.NetlogonInfo2.netlog2\_pdc\_connection\_status** MUST be set to the current connection status of the PDC, which is stored in the **ConnectionStatus** field of the **ServerSessionInfo** table. This field MUST be set to zero if this server is the PDC.
- **NETLOGON\_CONTROL\_QUERY\_INFORMATION.NetlogonInfo2.netlog2\_trusted\_dc\_name** MUST be set to the name of the DC with which the computer has a secure channel established, which is stored in the **DCName** field of the **ServerSessionInfo** table.
- **NETLOGON\_CONTROL\_QUERY\_INFORMATION.NetlogonInfo2.netlog2\_tc\_connection\_status** MUST be set to the status of the secure channel, which is stored in the **ConnectionStatus** field of the **ServerSessionInfo** table.

For *QueryLevel* 3, the return structure MUST be generated as follows:

- **NETLOGON\_CONTROL\_QUERY\_INFORMATION.NetlogonInfo3.netlog3\_flags** MUST be set to zero.
- **NETLOGON\_CONTROL\_QUERY\_INFORMATION.NetlogonInfo3.netlog3\_logon\_attempts** MUST be set to LogonAttempts.
- **NETLOGON\_CONTROL\_QUERY\_INFORMATION.NetlogonInfo3.netlog3\_reserved1** through **NETLOGON\_CONTROL\_QUERY\_INFORMATION.NetlogonInfo3.netlog3\_reserved5** MUST be set to zero.

For *QueryLevel* 4, the return structure MUST be generated as follows:

- **NETLOGON\_CONTROL\_QUERY\_INFORMATION.NetlogonInfo4.netlog4\_trusted\_domain\_name** MUST be set to the trusted domain that the user was found in.  
**NETLOGON\_CONTROL\_QUERY\_INFORMATION.NetlogonInfo4.netlog4\_trusted\_dc\_name** MUST be set to the DC in the trusted domain.

In addition to the above, the returned *Buffer* structure contains undefined data of varied size at the end, which MUST be ignored.

### 3.5.5.8.2 NetrLogonControl2 (Opnum 14)

The **NetrLogonControl2** method is a predecessor to the [NetrLogonControl2Ex](#) method (section [3.5.5.8.1](#)) and was updated to have the same functionality when **NetrLogonControl2Ex** was added. All parameters of this method have the same meanings as the identically named parameters of the **NetrLogonControl2Ex** method.

```
NET_API_STATUS NetrLogonControl2(  
    [in, unique, string] LOGONSRV_HANDLE ServerName,  
    [in] DWORD FunctionCode,  
    [in] DWORD QueryLevel,  
    [in, switch_is(FunctionCode)] PNETLOGON_CONTROL_DATA_INFORMATION Data,  
    [out, switch_is(QueryLevel)] PNETLOGON_CONTROL_QUERY_INFORMATION Buffer  
);
```

All restrictions on parameter values in the **NetrLogonControl2Ex** method (section [3.5.5.8.1](#)) apply. Extra restrictions are applied to the values of the *QueryLevel* parameter as follows:

- If the *QueryLevel* parameter is set to 0x00000004, the error ERROR\_INVALID\_LEVEL is returned.

Message processing is identical to NetrLogonControl2Ex (section [3.5.5.8.1](#)).

### 3.5.5.8.3 NetrLogonControl (Opnum 12)

The **NetrLogonControl** method is a predecessor to the [NetrLogonControl2Ex](#) method, as specified in section [3.5.5.8.1](#). All parameters of this method have the same meanings as the identically named parameters of the **NetrLogonControl2Ex** method.

```
NET_API_STATUS NetrLogonControl(  
    [in, unique, string] LOGONSRV_HANDLE ServerName,  
    [in] DWORD FunctionCode,  
    [in] DWORD QueryLevel,  
    [out, switch_is(QueryLevel)] PNETLOGON_CONTROL_QUERY_INFORMATION Buffer  
);
```

All restrictions on parameter values in the **NetrLogonControl2Ex** method (section [3.5.5.8.1](#)) apply. Extra restrictions are applied to the values of the *FunctionCode* [<264>](#) and *QueryLevel* parameters as follows:

- The value of *QueryLevel* parameter is restricted to 0x00000001. If 0x00000002 is used, the error ERROR\_NOT\_SUPPORTED is returned; if any value larger than 0x00000002 is used, the error ERROR\_INVALID\_LEVEL is returned.

Message processing is identical to **NetrLogonControl2Ex**, as specified in section [3.5.5.8.1](#), except for the following:

- The *Data* parameter of **NetrLogonControl2Ex** is set to NULL.

### 3.5.5.9 Obsolete Methods

Methods in this group are obsolete, as outlined in section [1.3](#).

### 3.5.5.9.1 NetrLogonUasLogon (Opnum 0)

```
NET_API_STATUS NetrLogonUasLogon(  
    [in, unique, string] LOGONSRV_HANDLE ServerName,  
    [in, string] wchar_t* UserName,  
    [in, string] wchar_t* Workstation,  
    [out] PNETLOGON_VALIDATION_UAS_INFO* ValidationInformation  
);
```

The **NetrLogonUasLogon** method was for the support of LAN Manager products and SHOULD [<265>](#) be rejected with an error code.

### 3.5.5.9.2 NetrLogonUasLogoff (Opnum 1)

```
NET_API_STATUS NetrLogonUasLogoff(  
    [in, unique, string] LOGONSRV_HANDLE ServerName,  
    [in, string] wchar_t* UserName,  
    [in, string] wchar_t* Workstation,  
    [out] PNETLOGON_LOGOFF_UAS_INFO LogoffInformation  
);
```

The **NetrLogonUasLogoff** method was for the support of LAN Manager products and SHOULD [<266>](#) be rejected with an error code.

## 3.5.6 Timer Events

None.

## 3.5.7 Other Local Events

When Netlogon receives a PolicyChange event ([\[MS-GPSQ\]](#) section 6.5), NRPC implementations which use the Windows registry to persistently store and retrieve the SignSecureChannel variable SHOULD load the new value from the HKEY\_LOCAL\_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Netlogon\Parameters registry path and SignSecureChannel key.

## 4 Protocol Examples

The Netlogon Remote Protocol methods are simple client/server RPC methods in which the client calls the method and the server returns a response. In establishing the connection with the server, the methods have two flows of operation:

- Not requiring a session key establishment.
- Requiring a session key establishment (often referred to as establishing a secure channel).


If a method does not require a session key establishment, the flow of operations will be as specified in section [3.1.4.7](#). The server will return a response whenever a method is called by the client.

When a method requires a session key establishment, the flow of operations to establish a secure channel will be as specified in section [3.1.4.6](#). RPC will use the Netlogon SSP to protect the method. The Netlogon SSP protects the data using the negotiated session key. The server will return a response whenever a method is called by the client.

The following section describes an example of pass-through authentication to illustrate the function of the Netlogon Remote Protocol and values that can be used to test session key validation cryptography.

### 4.1 NetrLogonSamLogon with Secure Channel

When a secure channel is required, a number of additional steps are taken in the process of executing the method. For example, if a client calls the [NetrLogonSamLogon](#) method to execute an interactive account logon, the execution of the method involves several steps.



**Figure 6: Secure channel execution of NetLogonSamLogon**

**NetLogonSamLogon** involves the following steps:

1. If the Netlogon RPC call is using authenticators, the following steps are also performed.
  1. The client creates an authenticator. An authenticator is represented by a [NETLOGON\\_AUTHENTICATOR](#) structure.
  2. The client fills in the timestamp field of the structure with the number of seconds since 00:00:00 on January 1, 1970 (UTC). The client then adds this value to the current authentication seed to produce a new seed value.
  3. The client computes the credential based on the new authentication seed, the session key, and the client challenge, per the calculation specified in the previous Netlogon Credentials section.
2. If the *LogonLevel* parameter of the **NetLogonSamLogon** method contained one of a set of particular values, the client encrypts the logon data using the session key with the negotiated



encryption algorithm. The following table defines the *LogonLevel* parameter value and the data that is encrypted.

LogonLevel value	Data encrypted
NetlogonInteractiveInformation (1)	The <b>LmOwfPassword</b> and <b>NtOwfPassword</b> fields of the <a href="#">NETLOGON_INTERACTIVE_INFO</a> structure that was passed in the <i>LogonInformation</i> parameter.
NetlogonInteractiveTransitiveInformation (5)	The <b>LmOwfPassword</b> and <b>NtOwfPassword</b> fields of the <b>NETLOGON_INTERACTIVE_INFO</b> structure that was passed in the <i>LogonInformation</i> parameter.
NetlogonServiceInformation (3)	The <b>LmOwfPassword</b> and <b>NtOwfPassword</b> fields of the <a href="#">NETLOGON_SERVICE_INFO</a> structure that was passed in the <i>LogonInformation</i> parameter.
NetlogonServiceTransitiveInformation (7)	The <b>LmOwfPassword</b> and <b>NtOwfPassword</b> fields of the <b>NETLOGON_SERVICE_INFO</b> structure that was passed in the <i>LogonInformation</i> parameter.
NetlogonGenericInformation (4)	The contents of the <b>LogonData</b> buffer of the <a href="#">NETLOGON_GENERIC_INFO</a> structure that was passed in the <i>LogonInformation</i> parameter.

This step is not performed for any other *LogonLevel* parameter values.

3. The client signs and encrypts the RPC message. The data is first passed to RPC, where it is formatted according to the RPC standard. RPC then calls back to Netlogon to encrypt the RPC data buffer. The encryption of the RPC data buffer includes the following steps. (The checksum algorithm used is the negotiated checksum algorithm. The encryption algorithm used is the negotiated encryption algorithm.)

1. Create and initialize a signature. A signature is represented by an [NL\\_AUTH\\_SIGNATURE](#) structure.
2. Generate random data for the confounder in the signature.
3. Assign the sequence number in the signature based on the nonce, and increment the nonce.

**Note** The nonce is initialized to zero and is used to maintain the sequence number for the calls over the secure channel.

4. Calculate the checksum of the first 8 bytes of the signature.
5. Calculate the checksum of the 8 bytes that make up the confounder in the signature.
6. Create an encryption key by using exclusive OR to join the session key with 0x0F0F0F0F.
7. Encrypt the confounder using the encryption key.
8. Calculate the checksum of the caller's message.
9. Encrypt the caller's message using the encryption key.
10. Finalize the checksum and assign it to the checksum in the signature.
11. Encrypt the sequence number in the signature using the session key.

4. The client sends the data over the Netlogon RPC connection.
5. The server verifies the signature and decrypts the RPC message. The decryption of the RPC message includes the following steps:
  1. Decrypt the sequence number in the signature using the session key.
  2. Compare the sequence number with the nonce, and increment the nonce.
  3. Calculate the checksum of the first 8 bytes of the signature.
  4. Create an encryption key by XOR'ing the session key with 0x0F0F0F0F.
  5. Decrypt the confounder using the encryption key.
  6. Calculate the checksum of the 8 bytes that make up the confounder in the signature.
  7. Decrypt the caller's message using the encryption key.
  8. Calculate the checksum of the caller's message.
  9. Finalize the checksum and compare it with the checksum in the signature.
6. If the Netlogon RPC call is using authenticators, the server verifies the received authenticator and creates a return authenticator. To verify the received authenticator, the server adds the time stamp value in the authenticator to the current authentication seed to produce a new seed value. The server then computes the client's credential based on the new authentication seed, the session key, and the client challenge, per the calculation specified in the previous Netlogon Credentials section. Finally, the server checks whether the resulting credential is equal to the credential in the received authenticator. If successful, the server adds 1 to the authentication seed. Then the server creates a return authenticator. The server computes the credential for the return authenticator based on the new authentication seed, the session key, and the server challenge, per the calculation specified in the previous Netlogon Credentials section.
7. If the *LogonLevel* parameter of the **NetrLogonSamLogon** method contained one of a set of particular values, the server decrypts the logon data, using the session key with the negotiated decryption algorithm. The following table defines the *LogonLevel* parameter values and the data that is decrypted.

LogonLevel value	Data decrypted
1	The <b>LmOwfPassword</b> and <b>NtOwfPassword</b> fields of the <b>NETLOGON_INTERACTIVE_INFO</b> structure that was passed in the <i>LogonInformation</i> parameter.
5	The <b>LmOwfPassword</b> and <b>NtOwfPassword</b> fields of the <b>NETLOGON_INTERACTIVE_INFO</b> structure that was passed in the <i>LogonInformation</i> parameter.
3	The <b>LmOwfPassword</b> and <b>NtOwfPassword</b> fields of the <b>NETLOGON_SERVICE_INFO</b> structure that was passed in the <i>LogonInformation</i> parameter.
7	The <b>LmOwfPassword</b> and <b>NtOwfPassword</b> fields of the <b>NETLOGON_SERVICE_INFO</b> structure that was passed in the <i>LogonInformation</i> parameter.

LogonLevel value	Data decrypted
4	The contents of the <b>LogonData</b> buffer of the <b>NETLOGON_GENERIC_INFO</b> structure that was passed in the <i>LogonInformation</i> parameter.

This step is not performed for any other *LogonLevel* parameter values.

8. The server executes its implementation of the **NetrLogonSamLogon** method to validate the user. The resulting validation information is returned in a **NETLOGON\_VALIDATION** union.
9. If the *LogonLevel* parameter of the **NetrLogonSamLogon** method contained one of the following values, the server encrypts the validation information:
  - NetlogonNetworkInformation
  - NetlogonNetworkTransitiveInformation
  - NetlogonGenericInformation

The validation data is encrypted using the session key with the negotiated encryption algorithm. The data that is encrypted depends on the value that was passed in the *ValidationLevel* parameter of the **NetrLogonSamLogon** method. The following table defines the *ValidationLevel* parameter values and the data that is encrypted.

ValidationLevel value	Data encrypted
2	The <b>UserSessionKey</b> and <b>ExpansionRoom</b> fields of the <b>NETLOGON_VALIDATION_SAM_INFO</b> structure, as specified in section <a href="#">2.2.1.4.11</a> , that was passed in the <i>ValidationInformation</i> parameter.
3	The <b>UserSessionKey</b> and <b>ExpansionRoom</b> fields of the <b>NETLOGON_VALIDATION_SAM_INFO2</b> structure, as specified in section <a href="#">2.2.1.4.12</a> , that was passed in the <i>ValidationInformation</i> parameter.
5	The contents of the <b>ValidationData</b> buffer of the <b>NETLOGON_VALIDATION_GENERIC_INFO2</b> structure, as specified in section <a href="#">2.2.1.4.8</a> , that was passed in the <i>ValidationInformation</i> parameter.

This step is not performed for any other *LogonLevel* parameter values.

10. The server signs and encrypts the RPC response message. The server performs the same steps as the client performed in step 3.
11. The server sends the response back to client over the Netlogon RPC connection.
12. The client unsigns and decrypts the RPC message. The client performs the same steps as the server performed in step 5.
13. If the Netlogon RPC call is using authenticators, the client verifies the return authenticator. To verify the return authenticator, the client adds 1 to the authentication seed to produce a new seed value. The client then computes the server's credential based on the new authentication seed, the session key, and the server challenge, per the calculation specified in the previous Netlogon Credentials section. Finally, the client checks whether the resulting credential is equal to the credential in the return authenticator.

14.If the *LogonLevel* parameter of the **NetrLogonSamLogon** method contained one of the following values, the client decrypts the validation information:

- NetlogonNetworkInformation
- NetlogonNetworkTransitiveInformation
- NetlogonGenericInformation

The validation data is decrypted using the session key with the negotiated decryption algorithm. The data that is decrypted depends on the value that was passed in the *ValidationLevel* parameter of the **NetrLogonSamLogon** method. The following table defines the *ValidationLevel* parameter value and the data that is decrypted.

ValidationLevel value	Data decrypted
2	The <b>UserSessionKey</b> and <b>ExpansionRoom</b> fields of the <b>NETLOGON_VALIDATION_SAM_INFO</b> structure, as specified in section <a href="#">2.2.1.4.11</a> , that was passed in the <i>ValidationInformation</i> parameter.
3	The <b>UserSessionKey</b> and <b>ExpansionRoom</b> fields of the <b>NETLOGON_VALIDATION_SAM_INFO2</b> structure, as specified in section <a href="#">2.2.1.4.12</a> , that was passed in the <i>ValidationInformation</i> parameter.
5	The contents of the <b>ValidationData</b> buffer of the <b>NETLOGON_VALIDATION_GENERIC_INFO2</b> structure, as specified in section <a href="#">2.2.1.4.8</a> , that was passed in the <i>ValidationInformation</i> parameter.

This step is not performed for all other *LogonLevel* parameter values.

The execution of all other Netlogon methods requiring a secure channel is similar to the previous example.

## 4.2 Cryptographic Values for Session Key Validation

The following values were obtained from a Kernel debugger dump. They can be used when validating session key negotiation code.

Clear-text **SharedSecret** (machine password):

```
0000000: 2e 00 2f 00 2c 00 6e 00 4c 00 3e 00 4f 00 4c 00  ../.,.n.L.>.O.L.
0000010: 5a 00 36 00 73 00 74 00 5e 00 58 00 4b 00 65 00  Z.6.s.t.^.X.K.e.
0000020: 4d 00 25 00 2e 00 49 00 2d 00 74 00 45 00 60 00  M.%...I.-.t.E.`.
0000030: 57 00 56 00 6a 00 43 00 5b 00 30 00 36 00 3f 00  W.V.j.C.[.0.6.?.
0000040: 5d 00 3a 00 51 00 76 00 5f 00 54 00 6e 00 55 00  ].:.Q.v._.T.n.U.
0000050: 6f 00 3a 00 3a 00 42 00 77 00 2c 00 67 00 60 00  o...:B.w.,.g.`.
0000060: 76 00 23 00 4a 00 4d 00 36 00 4d 00 71 00 53 00  v.#.J.M.6.M.q.S.
0000070: 50 00 75 00 55 00 28 00 6e 00 71 00 34 00 3e 00  P.u.U.(.n.q.4.>.
0000080: 79 00 6a 00 5b 00 64 00 5c 00 2b 00 56 00 70 00  y.j.[.d.\.+V.p.
0000090: 52 00 5f 00 79 00 78 00 75 00 63 00 21 00 67 00  R._.y.x.u.C.!g.
00000a0: 30 00 54 00 36 00 35 00 76 00 7a 00 57 00 41 00  0.T.6.5.v.z.W.A.
00000b0: 42 00 5f 00 42 00 22 00 69 00 3c 00 3c 00 53 00  B._.B."i.<.<.S.
00000c0: 2b 00 34 00 27 00 5e 00 3a 00 21 00 2c 00 3b 00  +.4.'.^.:!.,;.
00000d0: 25 00 47 00 73 00 2d 00 28 00 22 00 3a 00 20 00  %.G.s.-.(."...
00000e0: 6d 00 3e 00 21 00 43 00 4c 00 66 00 6e 00 4e 00  m.>!.C.L.f.n.N.
```

### OWF of **SharedSecret**:

```
00000000: 31 a5 90 17 0a 35 1f d5-11 48 b2 a1 0a f2 c3 05 1....5...H.....
```

### Client Challenge:

```
00000000: 3a 03 90 a4 6d 0c 3d 4f                                     :...m.=0
```

### Server Challenge:

```
00000000: 0c 4c 13 d1 60 41 c8 60                                     .L..`A..`
```

### Session Key:

```
00000000: ee fe 8f 40 00 7a 2e eb-68 43 d0 d3 0a 5b e2 e3 ...@.z..hC...[..
```

## 4.2.1 ASCII MD4 Testing

The following cryptographic values are provided to test using the session key to produce MD4 outputs with ASCII inputs.

### Input:

```
00000000: 74 65 73 74                                               test
```

### Output:

```
00000000: db 34 6d 69 1d 7a cc 4d c2 62 5d b1 9f 9e 3f 52 .4mi.z.M.b]...?R
```

## 4.2.2 UNICODE MD4 Testing

The following cryptographic values are provided to test using the session key to produce MD4 outputs with UNICODE inputs.

### Input:

```
00000000: 74 00 65 00 73 00 74 00                                   t.e.s.t.
```

### Output:

```
00000000: 0c b6 94 88 05 f7 97 bf 2a 82 80 79 73 b8 95 37 .....*.ys..7
```

## 5 Security Considerations

### 5.1 Security Considerations for Implementers

Security considerations for both unauthenticated RPC and Secure RPC, as used in this protocol, are as specified in [\[MS-RPCE\]](#) sections [5.1](#) and [5.2](#).

When the Netlogon Remote Protocol secure channel was originally implemented, only certain security-sensitive RPC call arguments, such as passwords, were encrypted. This mechanism involved passing extra parameters, known as authenticators, as RPC call arguments; these are used for authenticating the RPC calls. Later, support was added to sign and encrypt the entire RPC message with the help of a new Netlogon Remote Protocol security package. However, the encryption and validation of individual security-sensitive parameters, and the use of authenticators that are passed as RPC-call arguments for authenticating the calls, were preserved in the existing RPC calls, even though these were redundant at that point.

On receiving the [DsrDeregisterDnsHostRecords](#) call, the server SHOULD control access to this method. Because **DsrDeregisterDnsHostRecords** deletes DNS records for any specific DC, the client should have administrative privileges (such as those Administrator, Local System, Account Operator, or System Operator accounts have) for the call to succeed.

One of the new RPC calls that was added later, [NetrLogonSamLogonEx](#), does not use authenticators. Instead, it encrypts the entire RPC message when encryption is requested. **NetrLogonSamLogonEx** is currently the only RPC call that is made over a secure channel that does not use authenticators. The presence of authenticators is determined by the Netlogon Remote Protocol call that was made.

To prevent remote denial of service (DoS) attacks, the server can delete the stored *ServerChallenge*, client name and client challenge used for the [NetrServerRegChallenge](#) method after a couple of minutes.

To prevent information disclosure, the server SHOULD control access to the [DsrGetForestTrustInformation](#) method to authenticated users.

To prevent information disclosure, the client SHOULD be a registered user of the corporate forest for the local computer account RID and limited to only those clients (such as local system or members of the local administrators group) that need the RID for a trust account for the [NetrLogonGetTrustRid](#) call to succeed.

On receiving the [NetrLogonComputeServerDigest](#) call, the server should control access to this method. Because **NetrLogonComputeServerDigest** is an administrative method, the client should have administrative privileges (such as those the local administrators group, local system, or local service have) for the call to succeed.

On receiving the [NetrLogonComputeClientDigest](#) call, the server should control access to this method. Because **NetrLogonComputeClientDigest** is an administrative method, the client should have administrative privileges (such as those the local administrators group, local system, or local service have) for the call to succeed.

On receiving the [NetrLogonSetServiceBits](#) call, the server should control access to this method. Because **NetrLogonSetServiceBits** is an administrative method, the client should have administrative privileges (such as those the local administrators group, local system, or local service have) for the call to succeed.

On receiving the [NetrLogonGetTimeServiceParentDomain](#) call, the server should control access to this method to determine whether the caller can access the parent domain. To prevent information disclosure, the client should have administrative privileges (such as those the local administrators group, local system, or local service have) for the call to succeed.

The server SHOULD control access to the [NetrLogonControl2Ex](#) method to determine whether the caller can manage the Netlogon service (the caller requires administrative privileges such as those the local administrators group, local system, or local service have).

The following sections specify security considerations for implementers of the Netlogon Remote Protocol.

## 5.2 Index of Security Parameters

Security parameter	Section
SealSecureChannel	<a href="#">3.1.1</a>
Session Key Parameters	<a href="#">3.1.1</a>
Netlogon Negotiable Options	<a href="#">3.1.4.2</a>
Session-Key Computation	<a href="#">3.1.4.3</a>
Netlogon Credential Computation	<a href="#">3.1.4.4</a>
Netlogon Authenticator Computation and Verification	<a href="#">3.1.4.5</a>
Session-Key Negotiation	<a href="#">3.1.4.1</a>
Integrity	<a href="#">3.3.1</a>
Sequence Detect	<a href="#">3.3.1</a>
Confidentiality	<a href="#">3.3.1</a>
Netlogon Security Context Establishment	<a href="#">3.3.4.1</a>
NL_AUTH_MESSAGE	<a href="#">3.3.4.1</a>
Signing and Encrypting	<a href="#">3.3.4.2</a>
NL_AUTH_SIGNATURE	<a href="#">3.3.4.2</a>
domain-name	<a href="#">3.4.1</a>

## 6 Appendix A: Full IDL

For ease of implementation, the full IDL is provided, where "ms-dtyp.idl" refers to the IDL found in [\[MS-DTYP\] Appendix A](#).

The syntax uses the **IDL** syntax extensions defined in [\[MS-RPCE\] sections 2.2.4](#) and [3.1.1.5.1](#). For example, as noted in [\[MS-RPCE\] section 2.2.4.9](#), a `pointer_default` declaration is not required and `pointer_default(unique)` is assumed.

```
import "ms-dtyp.idl";

[
    uuid(12345678-1234-ABCD-EF00-01234567CFFB),
    version(1.0),
    ms_union,
    pointer_default(unique)
]

interface logon
{

    typedef struct _STRING{
        USHORT Length;
        USHORT MaximumLength;
        [size_is(MaximumLength), length_is(Length) ] CHAR * Buffer;
    } STRING,
        *PSTRING;

    typedef struct _OLD_LARGE_INTEGER{
        ULONG LowPart;
        LONG HighPart;
    } OLD_LARGE_INTEGER,
        *POLD_LARGE_INTEGER;

    typedef struct _CYPHER_BLOCK{
        CHAR data[8];
    } CYPHER_BLOCK,
        *PCYPHER_BLOCK;

    typedef struct _NT_OWF_PASSWORD{
        CYPHER_BLOCK data[2];
    } NT_OWF_PASSWORD, *PNT_OWF_PASSWORD,
        ENCRYPTED_NT_OWF_PASSWORD, *PENCRIPTED_NT_OWF_PASSWORD;

    typedef struct _LM_OWF_PASSWORD{
        CYPHER_BLOCK data[2];
    } LM_OWF_PASSWORD, *PLM_OWF_PASSWORD,
        ENCRYPTED_LM_OWF_PASSWORD, *PENCRIPTED_LM_OWF_PASSWORD;

    typedef DWORD NET_API_STATUS;
    typedef [handle] wchar_t * LOGONSRV_HANDLE;

    typedef struct _NLPR_SID_INFORMATION{
        PRPC_SID SidPointer;
    } NLPR_SID_INFORMATION, *PNLPR_SID_INFORMATION;

    typedef struct _NLPR_SID_ARRAY{
```



```

        ULONG Count;
        [size_is(Count)] PNLPR_SID_INFORMATION Sids;
    } NLPR_SID_ARRAY, *PNLPR_SID_ARRAY;

typedef struct _NLPR_CR_CIPHER_VALUE{
    ULONG Length;
    ULONG MaximumLength;
    [size_is(MaximumLength), length_is(Length)]
        UCHAR * Buffer;
} NLPR_CR_CIPHER_VALUE, *PNLPR_CR_CIPHER_VALUE;

typedef struct _NLPR_LOGON_HOURS{
    USHORT UnitsPerWeek;
    [size_is(1260), length_is((UnitsPerWeek+7)/8)]
        UCHAR * LogonHours;
} NLPR_LOGON_HOURS, *PNLPR_LOGON_HOURS;

typedef struct _NLPR_USER_PRIVATE_INFO{
    UCHAR SensitiveData;
    ULONG DataLength;
    [size_is(DataLength)] UCHAR * Data;
} NLPR_USER_PRIVATE_INFO, *PNLPR_USER_PRIVATE_INFO;

typedef struct _NLPR_MODIFIED_COUNT{
    OLD_LARGE_INTEGER ModifiedCount;
} NLPR_MODIFIED_COUNT, *PNLPR_MODIFIED_COUNT;

typedef struct _NLPR_QUOTA_LIMITS{
    ULONG PagedPoolLimit;
    ULONG NonPagedPoolLimit;
    ULONG MinimumWorkingSetSize;
    ULONG MaximumWorkingSetSize;
    ULONG PagefileLimit;
    OLD_LARGE_INTEGER Reserved;
} NLPR_QUOTA_LIMITS,
    *PNLPR_QUOTA_LIMITS;

typedef struct _NETLOGON_DELTA_USER{
    RPC_UNICODE_STRING UserName;
    RPC_UNICODE_STRING FullName;
    ULONG UserId;
    ULONG PrimaryGroupId;
    RPC_UNICODE_STRING HomeDirectory;
    RPC_UNICODE_STRING HomeDirectoryDrive;
    RPC_UNICODE_STRING ScriptPath;
    RPC_UNICODE_STRING AdminComment;
    RPC_UNICODE_STRING WorkStations;
    OLD_LARGE_INTEGER LastLogon;
    OLD_LARGE_INTEGER LastLogoff;
    NLPR_LOGON_HOURS LogonHours;
    USHORT BadPasswordCount;
    USHORT LogonCount;
    OLD_LARGE_INTEGER PasswordLastSet;
    OLD_LARGE_INTEGER AccountExpires;
    ULONG UserAccountControl;
    ENCRYPTED_NT_OWF_PASSWORD EncryptedNtOwfPassword;
    ENCRYPTED_LM_OWF_PASSWORD EncryptedLmOwfPassword;
    UCHAR NtPasswordPresent;
    UCHAR LmPasswordPresent;

```

```

    UCHAR PasswordExpired;
    RPC_UNICODE_STRING UserComment;
    RPC_UNICODE_STRING Parameters;
    USHORT CountryCode;
    USHORT CodePage;
    NLPR_USER_PRIVATE_INFO PrivateData;
    SECURITY_INFORMATION SecurityInformation;
    ULONG SecuritySize;
    [size_is(SecuritySize)] UCHAR * SecurityDescriptor;
    RPC_UNICODE_STRING ProfilePath;
    RPC_UNICODE_STRING DummyString2;
    RPC_UNICODE_STRING DummyString3;
    RPC_UNICODE_STRING DummyString4;
    ULONG DummyLong1;
    ULONG DummyLong2;
    ULONG DummyLong3;
    ULONG DummyLong4;
} NETLOGON_DELTA_USER,
  *PNETLOGON_DELTA_USER;

typedef struct _NETLOGON_DELTA_GROUP{
    RPC_UNICODE_STRING Name;
    ULONG RelativeId;
    ULONG Attributes;
    RPC_UNICODE_STRING AdminComment;
    SECURITY_INFORMATION SecurityInformation;
    ULONG SecuritySize;
    [size_is(SecuritySize)] UCHAR * SecurityDescriptor;
    RPC_UNICODE_STRING DummyString1;
    RPC_UNICODE_STRING DummyString2;
    RPC_UNICODE_STRING DummyString3;
    RPC_UNICODE_STRING DummyString4;
    ULONG DummyLong1;
    ULONG DummyLong2;
    ULONG DummyLong3;
    ULONG DummyLong4;
} NETLOGON_DELTA_GROUP,
  *PNETLOGON_DELTA_GROUP;

typedef struct _NETLOGON_DELTA_GROUP_MEMBER {
    [size_is(MemberCount)] ULONG * Members;
    [size_is(MemberCount)] ULONG * Attributes;
    ULONG MemberCount;
    ULONG DummyLong1;
    ULONG DummyLong2;
    ULONG DummyLong3;
    ULONG DummyLong4;
} NETLOGON_DELTA_GROUP_MEMBER,
  *PNETLOGON_DELTA_GROUP_MEMBER;

typedef struct _NETLOGON_DELTA_ALIAS{
    RPC_UNICODE_STRING Name;
    ULONG RelativeId;
    SECURITY_INFORMATION SecurityInformation;
    ULONG SecuritySize;
    [size_is(SecuritySize)] UCHAR * SecurityDescriptor;
    RPC_UNICODE_STRING Comment;
    RPC_UNICODE_STRING DummyString2;
    RPC_UNICODE_STRING DummyString3;

```

```

        RPC_UNICODE_STRING DummyString4;
        ULONG DummyLong1;
        ULONG DummyLong2;
        ULONG DummyLong3;
        ULONG DummyLong4;
    } NETLOGON_DELTA_ALIAS,
    *PNETLOGON_DELTA_ALIAS;

typedef struct _NETLOGON_DELTA_ALIAS_MEMBER{
    NLPR_SID_ARRAY Members;
    ULONG DummyLong1;
    ULONG DummyLong2;
    ULONG DummyLong3;
    ULONG DummyLong4;
} NETLOGON_DELTA_ALIAS_MEMBER,
*PNETLOGON_DELTA_ALIAS_MEMBER;

typedef struct _NETLOGON_DELTA_DOMAIN{
    RPC_UNICODE_STRING DomainName;
    RPC_UNICODE_STRING OemInformation;
    OLD_LARGE_INTEGER ForceLogoff;
    USHORT MinPasswordLength;
    USHORT PasswordHistoryLength;
    OLD_LARGE_INTEGER MaxPasswordAge;
    OLD_LARGE_INTEGER MinPasswordAge;
    OLD_LARGE_INTEGER DomainModifiedCount;
    OLD_LARGE_INTEGER DomainCreationTime;
    SECURITY_INFORMATION SecurityInformation;
    ULONG SecuritySize;
    [size_is(SecuritySize)] UCHAR * SecurityDescriptor;
    RPC_UNICODE_STRING DomainLockoutInformation;
    RPC_UNICODE_STRING DummyString2;
    RPC_UNICODE_STRING DummyString3;
    RPC_UNICODE_STRING DummyString4;
    ULONG PasswordProperties;
    ULONG DummyLong2;
    ULONG DummyLong3;
    ULONG DummyLong4;
} NETLOGON_DELTA_DOMAIN,
*PNETLOGON_DELTA_DOMAIN;

typedef struct _NETLOGON_DELTA_RENAME_GROUP{
    RPC_UNICODE_STRING OldName;
    RPC_UNICODE_STRING NewName;
    RPC_UNICODE_STRING DummyString1;
    RPC_UNICODE_STRING DummyString2;
    RPC_UNICODE_STRING DummyString3;
    RPC_UNICODE_STRING DummyString4;
    ULONG DummyLong1;
    ULONG DummyLong2;
    ULONG DummyLong3;
    ULONG DummyLong4;
} NETLOGON_RENAME_GROUP,
*PNETLOGON_DELTA_RENAME_GROUP;

typedef struct _NETLOGON_DELTA_RENAME_USER{
    RPC_UNICODE_STRING OldName;
    RPC_UNICODE_STRING NewName;
    RPC_UNICODE_STRING DummyString1;

```

```

        RPC_UNICODE_STRING DummyString2;
        RPC_UNICODE_STRING DummyString3;
        RPC_UNICODE_STRING DummyString4;
        ULONG DummyLong1;
        ULONG DummyLong2;
        ULONG DummyLong3;
        ULONG DummyLong4;
    } NETLOGON_RENAME_USER,
    *PNETLOGON_DELTA_RENAME_USER;

typedef struct _NETLOGON_DELTA_RENAME_ALIAS{
    RPC_UNICODE_STRING OldName;
    RPC_UNICODE_STRING NewName;
    RPC_UNICODE_STRING DummyString1;
    RPC_UNICODE_STRING DummyString2;
    RPC_UNICODE_STRING DummyString3;
    RPC_UNICODE_STRING DummyString4;
    ULONG DummyLong1;
    ULONG DummyLong2;
    ULONG DummyLong3;
    ULONG DummyLong4;
} NETLOGON_RENAME_ALIAS,
*PNETLOGON_DELTA_RENAME_ALIAS;

typedef struct _NETLOGON_DELTA_POLICY{
    ULONG MaximumLogSize;
    OLD_LARGE_INTEGER AuditRetentionPeriod;
    UCHAR AuditingMode;
    ULONG MaximumAuditEventCount;
    [size_is(MaximumAuditEventCount + 1)]
        ULONG * EventAuditingOptions;
    RPC_UNICODE_STRING PrimaryDomainName;
    PRPC_SID PrimaryDomainSid;
    NLPR_QUOTA_LIMITS QuotaLimits;
    OLD_LARGE_INTEGER ModifiedId;
    OLD_LARGE_INTEGER DatabaseCreationTime;
    SECURITY_INFORMATION SecurityInformation;
    ULONG SecuritySize;
    [size_is(SecuritySize)] UCHAR * SecurityDescriptor;
    RPC_UNICODE_STRING DummyString1;
    RPC_UNICODE_STRING DummyString2;
    RPC_UNICODE_STRING DummyString3;
    RPC_UNICODE_STRING DummyString4;
    ULONG DummyLong1;
    ULONG DummyLong2;
    ULONG DummyLong3;
    ULONG DummyLong4;
} NETLOGON_DELTA_POLICY,
*PNETLOGON_DELTA_POLICY;

typedef struct _NETLOGON_DELTA_TRUSTED_DOMAINS{
    RPC_UNICODE_STRING DomainName;
    ULONG NumControllerEntries;
    [size_is(NumControllerEntries)]
        PRPC_UNICODE_STRING ControllerNames;
    SECURITY_INFORMATION SecurityInformation;
    ULONG SecuritySize;
    [size_is(SecuritySize)] UCHAR * SecurityDescriptor;
    RPC_UNICODE_STRING DummyString1;

```

```

    RPC_UNICODE_STRING DummyString2;
    RPC_UNICODE_STRING DummyString3;
    RPC_UNICODE_STRING DummyString4;
    ULONG TrustedPosixOffset;
    ULONG DummyLong2;
    ULONG DummyLong3;
    ULONG DummyLong4;
} NETLOGON_DELTA_TRUSTED_DOMAINS,
  *PNETLOGON_DELTA_TRUSTED_DOMAINS;

typedef struct _NETLOGON_DELTA_ACCOUNTS{
    ULONG PrivilegeEntries;
    ULONG PrivilegeControl;
    [size_is(PrivilegeEntries)]
        ULONG * PrivilegeAttributes;
    [size_is(PrivilegeEntries)] PRPC_UNICODE_STRING PrivilegeNames;
    NLPR_QUOTA_LIMITS QuotaLimits;
    ULONG SystemAccessFlags;
    SECURITY_INFORMATION SecurityInformation;
    ULONG SecuritySize;
    [size_is(SecuritySize)] UCHAR * SecurityDescriptor;
    RPC_UNICODE_STRING DummyString1;
    RPC_UNICODE_STRING DummyString2;
    RPC_UNICODE_STRING DummyString3;
    RPC_UNICODE_STRING DummyString4;
    ULONG DummyLong1;
    ULONG DummyLong2;
    ULONG DummyLong3;
    ULONG DummyLong4;
} NETLOGON_DELTA_ACCOUNTS,
  *PNETLOGON_DELTA_ACCOUNTS;

typedef struct _NETLOGON_DELTA_SECRET{
    NLPR_CR_CIPHER_VALUE CurrentValue;
    OLD_LARGE_INTEGER CurrentValueSetTime;
    NLPR_CR_CIPHER_VALUE OldValue;
    OLD_LARGE_INTEGER OldValueSetTime;
    SECURITY_INFORMATION SecurityInformation;
    ULONG SecuritySize;
    [size_is(SecuritySize)] UCHAR * SecurityDescriptor;
    RPC_UNICODE_STRING DummyString1;
    RPC_UNICODE_STRING DummyString2;
    RPC_UNICODE_STRING DummyString3;
    RPC_UNICODE_STRING DummyString4;
    ULONG DummyLong1;
    ULONG DummyLong2;
    ULONG DummyLong3;
    ULONG DummyLong4;
} NETLOGON_DELTA_SECRET,
  *PNETLOGON_DELTA_SECRET;

typedef struct _NETLOGON_DELTA_DELETE_GROUP{
    [string] wchar_t * AccountName;
    RPC_UNICODE_STRING DummyString1;
    RPC_UNICODE_STRING DummyString2;
    RPC_UNICODE_STRING DummyString3;
    RPC_UNICODE_STRING DummyString4;
    ULONG DummyLong1;
    ULONG DummyLong2;

```

```

        ULONG DummyLong3;
        ULONG DummyLong4;
    } NETLOGON_DELTA_DELETE_GROUP,
    *PNETLOGON_DELTA_DELETE_GROUP;

typedef struct _NETLOGON_DELTA_DELETE_USER{
    [string] wchar_t * AccountName;
    RPC_UNICODE_STRING DummyString1;
    RPC_UNICODE_STRING DummyString2;
    RPC_UNICODE_STRING DummyString3;
    RPC_UNICODE_STRING DummyString4;
    ULONG DummyLong1;
    ULONG DummyLong2;
    ULONG DummyLong3;
    ULONG DummyLong4;
} NETLOGON_DELTA_DELETE_USER,
*PNETLOGON_DELTA_DELETE_USER;

typedef enum _NETLOGON_DELTA_TYPE{
    AddOrChangeDomain = 1,
    AddOrChangeGroup = 2,
    DeleteGroup = 3,
    RenameGroup = 4,
    AddOrChangeUser = 5,
    DeleteUser = 6,
    RenameUser = 7,
    ChangeGroupMembership = 8,
    AddOrChangeAlias = 9,
    DeleteAlias = 10,
    RenameAlias = 11,
    ChangeAliasMembership = 12,
    AddOrChangeLsaPolicy = 13,
    AddOrChangeLsaTDomain = 14,
    DeleteLsaTDomain = 15,
    AddOrChangeLsaAccount = 16,
    DeleteLsaAccount = 17,
    AddOrChangeLsaSecret = 18,
    DeleteLsaSecret = 19,
    DeleteGroupByName = 20,
    DeleteUserByName = 21,
    SerialNumberSkip = 22
} NETLOGON_DELTA_TYPE;

typedef [switch_type(NETLOGON_DELTA_TYPE)] union
    _NETLOGON_DELTA_UNION{
        [case(AddOrChangeDomain)]
            PNETLOGON_DELTA_DOMAIN DeltaDomain;
        [case(AddOrChangeGroup)]
            PNETLOGON_DELTA_GROUP DeltaGroup;
        [case(RenameGroup)]
            PNETLOGON_DELTA_RENAME_GROUP DeltaRenameGroup;
        [case(AddOrChangeUser)]
            PNETLOGON_DELTA_USER DeltaUser;
        [case(RenameUser)]
            PNETLOGON_DELTA_RENAME_USER DeltaRenameUser;
        [case(ChangeGroupMembership)]
            PNETLOGON_DELTA_GROUP_MEMBER DeltaGroupMember;
        [case(AddOrChangeAlias)]
            PNETLOGON_DELTA_ALIAS DeltaAlias;
    }

```

```

[case(RenameAlias)]
    PNETLOGON_DELTA_RENAME_ALIAS DeltaRenameAlias;
[case(ChangeAliasMembership)]
    PNETLOGON_DELTA_ALIAS_MEMBER DeltaAliasMember;
[case(AddOrChangeLsaPolicy)]
    PNETLOGON_DELTA_POLICY DeltaPolicy;
[case(AddOrChangeLsaTDomain)]
    PNETLOGON_DELTA_TRUSTED_DOMAINS DeltaTDomains;
[case(AddOrChangeLsaAccount)]
    PNETLOGON_DELTA_ACCOUNTS DeltaAccounts;
[case(AddOrChangeLsaSecret)]
    PNETLOGON_DELTA_SECRET DeltaSecret;
[case(DeleteGroupByName)]
    PNETLOGON_DELTA_DELETE_GROUP DeltaDeleteGroup;
[case(DeleteUserByName)]
    PNETLOGON_DELTA_DELETE_USER DeltaDeleteUser;
[case(SerialNumberSkip)]
    PNLPR_MODIFIED_COUNT DeltaSerialNumberSkip;
[default] ;
} NETLOGON_DELTA_UNION,
*PNETLOGON_DELTA_UNION;

typedef [switch_type(NETLOGON_DELTA_TYPE)] union
    _NETLOGON_DELTA_ID_UNION{
[case(AddOrChangeDomain,
    AddOrChangeGroup,
    DeleteGroup,
    RenameGroup,
    AddOrChangeUser,
    DeleteUser,
    RenameUser,
    ChangeGroupMembership,
    AddOrChangeAlias,
    DeleteAlias,
    RenameAlias,
    ChangeAliasMembership,
    DeleteGroupByName,
    DeleteUserByName )] ULONG Rid;
[case(AddOrChangeLsaPolicy,
    AddOrChangeLsaTDomain,
    DeleteLsaTDomain,
    AddOrChangeLsaAccount,
    DeleteLsaAccount)] PRPC_SID Sid;
[case(AddOrChangeLsaSecret,
    DeleteLsaSecret)] [string] wchar_t * Name;
[default] ;
} NETLOGON_DELTA_ID_UNION,
*PNETLOGON_DELTA_ID_UNION;

typedef struct _NETLOGON_DELTA_ENUM{
    NETLOGON_DELTA_TYPE DeltaType;
    [switch_is(DeltaType)] NETLOGON_DELTA_ID_UNION DeltaID;
    [switch_is(DeltaType)] NETLOGON_DELTA_UNION DeltaUnion;
} NETLOGON_DELTA_ENUM,
*PNETLOGON_DELTA_ENUM;

typedef struct _NETLOGON_DELTA_ENUM_ARRAY{
    DWORD CountReturned;
    [size_is(CountReturned)] PNETLOGON_DELTA_ENUM Deltas;

```

```

} NETLOGON_DELTA_ENUM_ARRAY,
*PNETLOGON_DELTA_ENUM_ARRAY;

typedef struct _NETLOGON_LOGON_IDENTITY_INFO{
    RPC_UNICODE_STRING LogonDomainName;
    ULONG ParameterControl;
    OLD_LARGE_INTEGER Reserved;
    RPC_UNICODE_STRING UserName;
    RPC_UNICODE_STRING Workstation;
} NETLOGON_LOGON_IDENTITY_INFO,
*PNETLOGON_LOGON_IDENTITY_INFO;

typedef struct _NETLOGON_INTERACTIVE_INFO{
    NETLOGON_LOGON_IDENTITY_INFO Identity;
    LM_OWF_PASSWORD LmOwfPassword;
    NT_OWF_PASSWORD NtOwfPassword;
} NETLOGON_INTERACTIVE_INFO,
*PNETLOGON_INTERACTIVE_INFO;

typedef enum _NETLOGON_LOGON_INFO_CLASS{
    NetlogonInteractiveInformation = 1,
    NetlogonNetworkInformation = 2,
    NetlogonServiceInformation = 3,
    NetlogonGenericInformation = 4,
    NetlogonInteractiveTransitiveInformation = 5,
    NetlogonNetworkTransitiveInformation = 6,
    NetlogonServiceTransitiveInformation = 7
} NETLOGON_LOGON_INFO_CLASS;

typedef struct _NETLOGON_SERVICE_INFO{
    NETLOGON_LOGON_IDENTITY_INFO Identity;
    LM_OWF_PASSWORD LmOwfPassword;
    NT_OWF_PASSWORD NtOwfPassword;
} NETLOGON_SERVICE_INFO,
*PNETLOGON_SERVICE_INFO;

typedef struct{
    CHAR data[8];
} LM_CHALLENGE;

typedef struct _NETLOGON_NETWORK_INFO{
    NETLOGON_LOGON_IDENTITY_INFO Identity;
    LM_CHALLENGE LmChallenge;
    STRING NtChallengeResponse;
    STRING LmChallengeResponse;
} NETLOGON_NETWORK_INFO,
*PNETLOGON_NETWORK_INFO;

typedef struct _NETLOGON_GENERIC_INFO{
    NETLOGON_LOGON_IDENTITY_INFO Identity;
    RPC_UNICODE_STRING PackageName;
    ULONG DataLength;
    [size_is(DataLength)] UCHAR * LogonData;
} NETLOGON_GENERIC_INFO,
*PNETLOGON_GENERIC_INFO;

typedef [switch_type(NETLOGON_LOGON_INFO_CLASS)] union
    _NETLOGON_LEVEL{
        [case(NetlogonInteractiveInformation)]

```



```

        PNETLOGON_INTERACTIVE_INFO LogonInteractive;
    [case (NetlogonInteractiveTransitiveInformation)]
        PNETLOGON_INTERACTIVE_INFO LogonInteractiveTransitive;
    [case (NetlogonServiceInformation)]
        PNETLOGON_SERVICE_INFO LogonService;
    [case (NetlogonServiceTransitiveInformation)]
        PNETLOGON_SERVICE_INFO LogonServiceTransitive;
    [case (NetlogonNetworkInformation)]
        PNETLOGON_NETWORK_INFO LogonNetwork;
    [case (NetlogonNetworkTransitiveInformation)]
        PNETLOGON_NETWORK_INFO LogonNetworkTransitive;
    [case (NetlogonGenericInformation)]
        PNETLOGON_GENERIC_INFO LogonGeneric;
    [default]
        ;
} NETLOGON_LEVEL,
* PNETLOGON_LEVEL;

typedef enum _NETLOGON_VALIDATION_INFO_CLASS{
    NetlogonValidationUasInfo = 1,
    NetlogonValidationSamInfo = 2,
    NetlogonValidationSamInfo2 = 3,
    NetlogonValidationGenericInfo = 4,
    NetlogonValidationGenericInfo2 = 5,
    NetlogonValidationSamInfo4 = 6
} NETLOGON_VALIDATION_INFO_CLASS;

typedef struct _GROUP_MEMBERSHIP{
    ULONG RelativeId;
    ULONG Attributes;
} GROUP_MEMBERSHIP,
*PGROUP_MEMBERSHIP;

typedef struct _USER_SESSION_KEY{
    CYPHER_BLOCK data[2];
} USER_SESSION_KEY,
*PUSER_SESSION_KEY;

typedef struct _NETLOGON_SID_AND_ATTRIBUTES{
    PRPC_SID Sid;
    ULONG Attributes;
} NETLOGON_SID_AND_ATTRIBUTES,
*PNETLOGON_SID_AND_ATTRIBUTES;

typedef struct _NETLOGON_VALIDATION_SAM_INFO{
    OLD_LARGE_INTEGER LogonTime;
    OLD_LARGE_INTEGER LogoffTime;
    OLD_LARGE_INTEGER KickOffTime;
    OLD_LARGE_INTEGER PasswordLastSet;
    OLD_LARGE_INTEGER PasswordCanChange;
    OLD_LARGE_INTEGER PasswordMustChange;
    RPC_UNICODE_STRING EffectiveName;
    RPC_UNICODE_STRING FullName;
    RPC_UNICODE_STRING LogonScript;
    RPC_UNICODE_STRING ProfilePath;
    RPC_UNICODE_STRING HomeDirectory;
    RPC_UNICODE_STRING HomeDirectoryDrive;
    USHORT LogonCount;
    USHORT BadPasswordCount;

```

```

        ULONG UserId;
        ULONG PrimaryGroupId;
        ULONG GroupCount;
        [size_is(GroupCount)] PGROUP_MEMBERSHIP GroupIds;
        ULONG UserFlags;
        USER_SESSION_KEY UserSessionKey;
        RPC_UNICODE_STRING LogonServer;
        RPC_UNICODE_STRING LogonDomainName;
        PRPC_SID LogonDomainId;
        ULONG ExpansionRoom[10];
    } NETLOGON_VALIDATION_SAM_INFO,
    *PNETLOGON_VALIDATION_SAM_INFO;

typedef struct _NETLOGON_VALIDATION_SAM_INFO2{
    OLD_LARGE_INTEGER LogonTime;
    OLD_LARGE_INTEGER LogoffTime;
    OLD_LARGE_INTEGER KickOffTime;
    OLD_LARGE_INTEGER PasswordLastSet;
    OLD_LARGE_INTEGER PasswordCanChange;
    OLD_LARGE_INTEGER PasswordMustChange;
    RPC_UNICODE_STRING EffectiveName;
    RPC_UNICODE_STRING FullName;
    RPC_UNICODE_STRING LogonScript;
    RPC_UNICODE_STRING ProfilePath;
    RPC_UNICODE_STRING HomeDirectory;
    RPC_UNICODE_STRING HomeDirectoryDrive;
    USHORT LogonCount;
    USHORT BadPasswordCount;
    ULONG UserId;
    ULONG PrimaryGroupId;
    ULONG GroupCount;
    [size_is(GroupCount)] PGROUP_MEMBERSHIP GroupIds;
    ULONG UserFlags;
    USER_SESSION_KEY UserSessionKey;
    RPC_UNICODE_STRING LogonServer;
    RPC_UNICODE_STRING LogonDomainName;
    PRPC_SID LogonDomainId;
    ULONG ExpansionRoom[10];
    ULONG SidCount;
    [size_is(SidCount)] PNETLOGON_SID_AND_ATTRIBUTES ExtraSids;
} NETLOGON_VALIDATION_SAM_INFO2,
*PNETLOGON_VALIDATION_SAM_INFO2 ;

typedef struct _NETLOGON_VALIDATION_GENERIC_INFO2{
    ULONG DataLength;
    [size_is(DataLength)] UCHAR * ValidationData;
} NETLOGON_VALIDATION_GENERIC_INFO2,
*PNETLOGON_VALIDATION_GENERIC_INFO2;

typedef struct _NETLOGON_VALIDATION_SAM_INFO4 {
    OLD_LARGE_INTEGER LogonTime;
    OLD_LARGE_INTEGER LogoffTime;
    OLD_LARGE_INTEGER KickOffTime;
    OLD_LARGE_INTEGER PasswordLastSet;
    OLD_LARGE_INTEGER PasswordCanChange;
    OLD_LARGE_INTEGER PasswordMustChange;
    RPC_UNICODE_STRING EffectiveName;
    RPC_UNICODE_STRING FullName;
    RPC_UNICODE_STRING LogonScript;

```

```

    RPC_UNICODE_STRING ProfilePath;
    RPC_UNICODE_STRING HomeDirectory;
    RPC_UNICODE_STRING HomeDirectoryDrive;
    unsigned short LogonCount;
    unsigned short BadPasswordCount;
    unsigned long UserId;
    unsigned long PrimaryGroupId;
    unsigned long GroupCount;
    [size_is(GroupCount)] PGROUP_MEMBERSHIP GroupIds;
    unsigned long UserFlags;
    USER_SESSION_KEY UserSessionKey;
    RPC_UNICODE_STRING LogonServer;
    RPC_UNICODE_STRING LogonDomainName;
    PRPC_SID LogonDomainId;
    unsigned char LMKey[8];
    ULONG UserAccountControl;
    ULONG SubAuthStatus;
    OLD_LARGE_INTEGER LastSuccessfulILogon;
    OLD_LARGE_INTEGER LastFailedILogon;
    ULONG FailedILogonCount;
    ULONG Reserved4[1];
    unsigned long SidCount;
    [size_is(SidCount)] PNETLOGON_SID_AND_ATTRIBUTES ExtraSids;
    RPC_UNICODE_STRING DnsLogonDomainName;
    RPC_UNICODE_STRING Upn;
    RPC_UNICODE_STRING ExpansionString1;
    RPC_UNICODE_STRING ExpansionString2;
    RPC_UNICODE_STRING ExpansionString3;
    RPC_UNICODE_STRING ExpansionString4;
    RPC_UNICODE_STRING ExpansionString5;
    RPC_UNICODE_STRING ExpansionString6;
    RPC_UNICODE_STRING ExpansionString7;
    RPC_UNICODE_STRING ExpansionString8;
    RPC_UNICODE_STRING ExpansionString9;
    RPC_UNICODE_STRING ExpansionString10;
} NETLOGON_VALIDATION_SAM_INFO4,
*PNETLOGON_VALIDATION_SAM_INFO4;

typedef [switch_type(enum _NETLOGON_VALIDATION_INFO_CLASS)] union
    _NETLOGON_VALIDATION{
        [case(NetlogonValidationSamInfo)]
            PNETLOGON_VALIDATION_SAM_INFO ValidationSam;
        [case(NetlogonValidationSamInfo2)]
            PNETLOGON_VALIDATION_SAM_INFO2 ValidationSam2;
        [case(NetlogonValidationGenericInfo2)]
            PNETLOGON_VALIDATION_GENERIC_INFO2 ValidationGeneric2;
        [case(NetlogonValidationSamInfo4)]
            PNETLOGON_VALIDATION_SAM_INFO4 ValidationSam4;
        [default]
            ;
    } NETLOGON_VALIDATION,
    *PNETLOGON_VALIDATION;

typedef [switch_type(DWORD)] union
    _NETLOGON_CONTROL_DATA_INFORMATION{
        [case(5,6,9,10)] [string] wchar_t * TrustedDomainName;
        [case(65534)] DWORD DebugFlag;
        [case(8)] [string] wchar_t *UserName;
    }

```

```

        [default]
        ;
    } NETLOGON_CONTROL_DATA_INFORMATION,
    *PNETLOGON_CONTROL_DATA_INFORMATION;

typedef struct _NETLOGON_INFO_1{
    DWORD netlog1_flags;
    NET_API_STATUS netlog1_pdc_connection_status;
} NETLOGON_INFO_1,
*PNETLOGON_INFO_1;

typedef struct _NETLOGON_INFO_2{
    DWORD netlog2_flags;
    NET_API_STATUS netlog2_pdc_connection_status;
    [string] wchar_t * netlog2_trusted_dc_name;
    NET_API_STATUS netlog2_tc_connection_status;
} NETLOGON_INFO_2,
*PNETLOGON_INFO_2;

typedef struct _NETLOGON_INFO_3{
    DWORD netlog3_flags;
    DWORD netlog3_logon_attempts;
    DWORD netlog3_reserved1;
    DWORD netlog3_reserved2;
    DWORD netlog3_reserved3;
    DWORD netlog3_reserved4;
    DWORD netlog3_reserved5;
} NETLOGON_INFO_3,
*PNETLOGON_INFO_3;

typedef struct _NETLOGON_INFO_4{
    [string] wchar_t * netlog4_trusted_dc_name;
    [string] wchar_t * netlog4_trusted_domain_name;
} NETLOGON_INFO_4,
*PNETLOGON_INFO_4;

typedef [switch_type(DWORD)] union
    _NETLOGON_CONTROL_QUERY_INFORMATION{
    [case(1)] PNETLOGON_INFO_1 NetlogonInfo1;
    [case(2)] PNETLOGON_INFO_2 NetlogonInfo2;
    [case(3)] PNETLOGON_INFO_3 NetlogonInfo3;
    [case(4)] PNETLOGON_INFO_4 NetlogonInfo4;
    [default] ;
} NETLOGON_CONTROL_QUERY_INFORMATION,
*PNETLOGON_CONTROL_QUERY_INFORMATION;

typedef enum _SYNC_STATE{
    NormalState = 0,
    DomainState = 1,
    GroupState = 2,
    UasBuiltInGroupState = 3,
    UserState = 4,
    GroupMemberState = 5,
    AliasState = 6,
    AliasMemberState = 7,
    SamDoneState = 8
} SYNC_STATE,
*PSYNC_STATE;

```

```

typedef struct _DOMAIN_NAME_BUFFER{
    ULONG DomainNameByteCount;
    [unique, size_is(DomainNameByteCount)]
    UCHAR * DomainNames;
} DOMAIN_NAME_BUFFER,
*PDOMAIN_NAME_BUFFER;

typedef struct _NETLOGON_LSA_POLICY_INFO{
    ULONG LsaPolicySize;
    [size_is(LsaPolicySize)] UCHAR * LsaPolicy;
} NETLOGON_LSA_POLICY_INFO,
*PNETLOGON_LSA_POLICY_INFO;

typedef struct _NETLOGON_ONE_DOMAIN_INFO{
    RPC_UNICODE_STRING DomainName;
    RPC_UNICODE_STRING DnsDomainName;
    RPC_UNICODE_STRING DnsForestName;
    GUID DomainGuid;
    PRPC_SID DomainSid;
    RPC_UNICODE_STRING TrustExtension;
    RPC_UNICODE_STRING DummyString2;
    RPC_UNICODE_STRING DummyString3;
    RPC_UNICODE_STRING DummyString4;
    ULONG DummyLong1;
    ULONG DummyLong2;
    ULONG DummyLong3;
    ULONG DummyLong4;
} NETLOGON_ONE_DOMAIN_INFO,
*PNETLOGON_ONE_DOMAIN_INFO;

typedef struct _NETLOGON_DOMAIN_INFO{
    NETLOGON_ONE_DOMAIN_INFO PrimaryDomain;
    ULONG TrustedDomainCount;
    [size_is(TrustedDomainCount)]
    PNETLOGON_ONE_DOMAIN_INFO TrustedDomains;
    NETLOGON_LSA_POLICY_INFO LsaPolicy;
    RPC_UNICODE_STRING DnsHostNameInDs;
    RPC_UNICODE_STRING DummyString2;
    RPC_UNICODE_STRING DummyString3;
    RPC_UNICODE_STRING DummyString4;
    ULONG WorkstationFlags;
    ULONG SupportedEncTypes;
    ULONG DummyLong3;
    ULONG DummyLong4;
} NETLOGON_DOMAIN_INFO,
*PNETLOGON_DOMAIN_INFO;

typedef [switch_type(DWORD)] union
    _NETLOGON_DOMAIN_INFORMATION{
        [case(1)] PNETLOGON_DOMAIN_INFO DomainInfo;
        [case(2)] PNETLOGON_LSA_POLICY_INFO LsaPolicyInfo;
    } NETLOGON_DOMAIN_INFORMATION,
*PNETLOGON_DOMAIN_INFORMATION;

typedef struct _NETLOGON_WORKSTATION_INFO{
    NETLOGON_LSA_POLICY_INFO LsaPolicy;
    [string] wchar_t * DnsHostName;
    [string] wchar_t * SiteName;
    [string] wchar_t * Dummy1;

```

```

    [string] wchar_t * Dummy2;
    [string] wchar_t * Dummy3;
    [string] wchar_t * Dummy4;
    RPC_UNICODE_STRING OsVersion;
    RPC_UNICODE_STRING OsName;
    RPC_UNICODE_STRING DummyString3;
    RPC_UNICODE_STRING DummyString4;
    ULONG WorkstationFlags;
    ULONG DummyLong2;
    ULONG DummyLong3;
    ULONG DummyLong4;
} NETLOGON_WORKSTATION_INFO,
*PNETLOGON_WORKSTATION_INFO;

typedef [switch_type(DWORD)] union
    _NETLOGON_WORKSTATION_INFORMATION{
        [case(1)] PNETLOGON_WORKSTATION_INFO WorkstationInfo;
        [case(2)] PNETLOGON_WORKSTATION_INFO LsaPolicyInfo;
    } NETLOGON_WORKSTATION_INFORMATION,
*PNETLOGON_WORKSTATION_INFORMATION;

typedef struct _NL_SOCKET_ADDRESS{
    [size_is(iSockaddrLength)] UCHAR * lpSockaddr;
    ULONG iSockaddrLength;
} NL_SOCKET_ADDRESS,
*PNL_SOCKET_ADDRESS;

typedef struct _NL_SITE_NAME_ARRAY{
    ULONG EntryCount;
    [size_is(EntryCount)] PRPC_UNICODE_STRING SiteNames;
} NL_SITE_NAME_ARRAY,
*PNL_SITE_NAME_ARRAY;

typedef struct _DS_DOMAIN_TRUSTSW{
    [string] wchar_t * NetbiosDomainName;
    [string] wchar_t * DnsDomainName;
    ULONG Flags;
    ULONG ParentIndex;
    ULONG TrustType;
    ULONG TrustAttributes;
    PRPC_SID DomainSid;
    GUID DomainGuid;
} DS_DOMAIN_TRUSTSW,
*PDS_DOMAIN_TRUSTSW;

typedef struct _NETLOGON_TRUSTED_DOMAIN_ARRAY{
    DWORD DomainCount;
    [size_is(DomainCount)] PDS_DOMAIN_TRUSTSW Domains;
} NETLOGON_TRUSTED_DOMAIN_ARRAY,
*PNETLOGON_TRUSTED_DOMAIN_ARRAY;

typedef struct _NL_SITE_NAME_EX_ARRAY{
    ULONG EntryCount;
    [size_is(EntryCount)] PRPC_UNICODE_STRING SiteNames;
    [size_is(EntryCount)] PRPC_UNICODE_STRING SubnetNames;
} NL_SITE_NAME_EX_ARRAY,
*PNL_SITE_NAME_EX_ARRAY;

typedef struct _NL_GENERIC_RPC_DATA{

```

```

        ULONG UlongEntryCount;
        [size_is(UlongEntryCount)] ULONG * UlongData;
        ULONG UnicodeStringEntryCount;
        [size_is(UnicodeStringEntryCount)]
            PRPC_UNICODE_STRING UnicodeStringData;
    } NL_GENERIC_RPC_DATA,
    *PNL_GENERIC_RPC_DATA;

typedef struct _NETLOGON_VALIDATION_UAS_INFO{
    [string] wchar_t * usrlog1_eff_name;
    DWORD usrlog1_priv;
    DWORD usrlog1_auth_flags;
    DWORD usrlog1_num_logons;
    DWORD usrlog1_bad_pw_count;
    DWORD usrlog1_last_logon;
    DWORD usrlog1_last_logoff;
    DWORD usrlog1_logoff_time;
    DWORD usrlog1_kickoff_time;
    DWORD usrlog1_password_age;
    DWORD usrlog1_pw_can_change;
    DWORD usrlog1_pw_must_change;
    [string] wchar_t * usrlog1_computer;
    [string] wchar_t * usrlog1_domain;
    [string] wchar_t * usrlog1_script_path;
    DWORD usrlog1_reserved1;
} NETLOGON_VALIDATION_UAS_INFO,
*PNETLOGON_VALIDATION_UAS_INFO;

typedef struct _NETLOGON_LOGOFF_UAS_INFO{
    DWORD Duration;
    USHORT LogonCount;
} NETLOGON_LOGOFF_UAS_INFORMATION,
*PNETLOGON_LOGOFF_UAS_INFO;

typedef [switch_type(DWORD)] union{
    [case(1)] ULONG Dummy;
} NETLOGON_DUMMY1,
*PNETLOGON_DUMMY1;

typedef struct _NETLOGON_CREDENTIAL{
    CHAR data[8];
} NETLOGON_CREDENTIAL,
*PNETLOGON_CREDENTIAL;

typedef struct _NETLOGON_AUTHENTICATOR{
    NETLOGON_CREDENTIAL Credential;
    DWORD timestamp;
} NETLOGON_AUTHENTICATOR,
*PNETLOGON_AUTHENTICATOR;

typedef enum _NETLOGON_SECURE_CHANNEL_TYPE{
    NullSecureChannel = 0,
    MsvApSecureChannel = 1,
    WorkstationSecureChannel = 2,
    TrustedDnsDomainSecureChannel = 3,
    TrustedDomainSecureChannel = 4,
    UasServerSecureChannel = 5,
    ServerSecureChannel = 6,
    CdcServerSecureChannel = 7

```

```

} NETLOGON_SECURE_CHANNEL_TYPE;

typedef struct _UAS_INFO_0{
    CHAR ComputerName[16];
    ULONG TimeCreated;
    ULONG SerialNumber;
} UAS_INFO_0,
*PUAS_INFO_0;

typedef struct _DOMAIN_CONTROLLER_INFOW{
    [string,unique] wchar_t *DomainControllerName;
    [string,unique] wchar_t *DomainControllerAddress;
    ULONG DomainControllerAddressType;
    GUID DomainGuid;
    [string,unique] wchar_t *DomainName;
    [string,unique] wchar_t *DnsForestName;
    ULONG Flags;
    [string,unique] wchar_t *DcSiteName;
    [string,unique] wchar_t *ClientSiteName;
} DOMAIN_CONTROLLER_INFOW,
*PDOMAIN_CONTROLLER_INFOW;

typedef struct _NL_TRUST_PASSWORD{
    WCHAR Buffer[256];
    ULONG Length;
} NL_TRUST_PASSWORD,
*PNL_TRUST_PASSWORD;

typedef struct _NL_PASSWORD_VERSION{
    ULONG ReservedField;
    ULONG PasswordVersionNumber;
    ULONG PasswordVersionPresent;
} NL_PASSWORD_VERSION,
*PNL_PASSWORD_VERSION;

typedef enum _LSA_FOREST_TRUST_RECORD_TYPE {
    ForestTrustTopLevelName = 0,
    ForestTrustTopLevelNameEx = 1,
    ForestTrustDomainInfo = 2,
} LSA_FOREST_TRUST_RECORD_TYPE;

typedef RPC_UNICODE_STRING LSA_RPC_UNICODE_STRING,
*PLSA_RPC_UNICODE_STRING;

typedef struct _LSA_FOREST_TRUST_DOMAIN_INFO{
    PRPC_SID Sid;
    LSA_RPC_UNICODE_STRING DnsName;
    LSA_RPC_UNICODE_STRING NetbiosName;
} LSA_FOREST_TRUST_DOMAIN_INFO,
*PLSA_FOREST_TRUST_DOMAIN_INFO;

typedef struct _LSA_FOREST_TRUST_BINARY_DATA{
    [range(0, 131072)] ULONG Length;
    [size_is( Length )] UCHAR * Buffer;
} LSA_FOREST_TRUST_BINARY_DATA,
*PLSA_FOREST_TRUST_BINARY_DATA;

typedef struct _LSA_FOREST_TRUST_RECORD{
    ULONG Flags;

```



```

    LSA_FOREST_TRUST_RECORD_TYPE ForestTrustType;
    LARGE_INTEGER Time;
    [switch_type( LSA_FOREST_TRUST_RECORD_TYPE ),
     switch_is( ForestTrustType )] union {
    [case( ForestTrustTopLevelName,
           ForestTrustTopLevelNameEx )]
        LSA_RPC_UNICODE_STRING TopLevelName;
    [case( ForestTrustDomainInfo )]
        LSA_FOREST_TRUST_DOMAIN_INFO DomainInfo;
    [default] LSA_FOREST_TRUST_BINARY_DATA Data;
    } ForestTrustData;
} LSA_FOREST_TRUST_RECORD,
*PLSA_FOREST_TRUST_RECORD;

typedef struct _LSA_FOREST_TRUST_INFORMATION{
    [range(0, 4000)] ULONG RecordCount;
    [size_is( RecordCount )] PLSA_FOREST_TRUST_RECORD * Entries;
} LSA_FOREST_TRUST_INFORMATION,
*PLSA_FOREST_TRUST_INFORMATION;

NET_API_STATUS
NetrLogonUasLogon (
    [in,unique,string] LOGONSRV_HANDLE ServerName,
    [in, string] wchar_t * UserName,
    [in, string] wchar_t * Workstation,
    [out] PNETLOGON_VALIDATION_UAS_INFO *ValidationInformation
);

NET_API_STATUS
NetrLogonUasLogoff (
    [in,unique,string] LOGONSRV_HANDLE ServerName,
    [in, string] wchar_t * UserName,
    [in, string] wchar_t * Workstation,
    [out] PNETLOGON_LOGOFF_UAS_INFO LogoffInformation
);

NTSTATUS
NetrLogonSamLogon (
    [in,unique,string] LOGONSRV_HANDLE LogonServer,
    [in,string,unique] wchar_t * ComputerName,
    [in,unique] PNETLOGON_AUTHENTICATOR Authenticator,
    [in,out,unique] PNETLOGON_AUTHENTICATOR ReturnAuthenticator,
    [in] NETLOGON_LOGON_INFO_CLASS LogonLevel,
    [in,switch_is(LogonLevel)] PNETLOGON_LEVEL LogonInformation,
    [in] NETLOGON_VALIDATION_INFO_CLASS ValidationLevel,
    [out,switch_is(ValidationLevel)]
        PNETLOGON_VALIDATION ValidationInformation,
    [out] UCHAR * Authoritative
);

NTSTATUS
NetrLogonSamLogoff (
    [in,unique,string] LOGONSRV_HANDLE LogonServer,
    [in,string,unique] wchar_t * ComputerName,
    [in,unique] PNETLOGON_AUTHENTICATOR Authenticator,
    [in,out,unique] PNETLOGON_AUTHENTICATOR ReturnAuthenticator,
    [in] NETLOGON_LOGON_INFO_CLASS LogonLevel,
    [in,switch_is(LogonLevel)] PNETLOGON_LEVEL LogonInformation
);

```

```

NTSTATUS
NetrServerReqChallenge (
    [in,unique,string] LOGONSRV_HANDLE PrimaryName,
    [in, string] wchar_t * ComputerName,
    [in] PNETLOGON_CREDENTIAL ClientChallenge,
    [out] PNETLOGON_CREDENTIAL ServerChallenge
);

NTSTATUS
NetrServerAuthenticate (
    [in,unique,string] LOGONSRV_HANDLE PrimaryName,
    [in,string] wchar_t * AccountName,
    [in] NETLOGON_SECURE_CHANNEL_TYPE SecureChannelType,
    [in, string] wchar_t * ComputerName,
    [in] PNETLOGON_CREDENTIAL ClientCredential,
    [out] PNETLOGON_CREDENTIAL ServerCredential
);

NTSTATUS
NetrServerPasswordSet (
    [in,unique,string] LOGONSRV_HANDLE PrimaryName,
    [in,string] wchar_t * AccountName,
    [in] NETLOGON_SECURE_CHANNEL_TYPE SecureChannelType,
    [in, string] wchar_t * ComputerName,
    [in] PNETLOGON_AUTHENTICATOR Authenticator,
    [out] PNETLOGON_AUTHENTICATOR ReturnAuthenticator,
    [in] PENCIPHERED_NT_OWF_PASSWORD UasNewPassword
);

NTSTATUS
NetrDatabaseDeltas (
    [in, string] LOGONSRV_HANDLE PrimaryName,
    [in, string] wchar_t * ComputerName,
    [in] PNETLOGON_AUTHENTICATOR Authenticator,
    [in,out] PNETLOGON_AUTHENTICATOR ReturnAuthenticator,
    [in] DWORD DatabaseID,
    [in, out] PNLPR_MODIFIED_COUNT DomainModifiedCount,
    [out] PNETLOGON_DELTA_ENUM_ARRAY *DeltaArray,
    [in] DWORD PreferredMaximumLength
);

NTSTATUS
NetrDatabaseSync (
    [in, string] LOGONSRV_HANDLE PrimaryName,
    [in, string] wchar_t * ComputerName,
    [in] PNETLOGON_AUTHENTICATOR Authenticator,
    [in,out] PNETLOGON_AUTHENTICATOR ReturnAuthenticator,
    [in] DWORD DatabaseID,
    [in, out] ULONG * SyncContext,
    [out] PNETLOGON_DELTA_ENUM_ARRAY *DeltaArray,
    [in] DWORD PreferredMaximumLength
);

NTSTATUS
NetrAccountDeltas (
    [in, unique, string] LOGONSRV_HANDLE PrimaryName,
    [in, string] wchar_t * ComputerName,

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[in] PNETLOGON_AUTHENTICATOR Authenticator,
[in,out] PNETLOGON_AUTHENTICATOR ReturnAuthenticator,
[in] PUAS_INFO_0 RecordId,
[in] DWORD Count,
[in] DWORD Level,
[out, size_is(BufferSize)] UCHAR * Buffer,
[in] DWORD BufferSize,
[out] ULONG * CountReturned,
[out] ULONG * TotalEntries,
[out] PUAS_INFO_0 NextRecordId
);

NTSTATUS
NetrAccountSync (
[in, unique, string] LOGONSRV_HANDLE PrimaryName,
[in, string] wchar_t * ComputerName,
[in] PNETLOGON_AUTHENTICATOR Authenticator,
[in,out] PNETLOGON_AUTHENTICATOR ReturnAuthenticator,
[in] DWORD Reference,
[in] DWORD Level,
[out, size_is(BufferSize) ] UCHAR * Buffer,
[in] DWORD BufferSize,
[out] ULONG * CountReturned,
[out] ULONG * TotalEntries,
[out] ULONG * NextReference,
[out] PUAS_INFO_0 LastRecordId
);

NET_API_STATUS
NetrGetDCName (
[in, string] LOGONSRV_HANDLE ServerName,
[in, unique, string] wchar_t *DomainName,
[out, string] wchar_t **Buffer
);

NET_API_STATUS
NetrLogonControl(
[in, unique, string] LOGONSRV_HANDLE ServerName,
[in] DWORD FunctionCode,
[in] DWORD QueryLevel,
[out,switch_is(QueryLevel)]
    PNETLOGON_CONTROL_QUERY_INFORMATION Buffer
);

NET_API_STATUS
NetrGetAnyDCName (
[in, unique, string] LOGONSRV_HANDLE ServerName,
[in, unique, string] wchar_t *DomainName,
[out, string] wchar_t **Buffer
);

NET_API_STATUS
NetrLogonControl2(
[in, unique, string] LOGONSRV_HANDLE ServerName,
[in] DWORD FunctionCode,
[in] DWORD QueryLevel,
[in,switch_is(FunctionCode)]
    PNETLOGON_CONTROL_DATA_INFORMATION Data,
[out,switch_is(QueryLevel)]

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```

        PNETLOGON_CONTROL_QUERY_INFORMATION Buffer
    );

NTSTATUS
NetrServerAuthenticate2 (
    [in,unique,string] LOGONSRV_HANDLE PrimaryName,
    [in,string] wchar_t * AccountName,
    [in] NETLOGON_SECURE_CHANNEL_TYPE SecureChannelType,
    [in, string] wchar_t * ComputerName,
    [in] PNETLOGON_CREDENTIAL ClientCredential,
    [out] PNETLOGON_CREDENTIAL ServerCredential,
    [in,out] ULONG * NegotiateFlags
);

NTSTATUS
NetrDatabaseSync2 (
    [in, string] LOGONSRV_HANDLE PrimaryName,
    [in, string] wchar_t * ComputerName,
    [in] PNETLOGON_AUTHENTICATOR Authenticator,
    [in,out] PNETLOGON_AUTHENTICATOR ReturnAuthenticator,
    [in] DWORD DatabaseID,
    [in] SYNC_STATE RestartState,
    [in, out] ULONG * SyncContext,
    [out] PNETLOGON_DELTA_ENUM_ARRAY *DeltaArray,
    [in] DWORD PreferredMaximumLength
);

NTSTATUS
NetrDatabaseRedo(
    [in, string] LOGONSRV_HANDLE PrimaryName,
    [in, string] wchar_t * ComputerName,
    [in] PNETLOGON_AUTHENTICATOR Authenticator,
    [in,out] PNETLOGON_AUTHENTICATOR ReturnAuthenticator,
    [in, size_is(ChangeLogEntrySize)]
        UCHAR * ChangeLogEntry,
    [in] DWORD ChangeLogEntrySize,
    [out] PNETLOGON_DELTA_ENUM_ARRAY *DeltaArray
);

NET_API_STATUS
NetrLogonControl2Ex(
    [in, unique, string] LOGONSRV_HANDLE ServerName,
    [in] DWORD FunctionCode,
    [in] DWORD QueryLevel,
    [in,switch_is(FunctionCode)]
        PNETLOGON_CONTROL_DATA_INFORMATION Data,
    [out,switch_is(QueryLevel)]
        PNETLOGON_CONTROL_QUERY_INFORMATION Buffer
    );

NTSTATUS
NetrEnumerateTrustedDomains (
    [in, unique, string] LOGONSRV_HANDLE ServerName,
    [out] PDOMAIN_NAME_BUFFER DomainNameBuffer
);

NET_API_STATUS
DsrGetDcName(
    [in, unique, string ] LOGONSRV_HANDLE ComputerName,

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[in, unique, string] wchar_t * DomainName,
[in, unique] GUID *DomainGuid,
[in, unique] GUID *SiteGuid,
[in] ULONG Flags,
[out] PDOMAIN_CONTROLLER_INFO *DomainControllerInfo
);

// This method not used on the wire
NTSTATUS
NetrLogonDummyRoutine1(
[in, string] LOGONSRV_HANDLE ServerName,
[in, string, unique] wchar_t* ComputerName,
[in] PNETLOGON_AUTHENTICATOR Authenticator,
[in, out] PNETLOGON_AUTHENTICATOR ReturnAuthenticator,
[in] DWORD QueryLevel,
[out, switch_is(QueryLevel)] PNETLOGON_DUMMY1 Buffer
);

NTSTATUS
NetrLogonSetServiceBits(
[in, unique, string] LOGONSRV_HANDLE ServerName,
[in] DWORD ServiceBitsOfInterest,
[in] DWORD ServiceBits
);

NET_API_STATUS
NetrLogonGetTrustRid(
[in, unique, string] LOGONSRV_HANDLE ServerName,
[in, string, unique] wchar_t * DomainName,
[out] ULONG * Rid
);

NET_API_STATUS
NetrLogonComputeServerDigest(
[in, unique, string] LOGONSRV_HANDLE ServerName,
[in] ULONG Rid,
[in, size_is(MessageSize)] UCHAR * Message,
[in] ULONG MessageSize,
[out] CHAR NewMessageDigest[16],
[out] CHAR OldMessageDigest[16]
);

NET_API_STATUS
NetrLogonComputeClientDigest(
[in, unique, string] LOGONSRV_HANDLE ServerName,
[in, string, unique] wchar_t * DomainName,
[in, size_is(MessageSize)] UCHAR * Message,
[in] ULONG MessageSize,
[out] CHAR NewMessageDigest[16],
[out] CHAR OldMessageDigest[16]
);

NTSTATUS
NetrServerAuthenticate3 (
[in, unique, string] LOGONSRV_HANDLE PrimaryName,
[in, string] wchar_t * AccountName,
[in] NETLOGON_SECURE_CHANNEL_TYPE SecureChannelType,
[in, string] wchar_t * ComputerName,
[in] PNETLOGON_CREDENTIAL ClientCredential,

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[out] PNETLOGON_CREDENTIAL ServerCredential,
[in,out] ULONG * NegotiateFlags,
[out] ULONG * AccountRid
);

NET_API_STATUS
DsrGetDcNameEx(
    [in, unique, string] LOGONSRV_HANDLE ComputerName,
    [in, unique, string] wchar_t * DomainName,
    [in, unique] GUID *DomainGuid,
    [in, unique, string] wchar_t * SiteName,
    [in] ULONG Flags,
    [out] PDOMAIN_CONTROLLER_INFO *DomainControllerInfo
);

NET_API_STATUS
DsrGetSiteName(
    [in, unique, string] LOGONSRV_HANDLE ComputerName,
    [out, string] wchar_t **SiteName
);

NTSTATUS
NetrLogonGetDomainInfo(
    [in, string] LOGONSRV_HANDLE ServerName,
    [in,string,unique] wchar_t * ComputerName,
    [in] PNETLOGON_AUTHENTICATOR Authenticator,
    [in,out] PNETLOGON_AUTHENTICATOR ReturnAuthenticator,
    [in] DWORD Level,
    [in,switch_is(Level)] PNETLOGON_WORKSTATION_INFORMATION WkstaBuffer,
    [out,switch_is(Level)] PNETLOGON_DOMAIN_INFORMATION DomBuffer
);

NTSTATUS
NetrServerPasswordSet2 (
    [in,unique,string] LOGONSRV_HANDLE PrimaryName,
    [in,string] wchar_t * AccountName,
    [in] NETLOGON_SECURE_CHANNEL_TYPE SecureChannelType,
    [in, string] wchar_t * ComputerName,
    [in] PNETLOGON_AUTHENTICATOR Authenticator,
    [out] PNETLOGON_AUTHENTICATOR ReturnAuthenticator,
    [in] PNL_TRUST_PASSWORD ClearNewPassword
);

NTSTATUS
NetrServerPasswordGet (
    [in,unique,string] LOGONSRV_HANDLE PrimaryName,
    [in,string] wchar_t * AccountName,
    [in] NETLOGON_SECURE_CHANNEL_TYPE AccountType,
    [in, string] wchar_t * ComputerName,
    [in] PNETLOGON_AUTHENTICATOR Authenticator,
    [out] PNETLOGON_AUTHENTICATOR ReturnAuthenticator,
    [out] PENCIPHERED_NT_OWF_PASSWORD EncryptedNtOwfPassword
);

NTSTATUS
NetrLogonSendToSam (
    [in,unique,string] LOGONSRV_HANDLE PrimaryName,
    [in, string] wchar_t * ComputerName,
    [in] PNETLOGON_AUTHENTICATOR Authenticator,

```

```

[out] PNETLOGON_AUTHENTICATOR ReturnAuthenticator,
[in, size_is(OpaqueBufferSize)] UCHAR * OpaqueBuffer,
[in] ULONG OpaqueBufferSize
);

NET_API_STATUS
DsrAddressToSiteNamesW(
    [in, unique, string] LOGONSRV_HANDLE ComputerName,
    [in, range(0,32000)] DWORD EntryCount,
    [in, size_is(EntryCount)] PNL_SOCKET_ADDRESS SocketAddresses,
    [out] PNL_SITE_NAME_ARRAY *SiteNames
);

NET_API_STATUS
DsrGetDcNameEx2(
    [in, unique, string] LOGONSRV_HANDLE ComputerName,
    [in, unique, string] wchar_t * AccountName,
    [in] ULONG AllowableAccountControlBits,
    [in, unique, string] wchar_t * DomainName,
    [in, unique] GUID *DomainGuid,
    [in, unique, string] wchar_t * SiteName,
    [in] ULONG Flags,
    [out] PDOMAIN_CONTROLLER_INFO *DomainControllerInfo
);

NET_API_STATUS
NetrLogonGetTimeServiceParentDomain(
    [in, unique, string] LOGONSRV_HANDLE ServerName,
    [out, string] wchar_t **DomainName,
    [out] int * PdcSameSite
);

NET_API_STATUS
NetrEnumerateTrustedDomainsEx (
    [in, unique, string] LOGONSRV_HANDLE ServerName,
    [out] PNETLOGON_TRUSTED_DOMAIN_ARRAY Domains
);

NET_API_STATUS
DsrAddressToSiteNamesExW(
    [in, unique, string] LOGONSRV_HANDLE ComputerName,
    [in, range(0,32000)] DWORD EntryCount,
    [in, size_is(EntryCount)] PNL_SOCKET_ADDRESS SocketAddresses,
    [out] PNL_SITE_NAME_EX_ARRAY *SiteNames
);

NET_API_STATUS
DsrGetDcSiteCoverageW(
    [in, unique, string] LOGONSRV_HANDLE ServerName,
    [out] PNL_SITE_NAME_ARRAY *SiteNames
);

NTSTATUS
NetrLogonSamLogonEx (
    [in] handle_t ContextHandle,
    [in, unique, string] wchar_t * LogonServer,
    [in, unique, string] wchar_t * ComputerName,
    [in] NETLOGON_LOGON_INFO_CLASS LogonLevel,
    [in, switch_is(LogonLevel)] PNETLOGON_LEVEL LogonInformation,

```

```

[in] NETLOGON_VALIDATION_INFO_CLASS ValidationLevel,
[out,switch_is(ValidationLevel)]
    PNETLOGON_VALIDATION ValidationInformation,
[out] UCHAR * Authoritative,
[in,out] ULONG * ExtraFlags
);

NET_API_STATUS
DsrEnumerateDomainTrusts (
    [in, unique, string] LOGONSRV_HANDLE ServerName,
    [in] ULONG Flags,
    [out] PNETLOGON_TRUSTED_DOMAIN_ARRAY Domains
);

NET_API_STATUS
DsrDeregisterDnsHostRecords (
    [in, unique, string] LOGONSRV_HANDLE ServerName,
    [in, unique, string] wchar_t * DnsDomainName,
    [in, unique] GUID *DomainGuid,
    [in, unique] GUID *DsaGuid,
    [in, string] wchar_t * DnsHostName
);

NTSTATUS
NetrServerTrustPasswordsGet (
    [in,unique,string] LOGONSRV_HANDLE TrustedDcName,
    [in,string] wchar_t * AccountName,
    [in] NETLOGON_SECURE_CHANNEL_TYPE SecureChannelType,
    [in, string] wchar_t * ComputerName,
    [in] PNETLOGON_AUTHENTICATOR Authenticator,
    [out] PNETLOGON_AUTHENTICATOR ReturnAuthenticator,
    [out] PENCIPHERED_NT_OWF_PASSWORD EncryptedNewOwfPassword,
    [out] PENCIPHERED_NT_OWF_PASSWORD EncryptedOldOwfPassword
);

NET_API_STATUS
DsrGetForestTrustInformation (
    [in, unique, string] LOGONSRV_HANDLE ServerName,
    [in, unique, string] wchar_t * TrustedDomainName,
    [in] DWORD Flags,
    [out] PLSA_FOREST_TRUST_INFORMATION * ForestTrustInfo
);

NTSTATUS
NetrGetForestTrustInformation (
    [in,unique,string] LOGONSRV_HANDLE ServerName,
    [in, string] wchar_t * ComputerName,
    [in] PNETLOGON_AUTHENTICATOR Authenticator,
    [out] PNETLOGON_AUTHENTICATOR ReturnAuthenticator,
    [in] DWORD Flags,
    [out] PLSA_FOREST_TRUST_INFORMATION * ForestTrustInfo
);

NTSTATUS
NetrLogonSamLogonWithFlags (
    [in,unique,string] LOGONSRV_HANDLE LogonServer,
    [in,string,unique] wchar_t * ComputerName,
    [in,unique] PNETLOGON_AUTHENTICATOR Authenticator,
    [in,out,unique] PNETLOGON_AUTHENTICATOR ReturnAuthenticator,

```



```

[in] NETLOGON_LOGON_INFO_CLASS LogonLevel,
[in,switch_is(LogonLevel)] PNETLOGON_LEVEL LogonInformation,
[in] NETLOGON_VALIDATION_INFO_CLASS ValidationLevel,
[out,switch_is(ValidationLevel)]
    PNETLOGON_VALIDATION ValidationInformation,
[out] UCHAR * Authoritative,
[in,out] ULONG * ExtraFlags
);

NTSTATUS
NetrServerGetTrustInfo (
    [in,unique,string] LOGONSRV_HANDLE TrustedDcName,
    [in,string] wchar_t * AccountName,
    [in] NETLOGON_SECURE_CHANNEL_TYPE SecureChannelType,
    [in, string] wchar_t * ComputerName,
    [in] PNETLOGON_AUTHENTICATOR Authenticator,
    [out] PNETLOGON_AUTHENTICATOR ReturnAuthenticator,
    [out] PENCIPHERED_NT_OWF_PASSWORD EncryptedNewOwfPassword,
    [out] PENCIPHERED_NT_OWF_PASSWORD EncryptedOldOwfPassword,
    [out] PNL_GENERIC_RPC_DATA *TrustInfo
);

//Local only method
DWORD
OpnumUnused47 (
    void
);

typedef struct _NL_DNS_NAME_INFO{
    ULONG Type;
    [string] wchar_t * DnsDomainInfo;
    ULONG DnsDomainInfoType;
    ULONG Priority;
    ULONG Weight;
    ULONG Port;
    UCHAR Register;
    ULONG Status;
} NL_DNS_NAME_INFO,
*PNL_DNS_NAME_INFO;

typedef struct _NL_DNS_NAME_INFO_ARRAY{
    ULONG EntryCount;
    [size_is(EntryCount)] PNL_DNS_NAME_INFO DnsNamesInfo;
} NL_DNS_NAME_INFO_ARRAY,
*PNL_DNS_NAME_INFO_ARRAY;

NTSTATUS
DsrUpdateReadOnlyServerDnsRecords (
    [in, unique, string] LOGONSRV_HANDLE ServerName,
    [in, string] wchar_t * ComputerName,
    [in] PNETLOGON_AUTHENTICATOR Authenticator,
    [out] PNETLOGON_AUTHENTICATOR ReturnAuthenticator,
    [in, unique, string] wchar_t * SiteName,
    [in] ULONG DnsTtl,
    [in, out] PNL_DNS_NAME_INFO_ARRAY DnsNames
);

typedef struct _NL_OSVERSIONINFO_V1{
    DWORD dwOSVersionInfoSize;

```

```

        DWORD dwMajorVersion;
        DWORD dwMinorVersion;
        DWORD dwBuildNumber;
        DWORD dwPlatformId;
        wchar_t szCSDVersion[128];
        USHORT wServicePackMajor;
        USHORT wServicePackMinor;
        USHORT wSuiteMask;
        UCHAR wProductType;
        UCHAR wReserved;
    } NL_OSVERSIONINFO_V1;

typedef struct _NL_IN_CHAIN_SET_CLIENT_ATTRIBUTES_V1{
    [unique,string] wchar_t * ClientDnsHostName;
    [unique] NL_OSVERSIONINFO_V1 *OsVersionInfo_V1;
    [unique,string] wchar_t * OsName;
} NL_IN_CHAIN_SET_CLIENT_ATTRIBUTES_V1;

typedef [switch_type(DWORD)] union{
    [case(1)] NL_IN_CHAIN_SET_CLIENT_ATTRIBUTES_V1 V1;
} NL_IN_CHAIN_SET_CLIENT_ATTRIBUTES;

typedef struct _NL_OUT_CHAIN_SET_CLIENT_ATTRIBUTES_V1{
    [unique,string] wchar_t *HubName;
    [unique,string] wchar_t **OldDnsHostName;
    [unique] ULONG * SupportedEncTypes;
} NL_OUT_CHAIN_SET_CLIENT_ATTRIBUTES_V1;

typedef [switch_type(DWORD)] union{
    [case(1)] NL_OUT_CHAIN_SET_CLIENT_ATTRIBUTES_V1 V1;
} NL_OUT_CHAIN_SET_CLIENT_ATTRIBUTES;

NTSTATUS
NetrChainSetClientAttributes(
    [in,string,ref] LOGONSRV_HANDLE PrimaryName,
    [in,string,ref] wchar_t * ChainedFromServerName,
    [in,string,ref] wchar_t * ChainedForClientName,
    [in,ref] PNETLOGON_AUTHENTICATOR Authenticator,
    [in,out,ref] PNETLOGON_AUTHENTICATOR ReturnAuthenticator,
    [in] DWORD dwInVersion,
    [in,ref] [switch_is(dwInVersion)]
        NL_IN_CHAIN_SET_CLIENT_ATTRIBUTES *pmsgIn,
    [in,out,ref] DWORD * pdwOutVersion,
    [in,out,ref] [switch_is(*pdwOutVersion)]
        NL_OUT_CHAIN_SET_CLIENT_ATTRIBUTES *pmsgOut
    );
//Client to server only method
NTSTATUS
OpnumUnused21 (
    void
);
}

```

## 7 Appendix B: Product Behavior

The information in this specification is applicable to the following Microsoft products or supplemental software. References to product versions include released service packs:

- Microsoft Windows NT® operating system
- Microsoft Windows® 2000 operating system
- Windows® XP operating system
- Windows Server® 2003 operating system
- Windows Vista® operating system
- Windows Server® 2008 operating system
- Windows® 7 operating system
- Windows Server® 2008 R2 operating system

Exceptions, if any, are noted below. If a service pack or Quick Fix Engineering (QFE) number appears with the product version, behavior changed in that service pack or QFE. The new behavior also applies to subsequent service packs of the product unless otherwise specified. If a product edition appears with the product version, behavior is different in that product edition.

Unless otherwise specified, any statement of optional behavior in this specification that is prescribed using the terms SHOULD or SHOULD NOT implies product behavior in accordance with the SHOULD or SHOULD NOT prescription. Unless otherwise specified, the term MAY implies that the product does not follow the prescription.

[<1> Section 2.2.1.1.2:](#) The value is ignored by the Windows NT 4.0 implementation.

[<2> Section 2.2.1.2.1:](#) This structure is introduced in Windows 2000 and is present in Windows XP, Windows Server 2003, Windows Vista, Windows Server 2008, Windows 7, and Windows Server 2008 R2.

[<3> Section 2.2.1.2.1:](#) IPv6 is supported starting with Windows Vista and is supported in Windows Server 2008, Windows 7, and Windows Server 2008 R2.

[<4> Section 2.2.1.2.1:](#) For Windows Vista, Windows Server 2008, Windows 7, and Windows Server 2008 R2, this address can be an IPv4 or IPv6 address. For all other versions of Windows, this will be an IPv4 address.

[<5> Section 2.2.1.2.1:](#) Windows NT-based domain controllers do not have a domain GUID.

[<6> Section 2.2.1.2.1:](#) Read-only DC is not supported in Windows 2000 and Windows Server 2003 DCs.

[<7> Section 2.2.1.2.1:](#) Writable DC is not supported in Windows 2000 and Windows Server 2003. The concept of designating a DC as writable was added when read-only DCs were created.

[<8> Section 2.2.1.2.1:](#) Added in Windows 7 and Windows Server 2008 R2; also present in Windows Server 2003 and Windows Server 2008 when Active Directory Management Gateway Service is installed.

[<9> Section 2.2.1.2.1:](#) Windows NT-based domain controllers do not have an associated site.

[<10> Section 2.2.1.3.3:](#) The NL\_AUTH\_SHA2\_SIGNATURE structure is supported by Windows Server 2008, Windows 7 and Windows Server 2008 R2.

[<11> Section 2.2.1.3.6:](#) This structure is introduced in Windows 2000 and is present in Windows XP, Windows Server 2003, Windows Vista, Windows Server 2008, Windows 7, and Windows Server 2008 R2.

[<12> Section 2.2.1.3.6:](#) The name of the client's operating system is used. The following are the strings used by Windows:

- For Windows 2000 Professional SKUs: "Windows 2000"
- For Windows 2000 Server SKUs: "Windows 2000 Server"
- For Windows XP Professional SKUs: "Windows XP Professional"
- For Windows Server 2003 SKUs: "Windows Server 2003"
- For Windows Vista and Windows 7 SKUs: The name of the product is used. For example, for Windows 7 Ultimate, the string "Windows 7 Ultimate" is used.
- For Windows Server 2008 and Windows Server 2008 R2 SKUs: The name of the product is used. For example, for Windows Server 2008 Enterprise, the string "Windows Server 2008 Enterprise" is used.

[<13> Section 2.2.1.3.6:](#) Not supported in Windows NT, Windows 2000 and Windows Server 2003.

[<14> Section 2.2.1.3.7:](#) This structure was introduced in Windows 2000 Server and is present in Windows XP, Windows Server 2003, Windows Vista, Windows Server 2008, Windows 7, and Windows Server 2008 R2.

[<15> Section 2.2.1.3.8:](#) This structure was introduced in Windows 2000 and is present in Windows XP, Windows Server 2003, Windows Vista, Windows Server 2008, Windows 7, and Windows Server 2008 R2.

[<16> Section 2.2.1.3.9:](#) This structure was introduced in Windows 2000 and is present in Windows XP, Windows Server 2003, Windows Vista, Windows Server 2008, Windows 7, and Windows Server 2008 R2.

[<17> Section 2.2.1.3.10:](#) This structure was introduced in Windows 2000 and is present in Windows XP, Windows Server 2003, Windows Vista, Windows Server 2008, Windows 7, and Windows Server 2008 R2.

[<18> Section 2.2.1.3.11:](#) This structure was introduced in Windows 2000 and is present in Windows XP, Windows Server 2003, Windows Vista, Windows Server 2008, Windows 7, and Windows Server 2008 R2.

[<19> Section 2.2.1.3.11:](#) SupportedEncTypes was added in Windows Vista and Windows Server 2008. Windows Server 2003 and client and server versions of Windows NT, Windows 2000, and Windows XP ignore this field.

[<20> Section 2.2.1.3.12:](#) This structure was introduced in Windows 2000 and is present in Windows XP, Windows Server 2003, Windows Vista, Windows Server 2008, Windows 7, and Windows Server 2008 R2.

[<21> Section 2.2.1.3.13:](#) This DC type is available only in Windows Server 2008 and Windows Server 2008 R2.

<22> [Section 2.2.1.3.13](#): Added in Windows Vista, and supported in Windows Server 2008, Windows 7, and Windows Server 2008 R2.

<23> [Section 2.2.1.3.14](#): This union is supported in Windows 7, and Windows Server 2008 R2.

<24> [Section 2.2.1.4.16](#): Windows NT 4.0, Windows 2000, Windows XP, Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows 7, and Windows Server 2008 R2 support NetlogonInteractiveInformation type.

<25> [Section 2.2.1.4.16](#): Windows NT 4.0, Windows 2000, Windows XP, Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows 7, and Windows Server 2008 R2 support NetlogonNetworkInformation type.

<26> [Section 2.2.1.4.16](#): Windows NT 4.0, Windows 2000, Windows XP, Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows 7, and Windows Server 2008 R2 support NetlogonServiceInformation type.

<27> [Section 2.2.1.4.16](#): Windows NT 4.0, Windows 2000, Windows XP, Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows 7, and Windows Server 2008 R2 support NetlogonGenericInformation type.

<28> [Section 2.2.1.4.16](#): Windows 2000, Windows XP, Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows 7, and Windows Server 2008 R2 support NetlogonInteractiveTransitiveInformation type.

<29> [Section 2.2.1.4.16](#): Windows 2000, Windows XP, Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows 7, and Windows Server 2008 R2 support NetlogonNetworkTransitiveInformation type.

<30> [Section 2.2.1.4.16](#): Windows 2000, Windows XP, Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows 7, and Windows Server 2008 R2 support NetlogonServiceTransitiveInformation type.

<31> [Section 2.2.1.4.17](#): Windows NT 4.0, Windows 2000, Windows XP, Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows 7, and Windows Server 2008 R2: NETLOGON\_VALIDATION\_INFO\_CLASS enumeration has **NetlogonValidationUasInfo** type defined. This value is used by LAN Manager in support of LAN Manager products, and is beyond the scope of this document.

<32> [Section 2.2.1.4.17](#): Windows NT 4.0, Windows 2000, Windows XP, Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows 7, and Windows Server 2008 R2 support **NetlogonValidationSamInfo** type.

<33> [Section 2.2.1.4.17](#): Windows NT 4.0, Windows 2000, Windows XP, Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows 7, and Windows Server 2008 R2 support **NetlogonValidationSamInfo2** type.

<34> [Section 2.2.1.4.17](#): Windows NT 4.0, Windows 2000, Windows XP, Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows 7, and Windows Server 2008 R2 support **NetlogonValidationGenericInfo** type.

<35> [Section 2.2.1.4.17](#): Windows NT 4.0, Windows 2000, Windows XP, Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows 7, and Windows Server 2008 R2 support **NetlogonValidationGenericInfo2** type.

[<36> Section 2.2.1.4.17:](#) Windows NT 4.0, Windows 2000, Windows XP, Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows 7, and Windows Server 2008 R2 support **NetlogonValidationSamInfo4** type.

[<37> Section 2.2.1.5.2:](#) This structure was introduced in Windows 2000 and is present in Windows XP, Windows Server 2003, Windows Vista, Windows Server 2008, Windows 7, and Windows Server 2008 R2.

[<38> Section 2.2.1.5.2:](#) Windows NT.

[<39> Section 2.2.1.5.2:](#) Windows 2000, Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2008 R2.

[<40> Section 2.2.1.5.3:](#) This structure was introduced in Windows 2000 and is present in Windows XP, Windows Server 2003, Windows Vista, Windows Server 2008, Windows 7, and Windows Server 2008 R2.

[<41> Section 2.2.1.5.4:](#) This structure was introduced in Windows XP and is present in Windows Server 2003, Windows Vista, Windows Server 2008, Windows 7, and Windows Server 2008 R2.

[<42> Section 2.2.1.6.2:](#) Flags A, B, C, and D are available in Windows NT 4.0, Windows 2000, Windows XP, Windows Server 2003, Windows Vista, Windows Server 2008, Windows 7, and Windows Server 2008 R2. Flags E, F, and G were introduced in Windows 2000.

[<43> Section 2.2.1.6.2:](#) This flag is set only in the query response from a Windows NT 4.0-based backup domain controller.

[<44> Section 2.2.1.6.2:](#) This flag can be set only in the query response from a Windows NT 4.0-based backup domain controller.

[<45> Section 2.2.1.6.2:](#) This flag can be set only in the query response from a Windows NT 4.0-based backup domain controller.

[<46> Section 2.2.1.6.2:](#) This flag can be set only in the query response from a Windows NT 4.0-based backup domain controller.

[<47> Section 2.2.1.6.2:](#) This flag can be set only in the query response from a domain controller running Windows 2000, Windows XP, Windows Server 2003, Windows Vista, Windows Server 2008, Windows 7, or Windows Server 2008 R2.

[<48> Section 2.2.1.6.2:](#) This flag can be set only in the query response from a server running Windows 2000, Windows XP, Windows Server 2003, Windows Vista, Windows Server 2008, Windows 7, or Windows Server 2008 R2.

[<49> Section 2.2.1.6.2:](#) This flag can be set only in the query response from a domain controller running Windows 2000, Windows XP, Windows Server 2003, Windows Vista, Windows Server 2008, Windows 7, or Windows Server 2008 R2.

[<50> Section 2.2.1.6.3:](#) Flags A and B are available for use in Windows 2000 Server, Windows XP, Windows Server 2003, Windows Vista, Windows Server 2008, Windows 7, and Windows Server 2008 R2. Flag C was introduced in Windows Server 2003.

[<51> Section 2.2.1.6.3:](#) This flag can be set only in the query response from a server running Windows 2000 Server, Windows XP, Windows Server 2003, Windows Vista, Windows Server 2008, Windows 7, and Windows Server 2008 R2.

[<52> Section 2.2.1.6.3:](#) This flag can be set only in the query response from a server running Windows 2000 Server, Windows XP, Windows Server 2003, Windows Vista, Windows Server 2008, Windows 7, and Windows Server 2008 R2.

[<53> Section 2.2.1.6.3:](#) This flag can be set only in the query response from a server running Windows Server 2003, Windows Vista, Windows Server 2008, Windows 7, and Windows Server 2008 R2.

[<54> Section 2.2.1.7.4:](#) Windows never uses this structure.

[<55> Section 3:](#) In Windows 2000, Windows XP, Windows Server 2003, Windows Vista, Windows Server 2008, and Windows Server 2008 R2, the server defaults to the primary domain if the name is not found.

[<56> Section 3.1.1:](#) In Windows 2000 Server, Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008 and Windows Server 2008 R2, for computer accounts in a domain, the OWF of the shared secret is stored in the **unicodePwd** attribute of the computer account object in Active Directory ([\[MS-ADTS\]](#) section 7.4.2). For trusts with Windows 2000, Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, and Windows Server 2008 R2 domains, the shared secret is stored in the **trustAuthIncoming** attribute ([\[MS-ADTS\]](#) section 7.1.6.7.10) and the **trustAuthOutgoing** attribute ([\[MS-ADTS\]](#) section 7.1.6.7.11) of the trusted domain object (TDO) that contains trust information in Active Directory ([\[MS-ADTS\]](#) section 7.1.6.9.1). Depending on the **AuthType** either the shared secret (TRUST\_AUTH\_TYPE\_CLEAR) or NTOWFv1 (TRUST\_AUTH\_TYPE\_NT4OWF) is stored. For trusts with Windows NT 4.0 domains, the OWF of the shared secret is stored in the **trustAuth** attribute of the corresponding TDO for the Windows NT 4.0 domain.

[<57> Section 3.1.1:](#) In Windows NT 4.0 ([\[MS-SAMR\]](#) section 3.1.1.3), the OWF of the shared secret is stored as an attribute of the computer account object (for domain members) or the interdomain trust account object (for domain trusts).

[<58> Section 3.1.1:](#) Windows uses the Netlogon Remote Protocol to change the machine account password every 30 days by default.

[<59> Section 3.1.1:](#) For trusts with Windows 2000, Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, and Windows Server 2008 R2 domains, the trust password version is stored in the TRUST\_AUTH\_TYPE\_VERSION of the **trustAuthIncoming** attribute ([\[MS-ADTS\]](#) section 7.1.6.7.10) and the **trustAuthOutgoing** attribute ([\[MS-ADTS\]](#) section 7.1.6.7.11) of the TDO that contains trust information in Active Directory ([\[MS-ADTS\]](#) section [7.1.6.9.1](#)). The trust password version is not maintained for Windows NT 4.0 domains.

[<60> Section 3.1.4.1:](#) Supported in Windows 7 and Windows Server 2008 R2.

[<61> Section 3.1.4.1:](#) Supported in Windows 7 and Windows Server 2008 R2.

[<62> Section 3.1.4.1:](#) Supported in Windows 7 and Windows Server 2008 R2.

[<63> Section 3.1.4.2:](#) Added in Windows 2000 Server and supported in Windows XP, Windows Server 2003, Windows Vista, Windows Server 2008, Windows 7, Windows Server 2008 R2.

[<64> Section 3.1.4.2:](#) Added in Windows 2000 Server and supported in Windows XP, Windows Server 2003, Windows Vista, Windows Server 2008, Windows 7, Windows Server 2008 R2.

[<65> Section 3.1.4.2:](#) Added in Windows 2000 Server and supported in Windows XP, Windows Server 2003, Windows Vista, Windows Server 2008, Windows 7, Windows Server 2008 R2.

[<66> Section 3.1.4.2:](#) Added in Windows 2000 Server and supported in Windows XP, Windows Server 2003, Windows Vista, Windows Server 2008, Windows 7, Windows Server 2008 R2.

<67> [Section 3.1.4.2](#): Added in Windows 2000 Server and supported in Windows XP, Windows Server 2003, Windows Vista, Windows Server 2008, Windows 7, Windows Server 2008 R2.

<68> [Section 3.1.4.2](#): Added in Windows 2000 Server and supported in Windows XP, Windows Server 2003, Windows Vista, Windows Server 2008, Windows 7, Windows Server 2008 R2.

<69> [Section 3.1.4.2](#): Added in Windows 2000 Server and supported in Windows XP, Windows Server 2003, Windows Vista, Windows Server 2008, Windows 7, Windows Server 2008 R2.

<70> [Section 3.1.4.2](#): Added in Windows XP and supported in Windows Server 2003, Windows Vista, Windows Server 2008, Windows 7, Windows Server 2008 R2.

<71> [Section 3.1.4.2](#): Added in Windows XP and supported in Windows Server 2003, Windows Vista, Windows Server 2008, Windows 7, Windows Server 2008 R2.

<72> [Section 3.1.4.2](#): Added in Windows Vista and supported in Windows Server 2008, Windows 7, Windows Server 2008 R2.

<73> [Section 3.1.4.2](#): Supported in Windows 7 and Windows Server 2008 R2.

<74> [Section 3.1.4.2](#): Added in Windows NT 4.0 SP2 and supported in Windows 2000 Server, Windows XP, Windows Server 2003, Windows Vista, and Windows Server 2008, Windows 7, Windows Server 2008 R2.

<75> [Section 3.1.4.6](#): For Windows NT, the client binds to the RPC server using named pipes. For Windows 2000 Server, Windows XP, Windows Server 2003, Windows Vista, Windows Server 2008, Windows 7, Windows Server 2008 R2, the client binds to the RPC server using TCP. If RPC returns an error indicating that the protocol sequence is not supported, then the client binds to the RPC server using named pipes.

<76> [Section 3.1.4.6](#): Windows NT 4.0 SP4 does not support Secure RPC and does not perform a secure bind.

<77> [Section 3.1.4.6](#): Windows caches and reuses the binding for subsequent RPC calls to the server.

<78> [Section 3.3](#): The Windows Netlogon SSP is not provided for use by other applications. It has neither the full functionality of public SSPs nor access from non-LSA applications.

<79> [Section 3.3](#): This Netlogon capability was added in Windows NT 4.0 SP6.

<80> [Section 3.3.4.2.2](#): Windows disregards the **Flags** data.

<81> [Section 3.4](#): Netlogon runs only on machines joined to a domain ([\[MS-ADTS\]](#) section 7.4). Upon startup, it locates a domain controller and establishes a secure channel to it. It is used for secure communication between the client and the domain controller and for passing sensitive data between the two entities. Starting with Windows 2000 Server, Netlogon also registers the service principal names (SPNs) for the computer that it runs on. It registers the SPNs of the form "HOST/NetBIOSName" and "HOST/Full.Dns.Name", which updates the **servicePrincipalName** attribute of the computer account object in Active Directory.

<82> [Section 3.4.1](#): Supported in Windows 7 and Windows Server 2008 R2.

<83> [Section 3.4.1](#): This ADM element does not exist in Windows NT.

<84> [Section 3.4.3](#): All versions of Windows use 4096. Other implementations can use any value.



<85> [Section 3.4.3:](#) Implementations that use the Windows registry to persistently store and retrieve the settings for **ClientCapabilities** bit O SHOULD use the HKEY\_LOCAL\_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Netlogon\Parameters registry path and the **SignSecureChannel** and **SealSecureChannel** values to indicate if bit O should be set. If either of these registry values are set to 0x1 then bit O SHOULD be set. Implementations that use the Windows registry to persistently store settings for **ClientCapabilities** bit U SHOULD use the HKEY\_LOCAL\_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Netlogon\Parameters registry path and NeutralizeNt4Emulator key to indicate if bit U should be set. If this registry value is set to 0x1 then bit U SHOULD be set.

<86> [Section 3.4.3:](#) Windows NT 4.0 SP4, Windows 2000, Windows XP, Windows Server 2003, Windows Vista, and Windows Server 2008, initialize RequireSignOrSeal to FALSE.

<87> [Section 3.4.3:](#) Windows 2000, Windows XP, Windows Server 2003, Windows Vista, and Windows Server 2008, Windows 7, and Windows Server 2008 R2 initialize RequireStrongKey to FALSE.

<88> [Section 3.4.5.1.3:](#) All applications available as part of Windows set the *SiteGuid* parameter to NULL.

<89> [Section 3.4.5.2.3:](#) This method was only used in Windows NT 3.5 and Windows NT 4.0.

<90> [Section 3.4.5.2.4:](#) This method was only used in Windows NT Server 3.1.

<91> [Section 3.4.5.2.5:](#) Windows clients re-establish the secure channel with the domain controller upon receiving STATUS\_ACCESS\_DENIED.

<92> [Section 3.4.5.2.6:](#) Windows clients re-establish the secure channel with the domain controller upon receiving STATUS\_ACCESS\_DENIED.

<93> [Section 3.4.5.2.8:](#) Windows clients reestablish the secure channel with the domain controller upon receiving STATUS\_ACCESS\_DENIED.

<94> [Section 3.4.5.2.9:](#) NetrLogonGetCapabilities is not supported by Windows NT, Windows 2000, Windows XP, Windows Server 2003, Windows Vista, or Windows Server 2008 clients.

<95> [Section 3.4.5.2.9:](#) Supported by Windows 7 and Windows Server 2008 R2.

<96> [Section 3.4.5.2.9:](#) For Windows DCs, this error means the DC is a Windows NT, Windows Server 2003, or Windows Server 2008 machine.

<97> [Section 3.4.5.2.9:](#) Windows clients re-establish the secure channel with the domain controller upon receiving STATUS\_ACCESS\_DENIED.

<98> [Section 3.4.5.3.2:](#) For all versions of Windows except Windows NT 3.1, encrypt by using the negotiated encryption algorithm and the session key.

For Windows NT 3.1, encrypt as follows.

```
InitLMKey(KeyIn, KeyOut)
    KeyOut[0] = KeyIn[0] >> 0x01;
    KeyOut[1] = ((KeyIn[0] & 0x01) << 6) | (KeyIn[1] >> 2);
    KeyOut[2] = ((KeyIn[1] & 0x03) << 5) | (KeyIn[2] >> 3);
    KeyOut[3] = ((KeyIn[2] & 0x07) << 4) | (KeyIn[3] >> 4);
    KeyOut[4] = ((KeyIn[3] & 0x0F) << 3) | (KeyIn[4] >> 5);
    KeyOut[5] = ((KeyIn[4] & 0x1F) << 2) | (KeyIn[5] >> 6);
    KeyOut[6] = ((KeyIn[5] & 0x3F) << 1) | (KeyIn[6] >> 7);
```

```

KeyOut[7] = KeyIn[6] & 0x7F;
((DWORD*)KeyOut)[0] <= 1;
((DWORD*)KeyOut)[1] <= 1;
((DWORD*)KeyOut)[0] &= 0xfefefefe;
((DWORD*)KeyOut)[1] &= 0xfefefefe;

```

Assume bytes(s, e, l) returns bytes from s to e of the byte array l. Assume concat(a1, a2) returns byte array containing the bytes of array a1 followed by the bytes from byte array a2.

```

LMDESECB(Input, Sk, Output)
    SET k1 to bytes(0, 7, Sk)
    CALL InitLMKey(k1, k3)
    SET k2 to bytes(8, 15, Sk)
    CALL InitLMKey(k2, k4)
    SET i1 to bytes(0, 7, Input)
    SET i2 to bytes(8, 15, Input)
    CALL DES_ECB(i1, k3, &output1)
    CALL DES_ECB(i2, k4, &output2)
    SET Output to concat(output1, output2)

```

[<99> Section 3.4.5.3.2:](#) For all versions of Windows except Windows NT 3.1, encrypt using the negotiated encryption algorithm and the session key.

For Windows NT 3.1, encrypt as follows.

```

InitLMKey(KeyIn, KeyOut)
    KeyOut[0] = KeyIn[0] >> 0x01;
    KeyOut[1] = ((KeyIn[0]&0x01)<<6) | (KeyIn[1]>>2);
    KeyOut[2] = ((KeyIn[1]&0x03)<<5) | (KeyIn[2]>>3);
    KeyOut[3] = ((KeyIn[2]&0x07)<<4) | (KeyIn[3]>>4);
    KeyOut[4] = ((KeyIn[3]&0x0F)<<3) | (KeyIn[4]>>5);
    KeyOut[5] = ((KeyIn[4]&0x1F)<<2) | (KeyIn[5]>>6);
    KeyOut[6] = ((KeyIn[5]&0x3F)<<1) | (KeyIn[6]>>7);
    KeyOut[7] = KeyIn[6] & 0x7F;
    ((DWORD*)KeyOut)[0] <= 1;
    ((DWORD*)KeyOut)[1] <= 1;
    ((DWORD*)KeyOut)[0] &= 0xfefefefe;
    ((DWORD*)KeyOut)[1] &= 0xfefefefe;

```

Assume bytes(s, e, l) returns bytes from s to e of the byte array l. Assume concat(a1, a2) returns byte array containing the bytes of array a1 followed by the bytes from byte array a2.

```

LMDESECB(Input, Sk, Output)
    SET k1 to bytes(0, 7, Sk)
    CALL InitLMKey(k1, k3)
    SET k2 to bytes(8, 15, Sk)
    CALL InitLMKey(k2, k4)
    SET i1 to bytes(0, 7, Input)
    SET i2 to bytes(8, 15, Input)
    CALL DES_ECB(i1, k3, &output1)
    CALL DES_ECB(i2, k4, &output2)
    SET Output to concat(output1, output2)

```

[<100> Section 3.4.5.3.2:](#) For all versions of Windows except Windows NT 3.1, encrypt using the negotiated encryption algorithm and the session key.

For Windows NT 3.1, encrypt as follows.

```
InitLMKey(KeyIn, KeyOut)
    KeyOut[0] = KeyIn[0] >> 0x01;
    KeyOut[1] = ((KeyIn[0]&0x01)<<6) | (KeyIn[1]>>2);
    KeyOut[2] = ((KeyIn[1]&0x03)<<5) | (KeyIn[2]>>3);
    KeyOut[3] = ((KeyIn[2]&0x07)<<4) | (KeyIn[3]>>4);
    KeyOut[4] = ((KeyIn[3]&0x0F)<<3) | (KeyIn[4]>>5);
    KeyOut[5] = ((KeyIn[4]&0x1F)<<2) | (KeyIn[5]>>6);
    KeyOut[6] = ((KeyIn[5]&0x3F)<<1) | (KeyIn[6]>>7);
    KeyOut[7] = KeyIn[6] & 0x7F;
    ((DWORD*)KeyOut)[0] <= 1;
    ((DWORD*)KeyOut)[1] <= 1;
    ((DWORD*)KeyOut)[0] &= 0xfefefefe;
    ((DWORD*)KeyOut)[1] &= 0xfefefefe;
```

Assume bytes(s, e, l) returns bytes from s to e of the byte array l. Assume concat(a1, a2) returns byte array containing the bytes of array a1 followed by the bytes from byte array a2.

```
LMDESECB(Input, Sk, Output)
    SET k1 to bytes(0, 7, Sk)
    CALL InitLMKey(k1, k3)
    SET k2 to bytes(8, 15, Sk)
    CALL InitLMKey(k2, k4)
    SET i1 to bytes(0, 7, Input)
    SET i2 to bytes(8, 15, Input)
    CALL DES_ECB(i1, k3, &output1)
    CALL DES_ECB(i2, k4, &output2)
    SET Output to concat(output1, output2)
```

[<101> Section 3.4.5.3.2:](#) Windows clients reestablish the secure channel with the domain controller upon receiving STATUS\_ACCESS\_DENIED.

[<102> Section 3.4.5.3.4:](#) For all versions of Windows except Windows NT 3.1, encrypt by using the negotiated encryption algorithm and the session key.

For Windows NT 3.1, encrypt as follows.

```
InitLMKey(KeyIn, KeyOut)
    KeyOut[0] = KeyIn[0] >> 0x01;
    KeyOut[1] = ((KeyIn[0]&0x01)<<6) | (KeyIn[1]>>2);
    KeyOut[2] = ((KeyIn[1]&0x03)<<5) | (KeyIn[2]>>3);
    KeyOut[3] = ((KeyIn[2]&0x07)<<4) | (KeyIn[3]>>4);
    KeyOut[4] = ((KeyIn[3]&0x0F)<<3) | (KeyIn[4]>>5);
    KeyOut[5] = ((KeyIn[4]&0x1F)<<2) | (KeyIn[5]>>6);
    KeyOut[6] = ((KeyIn[5]&0x3F)<<1) | (KeyIn[6]>>7);
    KeyOut[7] = KeyIn[6] & 0x7F;
    ((DWORD*)KeyOut)[0] <= 1;
    ((DWORD*)KeyOut)[1] <= 1;
    ((DWORD*)KeyOut)[0] &= 0xfefefefe;
    ((DWORD*)KeyOut)[1] &= 0xfefefefe;
```

Assume bytes(s, e, l) returns bytes from s to e of the byte array l. Assume concat(a1, a2) returns byte array containing the bytes of array a1 followed by the bytes from byte array a2.

```

LMDESECB(Input, Sk, Output)
    SET k1 to bytes(0, 7, Sk)
    CALL InitLMKey(k1, k3)
    SET k2 to bytes(8, 15, Sk)
    CALL InitLMKey(k2, k4)
    SET i1 to bytes(0, 7, Input)
    SET i2 to bytes(8, 15, Input)
    CALL DES_ECB(i1, k3, &output1)
    CALL DES_ECB(i2, k4, &output2)
    SET Output to concat(output1, output2)

```

[<103> Section 3.4.5.3.4:](#) For all versions of Windows except Windows NT 3.1, encrypt by using the negotiated encryption algorithm and the session key.

For Windows NT 3.1, encrypt as follows.

```

InitLMKey(KeyIn, KeyOut)
    KeyOut[0] = KeyIn[0] >> 0x01;
    KeyOut[1] = ((KeyIn[0]&0x01)<<6) | (KeyIn[1]>>2);
    KeyOut[2] = ((KeyIn[1]&0x03)<<5) | (KeyIn[2]>>3);
    KeyOut[3] = ((KeyIn[2]&0x07)<<4) | (KeyIn[3]>>4);
    KeyOut[4] = ((KeyIn[3]&0x0F)<<3) | (KeyIn[4]>>5);
    KeyOut[5] = ((KeyIn[4]&0x1F)<<2) | (KeyIn[5]>>6);
    KeyOut[6] = ((KeyIn[5]&0x3F)<<1) | (KeyIn[6]>>7);
    KeyOut[7] = KeyIn[6] & 0x7F;
    ((DWORD*)KeyOut)[0] <= 1;
    ((DWORD*)KeyOut)[1] <= 1;
    ((DWORD*)KeyOut)[0] &= 0xfefefefe;
    ((DWORD*)KeyOut)[1] &= 0xfefefefe;

```

Assume bytes(s, e, l) returns bytes from s to e of the byte array l. Assume concat(a1, a2) returns byte array containing the bytes of array a1 followed by the bytes from byte array a2.

```

LMDESECB(Input, Sk, Output)
    SET k1 to bytes(0, 7, Sk)
    CALL InitLMKey(k1, k3)
    SET k2 to bytes(8, 15, Sk)
    CALL InitLMKey(k2, k4)
    SET i1 to bytes(0, 7, Input)
    SET i2 to bytes(8, 15, Input)
    CALL DES_ECB(i1, k3, &output1)
    CALL DES_ECB(i2, k4, &output2)
    SET Output to concat(output1, output2)

```

[<104> Section 3.4.5.3.4:](#) For all versions of Windows except Windows NT 3.1, encrypt using the negotiated encryption algorithm and the session key.

For Windows NT 3.1, encrypt as follows.

```

InitLMKey(KeyIn, KeyOut)
    KeyOut[0] = KeyIn[0] >> 0x01;
    KeyOut[1] = ((KeyIn[0]&0x01)<<6) | (KeyIn[1]>>2);
    KeyOut[2] = ((KeyIn[1]&0x03)<<5) | (KeyIn[2]>>3);
    KeyOut[3] = ((KeyIn[2]&0x07)<<4) | (KeyIn[3]>>4);
    KeyOut[4] = ((KeyIn[3]&0x0F)<<3) | (KeyIn[4]>>5);

```

```

KeyOut[5] = ((KeyIn[4]&0x1F)<<2) | (KeyIn[5]>>6);
KeyOut[6] = ((KeyIn[5]&0x3F)<<1) | (KeyIn[6]>>7);
KeyOut[7] = KeyIn[6] & 0x7F;
((DWORD*)KeyOut)[0] <= 1;
((DWORD*)KeyOut)[1] <= 1;
((DWORD*)KeyOut)[0] &= 0xfefefefe;
((DWORD*)KeyOut)[1] &= 0xfefefefe;

```

Assume `bytes(s, e, l)` returns bytes from `s` to `e` of the byte array `l`. Assume `concat(a1, a2)` returns byte array containing the bytes of array `a1` followed by the bytes from byte array `a2`.

```

LMDESECB(Input, Sk, Output)
    SET k1 to bytes(0, 7, Sk)
    CALL InitLMKey(k1, k3)
    SET k2 to bytes(8, 15, Sk)
    CALL InitLMKey(k2, k4)
    SET i1 to bytes(0, 7, Input)
    SET i2 to bytes(8, 15, Input)
    CALL DES_ECB(i1, k3, &output1)
    CALL DES_ECB(i2, k4, &output2)
    SET Output to concat(output1, output2)

```

[<105> Section 3.4.5.3.4:](#) Windows clients reestablish the secure channel with the domain controller upon receiving `STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED`.

[<106> Section 3.4.5.3.5:](#) Windows clients reestablish the secure channel with the domain controller upon receiving `STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED`.

[<107> Section 3.4.5.4.4:](#) Windows clients reestablish the secure channel with the domain controller upon receiving `STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED`.

[<108> Section 3.4.5.4.6:](#) Windows clients reestablish the secure channel with the domain controller upon receiving `STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED`.

[<109> Section 3.4.5.5.4:](#) Windows clients reestablish the secure channel with the domain controller upon receiving `STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED`.

[<110> Section 3.4.6.1:](#) All versions of Windows use 4096. Other implementations can use any value.

[<111> Section 3.5.1:](#) In Windows implementations, the default `DynamicSiteNameTimeout` value is 5 minutes, and the allowed range is 0 minutes to 49 days.

[<112> Section 3.5.1:](#) Supported in Windows 7, and Windows Server 2008 R2.

[<113> Section 3.5.1:](#) This value is configured as described in [\[MS-DISO\]](#).

[<114> Section 3.5.1:](#) The ADM element does not exist in Windows NT.

[<115> Section 3.5.1:](#) `DCRPCPort` is supported in Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, and Windows Server 2008 R2.

[<116> Section 3.5.3:](#) The named pipe `LSASS` is also known by the **alias** `NETLOGON`. The client can use this alias to establish an RPC over named pipes connection. The Netlogon security package functionality was added in Windows 2000 and is present in Windows XP, Windows Server 2003, Windows Vista, Windows Server 2008, Windows 7, and Windows Server 2008 R2.

[<117> Section 3.5.3:](#) Windows NT 4.0 initializes this value to FALSE.

[<118> Section 3.5.3:](#)

In Windows implementations, this can be configured using the following registry path:

- Registry path: HKEY\_LOCAL\_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Netlogon\Parameters
- RegistryValueName: AllowSingleLabelDNSDomain
- RegistryType: DWORD
- Acceptable values: 0 = Disabled, 1 = Enabled
- Default value if not explicitly configured: 0.

[<119> Section 3.5.3:](#) Windows uses the HKEY\_LOCAL\_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\Netlogon\Parameters registry path and SiteName value.

[<120> Section 3.5.3:](#)

In Windows implementations, this can be configured using the following registry path:

- Registry path: HKEY\_LOCAL\_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Netlogon\Parameters
- RegistryValueName: NegativeCachePeriod
- RegistryType: DWORD
- AllowedRange: 0 - 604800 (7 days)
- Default value if not explicitly configured: 45 seconds

[<121> Section 3.5.3:](#) In Windows implementations, the value is 12 hours, unless changed by an administrator.

[<122> Section 3.5.3:](#) In Windows implementations, the value is 30 minutes, unless changed by an administrator.

[<123> Section 3.5.3:](#) In Windows NT, Windows 2000, Windows XP, Windows Server 2003, and Windows Vista, RejectDES is always FALSE.

[<124> Section 3.5.5:](#) NetrLogonSamLogon is available starting with Windows NT Server 3.1.

[<125> Section 3.5.5:](#) NetrLogonSamLogoff is available starting with Windows NT Server 3.1.

[<126> Section 3.5.5:](#) NetrServerReqChallenge is available starting with Windows NT Server 3.1.

[<127> Section 3.5.5:](#) NetrServerAuthenticate is available starting with Windows NT Server 3.1.

[<128> Section 3.5.5:](#) NetrServerPasswordSet is available starting with Windows NT Server 3.1.

[<129> Section 3.5.5:](#) NetrGetDCName is available starting with Windows NT Server 3.1.

[<130> Section 3.5.5:](#) NetrLogonControl is available starting with Windows NT Server 3.1.

[<131> Section 3.5.5:](#) NetrGetAnyDCName is available starting with Windows NT Server 3.1.

[<132> Section 3.5.5:](#) NetrLogonControl2 is available starting with Windows NT Server 3.1.

[<133> Section 3.5.5:](#) NetrServerAuthenticate2 is available starting with Windows NT Server 3.5.

[<134> Section 3.5.5:](#) NetrLogonControl2Ex is available starting with Windows NT 4.0.

[<135> Section 3.5.5:](#) NetrEnumerateTrustedDomains is available starting with Windows NT 4.0.

[<136> Section 3.5.5:](#) DsrGetDcName is available in Windows 2000 Server, Windows XP, Windows Server 2003, Windows Vista, Windows Server 2008, Windows 7, and Windows Server 2008 R2.

[<137> Section 3.5.5:](#) NetrLogonSetServiceBits is available in Windows 2000, Windows 2000 Server, Windows XP, and Windows Server 2003.

[<138> Section 3.5.5:](#) NetrLogonGetTrustRid is available in Windows 2000, Windows 2000 Server, Windows XP, Windows Server 2003, Windows Vista, Windows Server 2008, Windows 7, and Windows Server 2008 R2.

[<139> Section 3.5.5:](#) NetrLogonComputeServerDigest is available in Windows 2000 Server, Windows XP, Windows Server 2003, Windows Vista, Windows Server 2008, Windows 7, and Windows Server 2008 R2.

[<140> Section 3.5.5:](#) NetrLogonComputeClientDigest is available in Windows 2000 Server, Windows XP, Windows Server 2003, Windows Vista, Windows Server 2008, Windows 7, and Windows Server 2008 R2.

[<141> Section 3.5.5:](#) NetrServerAuthenticate3 is available in Windows 2000 Server, Windows XP, Windows Server 2003, Windows Vista, Windows Server 2008, Windows 7, and Windows Server 2008 R2.

[<142> Section 3.5.5:](#) DsrGetDcNameEx is available in Windows 2000 Server, Windows XP, Windows Server 2003, Windows Vista, Windows Server 2008, Windows 7, and Windows Server 2008 R2.

[<143> Section 3.5.5:](#) DsrGetSiteName is available in Windows 2000 Server, Windows XP, Windows Server 2003, Windows Vista, Windows Server 2008, Windows 7, and Windows Server 2008 R2.

[<144> Section 3.5.5:](#) NetrLogonGetDomainInfo is available in Windows 2000 Server, Windows XP, Windows Server 2003, Windows Vista, Windows Server 2008, Windows 7, and Windows Server 2008 R2.

[<145> Section 3.5.5:](#) NetrServerPasswordSet2 is available in Windows 2000 Server, Windows XP, Windows Server 2003, Windows Vista, Windows Server 2008, Windows 7, and Windows Server 2008 R2.

[<146> Section 3.5.5:](#) NetrLogonSendToSam is available in Windows 2000 Server, Windows XP, Windows Server 2003, Windows Vista, Windows Server 2008, Windows 7, and Windows Server 2008 R2.

[<147> Section 3.5.5:](#) DsrAddressToSiteNamesW is available in Windows 2000 Server, Windows XP, Windows Server 2003, Windows Vista, Windows Server 2008, Windows 7, and Windows Server 2008 R2.

[<148> Section 3.5.5:](#) DsrGetDcNameEx2 is available in Windows 2000 Server, Windows XP, Windows Server 2003, Windows Vista, Windows Server 2008, Windows 7, and Windows Server 2008 R2.

[<149> Section 3.5.5:](#) NetrLogonGetTimeServiceParentDomain is available in Windows 2000, Windows 2000 Server, Windows XP, and Windows Server 2003.

[<150> Section 3.5.5:](#) NetrEnumerateTrustedDomainsEx is available in Windows 2000 Server, Windows XP, Windows Server 2003, Windows Vista, Windows Server 2008, Windows 7, and Windows Server 2008 R2.

[<151> Section 3.5.5:](#) DsrAddressToSiteNamesExW is available in Windows 2000 Server, Windows XP, Windows Server 2003, Windows Vista, Windows Server 2008, Windows 7, and Windows Server 2008 R2.

[<152> Section 3.5.5:](#) DsrGetDcSiteCoverageW is available in Windows 2000 Server, Windows XP, Windows Server 2003, Windows Vista, Windows Server 2008, Windows 7, and Windows Server 2008 R2.

[<153> Section 3.5.5:](#) NetrLogonSamLogonEx is available in Windows 2000 Server, Windows XP, Windows Server 2003, Windows Vista, Windows Server 2008, Windows 7, and Windows Server 2008 R2.

[<154> Section 3.5.5:](#) DsrEnumerateDomainTrusts available in Windows 2000 Server, Windows XP, Windows Server 2003, Windows Vista, and Windows Server 2008.

[<155> Section 3.5.5:](#) DsrDeregisterDnsHostRecords is available in Windows 2000 Server, Windows XP, Windows Server 2003, Windows Vista, Windows Server 2008, Windows 7, and Windows Server 2008 R2.

[<156> Section 3.5.5:](#) NetrServerTrustPasswordsGet is available starting with Windows 2000 Server SP4.

[<157> Section 3.5.5:](#) DsrGetForestTrustInformation is available starting with Windows 2000 Server SP4.

[<158> Section 3.5.5:](#) NetrGetForestTrustInformation is available starting with Windows 2000 Server SP4.

[<159> Section 3.5.5:](#) NetrLogonSamLogonWithFlags is available starting with Windows 2000 Server SP4.

[<160> Section 3.5.5:](#) NetrServerGetTrustInfo is available starting with Windows 2000 Server SP4.

[<161> Section 3.5.5:](#) Gaps in the opnum numbering sequence apply to Windows as follows.

Opnum	Description
7	Windows uses this method only for server-to-server communication. It is never called by Windows client operating systems.
8	Windows uses this method only for server-to-server communication. It is never called by Windows client operating systems.
9	Windows uses this method only for server-to-server communication. It is never called by Windows client operating systems.
10	Windows uses this method only for server-to-server communication. It is never called by Windows client operating systems.
16	Windows uses this method only for server-to-server communication. It is never called by Windows client operating systems.
17	Windows uses this method only for server-to-server communication. It is never called by Windows client operating systems.



Opnum	Description
22	Windows uses this method only for server-to-server communication. It is never called by Windows client operating systems. Windows supports this method remotely only in Windows 2000 Server, and Windows Server 2003.
31	Windows uses this method only for server-to-server communication. It is never called by Windows client operating systems.
32	Windows uses this method only for server-to-server communication. It is never called by Windows client operating systems.
35	Windows supports this method remotely only in Windows 2000 Server and Windows Server 2003.
44	Windows uses this method only for server-to-server communication. It is never called by Windows client operating systems.
47	Windows uses this method only locally, never remotely.
48	Windows uses this method only for server-to-server communication. It is never called by Windows client operating systems.
49	Windows uses this method only for server-to-server communication. It is never called by Windows client operating systems.

[<162> Section 3.5.5.1:](#) If the string is NULL, the server is considered to be the same as the client (that is, the local computer).

[<163> Section 3.5.5.3.1:](#) Supported in Windows 2000 Server, Windows XP, Windows Server 2003, Windows Vista, Windows Server 2008, Windows 7, and Windows Server 2008 R2.

[<164> Section 3.5.5.3.1:](#) Added in Windows Server 2008.

[<165> Section 3.5.5.3.1:](#) Added in Windows Vista, and supported in Windows 7, Windows Server 2008, and Windows Server 2008 R2.

[<166> Section 3.5.5.3.1:](#) Windows implements both the LDAP Ping ([\[MS-ADTS\]](#) section 7.3.3) and the Mailslot Ping ([\[MS-ADTS\]](#) section 7.3.5) methods and uses them to locate a DC ([\[MS-ADTS\]](#) section 7.3.6).

[<167> Section 3.5.5.3.1:](#) Windows 2000, Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, and Windows Server 2008 R2 DCs support directory service functions.

[<168> Section 3.5.5.3.1:](#) Windows 2000, Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, and Windows Server 2008 R2 DCs support directory service functions.

[<169> Section 3.5.5.3.1:](#)

A DC is writable when:

- It is a Windows 2000, Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, or Windows Server 2008 R2 DC, and it hosts a writable copy of the directory service.
- It is a Windows NT DC, and it hosts a writable copy of SAM.

A Windows NT DC is writable only if it is a PDC. All Windows 2000, Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, and Windows Server 2008 R2 DCs are writable unless they are RODCs.

[<170> Section 3.5.5.3.1:](#) Added in Windows 7 and Windows Server 2008 R2.

[<171> Section 3.5.5.3.1:](#) If neither the R nor S flag is specified, Windows returns the type of name that matches the type of the *DomainName* parameter.

[<172> Section 3.5.5.3.1:](#)

In Windows, if neither the R nor S flags are set in the *Flags* parameter, the behavior is as follows:

- If only one of the **DnsHostName** or **NetbiosComputerName** fields is set in the message, the **DomainControllerName** field is set to that value.
- Otherwise, if both the **DnsHostName** and **NetbiosComputerName** fields are set in the message:
  - If the *DomainName* parameter is equal to the **DnsDomainName** message field, the **DomainControllerName** field is set to the value of the **DnsHostName** message field.
  - If the *DomainName* parameter is equal to the **NetbiosDomainName** message field, the **DomainControllerName** field is set to the value of the **NetbiosComputerName** message field.
  - If the *DomainName* parameter is NULL:
    - If the DC responded to the LDAP message, the **DomainControllerName** field is set to the value of the **DnsHostName** message field.
    - If the DC responded to the mailslot message, the **DomainControllerName** field is set to the value of the **NetbiosComputerName** message field.

[<173> Section 3.5.5.3.1:](#)

In Windows, if neither the R nor S flags are set in the *Flags* parameter, the behavior is as follows:

- If only one of the **DnsDomainName** or **NetbiosDomainName** fields is set in the message, the **DomainName** field is set to that value.
- Otherwise, if both the **DnsDomainName** and **NetbiosDomainName** fields are set in the message:
  - If the *DomainName* parameter of the **DsrGetDcNameEx2** call is equal to the **DnsDomainName** message field, the **DomainName** field is set to the value of the **DnsDomainName** message field.
  - If the *DomainName* parameter of the **DsrGetDcNameEx2** call is equal to the **NetbiosDomainName** message field, the **DomainName** field is set to the value of the **NetbiosDomainName** message field.
  - If the *DomainName* parameter of the **DsrGetDcNameEx2** call is NULL:
    - If the DC responded to the LDAP message, the **DomainName** field is set to the value of the **DnsDomainName** message field.
    - If the DC responded to the mailslot message, the **DomainName** field is set to the value of the **NetbiosDomainName** message field.

[<174> Section 3.5.5.3.2:](#) Supported in Windows 2000 Server, Windows XP, Windows Server 2003, Windows Vista, Windows Server 2008, Windows 7, and Windows Server 2008 R2.

[<175> Section 3.5.5.3.3:](#) Supported in Windows 2000, Windows XP, Windows Server 2003, Windows Vista, Windows Server 2008, Windows 7, and Windows Server 2008 R2.

[<176> Section 3.5.5.3.4:](#) This method was used in Windows NT Server 3.1 and is supported in Windows NT Server 3.1 versions. It was superseded by the [DsrGetDcNameEx2](#) method (section [3.5.5.3.1](#)) in Windows 2000, Windows XP, Windows Server 2003, Windows Vista, Windows Server 2008 Windows 7, and Windows Server 2008 R2.

[<177> Section 3.5.5.3.4:](#)

Return Value/Code	Description
0x00000035 ERROR_BAD_NETPATH	The network path was not found.

[<178> Section 3.5.5.3.4:](#) Windows implements both the LDAP ping-based method ([\[MS-ADTS\]](#) section 7.3.3) and the mailslot message-based method ([\[MS-ADTS\]](#) section 7.3.5), and uses those two methods to locate a DC ([\[MS-ADTS\]](#) section 7.3.6).

[<179> Section 3.5.5.3.5:](#) This method was introduced in Windows NT Server 3.1 and is supported in Windows NT Server 3.1 versions. It was superseded by the [DsrGetDcNameEx2](#) method (section [3.5.5.3.1](#)) in Windows 2000, Windows XP, Windows Server 2003, Windows Vista, Windows Server 2008, Windows 7, and Windows Server 2008 R2.

[<180> Section 3.5.5.3.5:](#)

Return Value/Code	Description
0x00000712 ERROR_DOMAIN_TRUST_INCONSISTENT	The name or security ID (SID) of the domain specified is inconsistent with the trust information for that domain.

[<181> Section 3.5.5.3.5:](#) Windows implements both the LDAP ping-based method ([\[MS-ADTS\]](#) section 7.3.3) and the mailslot ping method ([\[MS-ADTS\]](#) section 7.3.5), and uses those two methods to locate a DC ([\[MS-ADTS\]](#) section 7.3.6).

[<182> Section 3.5.5.3.6:](#) Supported in Windows 2000, Windows XP, Windows Server 2003, Windows Vista, Windows Server 2008, Windows 7, and Windows Server 2008 R2.

[<183> Section 3.5.5.3.6:](#)

Return Value/Code	Description
0x0000077F ERROR_NO_SITENAME	No site name is available for this machine.

[<184> Section 3.5.5.3.6:](#) Windows implements both the LDAP Ping method ([\[MS-ADTS\]](#) section 7.3.3) and the Mailslot Ping method ([\[MS-ADTS\]](#) section 7.3.5), and uses those two methods to locate a DC ([\[MS-ADTS\]](#) section 7.3.6).

[<185> Section 3.5.5.3.7:](#) Supported in Windows 2000 Server, Windows XP, Windows Server 2003, Windows Vista, Windows Server 2008, Windows 7, and Windows Server 2008 R2.

[<186> Section 3.5.5.3.8:](#) Supported in Windows 2000 Server, Windows XP, Windows Server 2003, Windows Vista, Windows Server 2008, Windows 7, and Windows Server 2008 R2.

[<187> Section 3.5.5.3.8:](#)

Return Value/Code	Description
0x00000008 ERROR_NOT_ENOUGH_MEMORY	Not enough storage is available to process this command.
0x00000057 ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER	One of the parameters is invalid. This error value is returned if the value of <i>EntryCount</i> passed to <b>DsrAddressToSiteNamesW</b> is zero.

[<188> Section 3.5.5.3.9:](#) Supported in Windows 2000 Server, Windows XP, Windows Server 2003, Windows Vista, Windows Server 2008, Windows 7, Windows Server 2008 R2.

[<189> Section 3.5.5.3.9:](#) To avoid large memory allocations, the number of 32,000 was chosen as a reasonable limit for the maximum number of socket addresses that this method accepts.

[<190> Section 3.5.5.3.9:](#)

Return Value/Code	Description
0x00000008 ERROR_NOT_ENOUGH_MEMORY	Not enough storage is available to process this command.
0x00000057 ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER	One of the parameters is invalid. This error value is returned if the value of <i>EntryCount</i> passed to <b>DsrAddressToSiteNamesExW</b> is zero.

[<191> Section 3.5.5.3.10:](#) Supported in Windows 2000 Server, Windows XP, Windows Server 2003, Windows Vista, Windows Server 2008, Windows 7, and Windows Server 2008 R2.

[<192> Section 3.5.5.3.10:](#)

Return Value/Code	Description
0x00000032 ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED	The request is not supported. This error value is returned when <b>DsrDeregisterDnsHostRecords</b> is called on a machine that is not a DC.

[<193> Section 3.5.5.4.2:](#) Supported in Windows 2000 Server, Windows XP, Windows Server 2003, Windows Vista, Windows Server 2008, Windows 7, and Windows Server 2008 R2.

[<194> Section 3.5.5.4.2:](#) In Windows, all machine account names are the name of the machine with a "\$" (dollar sign) appended.

[<195> Section 3.5.5.4.2:](#) For Windows 2000, Windows XP, Windows Server 2003, Windows Vista, Windows Server 2008, Windows 7, and Windows Server 2008 R2, if the value is 5 (UasServerSecureChannel), the server always returns an access-denied error because this functionality is no longer supported. Windows NT 4.0 has configuration parameter options allowing UAS compatibility mode, and if this mode is enabled, the error is not returned and further processing occurs. Otherwise, it returns an access-denied error.

[<196> Section 3.5.5.4.2:](#) Supported only in Windows Server 2008 R2.

[<197> Section 3.5.5.4.3:](#) This method was used in Windows NT 3.5 and Windows NT 4.0. In Windows 2000 Server, Windows XP, Windows Server 2003, Windows Vista, Windows Server 2008, Windows 7, and Windows Server 2008 R2, it was superseded by the [NetrServerAuthenticate3](#) method (section [3.5.5.4.2](#)).

[<198> Section 3.5.5.4.4:](#) This method was used in Windows NT Server 3.1. In Windows NT Server 3.5, it was superseded by the [NetrServerAuthenticate2](#) method (section [3.5.5.4.3](#)). In Windows 2000 Server, Windows XP, Windows Server 2003, Windows Vista, Windows Server 2008, Windows 7, and Windows Server 2008 R2, the [NetrServerAuthenticate2](#) method (section [3.5.5.4.3](#)) was superseded by the [NetrServerAuthenticate3](#) method (section [3.5.5.4.2](#)).

[<199> Section 3.5.5.4.5:](#) Supported in Windows 2000 Server, Windows XP, Windows Server 2003, Windows Vista, Windows Server 2008, Windows 7, and Windows Server 2008 R2.

[<200> Section 3.5.5.4.5:](#) A domain member uses this function to periodically change its machine account password. A PDC uses this function to periodically change the trust password for all directly trusted domains. By default, the period is 30 days in Windows 2000 Server, Windows XP, Windows Server 2003, Windows Vista, Windows Server 2008, Windows 7, and Windows Server 2008 R2.

[<201> Section 3.5.5.4.5:](#) In Windows, all machine account names are the name of the machine with a "\$" (dollar sign) appended.

[<202> Section 3.5.5.4.6:](#) In Windows, all machine account names are the name of the machine with a "\$" (dollar sign) appended.

[<203> Section 3.5.5.4.7:](#) Supported in Windows 2000 Server SP4, Windows XP, and Windows Server 2003, Windows Vista, Windows Server 2008, Windows 7, and Windows Server 2008 R2.

[<204> Section 3.5.5.4.7:](#) In Windows, all machine account names are the name of the machine with a "\$" (dollar sign) appended.

[<205> Section 3.5.5.4.8:](#) Supported in Windows 2000 Server, Windows XP, Windows Server 2003, Windows Vista, and Windows Server 2008, Windows 7, and Windows Server 2008 R2.

[<206> Section 3.5.5.4.8:](#) Not supported in Windows NT, Windows 2000, Windows Server 2003 and Windows Server 2008.

[<207> Section 3.5.5.4.8:](#) All versions of Windows use 4096. Other implementations can use any value.

[<208> Section 3.5.5.4.8:](#) For Windows 2000, Windows XP, Windows Server 2003, Windows Vista, Windows Server 2008, Windows 7, and Windows Server 2008 R2, NETLOGON\_ONE\_DOMAIN\_INFO.TrustExtension MaximumLength and Length are set to the size 0x10, and Buffer points to a buffer containing the following fields of a DS\_DOMAIN\_TRUSTSW structure: Flags, ParentIndex, TrustType, TrustAttributes.

[<209> Section 3.5.5.4.8:](#) If both WkstaBuffer.WorkstationInfo.OsVersion and WkstaBuffer.WorkstationInfo.OsName are unspecified, Windows 2000, Windows XP, and Windows Server 2003 use the generic string "Windows 2000" to update the **operatingSystem** attribute. If only WkstaBuffer.WorkstationInfo.OsName is unspecified, Windows 2000, Windows XP, and Windows Server 2003 use the generic string "Windows 2000 Professional" when WkstaBuffer.WorkstationInfo.OsVersion.wProductType is VER\_NT\_WORKSTATION, and otherwise use the string "Windows 2000 Server" to update the **operatingSystem** attribute.

[<210> Section 3.5.5.4.9:](#) NetrLogonGetCapabilities is supported by Windows 7 and Windows Server 2008 R2.

[<211> Section 3.5.5.4.9:](#) The ServerCapabilities field is not supported by Windows NT, Windows 2000, Windows XP, Windows Server 2003, Windows Vista, or Windows Server 2008. These operating systems supported a dummy buffer field:

[out, switch\_is(QueryLevel)] PNETLOGON\_DUMMY1 Buffer

**Buffer:** A pointer to a byte buffer.

[<212> Section 3.5.5.4.9:](#) Windows NT, Windows 2000, Windows XP, Windows Server 2003, Windows Vista, and Windows Server 2008 do no processing for this call, and always return 0xC0000002 (STATUS\_NOT\_IMPLEMENTED).

[<213> Section 3.5.5.5.1:](#) Supported in Windows 2000 Server, Windows XP, Windows Server 2003, Windows Vista, Windows Server 2008, Windows 7, and Windows Server 2008 R2.

[<214> Section 3.5.5.5.1:](#) Windows uses the value 0x01 as the representation of TRUE and 0x00 for FALSE.

[<215> Section 3.5.5.5.1:](#) Added in Windows Vista and supported in Windows Server 2008, and Windows Server 2008 R2.

[<216> Section 3.5.5.5.1:](#) Added in Windows Vista and supported in Windows Server 2008, and Windows Server 2008 R2.

[<217> Section 3.5.5.5.1:](#) For all versions of Windows except Windows NT 3.1, decrypt by using the negotiated decryption algorithm and the session key.

For Windows NT 3.1, decrypt as follows.

```
InitLMKey(KeyIn, KeyOut)
    KeyOut[0] = KeyIn[0] >> 0x01;
    KeyOut[1] = ((KeyIn[0] & 0x01) << 6) | (KeyIn[1] >> 2);
    KeyOut[2] = ((KeyIn[1] & 0x03) << 5) | (KeyIn[2] >> 3);
    KeyOut[3] = ((KeyIn[2] & 0x07) << 4) | (KeyIn[3] >> 4);
    KeyOut[4] = ((KeyIn[3] & 0x0F) << 3) | (KeyIn[4] >> 5);
    KeyOut[5] = ((KeyIn[4] & 0x1F) << 2) | (KeyIn[5] >> 6);
    KeyOut[6] = ((KeyIn[5] & 0x3F) << 1) | (KeyIn[6] >> 7);
    KeyOut[7] = KeyIn[6] & 0x7F;
    ((DWORD*)KeyOut)[0] <= 1;
    ((DWORD*)KeyOut)[1] <= 1;
    ((DWORD*)KeyOut)[0] &= 0xfefefefe;
    ((DWORD*)KeyOut)[1] &= 0xfefefefe;
```

Assume bytes(s, e, l) returns bytes from s to e of the byte array l. Assume concat(a1, a2) returns byte array containing the bytes of array a1 followed by the bytes from byte array a2.

```
LMDESECB(Input, Sk, Output)
    SET k1 to bytes(0, 7, Sk)
    CALL InitLMKey(k1, k3)
    SET k2 to bytes(8, 15, Sk)
    CALL InitLMKey(k2, k4)
    SET i1 to bytes(0, 7, Input)
    SET i2 to bytes(8, 15, Input)
    CALL DES_ECB(i1, k3, &output1)
    CALL DES_ECB(i2, k4, &output2)
    SET Output to concat(output1, output2)
```

[<218> Section 3.5.5.5.1:](#) For all versions of Windows except Windows NT 3.1, decrypt by using the negotiated decryption algorithm and the session key.

For Windows NT 3.1, decrypt as follows.

```

InitLMKey(KeyIn, KeyOut)
    KeyOut[0] = KeyIn[0] >> 0x01;
    KeyOut[1] = ((KeyIn[0]&0x01)<<6) | (KeyIn[1]>>2);
    KeyOut[2] = ((KeyIn[1]&0x03)<<5) | (KeyIn[2]>>3);
    KeyOut[3] = ((KeyIn[2]&0x07)<<4) | (KeyIn[3]>>4);
    KeyOut[4] = ((KeyIn[3]&0x0F)<<3) | (KeyIn[4]>>5);
    KeyOut[5] = ((KeyIn[4]&0x1F)<<2) | (KeyIn[5]>>6);
    KeyOut[6] = ((KeyIn[5]&0x3F)<<1) | (KeyIn[6]>>7);
    KeyOut[7] = KeyIn[6] & 0x7F;
    (DWORD*)KeyOut[0] <= 1;
    (DWORD*)KeyOut[1] <= 1;
    (DWORD*)KeyOut[0] &= 0xfefefefe;
    (DWORD*)KeyOut[1] &= 0xfefefefe;

```

Assume bytes(s, e, l) returns bytes from s to e of the byte array l. Assume concat(a1, a2) returns byte array containing the bytes of array a1 followed by the bytes from byte array a2.

```

LMDESECB(Input, Sk, Output)
    SET k1 to bytes(0, 7, Sk)
    CALL InitLMKey(k1, k3)
    SET k2 to bytes(8, 15, Sk)
    CALL InitLMKey(k2, k4)
    SET i1 to bytes(0, 7, Input)
    SET i2 to bytes(8, 15, Input)
    CALL DES_ECB(i1, k3, &output1)
    CALL DES_ECB(i2, k4, &output2)
    SET Output to concat(output1, output2)

```

[<219> Section 3.5.5.5.1:](#) For all versions of Windows except Windows NT 3.1, decrypt by using the negotiated decryption algorithm and the session key.

For Windows NT 3.1, decrypt as follows.

```

InitLMKey(KeyIn, KeyOut)
    KeyOut[0] = KeyIn[0] >> 0x01;
    KeyOut[1] = ((KeyIn[0]&0x01)<<6) | (KeyIn[1]>>2);
    KeyOut[2] = ((KeyIn[1]&0x03)<<5) | (KeyIn[2]>>3);
    KeyOut[3] = ((KeyIn[2]&0x07)<<4) | (KeyIn[3]>>4);
    KeyOut[4] = ((KeyIn[3]&0x0F)<<3) | (KeyIn[4]>>5);
    KeyOut[5] = ((KeyIn[4]&0x1F)<<2) | (KeyIn[5]>>6);
    KeyOut[6] = ((KeyIn[5]&0x3F)<<1) | (KeyIn[6]>>7);
    KeyOut[7] = KeyIn[6] & 0x7F;
    (DWORD*)KeyOut[0] <= 1;
    (DWORD*)KeyOut[1] <= 1;
    (DWORD*)KeyOut[0] &= 0xfefefefe;
    (DWORD*)KeyOut[1] &= 0xfefefefe;

```

Assume bytes(s, e, l) returns bytes from s to e of the byte array l. Assume concat(a1, a2) returns byte array containing the bytes of array a1 followed by the bytes from byte array a2.

```

LMDESECB(Input, Sk, Output)
    SET k1 to bytes(0, 7, Sk)
    CALL InitLMKey(k1, k3)
    SET k2 to bytes(8, 15, Sk)

```



```

CALL InitLMKey(k2, k4)
SET i1 to bytes(0, 7, Input)
SET i2 to bytes(8, 15, Input)
CALL DES_ECB(i1, k3, &output1)
CALL DES_ECB(i2, k4, &output2)
SET Output to concat(output1, output2)

```

<220> [Section 3.5.5.5.1](#): Windows XP, Windows Server 2003, Windows Vista, Windows Server 2008, Windows 7, and Windows Server 2008 R2 support validation of LogonLevel with ValidationLevel. The data is opaque to Netlogon and MUST be passed unexamined to the package specified by the **PackageName** field of the [NETLOGON\\_GENERIC\\_INFO](#) structure. For more information, see section [3.2.4.1](#).

<221> [Section 3.5.5.5.1](#): Windows XP, Windows Server 2003, Windows Vista, Windows Server 2008, Windows 7, and Windows Server 2008 R2 support validation of LogonLevel with ValidationLevel.

<222> [Section 3.5.5.5.2](#): Supported in Windows XP Windows Server 2003, Windows Vista, Windows Server 2008, Windows 7, and Windows Server 2008 R2.

<223> [Section 3.5.5.5.2](#): Windows uses the value of 0x01 as the representation of TRUE and 0x00 for FALSE.

<224> [Section 3.5.5.5.2](#): Added in Windows Vista and supported in Windows Server 2008, Windows 7, and Windows Server 2008 R2.

<225> [Section 3.5.5.5.2](#): Added in Windows Vista and supported in Windows Server 2008, Windows 7, and Windows Server 2008 R2.

<226> [Section 3.5.5.5.3](#): This method was used in Windows NT 4.0. It was superseded by the [NetrLogonSamLogonWithFlags](#) method (section [3.5.5.5.2](#)) in Windows 2000 Server, Windows XP, Windows Server 2003, Windows Vista, and Windows Server 2008, Windows 7, and Windows Server 2008 R2.

<227> [Section 3.5.5.5.4](#): Windows NT servers support logoff updates.

<228> [Section 3.5.5.6.1](#): Supported in Windows 2000 Server, Windows XP, Windows Server 2003, Windows Vista, Windows Server 2008, Windows 7, and Windows Server 2008 R2.

<229> [Section 3.5.5.6.1](#):

Return Value/Code	Description
0x0000051F ERROR_NO_LOGON_SERVERS	There are currently no logon servers available to service the logon request.
0x000006FA ERROR_NO_TRUST_LSA_SECRET	The workstation does not have a trust secret.
0x000006FB ERROR_NO_TRUST_SAM_ACCOUNT	The security database on the server does not have a computer account for this workstation trust relationship.

<230> [Section 3.5.5.6.2](#): Supported in Windows 2000 Server, Windows XP, Windows Server 2003, Windows Vista, Windows Server 2008, Windows 7, and Windows Server 2008 R2.



[<231> Section 3.5.5.6.2:](#)

Return Value/Code	Description
0x0000051F ERROR_NO_LOGON_SERVERS	There are currently no logon servers available to service the logon request.
0x000006FA ERROR_NO_TRUST_LSA_SECRET	The workstation does not have a trust secret.
0x000006FB ERROR_NO_TRUST_SAM_ACCOUNT	The security database on the server does not have a computer account for this workstation trust relationship.

[<232> Section 3.5.5.6.3:](#)

Return Value/Code	Description
0x0000051F ERROR_NO_LOGON_SERVERS	There are currently no logon servers available to service the logon request.
0x000006FA ERROR_NO_TRUST_LSA_SECRET	The workstation does not have a trust secret.
0x000006FB ERROR_NO_TRUST_SAM_ACCOUNT	The security database on the server does not have a computer account for this workstation trust relationship.

[<233> Section 3.5.5.6.4:](#) Supported in Windows 2000 Server, Windows XP, Windows Server 2003, Windows Vista, and Windows Server 2008, Windows 7, and Windows Server 2008 R2.

[<234> Section 3.5.5.6.5:](#) Supported in Windows XP, Windows Server 2003, Windows Vista, Windows Server 2008, Windows 7, and Windows Server 2008 R2.

[<235> Section 3.5.5.6.5:](#)

Return Value/Code	Description
0x00000001 ERROR_INVALID_FUNCTION	Incorrect function.

[<236> Section 3.5.5.6.6:](#) Supported in Windows XP and Windows Server 2003, Windows Vista, Windows Server 2008, Windows 7, Windows Server 2008 R2.

[<237> Section 3.5.5.7.1:](#) Supported in Windows 2000, Windows 2000 Server, Windows XP, Windows Server 2003, Windows Vista, Windows Server 2008, Windows 7, and Windows Server 2008 R2.

[<238> Section 3.5.5.7.2:](#) Supported in Windows 2000 Server, Windows XP, Windows Server 2003, Windows Vista, Windows Server 2008, Windows 7, and Windows Server 2008 R2.

[<239> Section 3.5.5.7.3:](#) Supported in Windows 2000 Server, Windows XP, Windows Server 2003, Windows Vista, Windows Server 2008, Windows 7, and Windows Server 2008 R2.

[<240> Section 3.5.5.7.4:](#) Supported in Windows 2000 Server, Windows XP, Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows 7, and Windows Server 2008 R2.

[<241> Section 3.5.5.7.5:](#) Not supported in Windows NT.

[<242> Section 3.5.5.7.5:](#) This flag was added in Windows 7.

[<243> Section 3.5.5.7.5:](#) This flag was added in Windows 7.

[<244> Section 3.5.5.7.6:](#) Supported in Windows 2000 Server, Windows XP, Windows Server 2003, Windows Vista, Windows Server 2008, Windows 7, and Windows Server 2008 R2.

[<245> Section 3.5.5.7.6:](#) The Netlogon client ignores this value if *ServerName* is not a domain controller.

[<246> Section 3.5.5.8.1:](#) The following restrictions apply to the values of the *FunctionCode* parameter in Windows NT 4.0, Windows 2000, Windows 7, and Windows Server 2008 R2. There are no restrictions in Windows Server 2003, Windows Vista, and Windows Server 2008.

The following values are not supported on Windows NT 4.0:

- NETLOGON\_CONTROL\_CHANGE\_PASSWORD (0x00000009)
- NETLOGON\_CONTROL\_TC\_VERIFY (0x0000000A)
- NETLOGON\_CONTROL\_FORCE\_DNS\_REG (0x0000000B)
- NETLOGON\_CONTROL\_QUERY\_DNS\_REG (0x0000000C)
- NETLOGON\_CONTROL\_BACKUP\_CHANGE\_LOG (0x0000FFFC)
- NETLOGON\_CONTROL\_TRUNCATE\_LOG (0x0000FFFD)
- NETLOGON\_CONTROL\_SET\_DBFLAG (0x0000FFFE)
- NETLOGON\_CONTROL\_BREAKPOINT (0x0000FFFF)

The error ERROR\_NOT\_SUPPORTED is returned if one of these values is used.

The following values are not supported on Windows 2000 Server:

- NETLOGON\_CONTROL\_TC\_VERIFY (0x0000000A)
- NETLOGON\_CONTROL\_FORCE\_DNS\_REG (0x0000000B)
- NETLOGON\_CONTROL\_QUERY\_DNS\_REG (0x0000000C)

The error ERROR\_NOT\_SUPPORTED is returned if one of these values is used.

The following values are not supported on Windows 7 or Windows Server 2008 R2:

- NETLOGON\_CONTROL\_REPLICATE (0x00000002)
- NETLOGON\_CONTROL\_SYNCHRONIZE (0x00000003)
- NETLOGON\_CONTROL\_PDC\_REPLICATE (0x00000004)
- NETLOGON\_CONTROL\_BACKUP\_CHANGE\_LOG (0x0000FFFC)

The error ERROR\_NOT\_SUPPORTED is returned if one of these values is used.

<247> [Section 3.5.5.8.1](#): Only supported on servers that are Windows NT 4.0 BDCs; otherwise, the ERROR\_NOT\_SUPPORTED error is returned from a server that is not a Windows NT 4.0 BDC.

<248> [Section 3.5.5.8.1](#): Only supported on servers that are Windows NT 4.0 BDCs; otherwise, the ERROR\_NOT\_SUPPORTED error is returned from a server that is not a Windows NT 4.0 BDC.

<249> [Section 3.5.5.8.1](#): Windows NT, Windows XP, Windows Server 2003, Windows Vista, and Windows Server 2008 support NETLOGON\_CONTROL\_PDC\_REPLICATE (0x00000004).

<250> [Section 3.5.5.8.1](#): The server is a Windows Server 2003, Windows Vista, Windows Server 2008, Windows 7, or Windows Server 2008 R2 DC; otherwise, the ERROR\_NOT\_SUPPORTED error is returned.

<251> [Section 3.5.5.8.1](#): The server is a Windows Server 2003, Windows Vista, Windows Server 2008, Windows 7, or Windows Server 2008 R2 DC; otherwise, the ERROR\_NOT\_SUPPORTED error is returned. The server implementation decides how the DNS update status is recorded.

<252> [Section 3.5.5.8.1](#): In Windows, the server copies to a backup file the contents of a file that contains a cache of database changes.

<253> [Section 3.5.5.8.1](#): In Windows, the server truncates the contents of a debug file that contains debugging information about the Netlogon service operations.

<254> [Section 3.5.5.8.1](#): In Windows, the server sets the level of verbosity of output into the debug file that contains debugging information about the Netlogon service operations. The level of verbosity to set is specified in the **DebugFlag** field of the *Data* parameter.

<255> [Section 3.5.5.8.1](#): In Windows, if the [NetrLogonControl2Ex](#) method is called with the function code NETLOGON\_CONTROL\_BREAKPOINT and the operating system is not a checked build, the method returns ERROR\_NOT\_SUPPORTED.

<256> [Section 3.5.5.8.1](#): In Windows, the server breaks into the debugger if it is attached to the computer that supports debugging.

<257> [Section 3.5.5.8.1](#): Not supported in Windows NT

<258> [Section 3.5.5.8.1](#): Windows NT 4.0 BDCs force an immediate partial synchronization of all databases.

<259> [Section 3.5.5.8.1](#): Windows NT 4.0 BDCs force an immediate full synchronization of all databases.

<260> [Section 3.5.5.8.1](#): Windows NT 4.0 PDCs immediately send announcement messages to request each BDC to replicate the database.

<261> [Section 3.5.5.8.1](#): Windows NT and Windows 2000 DCs MUST return ERROR\_NOT\_SUPPORTED.

<262> [Section 3.5.5.8.1](#): Windows NT and Windows 2000 DCs MUST return ERROR\_NOT\_SUPPORTED.

<263> [Section 3.5.5.8.1](#): Windows NT, Windows XP, and Windows Server 2003 support *FunctionCode* NETLOGON\_CONTROL\_PDC\_REPLICATE (0x00000004).

<264> [Section 3.5.5.8.3](#): The *FunctionCode* parameter is restricted to the following values:

Windows NT 4.0:

- NETLOGON\_CONTROL\_QUERY (0x00000001)
- NETLOGON\_CONTROL\_REPLICATE (0x00000002)
- NETLOGON\_CONTROL\_SYNCHRONIZE (0x00000003)
- NETLOGON\_CONTROL\_PDC\_REPLICATE (0x00000004)

If any other value is used, the error code ERROR\_NOT\_SUPPORTED is returned.

Windows 2000, Windows XP, Windows Server 2003, Windows Vista, and Windows Server 2008:

- NETLOGON\_CONTROL\_QUERY (0x00000001)
- NETLOGON\_CONTROL\_REPLICATE (0x00000002)
- NETLOGON\_CONTROL\_SYNCHRONIZE (0x00000003)
- NETLOGON\_CONTROL\_PDC\_REPLICATE (0x00000004)
- NETLOGON\_CONTROL\_BACKUP\_CHANGE\_LOG (0x0000FFFC)
- NETLOGON\_CONTROL\_TRUNCATE\_LOG (0x0000FFFD)
- NETLOGON\_CONTROL\_BREAKPOINT (0x0000FFFF)

If any other value is used, the error code ERROR\_NOT\_SUPPORTED is returned.

Windows 7 or Windows Server 2008 R2:

- NETLOGON\_CONTROL\_QUERY (0x00000001)
- NETLOGON\_CONTROL\_TRUNCATE\_LOG (0x0000FFFD)
- NETLOGON\_CONTROL\_BREAKPOINT (0x0000FFFF)

If any other value is used, the error code ERROR\_NOT\_SUPPORTED is returned.

[<265> Section 3.5.5.9.1:](#) The Netlogon server implementation of this method is present in all versions of Windows covered by this document. The Netlogon client implementations in all versions of Windows covered by this document ignore this method.

[<266> Section 3.5.5.9.2:](#) The Netlogon server implementation of this method is present in all versions of Windows covered by this document. The Netlogon client implementations in all versions of Windows covered by this document ignore this method.

## 8 Change Tracking

This section identifies changes that were made to the [MS-NRPC] protocol document between the May 2011 and June 2011 releases. Changes are classified as New, Major, Minor, Editorial, or No change.

The revision class **New** means that a new document is being released.

The revision class **Major** means that the technical content in the document was significantly revised. Major changes affect protocol interoperability or implementation. Examples of major changes are:

- A document revision that incorporates changes to interoperability requirements or functionality.
- An extensive rewrite, addition, or deletion of major portions of content.
- The removal of a document from the documentation set.
- Changes made for template compliance.

The revision class **Minor** means that the meaning of the technical content was clarified. Minor changes do not affect protocol interoperability or implementation. Examples of minor changes are updates to clarify ambiguity at the sentence, paragraph, or table level.

The revision class **Editorial** means that the language and formatting in the technical content was changed. Editorial changes apply to grammatical, formatting, and style issues.

The revision class **No change** means that no new technical or language changes were introduced. The technical content of the document is identical to the last released version, but minor editorial and formatting changes, as well as updates to the header and footer information, and to the revision summary, may have been made.

Major and minor changes can be described further using the following change types:

- New content added.
- Content updated.
- Content removed.
- New product behavior note added.
- Product behavior note updated.
- Product behavior note removed.
- New protocol syntax added.
- Protocol syntax updated.
- Protocol syntax removed.
- New content added due to protocol revision.
- Content updated due to protocol revision.
- Content removed due to protocol revision.
- New protocol syntax added due to protocol revision.

- Protocol syntax updated due to protocol revision.
- Protocol syntax removed due to protocol revision.
- New content added for template compliance.
- Content updated for template compliance.
- Content removed for template compliance.
- Obsolete document removed.

Editorial changes are always classified with the change type **Editorially updated**.

Some important terms used in the change type descriptions are defined as follows:

- **Protocol syntax** refers to data elements (such as packets, structures, enumerations, and methods) as well as interfaces.
- **Protocol revision** refers to changes made to a protocol that affect the bits that are sent over the wire.

The changes made to this document are listed in the following table. For more information, please contact [protocol@microsoft.com](mailto:protocol@microsoft.com).

Section	Tracking number (if applicable) and description	Major change (Y or N)	Change type
<a href="#">1.2 References</a>	Added explanatory statement regarding the removal of the publishing year from Microsoft Open Specification document references.	N	Content updated.
<a href="#">3.5.1 Abstract Data Model</a>	45545 Added ADM elements "NextClosestSiteName", "TrustedDomains", and "TrustedDomainObjectsCollection" and removed ADM element "TrustedDomainObjectsCollection".	Y	Content updated.
<a href="#">3.5.3 Initialization</a>	45545 Added initialization for abstract data model element NextClosestSiteName.	Y	Content updated.
<a href="#">3.5.5.3.1 DsrGetDcNameEx2 (Opnum 34)</a>	45545 Updated abstract data model element name TrustedDomainObjectCollection to TrustedDomains flag D description, added description for NextClosestSiteName abstract data model element in the list of DNS SRV queries and the list of response messages used by the DsrGetDcNameEx2.	Y	Content updated.
<a href="#">6 Appendix A: Full IDL</a>	65393 Added OpnumUnused21.	Y	Content updated.

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